

**DANS L’AFFIARE DE *LA LOIS SUR LES JUGES*, L.R.C.
(1985), ch. J-1**

**COMMISSION D’EXAMEN DE LA
RÉMUNÉRATION DES JUGES, 2020**

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Avocat-e-s pour le Gouvernement du Canada

INDEX

Volume 1

Transcriptions Parlementaires

1. *Délibérations du comité sénatorial permanent des Affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles*, Fascicule no 32, 1^{ère} sess, 36^e législ., 30 septembre 1998 (extraits)
2. *House of Commons Debates*, 36th Parl, 1st Sess, No 151 (6 November 1998) (excerpts)
3. *Délibérations du comité sénatorial permanent des Affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles*, Fascicule no 37, 1^{ère} sess, 36^e législ., 22 octobre 1998 (extraits)

Rapports des experts

4. Expert Report of Peter Gorham, Compensation Review of Federally Appointed Judges, March 26, 2021
5. Expert Report of Mark Szekely, Columbia Pacific Consulting Ltd., March 23, 2021

Commissariat à la magistrature fédérale

6. Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, Yearly Judicial Salaries, 2000-2020
7. Anonymized Data Re: Appointment, Supernumerary Status and Retirement, 1933 to 2020

Statistique Canada

8. Statistique Canada, “Produit intérieur brut, revenus et dépenses, quatrième trimestre de 2020”, le 2 mars 2021, en ligne: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/fr/daily-quotidien/210302/dq210302a-fra.pdf?st=gaAAf45f>
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Bureau du Conseil privé

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Gouvernement de l'Ontario, Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor

12. Gouvernement de l'Ontario, "Divulgence des salaires dans le secteur public pour 2019: Universités", en ligne: <https://www.ontario.ca/fr/page/divulgence-des-traitements> (extrait)

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First Session
Thirty-sixth Parliament, 1997-98

Première session de la
trente-sixième législature, 1997-1998

SENATE OF CANADA

SÉNAT DU CANADA

*Proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on*

*Délibérations du comité
sénatorial permanent des*

Legal and Constitutional Affairs

Affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles

Chairman:
The Honourable LORNA MILNE

Présidente:
L'honorable LORNA MILNE

Wednesday, September 30, 1998

Le mercredi 30 septembre 1998

Issue No. 32

Fascicule n° 32

Third meeting on:
Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act and to
make consequential amendments to other Acts

Troisième réunion concernant:
L'étude du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi
sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence

WITNESSES:
(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:
(Voir à l'endos)

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

The Honourable Lorna Milne, *Chairman*

The Honourable Pierre Claude Nolin, *Acting Deputy Chairman*

and

The Honourable Senators:

| | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| Beaudoin | Kinsella |
| Bolduc | Lavoie-Roux |
| Bryden | * Lynch-Staunton |
| Fraser | (or Kinsella (acting)) |
| * Graham, P.C. (or Carstairs) | Moore |
| Joyal, P.C. | Pépin |

* *Ex Officio Members*

(Quorum 4)

Changes in membership of the committee:

Pursuant to Rule 85(4), membership of the Committee was amended as follows:

The name of the Honourable Senator Milne substituted for that of the Honourable Senator Butts (*September 24, 1998*).

The name of the Honourable Senator Lewis resigned from the committee (*September 30, 1998*).

The name of the Honourable Senator Pépin substituted for that of the Honourable Senator Grafstein (*September 30, 1998*).

LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DES
AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES ET CONSTITUTIONNELLES

Présidente: L'honorable Lorna Milne

Vice-président intérimaire: L'honorable Pierre Claude Nolin

et

Les honorables sénateurs:

| | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Beaudoin | Kinsella |
| Bolduc | Lavoie-Roux |
| Bryden | * Lynch-Staunton |
| Fraser | (ou Kinsella (suppléant)) |
| * Graham, c.p. (ou Carstairs) | Moore |
| Joyal, c.p. | Pépin |

* *Membres d'office*

(Quorum 4)

Modifications à la composition du comité:

Conformément à l'article 85(4) du Règlement, la liste des membres du comité est modifiée, ainsi qu'il suit:

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Milne est substitué à celui de l'honorable sénateur Butts (*le 24 septembre 1998*).

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Lewis résigné du comité (*le 30 septembre 1998*).

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Pépin est substitué à celui de l'honorable sénateur Grafstein (*le 30 septembre 1998*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

OTTAWA, Wednesday, September 30, 1998

(36)

[English]

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, met this day in Room 257, East Block, at 3:37 p.m., the Honourable Lorna Milne, Chairman, presiding.

Members of the committee present: The Honourable Senators Beaudoin, Bryden, Fraser, Joyal, P.C., Milne, Moore and Pépin (7).

Other senators present: The Honourable Senators Cools, Lawson, Murray, P.C., St. Germain, P.C. and Sparrow (5).

In attendance: Nancy Holmes, Research Officer, Research Branch, Library of Parliament.

Pursuant to the Order of Reference adopted by the Senate on Tuesday, September 22, 1998, the committee continued its consideration of Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts. (For full text of Order of Reference, See Issue No. 31, Wednesday, September 23, 1998).

WITNESSES:

Mr. David Scott, Chair, 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits.

From Gahrns & Laliberté:

Ms Lucie Laliberté, Lawyer.

The Chairman made an opening statement.

Mr. David Scott answered questions.

Mr. Scott agreed to provide material to the Clerk about how judicial salaries are set in other jurisdictions.

At 5:01 p.m., the committee suspended.

At 5:07 p.m., the committee resumed.

The Chairman made an introductory statement.

Ms Lucie Laliberté made a statement and answered questions.

At 6:06 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

ATTEST:

PROCÈS-VERBAL

OTTAWA, le mercredi 30 septembre 1998

(36)

[Traduction]

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles se réunit aujourd'hui, à 15 h 37, dans la pièce 257 de l'édifice de l'Est, sous la présidence de l'honorable Lorna Milne (*présidente*).

Membres du comité présents: Les honorables sénateurs Beaudoin, Bryden, Fraser, Joyal, c.p., Milne, Moore et Pépin (7).

Autres sénateurs présents: Les honorables sénateurs Cools, Lawson, Murray, c.p., St. Germain, c.p. et Sparrow (5).

Également présente: Nancy Holmes, attachée de recherche, Direction de la recherche parlementaire, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Conformément à l'ordre de renvoi adopté par le Sénat le mardi 22 septembre 1998, le comité poursuit son examen du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence. (*L'ordre de renvoi figure dans le fascicule n° 31 du mercredi 23 septembre 1998.*)

TÉMOINS:

M. David Scott, président, Commission de 1995 sur le traitement et les avantages des juges.

De Gahrns & Laliberté:

Mme Lucie Laliberté, avocate.

La présidente fait une déclaration.

M. David Scott répond aux questions.

M. Scott accepte de fournir au greffier des renseignements sur la façon dont les salaires des juges sont fixés dans les autres compétences.

À 17 h 01, la séance est suspendue.

À 17 h 07, la séance reprend.

La présidente fait une déclaration.

Mme Lucie Laliberté fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 18 h 06, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

ATTESTÉ:

La greffière du comité,

Heather Lank

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

OTTAWA, Wednesday, September 30, 1998

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, to which was referred Bill C-37, to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, met this day at 3:37 p.m. to give consideration to the bill.

Senator Lorna Milne (*Chairman*) in the Chair.

[*English*]

The Chairman: We have before us Mr. David Scott, the author of the 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits.

We await your comments with some interest, Mr. Scott.

Mr. David Scott, Chair, 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits: I wish to reaffirm that I am one of the authors of this report. The other two authors are Michel Vennat, a distinguished lawyer with Stikeman Elliot in Montreal, and Barbara Rae, a very distinguished businesswoman from Vancouver. Ms Rae was an enormous resource for us, because she brought her background in personnel management to the job without the baggage of a connection to the judiciary. Since I have spent all of my life in the courts, I have a certain amount of baggage about the judiciary.

[*Translation*]

Senator Beaudoin: Your report is very interesting. I have a question about page 28 of your report, where you recommend that the Judges Act provide for the payment of a lifetime annuity to a common law spouse under legally applicable circumstances. I don't have any trouble with the whole question of paying out pensions, because that comes under section 100 of the Constitution. Everything is fine from that point of view.

When it comes to common law spouses, what do you mean by, "we recommend that the Judges Act allow for payments to a common law spouse, under legally applicable circumstances."

[*English*]

Does this refer to provincial law or to federal law? What do you mean by that?

Mr. Scott: We mean legal situations in which a person qualifies as a common-law spouse, which assumes a certain period of cohabitation. Our intent was not to define any circumstances in particular, but rather to take common-law spouses who had established rights in accordance with provincial law in all of the provinces, and to carry that forward for the benefit of the common-law spouses of judges.

Senator Beaudoin: Some of my colleagues will return to the issue of a common-law spouse.

Senator Murray: It is assumed that both parties to the common-law union are legally free to marry; that is to say, not married to someone else.

TÉMOIGNAGES

OTTAWA, le mercredi 30 septembre 1998

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles, auquel a été renvoyé le projet de loi C-37, modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence, se réunit aujourd'hui à 15 h 37 pour l'étude du projet de loi.

Le sénateur Lorna Milne (*présidente*) occupe le fauteuil.

[*Traduction*]

La présidente: Notre témoin est M. David Scott, président de la commission de 1995 sur le traitement et les avantages des juges.

Nous sommes impatients d'entendre vos remarques, monsieur Scott.

M. David Scott, président, Commission de 1995 sur le traitement et les avantages des juges: Je tiens à réaffirmer que je suis l'un des auteurs de ce rapport. Les deux autres auteurs sont Michel Vennat, éminent avocat chez Stikeman Elliot à Montréal, et Barbara Rae, très réputée femme d'affaires de Vancouver. La contribution de Mme Rae nous a été précieuse, car elle nous a fait profiter de son expérience en matière de gestion du personnel sans le moindre rapport avec la magistrature. Étant donné que, personnellement, j'ai passé toute ma vie dans les tribunaux, il m'est difficile d'être complètement détaché de ce monde.

[*Français*]

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Votre rapport est très intéressant. Ma question concerne la page 28 de votre rapport où vous recommandez que la Loi sur les juges prévoit le versement au conjoint de fait, dans les circonstances légalement applicables, d'une rente viagère de conjoint survivant. Je n'ai pas de difficulté avec la question du paiement des pensions parce que cela tombe sous l'article 100 de la Constitution. Tout est parfait sur ce plan.

Pour les conjoints de fait, que voulez-vous dire par la phrase: «nous recommandons que la Loi sur les juges prévoit le versement au conjoint de fait, dans les circonstances légalement applicables.»

[*Traduction*]

S'agit-il de la législation provinciale ou fédérale? Qu'entendez-vous par là?

M. Scott: Il s'agit de situations juridiques où une personne est considérée comme un conjoint de fait, ce qui suppose une certaine période de cohabitation. Nous n'avions pas l'intention de définir certains cas précis, mais plutôt d'appliquer aux conjoints de fait des juges les règles concernant les conjoints de fait ayant établi des droits conformément aux lois provinciales dans toutes les provinces.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Certains de mes collègues reviendront à la question du conjoint de fait.

Le sénateur Murray: On parle du principe que les deux conjoints d'une union libre sont légalement libres de se marier; autrement dit, ils ne sont pas mariés à une autre personne.

Mr. Scott: Let me begin by saying that I am not a family law lawyer. However, I do not think that the definition of a common-law spouse assumes freedom to marry. If I understand your question, you are saying that if the person is already married, he or she is incapable of being a common-law spouse.

Senator Murray: Well, he or she is certainly incapable or legally marrying someone else.

Mr. Scott: I could be quite wrong, but I do not think that precludes someone from being a common-law spouse. In my understanding such a person can qualify as a common-law spouse.

Senator Beaudoin: Let us return to the first question on the commission. I do not have any problem with the commission as such. Whether we like it or not, the fact is that the Supreme Court has already said that, in order to protect judicial independence, we need an organization such as the commission. I know that Mr. Justice La Forest is dissenting on this, but the majority of the court is of the opinion that to have judicial independence we need a commission such as this one.

What is your opinion on this? I understand that the report is not binding on the legislative and the executive branches, but that if Parliament or the government disagrees, they must justify themselves, and even in court if necessary.

Did you study that problem for your report?

Mr. Scott: Senator, as a result of reading some of the debates which were held here, the only thing that alarmed me somewhat was the suggestion from some witnesses that the triennial commission system works fine and that we should stick with it.

My colleagues and I were in complete agreement that the triennial commission system not only did not work well, but that it did not work at all. It might have looked very appealing, but nothing ever happened. We felt very strongly that it became, as we said in our report, a mechanism that allowed the government of the day to do nothing about the judges, because doing something about the judges is a very unpopular thing.

The discussion that we are now having is most unique. Previously, no one wanted to do anything for the judges because people believe that judges were well looked after. That is, they have tenure and pensions and everything else, so there is no reason no bother with them. Politically, it is very unappetizing to be preoccupied with judges.

When we were appointed and began our work, we read what had happened before. Every previous commission had said that the system did not work. The government not take up any of the meaningful ideas for reform in terms of issues such as pay and allowances, nor did it take up any of the suggestions for reforming the triennial commission system. The thrust of our report is that this must be fixed.

M. Scott: Permettez-moi de dire d'entrée de jeu que je ne suis pas avocat spécialisé en droit de la famille. Toutefois, je ne pense pas que la définition d'un conjoint de fait suppose la liberté de se marier. Si je comprends bien votre question, vous dites que si la personne est déjà mariée, il lui est impossible d'être un conjoint de fait.

Le sénateur Murray: Il ou elle n'est absolument pas en mesure de se marier légalement avec quelqu'un d'autre.

M. Scott: Je me trompe peut-être, mais je ne pense pas que cela empêche qui que ce soit d'être un conjoint de fait. D'après mon interprétation, cette personne peut tout à fait être considérée comme un conjoint de fait.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Revenons-en à la première question sur la commission. Je n'ai rien à redire à l'existence de celle-ci. Que nous le voulions ou non, il n'en demeure pas moins que la Cour suprême a déjà statué que pour protéger l'indépendance de la magistrature, il nous faut une institution comme la commission. Je sais que le juge La Forest a exprimé une opinion divergente sur ce point, mais la majorité des juges de la cour sont d'avis que cette commission est nécessaire pour garantir l'indépendance judiciaire.

Qu'en pensez-vous? Sauf erreur, le rapport n'est pas obligatoire pour les appareils législatif et exécutif, mais si le Parlement ou le gouvernement ne sont pas d'accord, ils doivent fournir une justification, au besoin devant un tribunal.

Avez-vous étudié le problème pour votre rapport?

M. Scott: Sénateur, après avoir lu la transcription de certaines de vos délibérations, la seule chose qui m'ait quelque peu inquiété, ça a été d'entendre certains témoins déclarer que le système de la commission triennale est satisfaisant et qu'il ne faut rien y changer.

Mes collègues et moi étions parfaitement d'accord pour dire que le système de la commission triennale est non seulement imparfait, mais qu'il est carrément inutile. Cela paraît peut-être très attrayant à première vue, mais rien ne s'est jamais passé. Nous étions fermement convaincus que, comme nous l'affirmons dans notre rapport, c'est devenu un simple mécanisme qui permet au gouvernement de l'heure de ne rien faire au sujet des juges, car prendre des mesures à l'égard des juges est une initiative très peu populaire.

Le débat actuel est presque unique en son genre. Auparavant, personne ne voulait rien faire pour les juges croyait qu'ils étaient très bien lotis. Étant donné qu'ils ont un emploi garanti, droit à pension, et cetera, il n'y a aucune raison de s'occuper d'eux. Sur le plan politique, ce n'est pas très bien vu de se préoccuper des juges.

Lorsque notre commission a été nommée et que nous avons débuté nos travaux, nous avons lu ce qui s'était produit auparavant. Toutes les commissions précédentes avaient déclaré que le système ne fonctionnait pas. Le gouvernement n'a donné suite à aucune des idées intéressantes de réforme dans les domaines comme la rémunération et les indemnités, pas plus qu'il n'a retenu les propositions de remaniement du système de

Luckily, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the P.E.I. case came along at the same time. We certainly were not anticipating that, nor would we have developed any such notion, although I would defend it. We felt that the government should be forced to react to the views of the triennial commission. Further, we felt that it should be forced to table a bill; that the government should be forced to do something in order to legitimize the process of inviting citizens to take part in this lengthy study and then allowing it to drift off before a committee and disappear.

The most important thing to me is for this committee and anyone charged with responsibility to recognize that the triennial commission system does not work.

As I understand it, the bill does not provide for what the commission suggested, which was a requirement to table the bill — and I understand that that may be an unrealistic expectation — but that the government will have to respond in some way. Therefore we now have this overlay from the court, and the whole process will be subject to judicial review and the test will be rationality.

I confess that I read the very impressive statements before you from the law professors. I am not nearly as alarmed about it as they are. Constitutional substance aside, I believe that a test of rationality for a commission report such as this one will be a very easy threshold for the government of the day to meet. If it cannot meet rationality, then, constitutional imperatives aside, what is wrong with the notion that the court advanced?

As a member of this commission, I believe that something must be done to fix this problem. The bill goes a certain way to fixing it. The Supreme Court overlay is another question.

Senator Beaudoin: I understand your point of view, and I have great respect for it. The question is, what happens if the government does not like it? A strong majority of the court said that the executive and the legislative branches must justify their points of view. At the end, if there is what in French is called une impasse, then the court may rule on the basis of rationality.

Mr. Scott: Should the government be told that it has to give reasons? The judges do not like to be told that they have to give reasons, so for the judges to tell Parliament that they have to give reasons may be a bit offensive.

The bottom line is that it is a rationality test, and I am not nearly as alarmed about that as others are.

Senator Joyal: We have tried to understand the fundamental changes to the principle of our Constitution stemming from this proposal in Bill C-37. To put the issue simply, section 100 of the Constitution vested the responsibility to ensure appropriate compensation for judges in the Parliament of Canada. The triennial commission did not produce a satisfactory result in a reasonable period of time. It seems to us that, in the judges'

commission triennale. L'idée principale de notre rapport c'est qu'il faut changer ce système.

Heureusement, la Cour suprême du Canada a rendu en même temps sa décision dans l'affaire de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard. Ce fut une vraie surprise pour nous, car nous n'avions pas envisagé une telle chose, même si elle me paraît tout à fait justifiable. À notre avis, le gouvernement devrait être obligé de réagir aux opinions exprimées par la commission triennale. En outre, nous avons estimé qu'il devrait être obligé de déposer un projet de loi et de faire quelque chose pour légitimer le processus de consultation des Canadiens dans le cadre de cette étude prolongée, pour que ce projet de loi ne soit pas simplement renvoyé par un comité et qu'il disparaisse de la circulation.

Ce qui importe le plus à mes yeux, c'est que ce comité et tous ceux qui seront responsables du processus, reconnaissent que le système de commission triennale n'est pas satisfaisant.

D'après ce que je sais, le projet de loi ne prévoit pas ce qu'a proposé la commission, à savoir une exigence pour déposer le projet de loi — et je pense que c'est peut-être une attente peu réaliste — mais le gouvernement devra répondre d'une façon ou d'une autre. C'est pourquoi à la suite de la décision du tribunal, tout le processus fera l'objet d'une révision judiciaire et le critère sera la rationalité.

Je dois avouer que j'ai lu les témoignages très impressionnants fournis par des professeurs de droit devant votre comité. Je ne suis pas aussi inquiet qu'eux. Mis à part l'aspect constitutionnel, un critère de rationalité pour un rapport de commission comme celui-ci sera à mon avis un seuil très facile à atteindre pour le gouvernement du jour. S'il est impossible de remplir ce critère, mises à part toutes les exigences constitutionnelles, qu'y a-t-il de mal avec l'idée avancée par le tribunal?

En tant que membre de cette commission, je crois qu'il faut faire quelque chose pour résoudre le problème. Le projet de loi y contribue en partie. La décision de la Cour suprême et ce qu'elle implique sont une autre question.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Je comprends votre point de vue que je respecte vivement. Toutefois, que se passe-t-il si le gouvernement n'est pas d'accord? La grande majorité des juges de la Cour suprême ont déclaré que les appareils exécutif et législatif devraient justifier leur opinion. En fin de compte, si on en arrive à ce qu'on appelle une impasse, la cour pourra trancher en fonction de la rationalité.

M. Scott: Faut-il dire au gouvernement qu'il doit indiquer ses motifs? Les juges n'aiment pas qu'on leur dise qu'ils doivent fournir des motifs, et il est donc un peu choquant que les juges disent au Parlement de le faire.

En un mot, il s'agit d'un critère de rationalité et cela ne m'affole pas autant que d'autres.

Le sénateur Joyal: Nous avons essayé de comprendre les modifications fondamentales au principe de la Constitution découlant de cette proposition dans le projet de loi C-37. En un mot, aux termes de l'article 100 de la Constitution, c'est au Parlement du Canada qu'il incombe de faire en sorte que les juges obtiennent une rémunération adéquate. La commission triennale n'a pas fourni un résultat satisfaisant au cours d'un délai

opinions, we ought to go to the other extreme whereby Parliament abandons its responsibility to have the final say in the vote for the appropriation to pay the salaries. In my opinion this is wrong. It is one thing to say that Parliament filibustered, but to amend the system by including a time frame within it so that there is an end result, either in the affirmative or in the negative, is the proper way to manage Parliament's responsibility. I can understand that and I think a reasonable citizen can understand that.

What goes beyond common sense is that the commission has no parameters to decide what constitutes a proper increase. The bill contains no criteria that defines the scope of the commission to decide upon what is a fair increase for whatever reasons they think are just. The other problem is that if the government does not give effect to the recommendations of the House of Commons or the Senate committee, or its own financial policies criteria, then the court might decide that there is litigation and the government must justify its decision in the court. We are both judges and parties in a decision like that. That is where the fine-tuning of the solution that is proposed to us must be investigated.

You have spent a lot of time with learned peoples to study the compensation for judges. Is it the same way in other countries — that is, do the judges have the last word on their pay increase and must the governments in those countries abide by commission reports because they do not have the capacity to say "No"? In Canada, the government civil service and the armed forces, among others, have had their salaries frozen. Judges are like other people; they make an effort. I am not against an increase in salaries at all. In fact, judges are underpaid in my opinion. However, in order not to go to the other extreme, we must protect the principles in the new system that we are putting into place. Can we not find a middle balance compared to what existed before, which did not produce a satisfactory result for the learned justices? Can we go the other way? There might be another way to fine-tune this.

Mr. Scott: The way you divide it out is the way to divide it. The decision of the court that the judges will have the last word on their salaries is one question; the whole question of the government having to meet a rationality test as proposed by the court is another question.

As far as the commission is concerned and the analysis of what is appropriate compensation, this has a historical base. Before 1981, there was no independent assessment of any kind. The triennial commission was established by statute as the basis of getting some independent input for Parliament about what is appropriate. Criteria for that would not be a good idea. How would you establish it? Would there be limits? No. The commission — that is, assuming that it is appropriately selected in terms of make-up — should be able to free-wheel in terms of what they think should happen. They then make a report. Up to that point, we have an appropriate historical basis for doing this.

raisonnable. Il nous semble que, de l'avis des juges, nous devrions en arriver à l'autre extrême, à savoir que le Parlement renonce à sa responsabilité d'avoir le dernier mot en votant les crédits nécessaires au paiement des traitements. C'est mal, à mon avis. C'est une chose de dire que le Parlement a fait de l'obstruction, mais si l'on veut que le Parlement assume comme il se doit sa responsabilité, il faut modifier le système en prévoyant un délai au bout duquel il faut en arriver à un résultat, qu'il soit positif ou négatif. Je peux le comprendre et je pense que tout citoyen raisonnable peut le comprendre également.

Ce qui échappe à l'entendement, c'est que la commission n'ait aucun paramètre pour décider de ce que représente une juste augmentation. Le projet de loi ne renferme aucun critère définissant la marge de manoeuvre dont dispose la commission pour décider de ce qui constitue une augmentation raisonnable, quelles que soient les raisons qu'elle trouve justes. Notre problème, c'est que si le gouvernement ne donne pas suite aux recommandations du comité de la Chambre des communes ou du Sénat, ni même aux critères de ses propres politiques financières, le tribunal pourra décider qu'il y a litige et le gouvernement devra justifier sa décision devant le tribunal. Nous serons donc à la fois juge et partie dans ce genre de cause. C'est pourquoi il faut trouver une façon de perfectionner la solution qui nous est proposée.

Vous avez passé beaucoup de temps aux côtés de personnes érudites à étudier la rémunération des juges. En va-t-il de même dans d'autres pays — c'est-à-dire, les juges ont-ils le dernier mot quant à leur augmentation de traitement et les gouvernements des pays en question doivent-ils respecter les rapports des commissions parce qu'il leur est impossible de dire «non»? Au Canada, la fonction publique et les forces armées, entre autres, se sont vu imposer un gel des salaires. Les juges sont comme les autres: ils font un effort. Je ne m'oppose pas à l'idée d'une augmentation de traitement. En fait, les juges sont même sous-payés à mon avis. Toutefois, pour ne pas en arriver à l'autre extrême, il faut protéger les principes dans le nouveau système que nous mettons en place. Ne peut-on pas trouver un juste milieu par rapport au système précédent, qui n'a pas donné de résultats satisfaisants pour nos érudits juges? Peut-on opter pour l'autre solution? Il y a peut-être une autre façon d'améliorer le système.

M. Scott: La distinction que vous faites est la bonne. La décision du tribunal selon laquelle les juges doivent avoir le dernier mot quant à leur traitement est une question; le fait que le gouvernement doive remplir un critère de rationalité comme le propose le tribunal en est une autre.

Pour ce qui est de la commission et de l'analyse qui constitue une rémunération, il y a des antécédents. Avant 1981, il n'existait aucune évaluation indépendante. La commission triennale a été créée en vertu de la loi en vue de donner au Parlement un avis indépendant sur ce qui constituait une juste rémunération. Se fonder sur des critères ne serait pas une bonne idée. Comment procéder? Faudrait-il fixer des plafonds? Non. La commission — c'est-à-dire, à supposer que les membres qui la composent soient bien choisis — devrait avoir les coudées franches quant aux solutions qu'elle propose. Elle doit ensuite présenter un rapport. Jusque-là, il y a des antécédents à cette façon de procéder.

What happens next? In our brief, we say that instead of nothing happening, something must happen.

Senator Moore: Within a set time-frame?

Mr. Scott: Yes. Otherwise, it is a screen of some design. Something must happen.

I accept the proposition that under the Constitution, Parliament will decide. Parliament should have the last word. We are talking about the mechanism for ensuring that something happens. This bill, which does not go as far as we hoped it would, says that within a fixed period of time government must react with a position statement. The court is saying that they must give reasons and the court will have this judicial review power. Whether or not people find that desirable is an interesting question. The court has spoken, so what happens next?

The task here is to fix on the nature of the commission, its make-up and its jurisdiction. It is important that that not get lost in the minds of some who are outraged about what the judges are doing to the vehicle of this judgment. I am more interested in what happens down the road and having a workable, practical commission that does the job.

Senator Joyal: I totally agree with you, as do some of my colleagues around the table, when you talk about a time-frame and trying to establish some kind of compelling agenda so that we arrive at the end of that process to have it resolved. That is a common understanding.

I have a slight reservation about your statement that you do not want criteria. Even the Supreme Court of Canada said that the commission should have some criteria. The judgment of the majority of the court was that the body must convene if a fixed period of time has elapsed since its last report in order to consider the inadequacy of judges' salaries in light of the cost of living and other relevant factors. Even the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that there must be some factors.

We cannot abandon to a commission the overall open-ended door to say, "Let us discuss whether or not we must increase judges' salaries." Perhaps judges in Australia had an increase last year. Our judges may say, "We work as hard as them, so we should have the same increase." There must be some criteria. Treasury Board negotiates with the union and they have criteria. The Government of Quebec will open negotiations with teachers, with unions, and with all the other services. They have some criteria such as equity, pay, and a lot of other principles that they want to implement.

It does not hurt my sense of democracy or fairness with judges if the commission is bound to follow specific criteria rather than offering us a general report that judges are nice people who are learned and forego part of their freedom to live in society because they are seen as symbols of rectitude, and so on. We all know that.

Que se passe-t-il ensuite? Dans notre mémoire, nous disons que quelque chose doit se produire, et qu'il ne faut pas en rester là.

Le sénateur Moore: Dans un certain délai?

M. Scott: Oui. Autrement, ce n'est que de la théorie. Il faut que quelque chose se produise.

J'accepte le postulat selon lequel aux termes de la Constitution, c'est au Parlement qu'il revient de décider. Le Parlement devrait avoir le dernier mot. Nous parlons du mécanisme qui garantit que quelque chose se passe. Le projet de loi, qui ne va pas aussi loin que nous l'espérions, stipule que dans un délai fixe, le gouvernement doit réagir par un énoncé de principe. Le tribunal affirme que le gouvernement doit justifier sa décision et que le tribunal aura ce pouvoir de révision judiciaire. Il serait intéressant de savoir si les gens estiment que c'est souhaitable. Le tribunal s'est prononcé, et que va-t-il se passer maintenant?

Il s'agit maintenant de prendre une décision quant à la nature de la commission, à sa composition et à son champ de compétence. Il importe que ceux qui sont choqués par l'attitude des juges ne perdent pas cela de vue. Ce qui m'intéresse davantage, c'est ce qui se passera ensuite et la garantie que nous aurons une commission pratique et en mesure de faire son travail.

Le sénateur Joyal: Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous, tout comme certains de mes collègues autour de la table, quand vous parlez de délai et de l'adoption d'une sorte d'échéancier obligatoire, de sorte qu'une solution soit atteinte lorsque le délai est écoulé. Tout le monde est d'accord.

J'ai une petite réserve quant à votre déclaration selon laquelle il ne faut pas adopter de critères. Même la Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré que la commission devrait se fixer certains critères. La majorité des juges se sont dits d'avis que l'organisme devait se réunir si un certain délai s'était écoulé depuis son dernier rapport afin d'étudier l'insuffisance du traitement des juges en tenant compte du coût de la vie et d'autres facteurs pertinents. Même la Cour suprême du Canada a admis qu'il doit exister certains facteurs.

On ne peut pas laisser ainsi toute liberté à une commission en disant «discutons pour voir s'il faut ou non augmenter le traitement des juges». Les juges de l'Australie ont peut-être eu une augmentation de traitement l'an dernier. Les nôtres diront peut-être: «Nous travaillons aussi fort qu'eux, et nous avons donc droit à la même augmentation.» Il faut qu'il existe des critères. Le Conseil du Trésor négocie avec le syndicat et il y a des critères. Le gouvernement du Québec va entreprendre des négociations avec les enseignants, les syndicats et tous les autres services. Il se fondera sur des critères comme l'équité, la rémunération, et une foule d'autres principes qu'il souhaite mettre en vigueur.

À mon sens, il n'est ni antidémocratique ni injuste envers les juges d'exiger que la commission respecte des critères précis, au lieu de nous présenter un rapport général en disant que les juges sont des gens très bien qui sont érudits et qui renoncent à une partie de leur liberté de vie au sein de la société parce qu'ils sont considérés comme des symboles de droiture, et cetera. Nous le savons tous.

Let us frame the mandate of the commission so that Parliament has a fair perception that those people are not just looking for any kind of increase — especially if we bound them to have a result at the end of the road. It is one thing to have everything on one side and nothing on the other side. I think it is a fair balance of the two. Even the court has recognized that.

Mr. Scott: I am not disagreeing with you. I am not saying that the commission should function arbitrarily. I am not sure how much needs to be said. The court said, “and other relevant criteria.” Will we now statutorily define the criteria? These previous triennial commissions — and let us exclude ours for the moment — followed the same process, namely, analyzing what salaries were in the private sector, what they were in the practising bar, and what they were in the government. They were then compared, as were the cost-of-living increases. That is the relevant criteria.

If you talk about hard criteria, such as whether the judges' salaries should be measured against the salaries of civil servants, our American friends are in the process of trying to disengage that right now. There is a kind of lock-step arrangement there and they are trying to eliminate it. I am not saying that there should not be any criteria, but once you start down the road of developing criteria, you may create a monster. These commissions should take into account all the relevant factors — certainly not irrelevant factors or arbitrary factors. You would not confine it to cost-of-living increases, although it would be a logical thing to consider. I am not sure what the relevant criteria would be.

Senator Joyal: When you did your report, you followed a certain number of criteria. What are they?

Mr. Scott: Those were exactly the criteria that anyone would use to complete this task. No one provided us with criteria. The criteria were: what the judges are making now, what they made previously, what they are making elsewhere, what groups comparable to them are making, and the judges' situation. The problem of what to consider was not a large one. The process of determining what to consider was important, but we were not stuck on it.

We were stuck on the question of whether we should be bound by some public service compensation level. That has been a traditional debate in these commissions. However, that aside, I do not think there was much problem deciding what to consider.

Senator Bryden: It is my understanding that under the bill the recommendation of government, based on the commission's report, will be presented to Parliament and enacted by Parliament. Is that correct?

Mr. Scott: Yes.

Senator Bryden: It is also my understanding that there are at least two places where the court now says clearly that it can intervene. First, it can intervene if the commission itself, like any other administrative tribunal, is alleged to have gone outside its jurisdiction. In such a case, it can quash the decision reached by

Façonnons le mandat de la commission pour que le Parlement ait l'impression que ces personnes ne sont pas simplement à la recherche d'une augmentation quelconque — surtout si nous exigeons qu'elle fournisse un résultat à la fin du processus. C'est une chose d'avoir tout d'un côté et rien de l'autre. À mon avis, cela représente un juste équilibre entre les deux et même la Cour suprême l'a admis.

M. Scott: Je ne suis pas en désaccord avec vous. Je ne prétends pas que la commission doive fonctionner de façon arbitraire. Je ne sais pas s'il faut être très précis. Le tribunal a dit: «et les autres critères pertinents». Faudra-t-il désormais définir les critères dans la loi? Les commissions triennales précédentes — et oublions la nôtre pour l'instant — ont suivi le même processus, c'est-à-dire qu'elles se sont penchées sur les niveaux de traitement dans le secteur privé, parmi les membres du barreau, et au gouvernement. Puis elles ont fait des comparaisons en tenant compte de la hausse du coût de la vie. Voilà le critère pertinent.

Si vous parlez de critères stricts, par exemple savoir si le traitement des juges doit être évalué par rapport à celui des fonctionnaires, nos amis américains sont justement en train de laisser tomber ce système. Ils appliquent un régime de rémunération par échelon et essaient de le supprimer. Je ne dis pas qu'il ne devrait y avoir aucun critère, mais lorsqu'on commence à élaborer des critères, on risque de créer un monstre. Ces commissions devraient tenir compte de tous les facteurs pertinents — et évidemment pas de facteurs futiles ou arbitraires. Il ne faut pas qu'elles se limitent aux hausses du coût de la vie, même si cela paraît logique à première vue. Je ne sais pas quel devrait être le critère pertinent.

Le sénateur Joyal: Lorsque vous avez rédigé votre rapport, vous vous êtes fondés sur un certain nombre de critères. Lesquels?

M. Scott: C'étaient exactement les critères que l'on utiliserait pour faire ce genre de travail. Personne ne nous a fourni de critères. Nous avons tenu compte du niveau de rémunération actuel des juges, de leur rémunération antérieure, de la rémunération des juges dans d'autres pays, de celle de groupes comparables aux juges et de la situation des juges. La question à prendre en ligne de compte ne posait pas de problème. Le processus de détermination des questions à étudier était important, mais il n'y avait rien de définitif pour nous.

Ce qui nous tenait à coeur, c'était de savoir s'il fallait nous en tenir à un niveau de rémunération en vigueur dans la fonction publique. Cela a toujours été un sujet de discussion traditionnel au sein de ces commissions. Cela mis à part, il n'a pas été trop difficile de choisir les questions à étudier.

Le sénateur Bryden: Sauf erreur, aux termes du projet de loi, la recommandation du gouvernement, fondée sur le rapport de la commission, sera présentée au Parlement et adoptée par ce dernier. Est-ce exact?

M. Scott: Oui.

Le sénateur Bryden: Si je ne m'abuse, il y a au moins deux cas où le tribunal affirme clairement qu'il peut intervenir. Tout d'abord, il peut le faire si la commission proprement dite, à l'instar de tout autre tribunal administratif, est accusée d'avoir outrepassé son champ de compétence. Dans ce cas-là, le tribunal

the commission. The court probably cannot substitute its own position, but it can ask the commission to take the matter up again. That is the normal administrative law procedure.

The courts appear to be taking the position that, if the government acts on the commission's report and someone says that the government has made an irrational decision, that person can make an application to the court for a judicial review of the government's decision. That review could, in a proper case, allow for the quashing of that decision. Is that true?

Mr. Scott: Yes. My understanding is that the theme of the judgment is that the rationality test is tied to undermining independence. In other words, the basis for going this route is the question of preserving independence. I do agree with what you have said, however.

Senator Bryden: I do not want to bring in "the ubiquitous reasonable man," which is where the rationality test takes us, but I would like to go one step further.

The commission makes its recommendation, which is accepted by the government. The government drafts a bill and presents it to Parliament. Parliament debates the bill and rejects it. On the independence test under the Constitution, is it possible for an application to be made to a judge to quash the act of Parliament because it is in violation of the Constitution Act, which gives independence to judges?

Mr. Scott: Forgive me, because I am the furthest thing from a parliamentarian. If Parliament rejects the bill, however, is there an act of Parliament at all?

Senator Bryden: Let me just vary the question a bit. Let us say that the act of Parliament is passed, but it grants the judges only \$1.

The concern that some of us have is that, after documents such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Parliament has been allowed to keep very few real parliamentary rights vis-à-vis the courts. The time when Parliament was supreme went out the window with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Parliament has always jealously guarded its right to appropriate taxes — the citizens' dollars.

That is what is troubling a number of us. Are the courts now saying, under the guise of protecting the independence of the judiciary, that the judiciary can override decisions made at the parliamentary level, and say that a particular judgment is irrational and interferes with the constitutional independence of the judiciary?

Mr. Scott: I believe that is what is being said. I will come to the reasons for that in a moment. If the government tables a bill that is not highly recommended by the commission, and the bill becomes law, it is my understanding that the case is saying that the courts, on judicial review, can intervene. That is a bit of a misnomer in terms of judicial review, because it would be questioning the constitutionality of a statute. However, that is the way the court would intervene. It would be confronted with this statute, and it would be exactly the same if the government proposed that the recommendations be followed and Parliament

peut casser la décision de la commission. Il ne peut sans doute pas imposer sa propre décision à la place, mais il peut demander à la commission de se pencher à nouveau sur la question. C'est la procédure normale en droit administratif.

Le tribunal semble partir du principe que, si le gouvernement donne suite au rapport de la commission et que quelqu'un déclare qu'il a pris une décision illogique, cette personne peut demander au tribunal de procéder à une révision judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement. Cette révision pourrait, selon le cas, permettre l'annulation de cette décision. Est-ce bien vrai?

M. Scott: Oui. D'après mon interprétation, le principe de la décision est que le critère de rationalité est lié à l'empiètement sur l'indépendance. Autrement dit, si l'on agit de cette façon, c'est pour préserver l'indépendance de la magistrature. Je suis toutefois d'accord avec ce que vous avez dit.

Le sénateur Bryden: Je ne veux pas faire intervenir le critère de «la personne raisonnable omniprésente», sur lequel débouche le critère de la rationalité, mais j'aimerais aller un peu plus loin.

La commission formule ses recommandations qui sont acceptées par le gouvernement. Ce dernier rédige un projet de loi et le présente au Parlement. Ce dernier débat du projet de loi et le rejette. En fonction du critère de l'indépendance prévu dans la Constitution, est-il possible de demander à un juge d'annuler la loi du Parlement parce qu'elle enfreint la Loi constitutionnelle, laquelle garantit l'indépendance des juges?

M. Scott: Pardonnez-moi, car je ne connais rien au régime parlementaire. Si le Parlement rejette le projet de loi, toutefois, y a-t-il une loi du Parlement?

Le sénateur Bryden: Permettez-moi de reformuler la question. Disons que la loi du Parlement est adoptée, mais elle accorde aux juges seulement 1 \$.

Ce qui inquiète certains d'entre nous c'est que, après l'adoption de documents comme la Charte des droits et libertés, le Parlement a été autorisé à conserver très peu de droits parlementaires réels par rapport aux tribunaux. L'entrée en vigueur de la Charte des droits et libertés a marqué la fin de la suprématie du Parlement. Ce dernier a toujours protégé jalousement son droit à l'égard des impôts et taxes — les deniers publics.

C'est ce qui préoccupe un certain nombre d'entre nous. Les tribunaux affirment-ils maintenant, sous prétexte de protéger l'indépendance de la magistrature, que les décisions des juges peuvent l'emporter sur celles du Parlement, et qu'une décision particulière est illogique et entrave l'indépendance constitutionnelle de la magistrature?

M. Scott: Je crois que c'est ce qui se dit. Je vais vous expliquer pourquoi dans un instant. Si le gouvernement dépose un projet de loi qui n'est pas chaleureusement recommandé par la commission, et que le projet prend force de loi, sauf erreur, il est dit que les tribunaux peuvent intervenir au moyen d'une révision judiciaire. En fait, c'est un euphémisme car cela reviendrait à mettre en cause la constitutionnalité d'une loi. Toutefois, c'est de cette façon que le tribunal interviendrait. Il serait confronté à cette loi et il en irait exactement de même si le gouvernement proposait de donner suite aux recommandations et que le Parlement rejetait cette

rejected it. I believe that you have analyzed that correctly. I may have this wrong, but that is my reading of it.

What happens if Parliament passes a bill which is deliberately drafted with a view to controlling the behaviour of judges by attacking them economically? What happens if the commission says that the judges have not had a pay raise for 40 years and they are on the poverty lines, yet Parliament attempts to further reduce their salaries? What mechanism do we have to deal with that?

Senator Bryden: The answer to your question is that you would get another Parliament. In a democracy, the final arbiter used to be the people who elected the parliamentarians and if the parliamentarians acted that ridiculously, the parliamentarians got voted out of office.

I hope I am not over-simplifying this, but the concern is that, in addition to all the other powers that now reside in the Supreme Court, we will now give the justices the power to tax. That is, they will be in a position to reject Parliament's decision that the people of Canada cannot afford to do a certain thing, even though it was recommended by the commission and by the government, and to increase the amount of money allocated for judges. We can go through this whole process and have the court say that the result is not acceptable.

Do the justices then fix the amount, or do they do the normal thing, which is to say, "Go back and try again"?

Mr. Scott: I think they say, "Go back and try again."

Senator Bryden: That is of real concern to many of us who grew up believing that Parliament had some power.

Mr. Scott: I understand that, and I suppose it depends upon one's point of view. I look at it entirely from the point of view of the independence of the judiciary. To take a far-fetched example, if a Parliament duly elected by the citizenry concluded that the judiciary was out of control and that therefore Parliament would undermine it economically, it would be modest comfort only to know that the Governor General might not sign the bill into law, or that we could have an election. Presumably, by this time Parliament is uttering the will of the people.

I understand what you are saying. I understand the concern.

I would be very surprised if the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, and their numbers who supported this notion, contemplated it extending as far as you have described it.

Senator Bryden: I am sure they did not. We are here to try to make sure that we understand all the implications of what is being stated here.

It bothers me as an individual that this is the only time in 130 years that, to preserve the independence of our judiciary, the Supreme Court is requesting the right to review. It was never required before. Why is it necessary, all of a sudden, at this stage?

proposition. Je pense que votre analyse est bonne. Je me trompe peut-être, mais c'est mon interprétation de la question.

Que se passe-t-il si le Parlement adopte un projet de loi délibérément rédigé dans le but de contrôler le comportement des juges en les attaquant sur le plan économique? Que se passe-t-il si la commission déclare que les juges n'ont pas eu d'augmentation depuis 40 ans et qu'ils vivent au seuil de la pauvreté, et que pourtant le Parlement essaie de réduire encore leur traitement? Quel mécanisme existe-t-il pour résoudre ce problème?

Le sénateur Bryden: La réponse à votre question, c'est qu'il y aurait un autre Parlement. En démocratie, c'est la population chargée d'élire les parlementaires qui est l'arbitre en dernier recours et, si les parlementaires agissaient de façon aussi ridicule, ils seraient remplacés aux prochaines élections.

J'espère ne pas m'exprimer de façon trop simpliste, mais ce qu'il est à craindre c'est que, outre tous les autres pouvoirs dont jouit actuellement la Cour suprême, nous donnions désormais aux juges le pouvoir de percevoir des impôts. Autrement dit, ils seront en mesure de rejeter la décision du Parlement selon laquelle les Canadiens n'ont pas les moyens de faire telle ou telle chose, même si cela a été recommandé par la commission et par le gouvernement, et d'accroître la rémunération des juges. Il peut arriver que, une fois le processus terminé, le tribunal décide que le résultat est inadmissible.

Les juges vont-ils alors fixer le montant de leur rémunération, ou feront-ils ce qu'il est normal de faire, à savoir déclarer: «Remettez-vous au travail»?

M. Scott: Je pense que c'est ce qu'ils diront.

Le sénateur Bryden: Cela inquiète vivement bon nombre d'entre nous qui ont grandi dans la conviction que le Parlement détenait certains pouvoirs.

M. Scott: Je comprends bien, et je suppose que tout dépend du point de vue de chacun. J'aborde la question sous l'angle de l'indépendance de la magistrature. Pour prendre un exemple tiré par les cheveux, si un Parlement élu en bonne et due forme par les électeurs concluait que les magistrats agissent de façon débridée et qu'il décidait de leur nuire sur le plan économique, il serait réconfortant de savoir que le Gouverneur général pourra refuser de donner force de loi au projet de loi ou que l'on pourra avoir des élections. Sans doute que cette fois-là le Parlement exprimera la volonté du peuple.

Je comprends ce que vous voulez dire. Je comprends votre préoccupation.

Je serais très surpris que les juges de la Cour suprême du Canada, et les autres qui ont appuyé cette idée, aient envisagé de pousser les choses aussi loin que ce que vous nous dites.

Le sénateur Bryden: Je suis sûr qu'ils ne l'ont pas fait. Notre rôle, c'est de faire en sorte que l'on comprenne bien toutes les répercussions de ces déclarations.

À titre personnel, je suis préoccupé de voir que, pour la première fois en 130 ans, pour préserver l'indépendance de la magistrature, la Cour suprême demande le droit d'examen. Elle ne l'a jamais fait auparavant. Pourquoi est-ce soudain nécessaire à ce stade?

The Chairman: To follow up in the same area, if the court quashed a bill of this nature, they would not then have the power to tax, because what would stand at that point would be the previous bill, would it not?

Senator Bryden: Quashing it means that we must try it again.

Mr. Scott: It means that the existing regime would continue.

Senator Bryden: It is an indirect ability, because they could go back and say, "Add another 10 and another 10 until we get something that is acceptable."

If the judges rule and say that they will quash the bill for Constitutional reasons, does the notwithstanding clause then come into effect, or is there no ability for it to operate in that situation?

Mr. Scott: No, it does not come into effect in that situation.

Senator Murray: The process that is provided for in this bill is that the commission submits its report and the Minister of Justice is obliged to table it in each of the Houses of Parliament within 10 days, effectively. The report must then be referred to this committee, to the Senate, and to our counterparts in the House of Commons. They have 90 sitting days to report their findings. It then says that "the Minister of Justice shall respond to a report within six months after receiving it."

Are we certain that the obligation is there is for the Minister of Justice to respond to the commission's report or to the parliamentary committee? If you look at the marginal notes on page 4 there is "Report by Committee," "Definition of 'sitting day'," and then "Response to report." I ask the question because it is quite normal under the rules in the House of Commons that the government is obliged to respond to reports of parliamentary committees within a certain period of time. We do not have a similar rule in the Senate.

I am not aware that ministers or the government are obliged by statute to respond to reports of other commissions, although they may be obliged to do so.

Mr. Scott: The intent is that the minister respond to the report of the commission. Whether that is regarded by senators as desirable or otherwise, I believe that is the intent. That is because we, and a succession of commissions before us, were of the view that the government should be required to respond rather than simply say nothing. That is my understanding, but I could be wrong.

Senator Murray: We should probably ask the minister.

The Chairman: That is a good question to ask the representatives of the department when they return here.

Mr. Scott: I think that is correct.

Senator Beaudoin: In the same line as the one taken by Senator Bryden, is it true that if the government is resisting the commission's recommendation, the government may have to justify its stand? If I understand the bill correctly, it means that the

La présidente: Dans la même veine, si le tribunal annulait un projet de loi de ce genre, les juges n'auraient pas de pouvoir en matière d'imposition puisque les mesures législatives en vigueur seraient celles de la loi précédente, n'est-ce pas?

Le sénateur Bryden: Annuler le projet de loi signifie qu'il nous faut essayer à nouveau.

M. Scott: Cela signifie que le régime actuel restera en vigueur.

Le sénateur Bryden: Ils disposent indirectement de ce pouvoir car ils pourraient revenir à la charge en disant «Ajoutez encore 10 et 10 encore jusqu'à ce que nous obtenions un montant acceptable.»

Si les juges tranchent et déclarent qu'ils vont annuler le projet de loi pour des raisons constitutionnelles, la clause dérogatoire prend-elle alors effet ou est-il impossible qu'elle s'applique en l'occurrence?

M. Scott: Non, elle ne s'applique pas dans ces cas-là.

Le sénateur Murray: En vertu du processus prévu dans le projet de loi, la commission présente son rapport et le ministre de la Justice est obligé de le déposer devant les deux Chambres du Parlement dans les 10 jours. Le rapport doit ensuite être renvoyé à notre comité, au Sénat et à nos homologues de la Chambre des communes. Les comités ont 90 jours ouvrables pour présenter le rapport de leurs conclusions. Il est dit ensuite que «le ministre de la Justice donne suite au rapport au plus tard six mois après l'avoir reçu».

Sommes-nous certains que le ministre de la Justice a l'obligation de donner suite au rapport de la commission ou au comité parlementaire? Si vous examinez les notes en marge de la page 4, elles mentionnent «Étude en comité et rapport», «Définition de "jour de séance"» et «Suivi». Je pose la question parce que le Règlement de la Chambre des communes oblige le gouvernement à répondre aux rapports des comités parlementaires dans un certain délai. Nous n'avons pas la même règle au Sénat.

À ma connaissance, les ministres ou le gouvernement ne sont pas tenus, par la loi, de donner suite aux rapports des autres commissions, même s'ils peuvent être tenus de le faire.

M. Scott: Cette disposition vise à faire en sorte que le ministre donne suite au rapport de la commission. Que les sénateurs jugent cela souhaitable ou non, je crois que c'est le but recherché. C'est parce que, comme diverses commissions qui nous ont précédés, nous estimions que le gouvernement devrait être tenu de donner suite au lieu de se contenter de ne rien dire. C'est ainsi que j'ai compris les choses, mais je me trompe peut-être.

Le sénateur Murray: Nous devrions sans doute poser la question à la ministre.

La présidente: C'est une bonne question à poser aux représentants du ministère lorsqu'ils reviendront.

M. Scott: En effet.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Dans le même esprit que la question du sénateur Bryden, est-il vrai que, si le gouvernement s'oppose à la recommandation de la commission, il peut avoir à se justifier? Si j'ai bien compris le projet de loi, cela veut dire que le fardeau

burden of evidence is on the shoulders of the legislated branch of the state. It is not often that we have that, but it is there. The court ruled on this in the provincial court judges reference.

However, the court may intervene only if it is not rational. That is the way I read the statute. It does not mean — and I would object strongly to this — that the court itself would fix the salaries. That would be quite unacceptable. I cannot see how we can go that far.

What is your understanding of this? In other words, the court may say: Your refusal is not rational. That means you must try again.

Mr. Scott: That is correct.

Senator Beaudoin: That does not mean more, which is quite something.

Mr. Scott: As Senator Beaudoin says, it is quite something.

Senator Beaudoin: At least the power of the court is on the irrationality, not on the question of taxation or things of that sort. I know it is close.

Mr. Scott: Rightly or wrongly, it is on rationality as measured by the undermining of independence. It is not economic rationality or some other rationality. I could be wrong, but that is the way I read the judgment. The court is concerned only with the issue of independence, so the rationality is at issue.

Senator Beaudoin: What was raised by Senator Bryden is that the last word is given to a court in a court case.

Mr. Scott: Yes, but it is not given to them to fix their salaries.

Senator Beaudoin: It is not to fix the salaries, so it means to try it again?

Mr. Scott: That is correct.

Senator Beaudoin: The court was not unanimous, but they do not need to be unanimous on this. There was a strong majority to that effect in the court.

Mr. Scott: That is correct.

Senator Beaudoin: We cannot go further than that on that precise question. We may like it or dislike it, but the fact is that there is already one advisory opinion of the court that says that the mechanism of a commission is good. We must abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.

I cannot see how we may use the notwithstanding clause in this because it is not a Charter case. It is a basic principle of the Canadian Constitution that is judicial independence. This is a difficult debate. The legislative area and the judiciary have been separate in Canada for 300 years. It is one of the basic principles of our Constitution. However, in a case like this it is a bit technical. I am glad that we must solve an interesting question like that.

de la preuve incombe au pouvoir législatif. Ce n'est pas souvent le cas, mais c'est ce qui est prévu ici. La Cour suprême s'est prononcée sur cette question dans le renvoi des juges de la Cour provinciale.

Néanmoins, la cour ne peut intervenir que si la décision n'est pas rationnelle. C'est ainsi que je comprends la loi. Cela ne veut pas dire — et je m'y opposerais énergiquement — que la cour fixerait elle-même la rémunération. Ce serait tout à fait inacceptable. Je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions aller aussi loin.

Comment comprenez-vous la situation? Autrement dit, la cour pourrait dire: votre refus n'est pas rationnel. Cela veut dire qu'il faut réexaminer votre position.

M. Scott: C'est exact.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Cela ne veut pas dire plus, ce qui est déjà quelque chose.

M. Scott: Comme le dit le sénateur Beaudoin, c'est déjà quelque chose.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Au moins, le pouvoir du tribunal porte sur le fait que la décision est irrationnelle et non pas sur la question de l'imposition, ce genre de choses. Je sais que la nuance est mince.

M. Scott: À tort ou à raison, il détermine si la décision est rationnelle ou non en fonction de la mesure dans laquelle l'indépendance des juges se trouve limitée. La décision n'a pas à être rationnelle sur le plan économique ou autre. Je me trompe peut-être, mais c'est ainsi que je comprends le jugement. La cour se préoccupe uniquement de la question de l'indépendance et c'est sur ce plan que la décision doit être rationnelle.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Le sénateur Bryden a fait valoir que le tribunal avait le dernier mot.

M. Scott: Oui, mais ce n'est pas lui qui fixe la rémunération.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Il ne fixe pas la rémunération, mais il demande que l'on réexamine le dossier?

M. Scott: C'est exact.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Les juges de la Cour suprême n'étaient pas unanimes, mais l'unanimité n'est pas nécessaire. Il y avait une forte majorité.

M. Scott: En effet.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Nous ne pouvons pas aller plus loin sur cette question précise. Que cela nous plaise ou non, le fait est que la Cour suprême s'est déjà prononcée en faveur du mécanisme que représente la commission. Nous devons nous conformer à cette décision.

Je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions invoquer la clause dérogatoire étant donné que la Charte n'est pas en cause. Il s'agit là d'un principe fondamental de la Constitution canadienne, celui de l'indépendance de la magistrature. C'est un débat complexe. Le pouvoir législatif et le pouvoir judiciaire sont séparés au Canada depuis 300 ans. C'est un des principes fondamentaux de notre Constitution. Néanmoins, dans un cas comme celui-ci, le problème est quelque peu technique. Je me réjouis que nous ayons à résoudre une question aussi intéressante.

Senator Sparrow: Let us say that there were no recommendations in the report that the status quo be maintained. What would happen then?

You suggested that that report must go to Parliament. If there was a status quo, you suggest that it still must go to Parliament with no changes. If they did in some way or other go to the house, the judge would determine whether Parliament had made an irrational decision.

Could the irrational decision have been made by the commission? That recommendation had gone, and now the government — Parliament — backed that decision, and it was irrational in both cases? Does the court still decide that the commission was irrational, as well as Parliament? If in fact there was no report, could that be considered an irrational decision because there was no recommendation for any changes?

Mr. Scott: I think that Senator Bryden's point is the correct one. If the commission exceeds its jurisdiction by irrationality, if that is possible, then judicial review would lie anyway.

My sense of the rationality here at issue is the government's response to the commission's report rather than the commission's report itself. In other words, the point of the independent commission is that it will be an independent adviser to government, and the concern is that governments are arbitrarily ignoring it. If the commission itself, by its methodology or what it says, is demonstrably irrational or lacks in jurisdiction or whatever, I believe that judicial review would lie anyway, whatever this case provides.

The irrationality or rationality is in the government's reaction to the commission's report. That is what I understand the Supreme Court of Canada is dealing with in the P.E.I. case.

Senator Sparrow: But if both decisions were irrational, in the opinion of a judge, what then?

Mr. Scott: I suppose that if the commission's decision were irrational to a level which merited judicial review, that would be the first step. Obviously, if the judges were challenging it, the first step is to either be supporting the commission's decision or attacking it. This is all premised on the proposition, as I appreciate it, that this independent commission will make a rational recommendation that will be arbitrarily rejected by government.

[Translation]

Senator Pépin: According to clause 45, a judge who is in receipt of an annuity can leave his pension to his common law spouse whom he has lived with for at least one year. Some people have pointed out to us that in most provinces, the requirement is three year's cohabitation. Could you explain this to us?

[English]

Mr. Scott: I have read what has been said to your committee about this. Certainly, three years is the provincial standard in many jurisdictions. I am not an expert in this area so I will be of no use to you. However, my understanding is that this is an expression of the regime in place in other areas. However, I have

Le sénateur Sparrow: Disons que le rapport ne recommande pas de maintenir le statu quo. Que se passerait-il alors?

Vous dites que ce rapport doit être soumis au Parlement. Si le statu quo est maintenu, vous dites qu'il faut quand même le soumettre au Parlement sans proposer de changement. Si c'est le cas, le juge établirait si le Parlement a pris une décision irrationnelle.

Cette décision irrationnelle pourrait-elle avoir été prise par la commission? La recommandation a été faite et maintenant le gouvernement et le Parlement l'appuient et, dans les deux cas, on a agi de façon irrationnelle. Le tribunal estimera-t-il que la commission a pris une décision irrationnelle, de même que le Parlement? S'il n'y a pas eu de rapport, peut-on considérer que cette décision est irrationnelle étant donné qu'aucun changement n'a été recommandé?

M. Scott: Je pense que le sénateur Bryden a raison. Si la commission outrepassé son mandat en prenant une décision irrationnelle, il y aurait de toute façon un examen judiciaire.

Ce dont il faut tenir compte ici, selon moi, c'est de la réponse du gouvernement au rapport de la commission plutôt que du rapport de la commission comme tel. Autrement dit, la commission indépendante doit agir comme conseiller indépendant auprès du gouvernement et l'on craint ici que ce dernier décide arbitrairement de ne pas en tenir compte. Si la commission se montre irrationnelle, par sa méthodologie ou par ses propos ou encore parce qu'elle outrepassé son champ de compétence, je crois que la révision judiciaire aura lieu de toute façon.

Ce qu'il y aura de rationnel ou d'irrationnel, ce sera la réaction du gouvernement au rapport de la commission. Si je comprends bien, c'est dans cet esprit que la Cour suprême du Canada a abordé la cause de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard.

Le sénateur Sparrow: Mais si le juge estime que les deux décisions sont irrationnelles, que se passe-t-il?

M. Scott: Si la décision de la commission est irrationnelle au point de justifier un examen judiciaire, ce sera la première étape. Bien entendu, si les juges la contestent, il s'agit d'abord d'appuyer ou de réfuter la décision de la commission. Tout cela part du principe que cette commission indépendante va faire une recommandation rationnelle que le gouvernement rejettera arbitrairement.

[Français]

Le sénateur Pépin: L'article 45 indique que les juges pensionnés peuvent laisser leur pension à leur conjoint de fait avec lequel ils ont cohabité depuis au moins un an. Des personnes ont attiré notre attention sur le fait que dans les régimes de la plupart des provinces, on parle d'une période de trois ans. Pouvez-vous nous éclairer à ce sujet?

[Traduction]

M. Scott: J'ai lu ce qui a été dit à votre comité à ce sujet. Trois ans représentent sans doute la norme dans de nombreuses provinces. Comme je ne suis pas expert en la matière, je ne peux pas vous éclairer. Néanmoins, si j'ai bien compris, cela reflète le régime en place ailleurs. J'ignore toutefois si cela s'éloigne ou

no idea whether this is a departure or whether this is an expression of the statutory regime in place in the provinces. I am just not on top of this. My recollection was that it was three years, but obviously this one-year provision is defensible based on the survivors' benefits, which do not apply to judges. I am sorry that I am of no help.

Senator Beaudoin: Someone said that this bill is harmonizing the situation of judges with that of people in other areas of the public service, such as the RCMP.

The Chairman: I believe that it is harmonizing it with the public service.

Senator Beaudoin: Yes, and even members of Parliament.

The Chairman: Yes. We will hear from another witness who is knowledgeable in this area. We can ask the question again then.

Senator Joyal: Did you study how other common-law systems comparable to Canada deal with this issue of judges' compensation to protect the principle of the judiciary's independence?

Mr. Scott: We did. While walking here from my office, I was wondering where our research papers had gone. They have all gone back to the judicial affairs centre and I will see if I can find them.

We did a study of that. As I am sure you have been told, in some Australian states they have negative resolution. I believe they have that in New South Wales. In others, they have commissions that have powers to recommend only. I could not list them for you, but the one most aggressively favourable to the judges is the negative resolution system, which is in place in New South Wales, Australia. The report is tabled and if there is no bill rejecting it, it becomes law.

Senator Joyal: Do you know the system in the U.K. generally?

Mr. Scott: I cannot recollect it. We did a study of that, but I cannot now remember what we learned. I will find out and send it up to the clerk.

Senator Joyal: I should like to come back to the question of rationality. As you realize, it is something that bothers us a lot. You say that the test would be rationality in reference with the maintenance of independency of the judiciary.

Let us take an example that we have experienced in the last years. We were in a difficult economic situation in terms of budgetary issues in Canada and the government decided to institute freezes all over the place. The judges were frozen, too, in terms of compensation.

Let us imagine that some time in the future the same situation arises and the government once again institutes freezes. The commission studies the workload of the judges and concludes that their workload has increased and they request a 2 per cent increase, which seems reasonable in a difficult time. However, the committees of the House of Commons and the Senate recommend against the commission's request, as does the Minister of Justice.

non du régime en place au niveau provincial. Je ne suis pas très au courant. Si je me souviens bien, c'était trois ans, mais cette disposition qui prévoit un an est certainement défendable pour ce qui est de la prestation de survivant, qui ne s'appliquait pas aux juges. Je regrette de ne pas pouvoir vous aider.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Quelqu'un a dit que ce projet de loi harmonisait la situation des juges avec celle des employés d'autres secteurs de la fonction publique comme la GRC.

La présidente: Je crois qu'elle l'harmonise avec la fonction publique.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Oui, et même les parlementaires.

La présidente: Oui. Nous allons entendre un autre témoin qui connaît bien ce domaine. Nous pourrions poser cette question.

Le sénateur Joyal: Avez-vous étudié la façon dont d'autres systèmes de common law comparables à celui du Canada abordent la question de la rémunération des juges pour protéger l'indépendance de la magistrature?

M. Scott: Nous l'avons fait. En venant ici, je me demandais où étaient passés nos documents de recherche. Ils ont tous été envoyés au Centre des affaires judiciaires et je vais voir si je peux les trouver.

Nous avons étudié la question. Comme on vous l'a dit certainement, certains États australiens ont la procédure de résolution négative. Je crois que c'est le cas en Nouvelle-Galles du Sud. Dans d'autres États, il y a des commissions qui ont seulement un pouvoir de recommandation. Je ne peux pas vous les énumérer, mais l'une des formules les plus en faveur des juges est la procédure de résolution négative qui existe en Nouvelle-Galles du Sud. Le rapport est déposé et si aucun projet de loi ne le rejette, il obtient force de loi.

Le sénateur Joyal: Connaissez-vous de façon générale le système en place au Royaume-Uni?

M. Scott: Je ne m'en souviens pas. Nous en avons fait une étude, mais je ne me souviens pas de ce que nous avons appris. Je vais vérifier et envoyer ces renseignements à la greffière.

Le sénateur Joyal: Je voudrais en revenir à la question de la rationalité. Comme vous le savez, cela nous ennuie parfois beaucoup. Vous dites que le critère de rationalité vise au maintien de l'indépendance de la magistrature.

Prenons un cas que nous avons connu ces dernières années. Nous avons connu une situation économique difficile au Canada et le gouvernement a alors décidé d'imposer un gel des prix et des salaires. La rémunération des juges a également été gelée.

Imaginons qu'un jour, la même chose se reproduit et que le gouvernement recourt de nouveau à ce genre de mesure. La commission étudiera la charge de travail des juges et, estimant qu'elle a augmenté, elle demandera une augmentation de 2 p. 100, ce qui semble raisonnable. Toutefois, le comité de la Chambre des communes et du Sénat se prononcera contre la recommandation de la commission, de même que le ministre de la Justice.

In such a context, where everyone is hit, where, in your opinion, does the maintenance of the rationality principle in relation to the independency of the judiciary stand?

Mr. Scott: A freeze across the board is rational. However, the judges did not always think that. It is very interesting what the Chief Justice said in the P.E.I. case. He said that a freeze across the board, although effectively a reduction, would be defensible.

The judges did not always think that. They did not like to be aligned with the executive branch of government, so they did not like to be swept in with other public servants. In respect of this last freeze, there was a lot of criticism on the part of the judges.

I read in the judgment that the chief justice acknowledges that an across-the-board freeze, where everyone bears the burden, would be rational. I regard that as an advance in judicial thinking. It would be rational, but the question is: What would be irrational? I am not sure of the answer to that question. I suppose that is part of the troubling nature of the problem, because what would be irrational in the face of what is perceived in society as unwarranted judicial activism is a massive reduction in compensation affecting only judges. The judges might regard that as an obvious attempt to undermine their independence and to control their behaviour.

Cases such as the one in P.E.I. have involved efforts include some independence problem associated with salaries. It arose from the fact that the executive branch set the salaries for judges, and the judges had no say whatsoever in the matter. There is always an effort to get the hook of independence into the question. That is why it is not just rationality per se, but rationality as tested by the stability of the independence of the judiciary.

Senator Joyal: On the same basis of your answer, a judge would recognize that when an effort is requested from everyone, it ought to be borne fairly by the judiciary, too. They are part of society as such.

Why are people so reluctant to have the criteria that the commission would follow mirror the criteria that Treasury Board follows when putting forward proposals that are within the framework of the government purse? Essentially, that is what Treasury Board must do when putting together a proposal for the unions. It would seem to be in accordance with the capacity of the taxpayers to pay at this point in time.

Mr. Scott: Perhaps I am pushing this point too far. I am not saying that there should not be any criteria, but at a certain point the criteria become developed enough that you do not need an independent commission. That is, you need only apply the criteria. You could say that the remuneration for the judiciary should be measured by the salaries of deputy ministers or by the incomes or benefits received by deputy ministers. That is the end of it.

I believe in the notion that for the judiciary, who are independent of government, there should be some mechanism for determining what is appropriate in terms of compensation.

Dans ce genre de situation, où tout le monde est touché, que fait-on, selon vous, du principe de la rationalité en ce qui concerne l'indépendance de la magistrature?

M. Scott: Un gel général des salaires est rationnel. Néanmoins, les juges n'ont pas toujours été de cet avis. Ce que le juge en chef a déclaré dans l'affaire de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard est très intéressant. Il a dit qu'un gel général serait défendable, même si cela revenait à une réduction de salaire.

Les juges n'ont pas toujours eu cette opinion. Ils ne voulaient pas s'aligner sur le pouvoir exécutif pas plus que sur les autres fonctionnaires. Le dernier gel a été largement critiqué par les juges.

D'après le jugement, le juge en chef reconnaît qu'un gel général qui amènerait tout le monde à faire sa part, serait rationnel. Je considère que c'est là un progrès. Ce serait rationnel, mais la question à se poser est la suivante: qu'est-ce qui serait irrationnel? Je ne suis pas certain de la réponse à cette question. C'est ce qui contribue au problème étant donné qu'une décision qui serait irrationnelle aux yeux de la société serait une baisse de salaire massive qui ne toucherait que les juges. Les juges pourraient voir là une tentative évidente de saper leur indépendance ou de contrôler leur comportement.

Des affaires comme celle de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard ont soulevé le problème de l'indépendance. Cela vient du fait que le pouvoir exécutif établit la rémunération des juges tandis que ces derniers n'ont pas voix au chapitre. On cherche toujours à mettre sur le tapis la question de l'indépendance. Voilà pourquoi ce n'est pas la question de la rationalité comme telle qui se pose. Cette rationalité est établie en fonction de la mesure où l'indépendance de la magistrature est maintenue.

Le sénateur Joyal: Pour aller dans le même sens que votre réponse, un juge reconnaîtrait que si l'on demande à tout le monde de faire sa part, la magistrature devrait faire un effort elle aussi. Elle fait partie de la société.

Pourquoi hésite-t-on tellement à demander à la commission de suivre les mêmes critères que le Conseil du Trésor lorsqu'elle présente une proposition qui fait appel aux deniers publics? C'est ce que doit faire le Conseil du Trésor lorsqu'il présente une proposition aux syndicats. Cela tiendrait compte de la capacité de payer des contribuables.

M. Scott: Je vais peut-être trop loin, mais je ne dis pas qu'on peut se passer totalement de critères. Toutefois, à un moment donné, les critères sont suffisamment développés pour qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire d'avoir une commission indépendante. Autrement dit, il vous suffit d'appliquer des critères. Vous pourriez dire que la rémunération des juges doit s'aligner sur celle des sous-ministres ou encore le salaire ou les avantages sociaux des sous-ministres et cela n'ira pas plus loin.

Je crois que la magistrature étant indépendante du gouvernement, il faudrait un mécanisme pour déterminer la rémunération qui convient.

I am not saying that we do not need criteria. What I am saying is that we need to determine the nature of the criteria. Will we consider the benefits received by deputy ministers? If so, at what levels? If you get to that point, then you do not need an independent commission, do you?

Senator Joyal: In the United States they have criteria, and they fix the level of compensation to avoid that kind of discretionary involvement of elected people, thereby protecting the independence of the judiciary.

When you put forward some criteria, is that not a way to contain the independence of the judiciary? In that situation you apply the criteria and then there is no discussion.

Mr. Scott: Except for the fact that such a solution presumes that criteria provide the complete answer. There is some judgment in here somewhere, and where there is judgment there is an opportunity to lobby for the judgment to go one way or the other. The way we get into this area is that judges cannot lobby; therefore, you must have an independent commission.

In the United States, there is an enormous boon from removing the link between judges' salaries and bureaucrats' salaries. That is not entirely the work of the judiciary. There is a feeling that the judiciary, as a separate branch of government, should be dealt with separately. The criteria change from time to time, depending upon the attractions of the bench. About four years ago, it was much more attractive to consider an appointment to the bench than it is now. People flocked to be appointed to the bench over the last 10 years. Before that, they did not do so, and they certainly are not doing so now.

You are trying to develop a system that matches what is available outside the judiciary in order to attract the right people. I would not favour simply establishing a set of criteria that says that judges will be treated like a certain group of people with all the same criteria. If you do that, you do not need an independent commission.

Senator Joyal: You said that there is a movement in the United States to deregulate the compensation mechanism for judges. Is that not a way for those people who fight for judicial activism to submit judges to the appreciation of discretionary compensation decisions?

Mr. Scott: The first group pushing for the removal of such a linkage is the judges. They feel that their situation and the need to attract the right people to the judiciary will not be addressed by putting them into a category with federal public servants and that, since they are a separate branch of government, they should be dealt with separately. The motives of others is another question, but that is a hot topic in the U.S. now.

Senator Joyal: I understand your point. Besides the cost of living index, the economic growth of Canada, and the objective that the government is pursuing in its budgetary policy involving salaries, you add the criteria of putting enough money on the table so that there will be enough candidates interested in the profession.

Mr. Scott: Yes, the right candidates.

Je ne dis pas que les critères sont inutiles. Je dis seulement qu'il faut déterminer la nature de ces critères. Allons-nous tenir compte des avantages sociaux qu'obtiennent les sous-ministres? Si c'est le cas, à quels niveaux? Si vous en arrivez là, vous n'avez pas besoin de commission indépendante, n'est-ce pas?

Le sénateur Joyal: Aux États-Unis, il y a des critères et l'on fixe le niveau de rémunération afin d'éviter l'intervention discrétionnaire des élus et protéger ainsi l'indépendance de la magistrature.

Lorsque vous proposez des critères, n'est-ce pas une façon de limiter l'indépendance de la magistrature? Vous appliquez alors les critères et il n'y a pas de discussion.

M. Scott: Si ce n'est que cette solution part du principe que les critères suffisent à eux seuls. Il y a un certain jugement à porter et il est donc possible d'exercer des pressions dans un sens ou dans l'autre. Comme les juges ne peuvent pas exercer des pressions, il faut une commission indépendante.

Aux États-Unis, il y a tout un mouvement pour la suppression du lien entre la rémunération des juges et celle des bureaucrates. La magistrature n'en est pas seule responsable. On estime que la magistrature étant une branche distincte du gouvernement, elle doit être traitée séparément. Les critères changent de temps à autre, selon l'attrait que représentent ces nominations. Il y a quatre ans environ, une nomination à la magistrature était beaucoup plus attrayante que ce n'est le cas maintenant. Un tas de gens souhaitaient se faire nommer juge ces 10 dernières années. Cela présentait beaucoup moins d'attrait avant cela et en tout cas maintenant.

Nous essayons de mettre au point un système de rémunération comparable à ce qui est offert à l'extérieur afin d'attirer des gens compétents. Je ne serais pas en faveur de l'établissement d'une série de critères disant que les juges seront traités comme tel autre groupe de personnes présentant les mêmes critères. Si vous le faites, vous n'avez pas besoin d'une commission indépendante.

Le sénateur Joyal: Vous dites qu'il y a, aux États-Unis, un mouvement en faveur de la déréglementation de la rémunération des juges. N'est-ce pas, pour ceux qui se battent pour l'activisme judiciaire, une façon de soumettre les juges à des décisions discrétionnaires concernant leur rémunération?

M. Scott: Les premiers à demander l'élimination de ces liens sont les juges. Ils estiment qu'on ne répondra pas à leur situation et à la nécessité d'attirer des gens compétents en les associant aux fonctionnaires fédéraux et que, la magistrature étant une branche distincte du gouvernement, elle devrait être traitée comme telle. Quant à ce qui motive les autres, c'est une autre question, mais cela suscite actuellement la controverse aux États-Unis.

Le sénateur Joyal: Je comprends ce que vous dites. En dehors de l'indice du coût de la vie, de la croissance économique du Canada et des objectifs de la politique budgétaire du gouvernement, ce qui comprend les salaires, vous voulez qu'on offre suffisamment d'argent aux juges afin qu'il y ait suffisamment de candidats qui s'intéressent à la profession.

M. Scott: Oui, les bons candidats.

Senator Joyal: In other words, we must make the package attractive enough to attract those we want to have, and not those who are looking for another job because they feel they are underpaid. Is that what you have in mind?

Mr. Scott: Yes.

The Chairman: I am rather surprised, Mr. Scott, to hear you say that this is not a position that people are avidly seeking. Most members of Parliament would be surprised to hear that, too.

Mr. Scott: But are they the right people? That is the question. From sea to sea, we have had a tremendous judiciary in this country. In my province of Ontario, the Court of Appeal has always had the top lawyers in the profession. This is not true in other countries. In other countries, the judiciary is frequently made up of people who have been appointed to the bench early in their lives. There is a completely different atmosphere in the judiciary. I make no apology for pushing hard for the idea that there should be enough independence in the effort to assess what judges should be paid to attract the right people. The right people are not necessarily Bay Street people, but people from communities across the country. We need to have the top people in the judiciary.

Senator Lawson: On the issue of criteria, I agree with Mr. Scott. I think it would be a serious mistake to try to have fixed criteria. I heard Senator Joyal say that the Treasury Board has some criteria, and I am sure that the executive board does. Every union does, but it is floating, flexible criteria that works on each individual occasion. You keep the ones which work, and if they do not work next time, you change them to meet the changing circumstances.

I have been involved in negotiations for over 40 years and I have learned that it is impossible to have fixed, rigid criteria. One or two criteria are obvious, such as the cost of living, but you simply cannot work within a strict framework.

Those parties with bargaining rights have flexible criteria. To attempt to apply it in this situation would be impossible. I agree with you that there is no point in having a commission if you are to have rigid criteria. Rather, it should be binding arbitration or binding conciliation, as it was in the old days: Fix it and leave it, with no appeal.

Mr. Scott: I do not think that a lot of people genuinely believe that there is a problem in attracting the right people to the bench. However, in reality, the opposite is true. We have some of the most wonderful people on the bench. Yet, every once in a while you get a rush of people who want to be judges and you see a hint of the other side of the coin, which is very unappealing. You see people who want to be judges because they perceive it to be easier work and because they are attracted by the pension, et cetera. Those people we positively do not want. They end up losing their spirit for it in no time at all, and the result is a disaster.

However, taking the point about the criteria, we do always have to be measuring how we compensate our judges against that body of people from which we are drawing to ensure that we are

Le sénateur Joyal: Autrement dit, il faut rendre les conditions de rémunération suffisamment attrayantes pour attirer les personnes que nous voulons avoir, et non pas celles qui recherchent un autre emploi parce qu'elles estiment être sous-payées. Est-ce bien ce que vous voulez dire?

M. Scott: Oui.

La présidente: Je m'étonne, monsieur Scott, de vous entendre dire que ce n'est pas un poste très convoité. La plupart des parlementaires seront également étonnés de l'entendre.

M. Scott: Mais s'agit-il des bonnes personnes? Tout est là. Nous avons, d'un bout à l'autre du pays, une magistrature extrêmement compétente au Canada. Dans ma province, l'Ontario, la Cour d'appel a toujours eu les meilleurs avocats de la profession. Ce n'est pas vrai dans d'autres pays. Ailleurs, la magistrature est souvent composée de gens qui ont été nommés très jeunes. L'atmosphère y est totalement différente. Je n'hésite pas à faire valoir que le processus de détermination du salaire versé aux juges pour attirer des gens compétents doit être suffisamment indépendant. Les bonnes personnes ne seront pas nécessairement des gens de Bay Street, mais plutôt des gens des divers coins du pays. Notre magistrature doit être composée des meilleurs éléments.

Le sénateur Lawson: Pour ce qui est des critères, je suis d'accord avec M. Scott. Ce serait une grave erreur, selon moi, que d'avoir des critères fixes. Le sénateur Joyal dit que le Conseil du Trésor applique certains critères et je suis certain que le comité de direction aussi. Chaque syndicat a des critères souples s'appliquant à chaque circonstance. Vous conservez ceux qui donnent de bons résultats et, s'ils laissent à désirer la prochaine fois, vous les modifiez pour tenir compte de l'évolution des circonstances.

J'ai participé à des négociations pendant plus de 40 ans et j'ai appris qu'il était impossible d'avoir des critères fixes et rigides. Certains critères sont évidents tels que le coût de la vie, mais il n'est pas possible d'avoir des paramètres très stricts.

Les parties qui ont le droit de négocier ont des critères souples. Il serait impossible de chercher à les appliquer dans ce genre de situation. Je conviens avec vous qu'il ne sert à rien d'avoir une commission si vous avez des critères rigides. Il faudrait plutôt recourir à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation obligatoire, comme dans l'ancien temps. La décision est sans appel.

M. Scott: Je ne pense pas que beaucoup de gens croient vraiment qu'il soit difficile d'attirer des gens compétents dans les rangs de la magistrature. C'est plutôt le contraire. Nous avons des gens exceptionnels dans la magistrature. Néanmoins, vous avez parfois des gens qui veulent devenir juges et vous voyez alors l'autre côté de la médaille, qui n'est pas très beau à voir. Certaines personnes veulent devenir juges parce qu'elles pensent que ce sera un travail plus facile ou parce qu'elles sont attirées par la pension et le reste. Nous ne voulons certainement pas de ces gens-là. Ils perdent très rapidement leur enthousiasme et le résultat est désastreux.

Néanmoins, pour ce qui est des critères, il faudra toujours mesurer la façon dont nous rémunérons nos juges en faisant une comparaison avec le secteur dans lequel nous les recrutons afin

competitive. We obviously do not pay anything like the incomes that are given up, but we must pay enough to ensure that it will not be such an enormous step down that people will not do it.

Senator Bryden: It is interesting that the tremendous courts that we all know and have practised before have all come about without this type of protection. I do not know why we have to go further with it at this particular time. There was an old saying in law school that A students make professors, B students make judges, and C students make money.

As you know, the fact that a given lawyer is making \$500,000 a year doing estates and commercial law in no way indicates that he is better than the carefully practising lawyer, even an independent practitioner, who is eking out enough to pay his secretary and his overhead and clear \$80,000 or \$100,000.

Mr. Scott: That is so.

Senator Bryden: I should like to go back to the issue of criteria or guidelines. Senator Lawson and I have both been in the labour business for a long time. The ability to go to economic warfare is in some instances removed in the public interest. For example, firefighters and sometimes police have the right to strike removed from them and replaced by arbitration.

In most statutes that make arbitration the final decision-maker, there are criteria laid out. If there are not criteria, you cannot take into account the employers' ability to pay. Therefore, the fact that the Province of Prince Edward Island could not afford to pay a 25 per cent increase would not be a factor that an arbitrator could take into consideration. Now they must because it is on the list. In other words, in your deliberations you must take the following into account.

There are criteria for the commissions in many provinces already. The Provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec and Prince Edward Island have them. The act of Prince Edward Island, for example, includes as criteria the need to provide fair and reasonable compensation to judges, the management board policy and other relevant considerations respecting judges' expenses, any changes in the cost of living, the need to attract excellent candidates, the prevailing economic conditions in the province and the overall state of the provincial economy, and the salaries and benefits paid to other provincial court judges in other Canadian jurisdictions. I do not see it here, but it says probably "and any other relevant criteria," but under the *ejusdem generis* rule you do not get too far away from that sort of stuff.

New Zealand's statute includes very interesting criteria. They are: the need to achieve and maintain fair relativity with the levels of remuneration received elsewhere; the need to be fair, both to the persons or group of persons whose remuneration is being determined, and to the taxpayer or ratepayer; and the need to recruit and maintain competent persons. Those are criteria which the commission must take into account.

d'être concurrentiels. Nous ne payons évidemment pas de salaires comparables aux revenus auxquels les juges doivent renoncer, mais nous devons payer une rémunération suffisante pour que le sacrifice ne soit pas énorme au point d'être dissuasif.

Le sénateur Bryden: Il est intéressant de constater que les merveilleux tribunaux que nous connaissons tous ont été établis sans ce genre de protection. Je ne vois pas pourquoi nous devrions aller plus loin pour le moment. Selon un vieil adage qui avait cours à la faculté de droit, les étudiants qui ont des A deviennent professeurs, ceux qui ont des B deviennent juges et ceux qui ont des C gagnent beaucoup d'argent.

Comme vous le savez, ce n'est pas parce qu'un avocat gagne 500 000 \$ par an en droit immobilier et commercial qu'il est plus compétent que l'avocat prudent qui gagne juste assez pour payer sa secrétaire et ses frais généraux et empocher 80 000 \$ ou 100 000 \$.

M. Scott: En effet.

Le sénateur Bryden: Je voudrais en revenir à la question des critères ou des lignes directrices. Le sénateur Lawson et moi-même avons travaillé dans le milieu syndical pendant longtemps. Le droit de défendre ses intérêts économiques vous est parfois supprimé dans l'intérêt public. Par exemple, dans le cas des pompiers et parfois des policiers, le droit de grève a été remplacé par l'arbitrage.

La plupart des lois qui imposent l'arbitrage énoncent certains critères. S'il n'y a pas de critères, vous ne pouvez pas tenir compte de la capacité de payer de l'employeur. Par conséquent, le fait que la province de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard ne pourrait pas se permettre de payer une augmentation de 25 p. 100 n'est pas un facteur dont un arbitre pourrait tenir compte. Il doit maintenant le faire car c'est sur la liste. Autrement dit, c'est une chose dont vous devez tenir compte.

Les commissions d'un grand nombre de provinces ont déjà des critères à appliquer. L'Ontario, la Colombie-Britannique, l'Alberta, le Québec et l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard en ont. La loi de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard, par exemple, prévoit la nécessité de payer aux juges une rémunération juste et raisonnable et contient également des critères visant la politique du conseil de gestion et d'autres éléments concernant les dépenses des juges, des changements dans le coût de la vie, la nécessité d'attirer d'excellents candidats, la situation économique dans la province et l'état général de l'économie provinciale ainsi que les salaires et avantages sociaux versés à d'autres juges de la Cour provinciale dans d'autres provinces canadiennes. Ce n'est pas précisé ici, mais cela fait sans doute partie de «tout autre critère pertinent». Néanmoins, conformément à la règle *ejusdem generis*, on ne doit pas trop s'éloigner de ce genre de critères.

La loi néo-zélandaise comprend des critères très intéressants. Ce sont la nécessité d'assurer un niveau de rémunération assez comparable aux autres; la nécessité d'être équitable envers les personnes dont on détermine la rémunération et envers le contribuable ainsi que la nécessité de recruter et de retenir des personnes compétentes. Tels sont les critères dont la commission doit tenir compte.

Mr. Scott: I started this by sounding as if I do not agree with Senator Joyal on this. I am saying that those are as obvious as they can be. It is not as though they are very earth shattering. While you were speaking, I wrote: "What would the criteria be? What others are being paid, what is being paid elsewhere, what is the cost of living, what is needed to attract the right candidates, and what is the state of the economy."

Senator Bryden: Then put it in the statute.

Mr. Scott: I have no problem with that, but once you go beyond that the problems arise.

Senator Bryden: The commission is to be comprised of three people — one nominated by the judiciary, one nominated by the Minister of Justice of Canada, and a third, who will be the chairman, agreed upon by the first two.

As Senator Lawson and I know, in the real world people sometimes cannot agree on who the third person will be. There is no provision in the bill for what happens in that circumstance.

I asked the minister what would happen in such a case and her response was that the first two people chosen would be fired and the process would start all over.

I presume that if one party — presumably the government — wanted to stonewall the process, it simply would not agree to the chair.

Mr. Scott: That is interesting because most arbitration statutes provide that in the event of a deadlock you apply to a judge — which would be inappropriate in this case.

Senator Bryden: That is my next point. To break a deadlock you apply to a judge, and the judge would have some degree of interest in who is appointed as chair. That is odd.

Mr. Scott: It is odd. The minister may be right. The minister could tell the two persons who were appointed that if they cannot agree within 10 days, their appointment will be revoked and two will be found who can agree.

Senator Bryden: The minister does not have the power to do that under the statute. They would just have to come to some agreement.

If the judiciary continued to quash recommendations of the government to Parliament, or if they had the ability to quash or find *ultra vires* under the Constitution a decision of Parliament, I assume that the status quo would remain in place until a change was finally effected through legislation. Therefore, it is not particularly in their interest to be totally unreasonable.

Senator Moore: They can still change the legislation.

Senator Bryden: That is right, but I am a little concerned in that this whole issue basically grew out of judicial disobedience in P.E.I., where the provincial court judges took the position that they could not handle these cases because they were biased.

M. Scott: J'ai commencé en donnant l'impression que je n'étais pas d'accord avec le sénateur Joyal sur ce point. Je dis seulement que ce sont des critères évidents. Cela n'a rien de bien nouveau. Pendant que vous parliez, j'ai écrit: «Quels seraient les critères? Ce que les autres touchent, ce qui est payé ailleurs, le coût de la vie, le montant requis pour attirer des candidats compétents et l'état de l'économie.»

Le sénateur Bryden: Alors inscrivez-le dans la loi.

M. Scott: Je n'y vois pas d'objection, mais si vous allez plus loin, cela soulève des problèmes.

Le sénateur Bryden: La commission doit être composée de trois personnes. La première sera nommée par la magistrature, la deuxième par le ministre de la Justice du Canada et la troisième, qui assumera la présidence, sera nommée avec l'accord des deux premières.

Le sénateur Lawson et moi-même savons que, dans la vraie vie, les gens ne sont pas toujours d'accord sur le choix de la troisième personne. Le projet de loi ne contient aucune disposition en pareille circonstance.

J'ai demandé à la ministre ce qui se passerait en pareil cas et elle m'a répondu que les deux premières choisies seraient congédiées et que le processus recommencerait à zéro.

Si l'une des parties — en principe le gouvernement — voulait saboter le processus, il lui suffirait de ne pas être d'accord sur le choix du président.

M. Scott: C'est intéressant, car la plupart des lois sur l'arbitrage portent qu'en cas d'impasse, vous vous adressez à un juge — ce qui ne conviendrait pas dans ce cas.

Le sénateur Bryden: J'y arrive. Pour rompre une impasse vous faites appel à un juge et ce dernier sera intéressé au choix de la personne nommée à la présidence. C'est curieux.

M. Scott: En effet. La ministre a peut-être raison. Elle pourrait dire aux deux personnes qui ont été nommées que si elles n'arrivent pas à se mettre d'accord dans les 10 jours, leur nomination sera révoquée et elles seront remplacées par deux autres personnes qui pourront s'entendre.

Le sénateur Bryden: La loi ne confère pas ce pouvoir au ministre. Il faudrait simplement que les deux personnes s'entendent.

Si la magistrature continuait à s'opposer aux recommandations du gouvernement ou si elle pouvait déclarer une décision du Parlement *ultra vires* en vertu de la Constitution, je suppose que le statu quo serait maintenu jusqu'à ce qu'un changement soit finalement effectué en légiférant. Les juges n'ont donc pas intérêt à se montrer parfaitement déraisonnables.

Le sénateur Moore: Ils peuvent quand même modifier la loi.

Le sénateur Bryden: C'est exact, mais ce qui m'inquiète un peu c'est que toute cette question découle de la désobéissance de la magistrature à l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard où les juges de la Cour provinciale ont estimé qu'ils ne pouvaient pas se pencher sur ces causes parce qu'ils manquaient d'objectivité.

They were biased because the person who paid them was either reducing their pay or was not prepared to increase it. Therefore, in any case where you had the Crown, Regina, against Joe Blow, the judge might very well be prejudiced against Regina and let the guy off. To my mind, that is judicial disobedience, like civil disobedience. Finally, it bubbled up and the issue arrived here.

We are back at the arena of Senator Lawson and myself: Who has the most power? Parliament has the ability to refuse to pass the legislation, and the judges have the ability to say that, if that is true, they will not hear any cases. Somehow we have to be sure to avoid those circumstances.

About the question of criteria, there are some criteria already established by the courts. One of them we have not discussed because it does not happen very often. To my knowledge, it has happened only in one case at the inferior level.

In the case of provincial judges, the Supreme Court declared a reduction of salaries as invalid, as *ultra vires*. It forced the government to reimburse the judges.

When we read the question of independence of judges, we must take into account the fact that, in that case, we were concerned with the real problem because there were some reductions of judges at the provincial level.

I do not know in which constitution this is found but I remember having read a constitution that makes it impossible to reduce the salary of a judge. It is unconstitutional right at the beginning. There is no such thing in our country, but I guess we may infer from that that if there is a reduction, that is at least strike two for the government because it seems, *prima facie*, to go against the principle of the independence of the judiciary. What do you think?

Mr. Scott: I have two points on that. It is interesting that, in the P.E.I. case, the court concluded that an across-the-board freeze is, theoretically, a reduction. Because the cost of living is increasing, it is a reduction.

In the *Beauregard* case, the argument was that, after the judge's appointment, a change in the law requiring contributory pensions was a reduction. Chief Justice Dickson concluded that it was a reduction but it was a legitimate reduction. That case came from the Quebec Court of Appeal. There had been a bill in the house and, literally weeks after the judge's appointment, the law was proclaimed to the effect that judges, who before had free pensions, now had to make contributions. He interpreted that, not surprisingly, as a form of reduction of his salary. He sued Her Majesty and it went through to the Federal Court. He was successful at every level until the Supreme Court divided and he lost.

The court concluded — and this was really the beginning in Chief Justice Dickson's notion of across-the-board, even-handed treatment. The conclusion was that everybody contributes to his or

En effet, leur employeur s'apprêtait à réduire leur traitement, ou n'était pas disposé à l'augmenter. En conséquence, dans toutes les affaires plaidées par la Couronne, le juge risquait d'avoir un préjugé favorable à l'adversaire de la Couronne et de lui donner gain de cause. À mon avis, on peut parler ici de désobéissance judiciaire comme on parle de désobéissance civile. Finalement, la situation a continué à mitonner, et voilà où on en est rendu.

Je suis dans la même situation que le sénateur Lawson: qui a le gros bout du bâton? Le Parlement a la possibilité de refuser d'adopter le projet de loi, et les juges ont la possibilité de dire que si tout cela est vrai, ils refuseront de juger. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut absolument éviter les circonstances de ce genre.

Sur la question des critères, les tribunaux en ont déjà fixé un certain nombre. Il y en a un dont nous n'avons pas parlé, car il n'est pas appliqué très souvent. À ma connaissance, il n'a été appliqué qu'une fois par une juridiction inférieure.

Dans le cas des juges provinciaux, la Cour suprême a déclaré que toute réduction de salaire était invalide et qu'elle outrepassait les pouvoirs de l'exécutif. La cour a obligé le gouvernement à rembourser les juges.

En ce qui concerne l'indépendance des juges, il faut tenir compte du fait qu'en l'occurrence, nous nous sommes intéressés au véritable problème, car les salaires des juges ont subi des réductions au niveau provincial.

Je ne me souviens plus de quelle partie de la Constitution il s'agit, mais j'ai vu un jour une disposition qui interdit de réduire le salaire d'un juge. D'emblée c'est une mesure anticonstitutionnelle. C'est impossible dans notre pays, mais il faut en déduire qu'en termes de réduction, le gouvernement sera automatiquement condamné car de toute évidence, une telle réduction va à l'encontre du principe de l'indépendance de la magistrature. Qu'en pensez-vous?

M. Scott: J'ai deux choses à dire à ce sujet. On remarque avec intérêt que dans l'arrêt concernant l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard, la cour a considéré qu'un gel de salaire équivaut théoriquement à une réduction. À cause de l'augmentation du coût de la vie, c'est une réduction de salaire.

Dans l'arrêt *Beauregard*, on a considéré qu'après la nomination d'un juge, tout changement législatif qui impose un régime de pensions contributif équivaut à une réduction de salaire. Le juge en chef Dickson a considéré qu'il s'agissait d'une réduction, mais d'une réduction légitime. C'est un arrêt de la Cour d'appel du Québec. L'Assemblée nationale avait adopté un projet de loi et quelques semaines après la nomination d'un juge, le gouvernement a promulgué une loi prévoyant que les juges, qui bénéficiaient antérieurement des régimes de pension gratuits, devaient désormais verser des contributions. Naturellement, le juge a interprété cette mesure comme une forme de réduction de salaire. Il a poursuivi la Couronne jusqu'en cour fédérale. Il a obtenu gain de cause à tous les niveaux, jusqu'à ce que la Cour suprême se prononce sur division et lui donne tort.

La cour a considéré — et c'était là le premier argument du juge en chef Dickson, qui a parlé de traitement uniforme — que tout le monde contribuait à son régime de pension et qu'il n'y avait

her pension so why should not judges contribute to theirs? They found there was nothing unconstitutional.

The argument was a constitutional one — that salaries must be fixed and provided and that it is inappropriate to reduce them. It was rejected. A reduction without more is not necessarily, in contemporary terms, evidence of anything.

Senator Beaudoin: There may be a case where it might be justified.

Mr. Scott: It might be justifiable. I think it is the juxtaposition. In an interesting example, a bill was discussed in Arizona where, on the one hand, there was a lot of talk about judges being out of control — which is the way it develops — while, coincidentally, over here, there was a discussion about the level of their income being too high. If these things are discussed at the same time, it gives you pause and it is troubling. That is the kind of thing where a reduction may be seen.

Senator Fraser: Almost identical to that, I have been sitting here brooding about how this would play out in practice. I am really troubled by the notion of giving a profession the right to, effectively, control its own pay when its salaries are paid out of public money.

Senator Lawson: That is what MPs do.

Senator Fraser: MPs must go back to the public, which is why they get in such a dither every time they have to think about a pay increase. Judges do not.

I was comforted by the observation of the chairman that, if we are talking about salary increases, when a judge says no to a bill, he does not get any increase at all. He is stuck with the status quo. However, when it comes to reduction, I seriously wonder because then, if a judge says no to the bill, he does not get a pay-cut. He gets to keep what he has.

I have enormous respect for judges but it seems to me that some of their wisdom — and the pension case you cited is one example — goes out the window when their own interests are at stake. There was a situation in Montreal a few years ago where judges were actually arguing that, in order to preserve their judicial independence, they had to continue to have indoor parking spots, free, near the elevator.

Mr. Scott: Surely there must be more to the argument than that.

Senator Fraser: No, they were busy persons and did not want to have to walk the length of the garage nor pay for the space.

You have outlined a couple of interesting elements that suggest that, ultimately, the judiciary has come a long way, such as Justice Lamer's reference to an across-the-board freeze being fair, in particular.

I am trying to find out whether, in our present state, we could reasonably assume that, faced with cuts across the board, affecting everybody, in the situation of deflation or of dire budgetary stringency where government needs to reduce pay for everyone, the courts would sit still for that or stonewall.

aucune raison pour que les juges ne contribuent pas au leur. Une telle mesure n'a rien d'inconstitutionnel.

L'argumentation portait sur la constitution: les salaires doivent être fixes et ne peuvent être réduits. L'argument a été rejeté. Dans le contexte contemporain, une simple réduction ne prouve rien.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Il peut arriver qu'elle soit justifiée.

M. Scott: Elle peut être justifiée. On essaye de juxtaposer deux notions. Dans un autre exemple intéressant, on a présenté en Arizona un projet de loi à un moment où, d'une part, on parlait beaucoup des juges qui échappaient à tout contrôle — c'est ce qui se passe là-bas — et où, parallèlement, on disait aussi que les revenus des juges étaient trop élevés. Quand des sujets de cette nature font simultanément l'objet d'un débat public, la situation prête à confusion. On peut alors parler d'une véritable réduction.

Le sénateur Fraser: Dans le même ordre d'idées, j'étais en train de me demander ce que cela pouvait donner en pratique. Je trouve gênant de conférer à une profession le droit de déterminer sa propre rémunération, alors même que les salaires de ses membres proviennent du Trésor public.

Le sénateur Lawson: C'est pourtant ce que font les députés.

Le sénateur Fraser: Les députés doivent s'exposer à l'opinion publique, et c'est pourquoi ils sont si nerveux à chaque fois qu'ils envisagent d'augmenter leur rémunération. Ce n'est pas le cas des juges.

J'ai bien apprécié la remarque de la présidente, qui a dit que lorsqu'il est question d'une augmentation de salaire, si un juge s'oppose à un projet de loi, il n'obtient aucune augmentation. Il conserve le même salaire. Mais lorsqu'il est question d'une réduction, j'ai des doutes, car si un juge s'oppose au projet de loi, il évite une réduction de salaire. Il conserve ses acquis.

J'ai beaucoup de respect pour les juges, mais il me semble qu'une partie de leur sagesse — par exemple dans le cas des pensions que vous avez cité — s'envole en fumée lorsqu'il est question de leur propre intérêt. Il y a quelques années, à Montréal, les juges ont prétendu que pour préserver leur indépendance, il fallait continuer de leur accorder gratuitement des places dans un stationnement intérieur, à proximité de l'ascenseur.

M. Scott: Cela ne devait pas être leur seul argument.

Le sénateur Fraser: Non, ils ont dit qu'ils étaient très occupés et qu'ils ne voulaient pas avoir tout un stationnement à traverser, et qu'ils n'accepteraient pas de frais de stationnement.

Vous avez présenté divers facteurs intéressants qui semblent indiquer qu'en définitive, l'opinion de la magistrature a déjà évolué considérablement, par exemple lorsque le juge Lamer reconnaît qu'un gel de salaire n'est pas injuste.

J'aimerais savoir si les tribunaux resteraient sans bouger dans un contexte de déflation ou de difficulté budgétaire grave qui obligerait le gouvernement à réduire tous les salaires.

Mr. Scott: I am confident that they would sit still now. I do not know that they would have done so 10 years ago.

Senator Fraser: You think we have come that far?

Mr. Scott: Yes, I do.

Senator Fraser: You think we can read that into Justice Lamer's comments?

Mr. Scott: Yes. I do not have the language at hand, but he virtually says that. If you have an across-the-board treatment that affects everyone based on economic conditions, of course the judges would be required to accept it. It seems self-evident.

Senator Fraser: Of course, but parking spots near the elevator also seems self-evident to me.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Scott, for your help. You have kept the ball in our court.

Our next witness, Madame Lucie Laliberté, is a lawyer who has been doing research on women and pensions over the past 13 years. Her practice is focussed on family law. She is also the president of the Organization of Spouses of Military Members and has presented briefs on their behalf to the Government of the Province of Ontario, the House of Commons and the Senate Finance Committee. Ms Laliberté asked to appear before this committee because many of the proposed amendments in Bill C-37 are similar to those that she did research on for Bill C-35 and she thought that her experience would be of value to the committee, and the steering committee agreed.

Madame Laliberté, the floor is yours.

Ms Lucie Laliberté, Lawyer, Gahrns & Laliberté: I should like to raise one preliminary matter that arose from my discussions with the clerk before being allowed to appear here. I raised the issue that there is litigation on this matter before the courts at this time, and the clerk of the committee expressed some concern about that. For that reason I would like some direction.

I propose not to deal with the substance or the merits of the case, but it does relate specifically to the definition of "survivor benefit." I will keep my remarks limited to those issues that are raised in the case and also relate them to the issues that I found under Bill C-57.

Senator Beaudoin: Legally speaking, I do not see a big problem with this, if you are simply giving us the information you have in mind. As a committee of the Senate we have the right to hear witnesses. I understand your concern, but if you are prudent in your presentation, I do not see any problem.

Ms Laliberté: My concern was with the fact that the way it was presented to me, I might have declined to appear or I might have limited my presentation. I am a lawyer, so I worked my way around that. I appreciate your comments.

I will be speaking only to the issues relating to pension division and death benefits, including the survivor benefits in Bill C-57. I propose to start with a brief general comparison of the main provisions of the public service plans. The ones I am most

M. Scott: Je suis sûr qu'ils resteraient sans bouger aujourd'hui, alors que les choses auraient peut-être été différentes il y a 10 ans.

Le sénateur Fraser: Pensez-vous qu'on ait progressé à ce point?

M. Scott: Oui.

Le sénateur Fraser: Pensez-vous qu'on puisse interpréter en ce sens les commentaires du juge Lamer?

M. Scott: Oui, je n'ai pas son arrêt par-devers moi, mais c'est presque ce qu'il a dit. Lorsqu'une décision générale fondée sur le contexte économique a des conséquences pour tout le monde, les juges sont obligés de l'accepter. C'est l'évidence même.

Le sénateur Fraser: Bien sûr, mais les places de stationnement près de l'ascenseur me semblent aussi évidentes.

La présidente: Merci de votre aide, monsieur Scott. Vous avez gardé la balle de notre côté.

Notre témoin suivant, Mme Lucie Laliberté, est avocate; elle se consacre depuis plus de 13 ans à des recherches sur les femmes et la retraite. Elle est spécialisée en droit de la famille. Elle est également présidente de l'Organization of Spouses of Military Members, qu'elle a représentée auprès du gouvernement de l'Ontario, de la Chambre des communes et du comité sénatorial des finances. Mme Laliberté a demandé à comparaître devant notre comité parce que de nombreux amendements concernant le projet de loi C-37 sont semblables à des amendements concernant le projet de loi C-35 qu'elle a étudiés et elle a pensé que son expérience pouvait intéresser le comité; notre comité directeur lui a donné raison.

Madame Laliberté, vous avez la parole.

Mme Lucie Laliberté, avocate, Gahrns & Laliberté: Je voudrais soulever tout d'abord une question préliminaire dont j'ai parlé avec la greffière avant d'être autorisée à comparaître devant vous. J'ai signalé que cette question est actuellement devant les tribunaux et la greffière du comité s'en est inquiétée. Voilà pourquoi j'aimerais avoir votre avis.

Je me propose de ne traiter ni du fond, ni du bien-fondé de la question, mais tout porte spécifiquement sur la définition de la «prestation au survivant». Je limiterai mon propos aux questions soulevées dans cette affaire, dans le contexte des éléments découverts lors de l'étude du projet de loi C-57.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Sur le plan juridique, il ne devrait pas y avoir de problème si vous nous faites simplement part de l'information que vous avez à l'esprit. En tant que membres d'un comité sénatorial, nous avons le droit d'entendre des témoins. Je comprends vos craintes, mais si vous faites preuve de prudence dans votre exposé, il ne devrait pas y avoir de problème.

Mme Laliberté: Ce que je craignais, c'est que compte tenu de la façon dont l'invitation avait été présentée, je pouvais refuser de comparaître ou décider de limiter mon exposé. Je suis avocate, et j'ai donc résolu la difficulté. Je vous remercie de vos remarques.

Je ne vais parler que des questions concernant la division de la pension et des prestations de décès, y compris des prestations au survivant telles qu'elles apparaissent dans le projet de loi C-57. Je commencerai par comparer brièvement les principales dispositions



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(HANSARD)

Friday, November 6, 1998

Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent

CONTENTS

(Table of Contents appears at back of this issue.)

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Friday, November 6, 1998

The House met at 10 a.m.

Prayers

GOVERNMENT ORDERS

• (1000)

[*English*]

JUDGES ACT

Hon. Don Boudria (for the Minister of Justice) moved the second reading of, and concurrence in, amendments made by the Senate to Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts.

Ms. Eleni Bakopanos (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Lib.): Mr. Speaker, Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act, has come back to this House with amendments from the other House. The Senate and the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs gave serious consideration to all aspects of this important bill and heard from a number of witnesses who contributed a range of perspectives on certain issues of concern to the Senate.

On behalf of the government and the Minister of Justice I want to commend the senators for their diligent review of the issues. Here is an example of the necessity of having a Senate to review House legislation. According to this government the Senate did an excellent job.

The key elements of Bill C-37 were passed by the Senate, including important improvements to the judicial compensation and benefits commission process, necessary increases to current judicial salaries after years of salary freezes and a major expansion of unified family courts in Canada.

However, the Senate proposed and passed two substantive changes to Bill C-37 that relate to the definition of surviving spouse and the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission. The government is prepared to support these amendments for the following reasons.

With respect to survivor benefits, the Senate did not pass the provision in the bill relating to the change in definition of

surviving spouse to include common law spouses. The Scott commission recommended that survivors' annuities be extended to common law spouses "where legally appropriate".

• (1005)

However, the commission did not systematically review all of the ramifications of extending the entitlement to survivors' annuities. It was these ramifications that gave rise to concern and debate at Senate committee.

I want to point out that no one disagrees with extending the benefit to common law spouses. Rather, the issue that caused some public debate and a lot of debate in the Senate is the method by which this recognition is implemented.

[*Translation*]

In accepting the recommendation made by the Scott commission, the government had to consider its impact on specific cases, including the formula to be used when there are two surviving spouses.

In the public service sector, the solution chosen is to divide the pension between the two surviving spouses. This is the approach taken in the public service pension plan and in the pension plan for members of Parliament and senators. We felt this was a reasonable solution which ensured consistency with other federal pension plans.

[*English*]

However, before the Senate committee there was much discussion and disagreement on what was the best approach to be used in this case.

After due consideration the Senate committee did not feel that all of the issues had been sufficiently resolved and recommended that the new judicial compensation and benefits commission take a fresh look at the issue of judicial pensions and their treatment after marriage breakdown.

The Senate also heard arguments which suggested that the federal government has no constitutional authority to legislate over survivors' annuities.

It is important to indicate that the government's concurrence in this amendment is not to be taken as agreement with such a suggestion. The federal government does have the clear authority to deal with pension matters, including matters ancillary to the creation and administration of those pensions. We do not accept

Government Orders

the argument that the government is acting outside of its jurisdiction on this matter.

[*Translation*]

However, in light of the concerns expressed, we accept that it would be useful to have the new judicial compensation and benefits commission look at possible solutions for the specific case where there are two surviving spouses.

The purpose of this commission is to remove the political element in determining the benefits and compensation to be paid to judges. The commission will hear the opinions of a number of experts in pension plans and family law, and those of other concerned parties, before making recommendations on a formula for surviving spouses that is fair and consistent with the general practices in the area of pensions.

[*English*]

The Senate also gave very careful consideration to and ultimately approved the new commission process in Bill C-37. However, the Senate was of the view that the process would be further strengthened by the inclusion of certain express statutory criteria that would help define and clarify the scope of the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission.

The Senate amendment will provide, in the statute, for objective criteria that the commission must consider in reaching its recommendations.

[*Translation*]

The objective criteria cited were the following: the state of Canada's economy, including the cost of living, as well as the government's overall economic and financial situation; the role played by the financial security of judges in maintaining judicial independence; the need to recruit the best candidates for the bench; and any other objective factor it deems pertinent.

• (1010)

[*English*]

As a matter of practice, the mandate letters of prior triennial commissions have always specified express objective criteria that should be considered.

For the government and the minister there was never any doubt that this practice would continue. However, putting these criteria into the statute will make it clear to everyone that objective criteria will continue to be used in coming to recommendations on judicial compensation.

This amendment will, therefore, reinforce the objective nature of the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission.

[*Translation*]

The Senate also proposed a number of technical amendments regarding the wording of provisions in the bill, which do not

change its content but which clarify the original intention of the bill. The government also supports these amendments.

In conclusion, the government is in favour of these amendments to Bill C-37. Eliminating the definition of surviving spouse will allow the new commission to examine all the options for recognizing common-law spouses and to make recommendations for a fair and logical approach in cases where there are two surviving spouses.

The inclusion of obligatory criteria will help to clarify the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission and, as a result, will enhance the credibility and independence of this commission.

[*English*]

Bill C-37 will strengthen what is already one of the best judicial systems in the world. The improvements to the judicial compensation process will ensure continued public confidence in the independence of our judiciary.

The bill provides reasonable and fair compensation for our judges consistent with the important role they play in protecting the key values in our democratic society.

Increased judicial resources for unified family courts combined with provincial commitment of support services will improve the way our courts respond to families and children in crisis. The increase in the number of court of appeal judges will improve access to justice generally.

This bill will both enhance the independence of our courts and improve access to justice. These are goals which I am sure all Canadians support.

Mr. Chuck Cadman (Surrey North, Ref.): Mr. Speaker, I rise today to debate the government's concurrence motion on Senate amendments to Bill C-37.

For the record, this is the second occasion I have had the opportunity to state Reform's opposition to this bill. This is a bill which grants judges an unprecedented salary increase of 8.3% and establishes a judicial compensation and benefits commission.

The official opposition is grateful for the amendment put forward by our colleague from Crowfoot. We are grateful that it was supported and passed in this House during report stage of Bill C-37.

The Reform amendment ensures that every four years the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights has the opportunity to review the report of the commission on judges' salaries and benefits. This task will not be left solely to the Minister of Justice as originally contemplated by the government.

However, this amendment has not swayed our opposition to the bill. It has simply made it more palatable. The Reform Party still stands firmly opposed to Bill C-37.

As stated repeatedly in this House during all stages of the bill, other public servants and Canadians in general have not been afforded the same wage increase as that granted to the judges by Bill C-37. At a time when Canadian incomes continue to decline we cannot support such an unprecedented hike in salary.

According to a June 10 Ottawa *Citizen* article, family incomes are still dropping and as a result Canadians need to stretch the family budget to keep a roof over their heads. While housing costs eased during the first half of the decade, family income declined even more. That nudged a proportion of Canadians who spend at least 30% of their income on shelter to one in four households, or almost 2.8 million households. These findings, released by Statistics Canada, were derived from the 1996 census.

Another *Citizen* article, published on the same date, revealed that more and more two-parent families had both parents in the workforce in 1996, while at the same time the number of children left at home was increasing.

• (1015)

Statistics Canada reported that the overall lower income among Canadians in 1996 was the reason both parents were being forced into the labour market. Stats Canada has also reported that the majority of Canadian children, 4.8 million under the age of 15, lived in two parent families in 1996. Of those children 60% had both parents in the workforce, up from 43% in 1981.

In light of this information regarding the income of Canadians, in good conscience the Reform Party cannot support the bill. In the same vein we cannot support the government's concurrence in the Senate amendments.

I recognize the thorough job the Senate did in reviewing the bill and the substantive amendments put forward by the upper house. In particular I single out Liberal Senator Anne Cools for her diligent efforts in revealing the inadequacies of the bill.

Senator Cools rightfully exposed the fact that Bill C-37 effectively allows judges to set their own salaries and perks. In doing so it sets up the possibility of there being a showdown between parliament and the judiciary because it allows judges to appeal parliament's decision regarding a recommended salary increase in the courts. Essentially judges could have the final say over whether parliamentarians are giving them a sufficient raise.

Although former judicial pay commissioner David Scott has said that it is unlikely judges would be setting their own salaries, he has not ruled out the possibility of the judiciary challenging parliament's response to the commission's recommendations.

The judiciary would have to prove, however, in a court that the refusal to increase salaries or a decision to lower them was

motivated by a wish to diminish the independence of judges. Mr. Scott said that even if the judges won in such a case the court could only declare parliament's motion on the issue void, which may result in a stalemate.

As pointed out by the Liberal senator this will:

—deprive Canadians of their undoubted constitutional right to the representative assembly's control over the public purse in respect of judicial salaries.

Clearly control of the public purse rests with parliament and not with the judiciary. Section 100 of the 1867 Constitution Act states in part:

The salaries, allowances and pensions of the judges... shall be fixed and provided by the Parliament of Canada.

Clause 6 of Bill C-37 potentially abolishes the true parliamentary role in the fixing of judges salaries. We must obviously question why the Minister of Justice has bestowed such potentially wielding powers on the judiciary in Bill C-37.

One can only surmise, and again I use the thoughts and words of Senator Cools when she said:

The real intent (of Bill C-37) is to remove parliament from the process.... There is a problem in that certain particular judges seem to crave a closeness to certain individuals in the Department of Justice and are trying to cling, closer and closer, to the executive rather than to parliament. In other words, honourable senators, what is happening here is that 200 years of history are being turned on their head, and we are being told in this judgment that, quite frankly, judges prefer their fate to be in the hands of the executive rather than in the hands of parliament. It is a most curious and interesting subject matter.

I will turn specifically to the amendments put forward by the Senate. Amendments 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 delete all the clauses referring to two spouses. Bill C-37, as originally drafted by the Department of Justice, created a legal right for a judge to have two spouses. The two spouses clause was meant to deal with a circumstance in which a married judge separates from his or her partner, moves into a common law relationship with another person and then dies. Once law, it would allow a judge to have both spouses, married and common law, eligible for the lucrative pension payouts and divide the money between them when the judge dies.

Additionally the common law spouse would collect the one time payout of one-sixth of the judge's annual salary at the time of death.

Former Supreme Court Justice Willard Estey has said that these particular Bill C-37 amendments would give his former colleagues on the bench the right to a kind of home-made harem. It would, Estey said:

—effectively create two separate sets of family law—one for judges and one for everyone else.

It has been well established that situations such as the one contemplated in Bill C-37 are rare. One therefore must question why such a clause was put in Bill C-37. Critics have suggested that this clause was tailor made for Chief Justice LeSage who is

Government Orders

separated from his wife and has resided for about one year with Judge Lang. If Chief Justice LeSage were to die, the new amendment would allow both Judge Lang and Mrs. LeSage to qualify as his surviving spouses and share his pension.

• (1020)

As pointed out earlier, Senator Cools, as well as many others, have surmised that Bill C-37 appears tailored to fit particular individuals. Senator Cools said:

We have a situation in the country where certain individuals have access to the legislative writing machine. That is bothersome.

This certainly is not the first time the government has tailor made legislation. Previous amendments to the Judges Act introduced during the last parliament under Bill C-42 set out terms in which Canadian judges could participate in international activities, although it was never explicitly admitted by the government—it was no secret—that those amendments to the Judges Act arose due to the appointment of Madam Justice Louise Arbour to the United Nations as prosecutor for the War Crimes Commission.

I commend the Senate and support those amendments eliminating this tailor made clause of Bill C-37, clauses which, as stated by Senator Cools, “script their sins into the laws of the nation”.

We do not support, however, Amendment No. 3 which adds subclauses to clause 6 of Bill C-37. Clause 6 establishes the judicial compensation and benefits commission. These subclauses effectively expand the powers of the commission, powers which were not contemplated or countenanced in the original bill. Specifically we take issue with section (1.1)(a) which reads:

In conducting its inquiry, the commission shall consider (a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government.

What exactly does this mean? How expansive are the powers of the commission? Does the reference to the current financial position of the federal government mean the commission will have the power to call the Minister of Finance before it to question him on our financial status? If such powers are vested with the commission, it is setting a dangerous precedent, a precedent the official opposition cannot support.

During his appearance before the Senate committee reviewing Bill C-37 former commission chairman David Scott clearly questioned statutorily defining criteria as proposed by the Senate. In fact Mr. Scott went so far as to say:

I am not sure what the relevant criteria would be.... I am not saying that there should not be any criteria, but once you start down the road of developing criteria, you may create a monster.

Clearly the Senate's amendment goes against the advice of the former commissioner.

As stated earlier, the official opposition does not support the government's concurrence motion. Nor do we support any expansion of the commission's powers, powers which were not originally contemplated by the government and the House.

A decision of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island forced the federal government to establish a judicial compensation commission. Bill C-37, as originally introduced, meets that legal obligation. Senate Amendment No. 3 is therefore unnecessary.

I caution the government's wisdom in accepting all the Senate amendments, particularly given the expanded powers of the commission which may involve additional time and travel for their inquiries, time and travel which may cost additional expenditure of funds that were not originally contemplated by the royal recommendation of Bill C-37. I am not emphatically stating that there is a violation. I am simply raising a flag for the record.

In closing, I reiterate the Reform Party's position. We stand opposed to Senate Amendment No. 3. We stand opposed to the outrageous salary increase for judges at a time when financial pressures on Canadian families continue to increase as their quality of life decreases.

It is incredible that we sit in this place in consideration of a windfall increase in pay for judges while in my home province of British Columbia public safety is being put at risk through reduced law enforcement due to the gutting of RCMP budgets.

In my constituency a police car which sustains more than \$4,000 damage is parked because there is no money to get it repaired. There is not enough money to replace worn tires on patrol cars, putting both police and public at risk. Store owners fear loss of business as customers run a gauntlet of crack cocaine dealers because police lack the money and resources to deal effectively with them.

We stand opposed to the concurrence motion.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg, BQ): Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to Bill C-37, as amended by the Senate.

It is often said that what is clearly understood can be clearly expressed. With this in mind, let me outline the Bloc Québécois' position. We oppose Bill C-37. However, while the amendments put forward by our brave colleagues in the Senate are a step in the right direction, we think many more amendments would be required and much more work would have to be done on this bill before the Bloc Québécois could consider supporting it.

• (1025)

On October 22, the Senate made eight amendments to the bill. We are opposed to the principle of raising federal judges' salaries

Government Orders

by approximately 13%, which is unacceptable to us in the Bloc Québécois, and that is why we oppose the bill.

On the other hand, we are in favour of establishing the Judicial Benefits and Compensation Commission. We are also in favour of the Senate amendments for the following reasons: a number of these amendments would bring the French and English versions of the bill more in line with one another, while one other amendment clarifies the mandate of the commission being established by the federal government.

This amendment explicitly sets out what we believe was the implicit mandate of the Judicial Benefits and Compensation Commission. In our view, these explicit criteria are positive and fair.

For the Bloc Québécois, the most crucial of these amendments is the one deleting clause 1 of Bill C-37. Clause 1 defines the term "surviving spouse" and, for constitutional reasons, we are opposed to the inclusion of surviving spouses in Bill C-37.

In this respect, we support the explanation given to the committee by Professor Jamie Cameron of Osgoode Hall. According to Professor Cameron, while it is the responsibility of the federal government to set benefits for federally appointed judges, the provinces have a similar responsibility with respect to matrimonial property and the division of assets in an estate.

Pensions are included in matrimonial property under family and estate distribution law. This raises the question of whether the federal government has jurisdiction to legislate the division of estate assets by defining the expression "surviving spouse" and with all the rights accorded subsequently in the bill according to the definition of "surviving spouse".

According to Ms. Cameron, and the Bloc Québécois completely supports this position, the federal government is encroaching on provincial jurisdiction over matrimonial and estate property.

Accordingly, we support the amendments eliminating clause 1, which defines "surviving spouse" and the clauses pertaining to the rights of surviving spouses.

The purpose of the bill is to amend the Judges Act in order to increase judges' salaries and to change the criteria governing pension plan eligibility. The bill also establishes the Judicial Benefits and Compensation Commission.

Finally, the bill provides for more judges in appeal and unified family courts. The bill is the Liberal government's response to the 1995 triennial commission on judges' salaries and benefits, also known as the Scott commission.

In 1981, Parliament provided for the creation of independent commissions with a mandate to confirm that the pay and benefits of judges were sufficient in view of the importance of judicial

independence and the unique role given judges by the Canadian Constitution.

On September 18, 1997, in a reference regarding the remuneration of provincial court justices in Prince Edward Island, which pertained to the independence and impartiality of these justices, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of these independent commissions, which establish a vital link between two government powers: the executive and the judicial. The court also pointed out the constitutional obligation to set magistrates' salaries.

The commission's recommendations are not binding on the government, but the court judgment requires a reasonable and public justification to be provided if the recommendations are rejected, before a court of law if necessary.

The 1995 Scott Commission I have already referred to recommended a progressive 8.3% increase, and the Liberal government accepted that recommendation in its bill by proposing 4.1% yearly for two years.

Moreover, in determining what was reasonable, the Scott Commission acknowledged that a complex and broad range of factors needed to be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate pay level, including the need of pay levels capable of attracting and retaining the most qualified candidates for the office of judge.

The report is based on the relationship between judges' salaries and those of lawyers in private practice, since this is the source of most candidates for the office of judge.

Section 25 of the Judges Act calls for annual adjustments to judges' salaries based on the increase in the industrial aggregate, up to a maximum of seven per cent.

• (1030)

Judges' salaries were frozen between December 1992 and March 31, 1997, under the Public Service Compensation Restraint Act.

Our objection to the Scott report is that it is based solely on federal economic activity indicators, and not on the economic sectors most heavily affected since the 1993 cuts. In our opinion, the most fundamental question is whether we should be putting books back into the schools and beds back into the hospitals, or raising the salaries of high court judges already earning \$155,800. These are hardly starvation wages, after all.

To sum up the Bloc Québécois' position on Bill C-37, we think that the Liberal government has already achieved its zero deficit, but we all know it did so on the backs of the provinces, unemployed workers and the most disadvantaged members of our society.

The Minister of Justice may well want to reward judges by increasing their salaries, but she would do better to persuade her colleague, the Minister of Finance, to compensate the provinces

Government Orders

for the cuts to health, welfare and post-secondary education transfer payments.

The Bloc Québécois puts other priorities ahead of raising judges' salaries. None of us is in any doubt that judges work hard, but they are far from the only ones doing so.

It is for these reasons that the Bloc Québécois is opposed to the principle of increasing judges' salaries. We are in favour of creating an independent commission, but we cannot go along with this lapse in solidarity and vision in an economic context where the provinces have borne the brunt of the federal government's fight to eliminate the deficit.

Naturally, we have heard the government's arguments that the most competent lawyers must be attracted to the bench, and we fully agree. But judges too are members of society, and as such must take part in the collective effort. Even though the federal deficit has been eliminated, the \$500 billion debt is still hanging over our heads.

Instead of increasing judges' salaries, the government could have given the money to the provinces to buy hospital beds and to help the most disadvantaged members of our society.

The supplementary estimates tabled last Wednesday also indicate that the Canadian unity group at Justice, one of whose responsibilities is the reference to the Supreme Court, is costing Canadian and Quebec taxpayers \$700,000. Again, this money could have paid for many hospital beds and many meals on the tables of the most disadvantaged members of our society.

Today, therefore, I am calling on the Minister of Justice to withdraw her bill and to use the money instead to compensate the provinces for the unjust cuts they have suffered since this Liberal government took office.

[English]

Mr. Peter Mancini (Sydney—Victoria, NDP): Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the Senate amendments to Bill C-37.

I reviewed some of the comments that I made on behalf of my party some time ago when this bill was first introduced. I compared this piece of legislation to a recipe that my grandfather brought to this country from Italy some time ago. I said that as much as my grandfather would try to pass that recipe onto his children, when he would taste the sauce he would say "You got a little bit of it right and whole lot of it wrong". I said that this bill was very similar to that sauce.

The Senate has added a dash a salt but nothing particularly to improve the flavour of this legislation. What remains tragic is that with this legislation there was an opportunity for the government to address some fundamental issues.

I will pick up on the comments of my colleague from Charlebourg. He talked about cutbacks in the provinces. He talked about hospital beds. He talked about the kinds of things that matter to Canadians at a time when this government is determined that we should give judges a substantial increase in their salaries.

I am not going to talk so much about hospital beds. I am going to talk about the justice system and where those funds might be better funnelled at a time of increasing demands on the courts, at a time when we are looking at a role for victims to play in the courts, at a time when crown prosecutors who have to enforce the laws are finding their hands tied because of lack of resources, and at a time when the RCMP and law enforcement agencies are finding their budgets slashed.

• (1035)

When we are determining how the very sparse funds have to be divided up, increasing the judges' salary at this point in time when this country has other problems is perhaps not the wisest and most judicial, if you will, use of funds.

I sit on the custody and access committee. One complaint we have heard continually is that when there is a dispute in family law it cannot be resolved for months because of the backlog in cases. There is a lack of legal aid availability for parties who are seeking to bring their matters before the court. There is a lack of court clerks. There is a lack of all kinds of necessary instruments to bring matters to court and to have them resolved quickly. When matters are not resolved quickly before the courts, it results in increased tension between the parties. The parties take matters into their own hands and there is increased concern.

These funds might have been better spent in improving the justice system in the provinces. That is in the family law courts. Let us look at the criminal courts.

More and more powers are being delegated to provincial court judges with fewer and fewer resources. Again this means longer waiting times for court hearings. It does no good for the accused, who lives under a cloud of suspicion while waiting for his or her day in court. It does no good for the victim, who waits for months and months in a system he or she never asked to end up in the first place.

The cuts to the provinces have resulted in increased waiting times in both the criminal and family courts.

Also, as has been raised by this side of the House, the RCMP training centre out west is being closed down. I am meeting with a group of people in my own riding next Monday when the House is down. Seniors in my riding have been told that when they press an alarm, it will only be responded to if the person pressing the alarm can guarantee that there is a break and enter.

Government Orders

I practised criminal law for some time. It was a rare occasion when one could say to the criminal breaking into the home "Hold on for a minute while I call the police to confirm that you are here. Would you take the phone and let the RCMP know that there is a reason for them to come". I do not blame the RCMP officers for this. The reality is that they do not have the resources to respond unless they can be sure there is a crime taking place. At the same time that this is happening, we are increasing the wages for some of the wealthiest people in this country. I again question whether that is the best use of resources.

There was also a golden opportunity, which I have spoken to the Minister of Justice about, to review the method of appointment of judges. The parliamentary secretary has said in support of some of the Senate amendments that the criteria in terms of determining judicial compensation ought to be accepted and it is something the government looks favourably on. I would suggest we ought to revamp the criteria for the appointment of judges before we revamp the criteria for increasing their salaries and determining whether they ought to get it.

This country has some very good judges. I do not want to diminish that for a moment. The late Justice Dickson was an example of a fine judge. He moved this country forward in his position as a supreme court justice. There are hundreds of good judges in this country.

Every now and then we hear about an appointment to the court that is simply a patronage appointment. It is well known certainly on the east coast and in the province I come from that part of how one gets to the judiciary is to make the right contributions to the parties in power.

• (1040)

Just this summer there was an appointment of a judge to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. Prior to her being a judge, she started her career as a lawyer and a keen organizer for the Liberal Party. The reward for that was an appointment to the public utility board in Nova Scotia which paid some \$75,000 a year up until the age of 75. This was a pretty nice plum and everybody thought she was satisfied with that. As it turned out, she was a classmate of the Minister of Justice, I think the year behind. She was not too happy on the utility board and found herself appointed to the supreme court. That appointment met with considerable criticism in the province. It was not the only one.

That is unfair to the judges who legitimately serve this country well, who achieve their appointment on merit. We need to have a discussion about this. I have indicated to the Minister of Justice that there ought to be a subcommittee of the justice committee that can explore and ensure a fair method of the appointment of the judiciary. Citizens look to the judiciary in some ways to set the moral standards of the country. They look to parliamentarians. They look to people in authority.

This is a time when we are talking about youth crime and young offenders who appear before judges. It is very difficult to present to them the argument that the society we want them to participate in is one that is fair and just if some of the very people they appear before received their positions on the bench not because of their understanding of criminal, family or contract law, but because of their connections to particular parties. This was a missed opportunity.

Some of the amendments that were put forward by members of the justice committee from the Reform Party and the Bloc party were good. It is too bad that the government could not have supported them. It did support one of those amendments. The amendment put forward by the Bloc which had to do with the actual pay increase would have been well received. It is too bad that the government did not choose to accept that in the same way it accepted the amendments from the Senate.

Mr. Mark Muise (West Nova, PC): Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak on the Senate amendments to Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act and other consequential acts.

It is nice to see the upper chamber bringing forth amendments that we believe will only benefit this bill. This is further proof that the other place continues to play a vital role in Canadian politics. It is also proof that although the Liberal government likes to ram bills through with little consultation, it does not always work.

Nevertheless, our party is encouraged by the provisions contained in Bill C-37. These amendments will improve the independence, the objectivity and the effectiveness of the salary and benefits commission process.

Clause 6 of the proposed amendments will for the most part strengthen the judiciary. For example, the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary will not only enhance the credibility of the judiciary but it will also enhance the process.

The Progressive Conservative Party is encouraged by the provisions which make the appointments less bureaucratic and more democratic.

This commission will consist of three people, of which one will be appointed by the Minister of Justice. The other would be appointed or nominated if you will, by the judiciary, while the chair would be named by the two previously mentioned.

I stand by my remarks from last March when I first spoke on this bill. I believed then as I do now that a better, more accountable way of appointing people to this committee would be to enable the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to nominate a member to sit on the commission. Such a process would not only

Government Orders

improve the transparency, but it would also eliminate some of the patronage that goes on during these appointments.

As for the deletion of section 45 of the act, the joint and survivor provisions, it will rightfully entitle the respective provincial governments to handle the salary and benefits situation as it relates to spouses according to the province in which the judge respectfully works.

An example of this is in Quebec where common law marriages are not recognized. Should Quebec judges be penalized for working in Quebec? No, they certainly should not be. This amendment will ensure equality for all judges right across the country as it relates to their place of work and residency.

• (1045)

By keeping central control in the confines of the provincial government, we believe it is more practical to apply a case by case process as it pertains to individual judges. Narrowing the scope eliminates the possibility for difficulty and confusion down the road. This legislation has invoked a great deal of passion and provocative commentary within the House, and to some extent a great deal of righteous indignation on the part of some.

It is important to focus on the role of judges and the important tasks they are charged to perform. We have previously debated the important question of the separation of power in society. My party strongly believes judicial independence is the cornerstone of our democracy. There is no question that we as parliamentarians may not always agree with a court's decision, but it is our job to respect and uphold the system in place for the good of the country and the citizens we represent.

However, it cannot be stated strongly enough or with enough emotion the importance of having our judges remain independent of the elected body. We as parliamentarians are elected as opposed to appointed judges. A balance needs to be struck to eliminate the practice of governments, in particular majority governments, using heavy handed measures the judiciary is called to investigate.

My party is comfortable supporting the amendments brought forth today because they give guidelines to the commission that will ultimately strengthen the judiciary and present guidelines for the way salaries are set. Furthermore, we believe in an independent commission setting the judges' salaries. The provisions regarding spousal pension benefits are nothing but beneficial to the law and the process. Therefore I would ask that the other parties here today agree to the amendments brought forth.

The Deputy Speaker: Is the House ready for the question?

Some hon. members: Question.

The Deputy Speaker: The question is on the motion. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

Some hon. members: No.

The Deputy Speaker: All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.

Some hon. members: Yea.

The Deputy Speaker: All those opposed will please say nay.

Some hon. members: Nay.

The Deputy Speaker: In my opinion the yeas have it.

And more than five members having risen:

The Deputy Speaker: Pursuant to Standing Order 45, the vote is deferred until Monday, November 16 at the ordinary time of adjournment.

* * *

FIRST NATIONS LAND MANAGEMENT ACT

The House resumed from November 5 consideration of the motion that Bill C-49, an act providing for the ratification and the bringing into effect of the framework agreement on first nation land management, be read the second time and referred to a committee; and of the amendment.

Mr. Roy Bailey (Souris—Moose Mountain, Ref.): Mr. Speaker, I will continue my delivery from yesterday. I was discussing some of the many injustices that have taken place in the past. I will deal specifically with the land claims agreement in Saskatchewan and how it continues to fail daily in terms of the obligation of this government. It drives the wedge, a feeling of inequality, between rural Saskatchewan and this government. I am talking about a debt owed by this government to the rural areas of Saskatchewan.


Let us go back 10 years.

• (1050)

A promise was made to the rural governments of Saskatchewan that when the natives would acquire Indian land, the RMs would be paid 22.5 times the assessment for the land taken out of the assessment role.

In other words, the deal was that they would get 22.5 years of taxes in lieu of services they provided. When this government came into power, it changed this so that the rural municipalities of Saskatchewan get a mere 5 years taxes.

That is an injustice. The debt owed to the RMs is owed by the government and the people of Canada. It is a national debt.



First Session
Thirty-sixth Parliament, 1997-98

Première session de la
trente-sixième législature, 1997-1998

SENATE OF CANADA

SÉNAT DU CANADA

*Proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on*

*Délibérations du comité
sénatorial permanent des*

Legal and Constitutional Affairs

Affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles

Chairman:
The Honourable LORNA MILNE

Présidente:
L'honorable LORNA MILNE

Thursday, October 22, 1998

Le jeudi 22 octobre 1998

Issue No. 37

Fascicule n° 37

Sixth and last meeting on:
Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act
and to make consequential amendments
to other Acts

Sixième et dernière réunion concernant:
L'étude du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi
sur les juges et d'autres lois
en conséquence

INCLUDING:
THE FOURTEENTH REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE (Bill C-37)

Y COMPRIS:
LE QUATORZIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(projet de loi C-37)

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

The Honourable Lorna Milne, *Chairman*

The Honourable Pierre Claude Nolin, *Acting Deputy Chairman*

and

The Honourable Senators:

| | |
|----------------|------------------------|
| Balfour | Johnstone |
| Beaudoin | Joyal, P.C. |
| Buchanan, P.C. | * Lynch-Staunton |
| Eyton | (or Kinsella (acting)) |
| Fraser | Moore |
| Grafstein | Pépin |

* Graham, P.C. (or Carstairs)

* *Ex Officio Members*

(Quorum 4)

Changes in membership of the committee:

Pursuant to rule 85(4), membership of the committee was amended as follows:

The name of the Honourable Senator Grafstein was added (October 22, 1998).

The name of the Honourable Senator Johnstone was substituted for that of the Honourable Senator Bryden (October 22, 1998 — 11:25 a.m.)

LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DES
AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES ET CONSTITUTIONNELLES

Présidente: L'honorable Lorna Milne

Vice-président suppléant: L'honorable Pierre Claude Nolin

et

Les honorables sénateurs:

| | |
|----------------|---------------------------|
| Balfour | Johnstone |
| Beaudoin | Joyal, c.p. |
| Buchanan, c.p. | * Lynch-Staunton |
| Eyton | (ou Kinsella (suppléant)) |
| Fraser | Moore |
| Grafstein | Pépin |

* Graham, c.p. (ou Carstairs)

* *Membres d'office*

(Quorum 4)

Modifications à la composition du comité:

Conformément à l'article 85(4) du Règlement, la liste des membres du comité est modifiée, ainsi qu'il suit:

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Grafstein est ajouté (le 22 octobre 1998).

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Johnstone est substitué à celui de l'honorable sénateur Bryden (le 22 octobre 1998 — 11 h 25).

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The question being put on the motion by Senator Nolin, it was agreed.

After debate on the motion by Senator Joyal, it was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That the motion be amended, in the English version, new subclause 1.1, paragraph *d*), to read:

“any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.”

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That the motion be further amended, in the French version, new subclause 1.1, paragraph *d*), to read:

“tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.”

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That Bill C-37 be further amended in clause 6, on page 4, by replacing line 14 with the following:

“a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.”

The question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was agreed — That clause 6, as amended, carry.

It was agreed — That clause 7 carry.

It was agreed — That clause 8 carry.

It was agreed — That clause 9 not carry.

It was agreed — That clause 10 not carry.

It was agreed — That clause 11 not carry.

After debate, it was agreed — That clauses 12 to 20 carry.

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That Bill C-37 be amended in clause 21, on page 13, by replacing lines 1 to 3 with the following:

“21. Sections 2, 3 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or”.

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was agreed — That clause 21, as amended, carry.

It was agreed — That the Title carry.

It was agreed — That the Bill, as amended, carry.

It was agreed — That the clauses be renumbered appropriately.

La question, mise aux voix par le sénateur Nolin, est adoptée.

Après discussion de la motion du sénateur Joyal, il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que la motion soit modifiée dans sa version anglaise et que l'alinéa *d*) du nouveau paragraphe 1.1 soit le suivant:

«any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.»

Après discussion, la question mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que la motion soit modifiée, dans sa version française, et que l'alinéa *d*) du nouveau paragraphe 1.1 soit le suivant:

«tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.»

Après discussion, la question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 6, soit modifié, à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13 de ce qui suit:

«(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au».

La question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 6 ainsi modifié soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 7 soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 8 soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 9 ne soit pas adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 10 ne soit pas adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 11 ne soit pas adopté.

Après discussion, il est convenu — Que les articles 12 à 20 soient adoptés.

Il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié par substitution aux lignes 3 à 5, à la page 13, de ce qui suit:

«21. Les articles 2, 3, 7 et 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date».

Après discussion, la question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 21 ainsi modifié soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que le titre soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que le projet de loi ainsi modifié soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que les articles soient renumérotés en conséquence.

It was agreed — That Bill C-37 be reported to the Senate, as amended.

Il est convenu — Qu'il soit fait rapport au Sénat du projet de loi C-37 ainsi modifié.

At 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

À 12 h 20, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

ATTEST:

ATTESTÉ:

La greffière du comité,

Heather Lank

Clerk of the Committee

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

THURSDAY, October 22, 1998

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs has the honour to present its

FOURTEENTH REPORT

Your Committee, to which was referred Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, has, in obedience to the Order of Reference of Tuesday, September 22, 1998, examined the said Bill and now reports the same with the following amendments:

1. *Page 1, Clause 1:* Delete Clause 1 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
2. *In the French version, Page 3, Clause 6:* Replace line 4 with the following:
 «de la rémunération des juges chargée».
3. *Page 3, Clause 6:* Add after line 7, on page 3, the following:
 «(1.1) In conducting its inquiry, the Commission shall consider
 - (a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government;
 - (b) the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence;
 - (c) the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary; and
 - (d) any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.»
4. *Page 4, Clause 6:* Replace line 14 with the following:
 «a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.»
5. *Page 6, Clause 9:* Delete Clause 9 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
6. *Pages 6, 7 and 8: Clause 10:* Delete Clause 10 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
7. *Page 8, Clause 11:* Delete Clause 11 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
8. *Page 13, Clause 21:* Replace lines 1 to 3 with the following:
 «21. Sections 2, 3, 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or».

Respectfully submitted,

La présidente,

LORNA MILNE

Chair

RAPPORT DU COMITÉ

Le JEUDI 22 octobre 1998

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles a l'honneur de présenter son

QUATORZIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, auquel a été déféré le projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence, a, conformément à l'ordre de renvoi du mardi 22 septembre 1998, étudié ledit projet de loi et en fait maintenant rapport avec les modifications suivantes:

1. *Page 1, article 1:* supprimer l'article 1 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
2. Dans la version française, Page 3, article 6: substituer la ligne 4 par ce qui suit:
 «de la rémunération des juges chargée».
3. *Page 3, article 6:* ajouter après la ligne 9, page 3, ce qui suit:
 «(1.1) La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:
 - a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;
 - b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;
 - c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;
 - d) tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.»
4. *Page 4, article 6:* substituer la ligne 13, par ce qui suit:
 «(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au».
5. *Page 6, article 9:* supprimer l'article 9 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
6. Pages 6 et 7, article 10: supprimer l'article 10 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
7. Page 8, article 11: supprimer l'article 11 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
8. Page 13, article 21: substituer les lignes 3 à 5 par ce qui suit:
 «21. Les articles 2, 3, 7 et 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date».

Respectueusement soumis,

EVIDENCE

OTTAWA, Thursday, October 22, 1998

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, to which was referred Bill C-37, to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, met this day at 11:05 a.m. to give consideration to the bill.

Senator Lorna Milne (*Chairman*) in the Chair.

[*English*]

The Chairman: This meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs is now in session. We will proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37, to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts.

Senator Moore: Honourable senators, I move that the committee complete clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37.

Senator Cools: Before we move to clause-by-clause consideration, I wish to raise a question of privilege.

Senator Grafstein: To be fair, Senator Cools did declare her intention in advance of the motion. I would hope that Senator Moore could withhold his motion so that Senator Cools has an opportunity to make her statement.

The Chairman: That is quite right.

Senator Cools, the floor is yours.

Senator Cools: Thank you for your consideration. In any event, it has always been my understanding that questions of privilege take precedence.

We had an interesting situation yesterday where, as a committee, we engaged in some unusual methodology. In hearing from Department of Justice officials, certain senators indicated their intention to bring forward motions. The content and intent of the motions were worthy. However, I questioned the procedural technique that was being used. I have never really encountered a situation where there is a public discussion between department officials and members about their intentions to bring certain motions.

I will agree with the motions when they are actually brought forth.

Yesterday, we had a discussion, without the motion, to discuss the subject matter being before us. Those questions were raised briefly and not as sufficiently as I would have liked because I did not want to resort to the technique of formally making a point of order or any more strenuous procedural technique. I thought the appeal to common sense and to our customs would have prevailed.

My concern about the techniques used yesterday has been heightened. Information has come into my possession that many of the interested judges — those who would be affected by these provisions — have known for quite some time that these clauses — what I have learned to call the “spousal clauses” — will be deleted.

TÉMOIGNAGES

OTTAWA, le jeudi 22 octobre 1998

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles, auquel a été renvoyé le projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence, se réunit aujourd'hui à 11 h 05 pour en étudier la teneur.

Le sénateur Lorna Milne (*présidente*) occupe le fauteuil.

[*Traduction*]

La présidente: Je déclare ouverte cette séance du comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles. Nous procéderons à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence.

Le sénateur Moore: Honorables sénateurs, je propose que le comité procède à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-37.

Le sénateur Cools: Avant de passer à l'étude article par article, j'aimerais soulever une question de privilège.

Le sénateur Grafstein: En toute justice, le sénateur Cools avait fait part de son intention avant le dépôt de la motion. J'espère que le sénateur Moore peut différer sa motion de manière à ce que le sénateur Cools puisse faire sa déclaration.

La présidente: C'est tout à fait juste.

Sénateur Cools, vous avez la parole.

Le sénateur Cools: Merci. De toute façon, j'ai toujours cru que les questions de privilège avaient préséance.

Il s'est passé quelque chose d'intéressant hier alors qu'à ce comité, nous avons fait quelque chose d'inhabituel. Lors de l'audition de hauts fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice, certains sénateurs ont manifesté leur intention de déposer des motions dont le contenu et l'intention étaient louables. Cependant, je mets en doute la façon de procéder. Il ne m'est jamais arrivé d'assister à un débat public entre des hauts fonctionnaires du ministère et des membres d'un comité au sujet de leur intention de déposer certaines motions.

J'appuierai les motions lorsqu'elles seront bel et bien déposées.

Hier, nous avons parlé, sans la motion, de discuter du sujet du projet de loi qui nous a été confié. Ces questions ont été soulevées brièvement et pas autant que je l'aurais voulu parce que je ne n'ai pas voulu en venir à formuler officiellement une objection ou à recourir à une procédure beaucoup plus ardue. J'ai cru que l'appel à notre sens commun et à nos coutumes aurait prévalu.

Mon inquiétude au sujet des méthodes employées hier s'est accrue. Selon les renseignements dont je dispose, bon nombre des juges intéressés — ceux qui seraient visés par ces dispositions — savaient depuis un certain temps que ces articles — ce que j'appelle maintenant les «dispositions relatives au conjoint» — seront supprimées.

As far as I am concerned, when one has had a political victory, one never does complain. I am pleased that reason, common sense, and judiciousness have prevailed and that certain individuals have recognized that these clauses were indeed very questionable and suspicious, not to mention embarrassing, and that they were sadly in need of amendment. I am also pleased that, after several weeks of effort, the minister has finally conceded that something was very wrong and that she herself was prepared to accept changes, mainly the deletion of those clauses from Bill C-37.

However, having said that, I believe that some "impropriety", and perhaps that is not the appropriate word, but a less-than-parliamentary occurrence has taken place. That, I believe, should be brought to the attention of members of this committee. To me, it is most distressing and vexing that certain interested judges and other interested parties will have information about the deletion or amendment of these clauses far in advance of the members of the Senate themselves knowing, or far in advance of any formal, procedural, or parliamentary activity to implement those wishes.

As I said before, this is not the first time that I have worked on committees and encountered this situation. For example, last year before our committee reached its clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-41, certain persons at the Department of Justice, or whoever, had already put certain information into the public domain.

Let me be clear so no one would, for a moment, suggest that I am opposed to freedom of the press: I am a great believer in freedom of the press. My concern is that this information has been made available to interested judges and that there are currently separation agreements, and whatever other agreements being entered into, based on information which certain people have received. I find that very questionable.

It seems to me that, if we are doing proper and judicious work, which we have been doing, the formal process of Parliament should be allowed to function without the unnecessary, inconvenient or inappropriate release of information to interested individuals. This question is usually raised quite publicly when the Minister of Finance is preparing a budget.

I raise this as a question of privilege. I believe that there has been an impropriety, that there has been a breach, and that it is indeed unfortunate that information is out and available before senators have been informed, or before any senator has moved a motion in this committee to basically delete those clauses.

An additional consideration is that, frequently in committee and in the chamber, I raise the issue of constant, ongoing, persistent, and insistent contact between certain persons, whomever they may be, at the Department of Justice and certain judges of this land. I find it extremely disturbing and unhelpful that this information is in the hands of certain parties prior to it being in my hands.

To that extent, I consider this to be a very serious breach of my privileges here. As I said before, I support the minister's agreement to these amendments and I would have appreciated it

À ce que je sache, quand quelqu'un remporte une victoire politique, il ne se plaint jamais. Je suis heureuse que la raison, le sens commun et la sagesse aient prévalu et que certaines personnes aient reconnu que ces dispositions étaient très discutables et très contestables, pour ne pas dire embarrassantes, et qu'elles avaient grandement besoin d'être modifiées. Je me réjouis aussi de voir que, après plusieurs semaines d'efforts, la ministre a finalement admis que quelque chose n'allait pas et qu'elle était prête à accepter des changements, plus particulièrement le retrait de ces articles du projet de loi C-37.

Cependant, cela dit, je crois qu'une «irrégularité», et ce n'est peut-être pas le mot qui convient, un événement moins que parlementaire s'est produit et devrait, selon moi, être signalé aux membres de ce comité. Quant à moi, je trouve très frustrant que certains juges et autres parties intéressées seront mis au courant du retrait de ces dispositions ou d'amendements qui pourraient y être apportés, et ce bien avant que le Sénat ou toute activité officielle, procédurale ou parlementaire s'en charge.

Comme je l'ai déjà dit, ce n'est pas la première fois qu'une telle situation se présente à un comité auquel je siège. Par exemple, l'année dernière, avant que notre comité entreprenne l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-41, certaines personnes du ministère de la Justice ou qui vous voulez avaient déjà divulgué certains renseignements.

Je veux bien me faire comprendre afin que personne ne laisse entendre le moindrement que je m'oppose à la liberté de presse en laquelle je crois fermement. Ce qui me laisse perplexe, c'est que cette information a été mise à la disposition des juges intéressés et qu'il y a à l'heure actuelle des ententes en matière de séparation et quelque autre entente conclue, qui sont basées sur l'information que certaines personnes ont obtenue. Je trouve cela très suspect.

Il me semble que, si nous accomplissons judicieusement notre travail, ce que nous avons fait, le processus parlementaire officiel ne devrait pas être entravé par la diffusion inutile, inopportune ou inappropriée d'information à des personnes intéressées. Cette question est habituellement soulevée assez publiquement lorsque le ministre des Finances prépare un budget.

Je soulève ce point en tant que question de privilège. Je crois qu'une irrégularité a été commise, qu'il y a eu un manquement et qu'il est en fait malheureux que de l'information soit diffusée avant que les sénateurs soient mis au courant ou avant qu'un sénateur propose une motion à ce comité portant pour ainsi dire retrait de ces dispositions.

En outre, il m'est arrivé fréquemment, en comité et à la Chambre, de soulever la question des contacts constants, permanents, persistants et insistants entre certaines personnes, peu importe de qui il peut s'agir, du ministère de la Justice et certains juges de ce pays. Je trouve tout à fait inquiétant et peu utile que cette information soit divulguée à certaines parties avant de m'être transmise.

Je considère qu'il s'agit d'une grave atteinte à mon privilège. Je le répète, je suis d'accord avec la ministre qui appuie ces amendements et j'aurais apprécié que les sénateurs aient l'honneur

had senators had the honour and the privilege of hearing this first, before the information was released into certain secretive circles.

Other persons may wish to speak to this point of privilege.

The Chairman: Before I open up the floor to discussion, Senator Cools, I should point out that this committee does not have the power to rule on a matter of privilege. If the committee so wishes, it must be reported to the Senate for decision.

I should also point out to you that, historically, the manner of proceeding in this committee has been to allow all members of the committee to know what was coming down the pike.

I think Senator Beaudoin will bear me out on this. I know that a similar situation happened when he was chair of this committee and I was sitting in as a member. This has been the custom of this committee, and I think we should proceed on those same grounds.

Senator Cools: That is not my question. My question is not on what you did yesterday. I accepted what you did yesterday. The question of privilege, the breach that I perceive, is the fact that other persons in this land, namely certain judges, are in possession of what we were to do as senators prior to any senator making statements about this in this committee and prior to senators having an opportunity to move motions to that effect. That is my concern, and I think it would behoove this committee to try to discover who has been making this information available to the judges of this land.

I am pleased that there has been progress made regarding these clauses but, frankly, I think we should have a chance to vote on it, or at least let the system move ahead.

The Chairman: We are about to have a chance to vote on it.

Senator Joyal: Following the statement made by Senator Cools, and since yesterday I was the member of the committee who notified my colleagues of my intention to move some amendments, I would like to bring a point of clarification. I would like to make a formal statement that I never, directly or indirectly, consulted any member of the bench, at any level, to get their opinion or reaction on my intention to move forward with any amendments and I never asked anyone in my office to do so.

I would like that point to be very clear on the record. If Senator Cools' statements happen to be true, it is certainly not because I was in any way part of an initiative that would have made my intentions known by any judge in this land.

The Chairman: I would further add — if I may, Senator Cools — that I want it made absolutely clear that any amendments that may be proposed today are not being proposed by the Minister of Justice. They are the Liberal senators' amendments.

Senator Cools: I accept that and I approve. I would like to be clear here. It was never my intention to question Senator's integrity in any form or fashion. I have known him for a long time. He is a man of outstanding character.

et le privilège d'être mis au courant avant que l'information soit diffusée dans certains cercles secrets.

Quelqu'un d'autre a peut-être quelque chose à dire au sujet de cette question de privilège.

La présidente: Avant de céder la parole à d'autres sénateurs, sénatrice Cools, je dois vous dire que ce comité n'est pas autorisé à se prononcer sur des questions de privilège. S'il veut le faire, il doit faire rapport au Sénat afin qu'il prenne une décision.

Je dois aussi vous dire que ce comité a toujours eu comme principe de permettre à tous ses membres de savoir ce qui va se passer.

Je crois que le sénateur Beaudoin confirmera ce qui suit. Je sais qu'une situation similaire s'est présentée lorsqu'il présidait ce comité et que j'y siégeais comme membre. Telle a été la pratique à ce comité et je crois que nous devrions poursuivre dans la même veine.

Le sénateur Cools: Ce n'est pas ce qui me préoccupe. Je m'interroge au sujet de ce que nous avons fait hier. J'ai accepté ce que vous avez fait hier. La question de privilège, l'infraction que je perçois, a à voir avec le fait que d'autres personnes dans ce pays, à savoir certains juges, ont été mises au courant de ce que nous nous apprêtions à faire en tant que sénateurs avant qu'un sénateur fasse une déclaration à ce sujet à ce comité et avant que les sénateurs aient l'occasion de proposer des motions à cet effet. C'est à ce sujet que je m'interroge et je crois qu'il incombe à ce comité d'essayer de déterminer qui a diffusé cette information aux juges de ce pays.

Je suis heureuse que des progrès aient été faits en ce qui concerne ces articles mais, en toute franchise, je crois que nous devrions avoir la chance de voter sur la question ou du moins de laisser le système suivre son cours.

La présidente: Nous sommes sur le point de voter sur ces motions.

Le sénateur Joyal: Pour faire suite à la déclaration du sénateur Cools et comme c'est moi qui ai informé hier mes collègues de mon intention de présenter certains amendements, j'aimerais éclaircir un point. J'aimerais dire officiellement que je n'ai jamais, directement ou indirectement, consulté un juge de quelque niveau que ce soit pour savoir ce qu'il pensait de mon intention de proposer des amendements. Je n'ai jamais non plus demandé à personne de mon bureau de le faire.

J'aimerais que ma déclaration soit consignée au compte rendu. Si les déclarations du sénateur Cools devaient s'avérer juste, ce n'est assurément pas parce que j'ai participé de quelque manière à une initiative qui aurait permis de révéler mes intentions à un juge de ce pays.

La présidente: J'ajouterais — si vous le permettez, sénateur — que je tiens à ce qu'il soit absolument clair qu'aucun des amendements qui seront proposés aujourd'hui n'émane du ministre de la Justice. Ils sont présentés par les sénateurs libéraux.

Le sénateur Cools: Je l'accepte et j'approuve. J'aimerais me faire bien comprendre. Mon intention n'a jamais été de remettre en question l'intégrité du sénateur d'aucune façon que ce soit. Je le connais depuis longtemps. C'est un homme remarquable.

The information that I was referring to is obviously being exchanged between certain individuals at the Department of Justice and other persons across this land. I do not believe that members of this committee divulged the information. Let me be clear, so that no one thinks I was questioning that point.

Madam Chair, you have said that you cannot rule on a question of privilege. I know the rules concerning this well. However, this committee can resolve to take some action to investigate the matter in order to discover how this sort of information has been received by certain people. Perhaps the minister could come here to explain or perhaps we could recall the departmental officials to explain. I believe there is something here that commands attention.

The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Cools. However, for this committee to proceed in such a manner, we would need an order to do so from the Senate.

Senator Cools: In that case, since I cannot move a motion on this committee to that effect, I would urge the chairman or a member of this committee to put forward a motion asking the Senate to study the matter.

Senator Grafstein: Since I am a voting member of the committee, perhaps I could suggest to Senator Cools that a question of privilege, first and foremost, must arise and be stated at the first possible moment. In other words, if somebody's privileges are impinged, the rules state that the senator whose privileges one believes are impinged or interfered with must raise the issue. I assume that is why Senator Cools has raised it here.

Having said that, since Senator Cools believes that this is a matter of her privileges being encroached upon — and, ultimately, it might affect others — the appropriate way to deal with this matter that she is contesting is for the committee to take note of it. I assume we have already done so because it is noted on the record. If the senator wishes to pursue it, she should do so before the full chamber at the appropriate time, which would be today. I have not looked at the questions myself, but I am always sensitive to the privileges of senators. I assume that is the appropriate practice, but I look to Senator Beaudoin and others who may be more familiar with the rules. I am having difficulty with Senator Cools' position that a privilege has been breached because she is a non-voting member of the committee. I am not sure how the privilege is breached. Unless I am told otherwise, I conclude that this is a matter for the full chamber.

I would ask Senator Beaudoin for his comments and then we can move on.

Senator Beaudoin: If a person wishes to raise a point of privilege, then he or she must be a member of the committee. If no member of the committee wishes to do so, then that is the end of it. Of course, the matter may be raised in the Senate. However, if no voting member of this committee wishes to raise the point, then I do not see how we can deal with it.

Senator Cools: That is rubbish!

Les renseignements dont je parlais ont manifestement été échangés entre des gens du ministère de la Justice et d'autres personnes dans tout le pays. Je ne crois pas que les membres de ce comité ont divulgué les renseignements. Je tiens à ce que ce soit clair, parce que je ne veux pas qu'on pense que c'est ce que je remettais en question.

Madame la présidente, vous avez dit que vous ne pouvez pas vous prononcer sur une question de privilège. Je connais très bien les règles à ce sujet. Quoi qu'il en soit, le comité peut décider d'examiner la question pour découvrir comment certaines personnes ont pu être en possession de ce genre de renseignements. Peut-être que le ministre pourrait venir nous l'expliquer, ou que des fonctionnaires du ministère pourraient revenir nous rencontrer pour le faire. À mon avis, des mesures s'imposent.

La présidente: Merci, sénateur. Cependant, le comité doit, pour procéder ainsi, en recevoir l'ordre du Sénat.

Le sénateur Cools: Dans ce cas, puisque je ne peux pas présenter de motion en ce sens, j'exhorte la présidente ou un membre du comité à proposer qu'on demande au Sénat d'étudier la question.

Le sénateur Grafstein: À titre de membre votant de ce comité, je pourrais peut-être signaler au sénateur Cools qu'une question de privilège doit d'abord et avant tout être soulevée et énoncée à la première occasion possible. Autrement dit, si les privilèges de quelqu'un sont lésés, la règle veut que ce soit le sénateur dont les privilèges auraient été lésés ou restreints qui soulève la question. Je suppose que c'est pourquoi le sénateur Cools nous a fait part du problème ici.

Cela dit, étant donné que le sénateur Cools a des raisons de croire que cette question porte atteinte à ses privilèges — et pourrait bien porter préjudice à d'autres personnes —, la manière appropriée pour le comité de traiter le problème qu'elle soulève est d'en prendre note. Je présume que nous l'avons déjà fait, puisque c'est inscrit au compte rendu. Si le sénateur tient à approfondir la question, elle devrait le faire devant l'ensemble des sénateurs au moment opportun, soit aujourd'hui même. Je ne me suis pas penché là-dessus, mais je suis toujours sensible aux privilèges des sénateurs. Je présume que c'est ainsi que se font les choses, mais je me fie au sénateur Beaudoin et à d'autres, qui connaissent peut-être mieux les règles que moi. J'ai quelque difficulté à comprendre le point de vue du sénateur Cools selon lequel un privilège a été enfreint parce qu'elle n'est pas un membre votant du comité. Je ne vois pas très bien en quoi cela porte atteinte à ses privilèges. À moins d'avis contraire, j'en conclus que cette question relève de l'ensemble des sénateurs.

J'inviterais le sénateur Beaudoin à faire des commentaires, puis nous pourrions poursuivre.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Pour soulever une question de privilège, il faut être membre du comité. Si aucun membre du comité ne veut le faire, c'est fini. Bien sûr, la question peut être soulevée au Sénat. Cependant, si aucun membre votant du comité ne veut soulever la question, je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions en traiter.

Le sénateur Cools: Foutaise!

The Chairman: No. Order!

Senator Nolin: We do not accept "rubbish." If we are to decide on this, I want to hear all the evidence or I do not want to discuss it. I do not think we have the mandate to discuss it. It is your privilege to raise this matter in the chamber and to table all the evidence you have. You will have to produce something. You are accusing a lot of people without mentioning names and I do not wish to be part of that. It is your right to do so in the chamber, but do not do it here.

Senator Cools: I would like to respond to that.

Senator Beaudoin: One cannot call an explanation of our rules "rubbish."

Senator Nolin: No, you cannot.

The Chairman: Order. I agree with Senator Beaudoin's comments. I would hope that the senator would retract the word "rubbish."

Senator Cools: The word "rubbish" was an aside. It was not intended to be a formal statement.

Senator Balfour: Earlier you insisted on being on the record.

Senator Cools: Perhaps I should repeat that it was never my intention, in any way, to impugn the integrity of any individual member of this committee. If my use of a particular word as an aside was inappropriate, I will apologize. That is not a problem. Magnanimity comes very easily to me.

In response to the substance of what was said, I should like to say that the rule of "earliest opportunity" does not apply here. It is only applied when the Senate Speaker's role is being invoked in what we call a *prima facie* case in the chamber. It is only invoked in that instance and then, *prima facie*, that response is whether or not the Speaker of the Senate chooses to give priority over all other debate. This subject matter is becoming increasingly not only arcane but also unknown to the majority of senators.

The fact of the matter is that Senate privileges are not "my" privileges. Senators hold them collectively. It is my understanding that it is our duty to uphold the rules at all times. Those rules provide that senators must request information in a certain way. One of those ways, honourable senators, is to introduce a motion in the house. One cannot simply demand information.

What I am introducing here is a sense of discussion —

The Chairman: Senator Cools, I have the chair!

Senator Cools: You certainly do.

The Chairman: I believe that this subject has been explored in great depth. At this point, we will proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37.

It has been moved by Senator Moore that the committee complete clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37. Is it agreed?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

La présidente: Non. À l'ordre!

Le sénateur Nolin: Nous n'acceptons pas ici les termes comme «foutaise». Si nous devons prendre une décision à ce sujet, je tiens à entendre tous les faits, sinon je ne veux plus en entendre parler. Je ne crois pas que nous sommes mandatés pour discuter de ça. Vous avez le droit de soulever cette question au Sénat et de présenter toutes les preuves que vous avez. Il vous faudra en produire. Vous accusez des tas de gens sans donner de nom et je ne tiens pas à être mêlé à ça. Vous avez droit d'en parler au Sénat, mais pas ici.

Le sénateur Cools: J'aimerais répondre à ça.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Personne ne peut qualifier de «foutaise» une explication de nos règlements.

Le sénateur Nolin: Non, personne.

La présidente: À l'ordre. Je suis d'accord avec le sénateur Beaudoin. J'espère que le sénateur voudra bien retirer le mot «foutaise».

Le sénateur Cools: C'était un aparté. Ça ne se voulait pas une déclaration officielle.

Le sénateur Balfour: Vous avez pourtant insisté plus tôt pour que votre intervention soit consignée au compte rendu.

Le sénateur Cools: Je devrais peut-être répéter que je n'ai jamais eu la moindre intention de mettre en doute l'intégrité d'aucun membre de ce comité. Si l'expression que j'ai utilisée en aparté n'était pas convenable, je m'en excuse. Ce n'est pas là qu'est le problème. Je sais me montrer magnanime.

Pour en revenir à ce qui a été dit, j'aimerais souligner que la règle de la «première occasion» ne s'applique pas ici. Elle ne s'applique que lorsque le Président du Sénat doit déterminer si la question paraît fondée à première vue. Ce n'est que dans ce cas que cette règle peut être invoquée et le Président peut, à première vue, décider de donner ou non la priorité à cette question sur toutes les autres. Cette règle devient de plus en plus obscure et même ignorée pour la majorité des sénateurs.

Le fait est que les privilèges du Sénat ne sont pas uniquement les miens. Ils sont ceux de tous les sénateurs. D'après moi, nous avons le devoir d'observer les règles tout le temps. Ces règles prévoient que les sénateurs doivent suivre une certaine procédure pour obtenir des renseignements. Ils peuvent notamment les obtenir par voie de motion au Sénat. On ne peut pas tout simplement les exiger.

Ce que je suggère ici est une discussion...

Le président: Sénateur, c'est moi qui occupe le fauteuil!

Le sénateur Cools: Ça ne fait pas de doute.

La présidente: Il me semble que cette question a été amplement approfondie. Nous allons maintenant passer à l'étude détaillée du projet de loi C-37.

Le sénateur Moore propose que le comité procède à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-37. Êtes-vous d'accord?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Adopté.

Shall clause 1 carry? At this point, I should point out that the normal procedure, if we want to delete a clause, is to vote "No, it shall not carry."

Senator Beaudoin: Yes, when the clause is called.

The Chairman: The clause is now called. Shall clause 1 carry?

Senator Beaudoin: No.

Senator Nolin: No.

The Chairman: I declare the motion negatived.

Senator Cools: Usually when we move clause by clause, there is opportunity for discussion first.

The Chairman: Senator Cools, there was no offer for discussion on this one and the motion has been negatived.

Shall clause 2 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed? Carried.

Shall clause 3 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed? Carried.

Senator Cools: I was under the impression that when we move a clause we do it formally by motion. It takes more than to say, "Shall this carry? Carried." It seems to me that an individual moved it. I move that.

The Chairman: It has been moved by Senator Moore that we should go to clause-by-clause consideration of the bill, and that is what we are doing.

Senator Cools: I think the proper way to proceed is for Senator Moore to say, "I move that this clause carry" when we get to each clause. It should then be seconded. Otherwise, the bill is not properly voted on.

The Chairman: This is the format that we have traditionally been following in the committee.

Senator Beaudoin: When we have an omnibus motion, such as that moved by Senator Moore, we do not repeat ourselves 25 times.

Senator Nolin: It implies we are moving each and every clause.

Senator Beaudoin: That is right. It is up to the chair to call each clause separately but not each motion separately.

The Chairman: Precisely, and that is what I am doing.

We have now carried clause 3.

Shall clause 4 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Shall clause 5 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Est-ce que l'article 1 est adopté? Il convient de souligner que, selon la procédure, si nous voulons supprimer un article il faut voter «non, il n'est pas adopté».

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Oui, lorsqu'il est mis aux voix.

La présidente: L'article est maintenant mis aux voix. Est-ce que l'article 1 est adopté?

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Non.

Le sénateur Nolin: Non.

La présidente: Je déclare la motion rejetée.

Le sénateur Cools: Normalement, quand on fait une étude article par article, on peut d'abord discuter.

La présidente: Sénateur, personne n'a proposé de discuter de cet article, et la motion a été rejetée.

Est-ce que l'article 2 est adopté?

Des voix: Oui.

La présidente: Qui est contre? Adopté.

Est-ce que l'article 3 est adopté?

Des voix: Oui.

La présidente: Qui est contre? Adopté.

Le sénateur Cools: J'avais l'impression que, pour proposer un article, il fallait le faire formellement au moyen d'une motion. Ça devrait être plus que «est-ce que c'est adopté? Adopté». Il me semble que quelqu'un doit le proposer. C'est ce que je voudrais.

La présidente: Le sénateur Moore a proposé que nous fassions l'étude article par article du projet de loi, et c'est ce que nous faisons.

Le sénateur Cools: Je crois que pour faire les choses comme il se doit, le sénateur Moore devrait dire «je propose l'adoption de cet article» pour chaque article. Quelqu'un doit ensuite appuyer sa proposition. Autrement, le vote sur le projet de loi n'est pas fait selon les règles.

La présidente: Notre comité a toujours procédé de cette façon.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Lorsqu'une motion générale, comme celle du sénateur Moore, est présentée nous ne nous répétons pas 25 fois de suite.

Le sénateur Nolin: Ça sous-entend que nous proposons chacun des articles.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: C'est exact. Il incombe à la présidente de mettre chaque article aux voix, mais pas chaque motion.

La présidente: Précisément, et c'est ce que je fais.

Nous avons donc adopté l'article 3.

Est-ce que l'article 4 est adopté?

Des voix: Oui.

La présidente: Adopté.

Est-ce que l'article 5 est adopté?

Des voix: Oui.

La présidente: Adopté.

Shall clause 6 carry?

Senator Joyal: Honourable senators, on clause 6, I move the following amendment. Members of the committee have copies in English in French.

That Bill C-37 be amended, in clause 6,

(a) on page 3, by adding the following after line 7:

“(1.1) In conducting its inquiry, the commission shall consider

(a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government;

(b) the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence;

(c) the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary; and

(d) any other objective measure that the Commission considers relevant.”; and

(b) on page 4, by replacing line 14 with the following:

“a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.”

[Translation]

In French, “Que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié,

a) à la page 3, par adjonction, après la ligne 9, de ce qui suit:

«(1.1) La commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;

b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;

c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;

d) tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.”;

[English]

Of course, the rest of the article follows.

Senator Nolin: I have a subamendment. I do not have it in writing because I thought it would be included in the amendment just read. In the French version, section 26, or clause 6 of the bill, paragraph 1 —

[Translation]

The French version contains a reference to “juges fédéraux” in line 2, whereas the English version makes no mention whatsoever of federal judges. Federal judges do not exist in the legislation. The only reference is to judges. In my subamendment, I propose that the reference to “juges fédéraux” in clause 6, paragraph 1,

Est-ce que l'article 6 est adopté?

Le sénateur Joyal: Honorables sénateurs, à propos de l'article 6, j'ai un amendement à proposer. Les membres du comité ont reçu copie en anglais et en français de l'amendement.

Que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié, à l'article 6,

a) à la page 3, par adjonction, après la ligne 9, de ce qui suit:

«(1.1) La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;

b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;

c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;

d) tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.»;

b) à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13, de ce qui suit:

«(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au.»

[Français]

En français, que l'article 6 soit modifié:

a) à la page 3, par adjonction, après la ligne 9, de ce qui suit:

«(1.1) La commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;

b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;

c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;

d) tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.»;

[Traduction]

Bien entendu, le reste de l'article reste tel quel.

Le sénateur Nolin: J'aimerais proposer un sous-amendement. Je ne l'ai pas par écrit, parce que je croyais qu'il ferait partie de l'amendement qui vient d'être lu. Dans la version française, à l'article 26, ou à l'article 6 du projet de loi, au paragraphe 1...

[Français]

Dans la version française, on fait référence aux juges fédéraux à la deuxième ligne alors que dans la version anglaise, il n'y a aucune mention des juges fédéraux. Dans la loi, les juges fédéraux n'existent pas. Il existe des juges, point. Mon sous-amendement est de rayer du projet de loi C-37, article 6,

line 2 of the French version of Bill C-37 be deleted. Unfortunately, I do not have this subamendment in writing.

[English]

Senator Beaudoin: I support that.

The Chairman: We are discussing this, Senator Cools, and I will give you an opportunity to speak.

Senator Joyal: I have no objection to including the proposed subamendment to the amendment which I have just read. Senator Nolin is right, there is no such qualification of judges in the English version of the bill. If we maintain "juges fédéraux," it could lead to confusion that we are dealing only with members of the Federal Court and not the other courts. That is certainly not the intention of the bill. We are dealing with the salary of all the judges appointed by the federal government, not only the Federal Court judges, but the Superior Court judges, the Court of Appeal judges, and so forth. The point raised by Senator Nolin is appropriate. It will not change the scope of the bill.

Senator Nolin: If we are on the discussion part of our consideration, in English, you have the word "Judicial" in the name of the commission. That word is not used in the French version.

Senator Grafstein: What word do they use in French?

Senator Nolin: In the name of the commission, there is no word like "judiciaire."

Senator Joyal: It is "Commission d'examen de la rémunération".

Senator Nolin: All of our judges are federal, first.

Senator Joyal: There is no doubt that if we maintain "juges fédéraux" in the French version, it could lead to some confusion in the interpretation of the mandate of the commission.

Senator Beaudoin: There is another reason. Both texts are equal according to law and the Constitution, and I think that is a major reason to eliminate the redundant word. We are talking about judges appointed by federal authority, but the expression "juges fédéraux" is not the best translation.

The Chairman: Our clerk is writing madly here. Senator Cools?

Senator Cools: I would submit to this committee, in particular to Senator Joyal and to the Liberal senators here, that this amendment has not received substantial and sufficient discussion in the Liberal Senate caucus. I would ask Senator Joyal if he would impose a limitation on himself, difficult as it would be, and that is to consider submitting this proposed amendment to our caucus and then —

Senator Beaudoin: On a point of order.

Senator Cools: I have not finished my remarks, but that is quite all right.

Senator Beaudoin: We are sitting in committee. What is going on in your caucus or in our caucus is immaterial.

clause 6, paragraphe 1, à la deuxième ligne, les mots «des juges fédéraux» uniquement dans la version française. Malheureusement, je ne l'ai pas par écrit.

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Beaudoin: J'appuie cette proposition.

Le président: Nous allons en discuter, sénateur Cools, et vous pourrez prendre la parole.

Le sénateur Joyal: Je ne vois pas d'objection à incorporer le sous-amendement proposé à l'amendement que je viens de lire. Le sénateur Nolin a raison, la version anglaise de la loi ne qualifie pas les juges. Si nous conservons l'expression «juges fédéraux», ça pourrait prêter à confusion et donner à penser que nous ne parlons que des membres du tribunal fédéral et pas de ceux des autres tribunaux. Ce n'est certainement pas l'intention du projet de loi. Nous traitons des salaires de tous les juges désignés par le gouvernement fédéral, pas seulement de ceux des juges fédéraux, mais des juges du tribunal supérieur, de la Cour d'appel, et cetera. L'intervention du sénateur Nolin est donc pertinente. Ça ne changera pas la portée du projet de loi.

Le sénateur Nolin: Puisque nous discutons de ça, en anglais, il y a le terme «judicial» dans le titre de la commission. Il n'y a rien de tel dans la version française du titre.

Le sénateur Grafstein: Quel est le terme utilisé en français?

Le sénateur Nolin: On n'emploie pas, dans le titre de la commission, le mot «judiciaire».

Le sénateur Joyal: C'est la Commission d'examen de la rémunération.

Le sénateur Nolin: Tous les juges sont fédéraux, en premier lieu.

Le sénateur Joyal: Il n'y a pas de doute que si nous conservons les mots «juges fédéraux» dans la version française, ça pourrait porter à confusion dans l'interprétation du mandat de la commission.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Il y a une autre raison. En vertu de la loi et de la Constitution, les deux textes sont égaux, et je crois que c'est une raison suffisante pour éliminer les mots inutiles. Nous parlons des juges désignés par le pouvoir fédéral, mais l'expression «juges fédéraux» n'est pas la meilleure traduction qui soit.

La présidente: Le greffier écrit à toute vitesse. Sénateur Cools?

Le sénateur Cools: Je voudrais signaler au comité, en particulier au sénateur Joyal et aux sénateurs libéraux ici présents, que le caucus libéral du Sénat n'a pas eu l'occasion de discuter suffisamment de cet amendement. Je demanderai donc au sénateur Joyal de freiner son élan, aussi difficile que ça puisse être, et d'envisager de soumettre l'amendement qu'il propose à notre caucus, et puis...

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Comme rappel au Règlement.

Le sénateur Cools: Je n'ai pas fini de parler, mais c'est exactement où je veux en venir.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Nous siégeons à un comité, ce qui se passe dans votre caucus ou dans le nôtre importe peu.

The Chairman: I am not accepting that as a point of order, but I am accepting it as a valid point on this.

Senator Cools: My statement was cut off midstream. I was asking Senator Joyal to delay by a day or two, prior to proposing his amendment, so that this matter could be properly canvassed by the Liberal Senate caucus. I do not believe that I asked anything that was out of order. It is a very curious situation where the gentlemen across here are raising this as a potential point of order. I think I understand why. That is quite acceptable, because life unfolds as it does. I was making an appeal to Senator Joyal, since it is his amendment.

As I see it, it is not the government senators' amendment, because it has not been placed before us by the government sponsor of the bill. Thus, I must conclude that it is a personal amendment being moved by Senator Joyal. There is a big difference. Our government sponsors usually do certain things. If Senator Joyal wishes to comply with my request, I would submit, Senator Beaudoin, that it is no business of yours. I was putting it to Senator Joyal.

Senator Beaudoin: And my business is to point out that we are in committee. This committee does not need to know what is going on in your caucus or in my caucus.

Senator Cools: I am trying to ask a member whether he will consider delaying making a motion, and that is usually done at the point in time when that motion is made. I would like to hear Senator Joyal's response.

The Chairman: Order. Senator Joyal has heard your request. I do not believe that the caucus of any side of the Senate should be brought into discussions in this committee. It is up to Senator Joyal to decide whether he will agree to postpone these discussions, for whatever reason. Senator Cools, you did not have the floor.

Senator Joyal: Madam Chairman, we are now engaged in the process of voting on the proposed legislation clause by clause. I have suggested that we move forward, as that is our agenda for today. If there is any need for further discussion among certain members of this committee, that discussion will proceed outside the sitting this morning.

The Chairman: We shall proceed on the suggestions that have been made by Senator Nolin and Senator Joyal that Bill C-37 be amended, in the French version, by deleting, in clause 6 on page 3, line 4, the phrase "des juges fédéraux".

Senator Fraser: No, just the word "fédéraux".

Senator Joyal: That is right because the Judges Act defines which judges are covered by the Judges Act. Since it is an amendment to the Judges Act, the definition that is applied in that section is already contained in the Judges Act. Therefore, we should not create confusion. I feel that we should maintain the definition currently in the Judges Act. That is probably the most compelling argument in support of Senator Nolin's argument.

La présidente: Je n'accepte pas votre intervention comme un rappel au Règlement, mais j'admets que c'est un argument valable.

Le sénateur Cools: J'ai été interrompue dans ma lancée. Je demandais au sénateur Joyal de remettre sa proposition d'un jour ou deux afin de permettre au caucus libéral du Sénat de l'examiner de manière appropriée. Je ne pense pas demander l'impossible. Il est très curieux que ces messieurs, en face de moi, interprètent ça comme un éventuel rappel au Règlement. Je crois comprendre pourquoi. Ça se comprend très bien, parce que la vie suit son cours. Je m'adressais au sénateur Joyal, parce qu'il s'agit de son amendement.

Que je sache, cet amendement n'a pas été proposé par les sénateurs du parti ministériel, parce qu'il n'a pas été proposé par le parrain du projet de loi. J'en conclus donc qu'il s'agit d'un amendement que propose personnellement le sénateur Joyal. C'est très différent. Les parrains du parti ministériel procèdent généralement d'une certaine manière. Si le sénateur Joyal veut bien se plier à ma demande, je soutiendrais, sénateur Beaudoin, que ça ne vous regardé pas. C'est au sénateur Joyal que je m'adressais.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Ça me regarde, cependant, de souligner que nous sommes en comité. Ce comité n'a nullement besoin de savoir ce qui se passe dans votre caucus ou dans le mien.

Le sénateur Cools: J'essaie de demander à un membre du comité s'il veut bien envisager de reporter le dépôt d'une motion, et ce genre de requête se fait généralement lorsque la motion est présentée. J'aimerais entendre la réponse du sénateur Joyal.

La présidente: À l'ordre. Le sénateur Joyal a entendu votre requête. Je ne crois pas que le caucus ou n'importe quel parti représenté au Sénat devrait être mêlé aux discussions de ce comité. Il incombe au sénateur Joyal de décider s'il veut ou non reporter ces discussions, pour une raison ou une autre. Sénateur Cools, je ne vous avais pas donné la parole.

Le sénateur Joyal: Madame la présidente, nous avons entrepris l'adoption article par article du projet de loi à l'étude. Je suggère que nous poursuivions, puisque c'est l'objet de notre rencontre d'aujourd'hui. Si certains membres du comité veulent continuer de discuter, ils devraient le faire en dehors de la séance de ce matin.

La présidente: Nous revenons aux propositions du sénateur Nolin et du sénateur Joyal qui ont demandé d'amender la version française du projet de loi C-37, à l'article 6, de la page 3, ligne 4, en supprimant les mots «des juges fédéraux».

Le sénateur Fraser: Non, seulement le mot «fédéraux».

Le sénateur Joyal: C'est exact, parce que la Loi sur les juges définit les juges qu'elle vise. Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'une modification de la Loi sur les juges, la définition qui s'applique à cet article figure déjà dans la Loi sur les juges. Par conséquent, nous ne devons pas semer la confusion. Je crois que nous devons nous en tenir à la définition qui figure dans la Loi sur les juges. C'est probablement l'argument qui donne le plus de poids à la proposition du sénateur Nolin.

[Translation]

Senator Fraser: Still with respect to the translation, point (d) in the English version refers to "any other objective measure", while the French version refers to "de tout autre facteur". Should the word "objectif" be added to the French version or does the word "facteur" imply objectivity?

[English]

Senator Joyal: That is a very important point. Would Senator Fraser care to explain why she raised it?

Senator Fraser: I suggest that we insert the word "objectif" after the word "facteur".

Senator Beaudoin: Two words or just one?

Senator Fraser: Just one.

[Translation]

Senator Beaudoin: How would the amendment read then?

Senator Fraser: Right now, it reads "tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent". I am proposing that it to be amended to read "tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent".

[English]

Senator Joyal: In the English version we say "any other objective measure". There is a qualification in English which does not exist in the French version.

[Translation]

Senator Nolin: "Objectif" is used as an adjective rather than as a noun. It would be inserted after the word "facteur".

[English]

The Chairman: Before we continue with amending clause 6, perhaps we should decide whether we will vote on the amendment to clause 1, in the French version, to delete the word "fédéraux".

Our researcher has something of interest to say on this.

Ms Nancy Holmes, Researcher: I should like to bring it to the attention of senators before they vote, that section 26 of the Judges Act does not use the reference "des juges fédéraux" with regard to establishing the commission.

Senator Beaudoin: What did they use?

Ms Holmes: They did not. They said:

[Translation]

"Chargé d'examiner si les traitements et autres prestations prévues à la présente loi".

[English]

It continues in the same.

The Chairman: So the entire phrase is not there.

[Français]

Le sénateur Fraser: Toujours au niveau de la traduction, dans l'amendement d), en anglais on parle de «any other objective measure», et en français, il est écrit: «de tout autre facteur». Est-ce qu'on devrait insérer le mot «objectif» dans la version française ou est-ce que le mot «facteur» est lui-même un mot qui implique l'objectivité?

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Joyal: C'est certainement très important. Est-ce que le sénateur Fraser veut bien expliquer pourquoi elle a soulevé cette question?

Le sénateur Fraser: Je suggère que nous ajoutions le terme «objectif» après le terme «facteur».

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Deux mots ou un seul?

Le sénateur Fraser: Seulement un.

[Français]

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Comment cela se lirait-il?

Le sénateur Fraser: Présentement, nous avons: «tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent». Je suggère que l'on devrait l'amender pour «tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent».

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Joyal: Dans la version anglaise, nous disons «any other objective measure». L'anglais comporte donc une qualification qui n'est pas dans la version française.

[Français]

Le sénateur Nolin: Le mot «objectif» est utilisé comme adjectif plutôt que comme nom. Alors on ajoute le mot «objectif» après le mot «facteur».

[Traduction]

La présidente: Avant de poursuivre avec l'amendement de l'article 6, nous pourrions peut-être décider si nous allons mettre aux voix l'amendement de l'article 1, qui vise à supprimer le terme «fédéraux» dans la version française.

Notre attachée de recherche à quelque chose à dire là-dessus.

Mme Nancy Holmes, attachée de recherche: J'aimerais signaler aux sénateurs, avant qu'ils passent au vote, que l'article 26 de la Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges ne contient pas de référence à «des juges fédéraux», en ce qui a trait à la mise sur pied de la commission.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Que dit-on?

Mme Holmes: On n'y fait pas référence. On dit:

[Français]

«Chargé d'examiner si les traitements et autres prestations prévues à la présente loi».

[Traduction]

Et ça continue ainsi.

La présidente: Donc, on ne retrouve pas ces mots.

Senator Nolin: The act refers to the appointment of commissioners without naming the commission. Now we will have a name for that commission. In the English version of the name we have the word "judicial". In the French version we have "juges fédéraux". I am suggesting that we leave out the word "fédéraux". All our judges are "fédéraux".

The Chairman: At this point, I will put the question on the first amendment to clause 6, which is that Bill C-37 be amended, in the French version, by deleting, in clause 6 on page 3, line 4, the word "fédéraux". Will all those in favour of the amendment so indicate.

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Will all those opposed so indicate.

The amendment is carried.

We shall move to the second amendment.

Senator Grafstein: May I ask a question of Senator Joyal on the substance of the drafting? I have no difficulty with the principles. I just query the placement of "(a)" as opposed to "(b)". One of the fundamental principles and one of our concerns is the principle of judicial independence. I wondered whether "(b)" should be "(a)" and "(a)" should be "(b)". I raise this in the context that general principles should follow with specifics, as opposed to specific and then general. The key principle here is to sustain the principle of judicial independence.

Having said that, I then look at the wording of "(b)". While I think I understand the principle, to which I do not object, I wonder whether we could redraft it slightly. Just to illustrate my point, instead of using the phrase, "the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence", I would suggest we start with, "to ensure judicial independence, the role of financial security of the judiciary." I would make that the first principle that describes what we are doing here. We are really trying to establish an objective standard for judicial independence, yet political accountability. Those are the two principles.

I am not suggesting that we make that change. I am only asking Senator Joyal, who has looked at this longer than I have, to tell me if that meets with his view. If it does not, I will not move it as an amendment.

Senator Joyal: Madam Chair, we all know that one of the fundamental principles is, of course, the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and the executive. Those principles are at the root of our parliamentary and constitutional system. To maintain the separation of the three powers, there are elements that the independence of the judiciary should be asserting. One of them, of course, is security of tenure. The second one is financial security. It is important that those elements be stated when we are dealing with compensation of the judiciary.

I personally have no opposition to the suggestion put forward by Senator Grafstein, as such. However, since we are addressing only one aspect of the independence of the judicial system, which is financial security — we are not dealing with security of tenure in this bill — I suggest that, in bringing forward the importance of

Le sénateur Nolin: La loi fait référence à la nomination des commissaires sans nommer la commission. Cette commission aura un nom. Dans son nom en anglais, on retrouve le mot «judicial». Dans son nom en français, il est question des «juges fédéraux». Je propose qu'on enlève le mot «fédéraux». Tous nos juges sont «fédéraux».

La présidente: Je vais maintenant mettre aux voix le premier amendement de l'article 6 du projet de loi qui propose que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié, dans sa version française, par suppression, à la ligne 4, du mot «fédéraux». Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement se manifestent.

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Que tous ceux qui sont contre se manifestent.

L'amendement est adopté.

Nous passons au deuxième amendement.

Le sénateur Grafstein: Puis-je poser une question au sénateur Joyal sur la façon dont l'amendement a été rédigé? Je ne mets pas en question les principes de l'amendement. Je m'interroge seulement sur l'ordre des alinéas a) et b). Un des principes fondamentaux qui nous préoccupent est celui de l'indépendance judiciaire. Je me demande si l'on ne devrait pas inverser l'ordre des alinéas b) et a), étant donné que les principes généraux doivent être énoncés avant les particularités et non l'inverse. Ce qui compte ici, c'est de confirmer le principe de l'indépendance judiciaire.

Cela dit, je me demande si on ne pourrait pas modifier légèrement la formulation de l'alinéa b) même si j'en comprends le principe et que je ne m'y oppose pas. Au lieu d'écrire «le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire», je proposerais d'inverser l'ordre des mots pour commencer par «dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire, le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges». J'aimerais qu'on énonce en premier le principe que nous voulons assurer. Ce que nous voulons vraiment faire ici c'est établir un critère objectif d'indépendance judiciaire, sans négliger la responsabilité politique. Ce sont les deux principes à garantir.

Je ne suis pas en train de proposer ce changement. Je veux simplement demander au sénateur Joyal, qui a étudié la question plus à fond que moi, si mon point de vue concorde avec le sien. S'il ne concorde pas, je ne proposerai pas l'amendement.

Le sénateur Joyal: Madame la présidente, nous savons tous que l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire par rapport au pouvoir législatif et au pouvoir exécutif est un principe fondamental. Ce principe est à la base de notre régime parlementaire et constitutionnel. Pour assurer la séparation des trois pouvoirs, il y a des éléments que l'indépendance judiciaire doit affirmer, dont bien sûr la sécurité du mandat. Il y a aussi la sécurité financière. Il est important de mentionner ces éléments quand on parle de la rémunération des juges.

Je n'ai personnellement rien contre la proposition faite par le sénateur Grafstein. Cependant, comme il n'est question ici que d'un aspect de l'indépendance du système judiciaire, à savoir la sécurité financière — étant donné qu'il n'est pas question de la sécurité du mandat dans ce projet de loi — je pense qu'en

the financial security to the commission, as it is an essential element of their work, we not deal with the overall elements of the independence of the judiciary.

That, of course, involves security of tenure and so on. That is why it was phrased that way. Otherwise, we would need to enumerate the three elements that have been traditionally considered as the guarantees of judicial independence.

This is the best way we could find to state the principles which you just stated yourself and which are, in fact, at the root of any work of the commission. The commission works within the context of the independence of the judicial system and, in that context, it has a specific role to ensure that financial security is confirmed through the recommendation and the study that it makes. It gives the overall context in which the commission must work to prevent the discussion of the questions which were raised in the Supreme Court of Canada in the *P.E.I. Reference* case, which is: How do you define "financial security" versus "judicial independence"?

Of course, it brings forward the overall capacity of the commission to maintain a balance between that principle and the other prevailing economic conditions and so forth. In other words, there is not only the economic set of elements. There are also sets of elements which deal with the very structure of the independence of the judicial system, which, for instance, do not exist in compensation boards for the public service. The public service is not separated from the administration of the government, but the judicial system is totally separated from the administration of the government. It is important to state that principle when we are formally establishing a commission that has the responsibility to define how the element of financial security will be guaranteed in that context. That is why it is stated that way. I agree there are two ways to state the overall objective of the work of the commission, but I feel that the way it is stated now meets Senator Grafstein's preoccupation.

Senator Balfour: I do not wish to quibble over words with Senator Grafstein, but if I had been drafting the text, I think I would have stated "the necessity for" or "the need for" rather than "the role of", because that is what we are talking about. In order to have judicial independence, it is necessary that judges have financial security. We are not talking about a role; we are talking about a need.

The Chairman: I must say this clause has been the subject of a great deal of debate.

Senator Balfour: And I was not present for that.

Senator Joyal: I agree with Senator Balfour and Senator Grafstein. I should say, in a candid way, that the dictionary is full of words. That is the magic of language. Certainly we can state an objective and use a certain number of words to describe it without changing the very nature of what we want to say. My honourable colleagues will understand that I tried to draft a text which would meet the very point I was making in my remarks, that is, to be sure that this text is in conformity with our constitutional tradition

soulignant à la commission l'importance de la sécurité financière des juges dans l'exécution de leur travail, nous n'avons pas à traiter de tous les éléments qui assurent l'indépendance judiciaire.

Parmi ces éléments, on retrouve la sécurité du mandat évidemment. C'est pourquoi l'amendement a été formulé de cette façon. Autrement, il faudrait énumérer les trois éléments qui sont normalement censés garantir l'indépendance judiciaire.

C'est la meilleure façon que nous avons trouvée pour énoncer les principes dont vous venez de parler vous-même et qui sont à la base de tous les travaux de la commission. La commission fonctionne dans le contexte de l'indépendance du système judiciaire et, dans ce contexte, elle a pour rôle précis de s'assurer que la sécurité financière des juges est confirmée dans les recommandations et les études qu'elle fait. C'est le contexte global dans lequel la commission doit travailler pour empêcher qu'on ait à se poser des questions comme celles qui ont été soulevées à la Cour suprême du Canada dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, à savoir comment définir la «sécurité financière» par rapport à l'«indépendance judiciaire».

Bien sûr, ça suppose que la commission est capable de tenir compte à la fois de ce principe et de l'état de l'économie et le reste. Autrement dit, il n'y a pas seulement les aspects économiques qui entrent en ligne de compte. Il y a aussi des aspects qui ont trait à la structure même du système judiciaire indépendant et qui n'existent pas dans le cas des commissions de rémunération de la fonction publique. Contrairement à la fonction publique, le système judiciaire est complètement distinct de l'administration gouvernementale. Il est important d'énoncer ce principe quand nous créons officiellement une commission qui est chargée de définir comment la sécurité financière des juges sera garantie dans ce contexte. C'est pourquoi on a formulé ainsi la disposition. Je conviens qu'il y a deux façons de formuler l'objectif général du mandat de la commission, mais j'estime que celle qui a été utilisée répond à la préoccupation du sénateur Grafstein.

Le sénateur Balfour: Ce n'est pas que je veuille pinailler sur le choix des mots avec le sénateur Grafstein, mais si j'avais rédigé ce texte, j'aurais employé les mots «nécessité» ou «besoin» plutôt que «rôle», parce que c'est ce dont nous parlons. Pour assurer l'indépendance judiciaire, il est nécessaire que les juges aient une sécurité financière. Nous ne parlons pas d'un rôle, mais d'un besoin.

La présidente: Je dois dire que cette disposition a fait l'objet d'un long débat.

Le sénateur Balfour: Auquel je n'ai pas assisté.

Le sénateur Joyal: Je suis d'accord avec le sénateur Balfour et le sénateur Grafstein. Je dois dire, bien honnêtement, qu'il y a plein de mots dans le dictionnaire. C'est la magie de la langue. Il est certain qu'on peut formuler un objectif de différentes façons sans changer l'essence même de ce que nous voulons dire. Mes collègues comprendront que j'ai essayé de rédiger un texte qui respecte ce que j'ai souligné, c'est-à-dire qui soit conforme à la tradition et aux obligations de notre Constitution sur la séparation

and our constitutional obligations of separation of power. I was conscious of choosing the terms to be sure that they were acceptable in the context of our legal tradition.

At this point, while I know that those of us who are lawyers or who have discussed legal concepts can express principles in various ways, I would be tempted to maintain this one as it stands, taking into account the research and discussion I had with the legal adviser on the selection of these words.

I understand your point. It is part of the overall essential of judicial independence that we want to maintain through the capacity of the commission to ensure that judges have financial security.

Senator Beaudoin: I think we have discussed this *ad nauseam*, because it is only one point out of three in the *Valenti* case. I am ready to accept this as it is.

The Chairman: May I ask your opinions on point "(d)", Senator Joyal and others?

Senator Joyal: I would like to hear the opinion of my colleagues before I make my comments on that, Madam Chairman.

The Chairman: We are referring to the change suggested by Senator Fraser in the French version of "1.1(d)", that the word "objectif" be added after the word "facteur".

Senator Beaudoin: I have a problem with that. Look at this.

[Translation]

The French version reads "La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants", namely (a), (b), (c) and (d), "tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent."

[English]

I think if we change any version, it should be the English version which states that the commission shall consider. There is no mention of the objective or the measure. It states, shall consider "(a), (b), (c), (d)" and any other objective measure. It has been translated as "tout autre facteur".

[Translation]

When you say "tout autre facteur", this implies objectivity.

Senator Joyal: No, not necessarily.

[English]

Senator Beaudoin: A factor is something that exists. It exists or it does not exist.

Senator Grafstein: That point is well taken. In the *P.E.I. Reference* case, one of the overlapping issues was the need for objective criteria. "Criteria" is better than "objective measures". I can bring a criterion to bear. I can say that I think everyone who has a certain colour of hair should be treated in a certain way. That, to my mind, is an arbitrary criterion. On the other hand, if I say judges who are disabled should be treated in a certain way, then I move from the arbitrary to the general. I think that "objectif" means those objective, non-arbitrary factors. We do not want the commission to say, "By the way, this was our

des pouvoirs. Je me suis employé à choisir des mots qui allaient être acceptables sur le plan juridique.

Même si je sais que ceux d'entre nous qui sont avocats ou discutent de concepts juridiques peuvent exprimer des principes de différentes façons, je serais tenté de défendre la formulation que j'ai choisie compte tenu des recherches que j'ai faites et des discussions que j'ai eues avec un conseiller juridique sur le choix des mots.

Je comprends votre point de vue. Ça fait partie du principe général de l'indépendance de la magistrature que nous voulons maintenir en permettant à la commission de s'assurer que les juges ont une sécurité financière.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Je pense que nous avons discuté de cela *ad nauseam* parce que c'est seulement un des trois points traités dans l'affaire *Valenti*. Je suis prêt à accepter la disposition telle quelle.

La présidente: Puis-je vous demander votre avis sur l'alinéa d), sénateur Joyal et d'autres?

Le sénateur Joyal: J'aimerais d'abord entendre l'opinion de mes collègues avant de donner la mienne, madame la présidente.

La présidente: Je parle de la modification proposée par le sénateur Fraser à la version française de l'alinéa 1.1d) pour faire ajouter le mot «objectif» après le mot «facteur».

Le sénateur Beaudoin: J'y vois un problème. Regardez bien.

[Français]

«La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants, a), b), c) et à d), tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.»

[Traduction]

À mon avis, si on change l'une ou l'autre version, ce devrait être la version anglaise parce qu'il n'y est pas question de l'objectif ou de la mesure que la commission doit examiner. On dit que la commission examine a), b), c) et d), toute autre mesure objective. On a traduit ce passage par «tout autre facteur».

[Français]

Si vous dites tout autre facteur, le facteur est toujours objectif.

Le sénateur Joyal: Non, pas nécessairement.

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Un facteur est quelque chose qui existe ou qui n'existe pas.

Le sénateur Grafstein: On en prend note. Dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, il est question de la nécessité d'avoir des critères objectifs. Le mot «critères» vaut mieux que les mots «objective measures» utilisés en anglais. Je peux établir un critère à prendre en considération. Je peux dire que tous ceux qui ont les cheveux d'une certaine couleur doivent être traités d'une certaine façon. D'après moi, c'est un critère arbitraire. En revanche, si je dis que les juges qui ont un handicap devraient être traités d'une certaine façon, je passe de l'arbitraire au général. Je pense que le mot

thought.” If they have a thought, it must be a generally accepted criterion. It is almost like the notion of generally accepted accounting principles.

The Chairman: Before we go further, it may be of interest to you to note that, in the *P.E.I. Reference* case, they must make recommendations on judges’ remuneration by reference to objective criteria. This is where the reference comes from.

Senator Beaudoin: Objective criteria is much better. I think we should change it to that expression.

Senator Grafstein: How would that be translated in French?

The Chairman: Senator Nolin has the floor.

Senator Nolin: Of course, we can change the word “measure” to “criteria”, but the intent of Senator Fraser’s amendment was to add —

[Translation]

— if you look at the three first factors or criteria listed, clearly, they are all objective. There is no need to qualify them. However, in subparagraph 4, because they are no longer defined, these factors need to be qualified. The commission has the flexibility to choose on its own those measures or criteria that it deems necessary. These criteria should be objective. It is quite appropriate to insert the word “objective”, but only in subparagraph 4.

[English]

Senator Beaudoin: In the *P.E.I. Reference* case, they referred to objective criteria. That decision is also available in French. What does it say in French?

The Chairman: We do not have the French version of the *P.E.I. Reference* case here. We will try to get it off the Internet.

Senator Joyal: To continue on the point raised by Senator Nolin, I would remind you that the concept came from the *P.E.I. Reference* case. In my opinion, it was important. The basis of this amendment is that the mandate of the commission be circumscribed. The court clearly mentioned it had one element in mind when it stated that objective. In other words, it did not want to leave the commission with an open-ended mandate to make recommendations that could not be measured by objective criteria. That is my interpretation of the decision, and that is what I think we understand here.

When I was drafting the amendment, I thought it important that the word “objective” be maintained. It qualifies the various elements that the commission would take into consideration in making recommendations. I thought it was necessary to add a certain number of examples of criteria, such as the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary. That idea came from the Scott commission. Honourable senators will remember that when Mr. Scott was here, he testified in that regard.

«objectif» qualifie les facteurs non arbitraires. Nous ne voulons pas que la commission exprime un avis sans y avoir vraiment réfléchi. L’avis qu’elle exprime doit être appuyé sur un critère généralement reconnu. C’est un peu comme les principes comptables généralement admis.

La présidente: Avant de poursuivre, il peut être intéressant de noter que, selon le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, la commission doit formuler des recommandations sur la rémunération des juges en s’appuyant sur des critères objectifs. C’est de là que viennent ces mots.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Les mots «objectives criteria» valent beaucoup mieux. Je pense que nous devrions les employer à la place.

Le sénateur Grafstein: Comment les traduirait-on en français?

La présidente: La parole est au sénateur Nolin.

Le sénateur Nolin: Évidemment, nous pourrions changer le mot «measure» par «criteria», mais le changement proposé par le sénateur Fraser visait à ajouter...

[Français]

... en français, le mot objectif. Si vous regardez l’énumération des trois premiers facteurs ou critères, ils sont de toute évidence objectifs. On n’a pas besoin de les qualifier à ce moment. Mais au quatrième alinéa, il faut absolument le préciser parce qu’ils ne sont plus définis à ce moment. On laisse la Commission libre de choisir elle-même les facteurs ou critères qu’elle jugera nécessaire afin de l’influencer. On veut bien que ces critères soient objectifs. Il est à propos d’ajouter le mot objectif uniquement au quatrième sous-alinéa.

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, il est question de critères objectifs. La décision a été traduite. Que dit-on en français?

La présidente: Nous n’avons pas la version française du renvoi ici. Nous essayerons de nous la procurer sur Internet.

Le sénateur Joyal: Pour revenir à ce que disait le sénateur Nolin, j’aimerais vous rappeler que ce concept vient du *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard*. À mon avis, c’est important. L’amendement vise à circonscrire le mandat de la commission. La cour a bien indiqué l’intention qu’elle avait en énonçant cet objectif. Autrement dit, elle ne voulait pas que la commission puisse formuler des recommandations qui ne pourraient pas s’appuyer sur des critères objectifs. C’est ainsi que j’interprète la décision et c’est aussi ce que nous en pensons ici, je crois.

Quand j’ai rédigé l’amendement, j’ai jugé qu’il était important de conserver le mot «objectif». Il qualifie les divers éléments que la commission examinerait pour formuler ses recommandations. J’ai cru bon d’énoncer certains critères, comme le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature. J’ai tiré cet exemple de ce qu’a produit la commission Scott. Mes collègues se rappelleront que M. Scott a parlé en ce sens quand il est venu témoigner devant nous.

As well, the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, must be taken into account. It is mentioned in the *P.E.I. Reference* decision as an objective criterion. The overall economic and current financial position of the federal government is also an objective criterion.

If we are to allow the commission the capacity to do its work, then it must be able to consider other criteria, but in an objective manner. In other words, it must consider criteria that are justified, ones that are measured on objective grounds. That is why the word "objective" is so important.

I certainly support the suggestion of Senator Fraser in that regard; the word "criteria" is part of the sense of that amendment.

The Chairman: It is in the French version of the P.E.I. decision as well.

Senator Joyal: We agree that we must ensure that the English and French versions are as similar as possible.

The Chairman: We cannot change the wording after we have passed it. Therefore, we should have the exact wording before us before we vote.

We can come back to it later. We will leave the staff to worry about it.

We will move on to part "(b)" of clause 6, on page 4. Do you have a further amendment, Senator Joyal?

Senator Joyal: Yes, Madam Chairman. It is essentially a matter of clarification.

I move that Bill C-37 be amended at paragraph "(b)", on page 4, by replacing line 14 with the following:

"a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it."

The French amendment would read:

[Translation]

Paragraphe:

b) à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13, de ce qui suit:

"(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au".

...within six months of receiving it. The six-month period remains in effect. We are talking here about the commission's report. This provision can be somewhat confusing, as it is not clear if we are talking about the commission's report or about Parliament's report.

Senator Beaudoin: Does the French version make no mention of this six-month period?

Senator Joyal: Yes, the text continues on line 14.

Senator Beaudoin: And that is where mention is made of the six-month period?

Il faut également tenir compte de l'état de l'économie au Canada, et notamment du coût de la vie. Dans la décision rendue dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, cet aspect est considéré comme un critère objectif. La situation économique et financière du gouvernement fédéral est aussi un critère objectif.

Pour pouvoir remplir son mandat, la commission doit pouvoir étudier d'autres critères, mais de façon objective. Autrement dit, elle doit examiner des critères qui sont justifiés, des critères qui peuvent être évalués sur une base objective. Voilà pourquoi le mot «objectif» est si important.

J'approuve tout à fait la proposition du sénateur Fraser à ce sujet; le mot «criteria» donne en partie son sens à cet amendement.

La présidente: Il est aussi employé dans la version française de la décision sur le renvoi de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard.

Le sénateur Joyal: Nous convenons qu'il faut nous assurer que les versions anglaise et française se ressemblent le plus possible.

La présidente: Nous ne pouvons pas changer le libellé après l'avoir adopté. Nous devons donc avoir le libellé exact avant de nous prononcer.

Nous pouvons y revenir plus tard. Nous laisserons le soin au personnel de s'en occuper.

Nous passons à la partie b) de l'article 6, à la page 4. Avez-vous un autre amendement, sénateur Joyal?

Le sénateur Joyal: Oui, madame la présidente. Il s'agit simplement d'un éclaircissement.

Je propose que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié, à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 14 de la version anglaise de ce qui suit:

«a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.»

Voici le libellé de l'amendement en français:

[Français]

Paragraphe:

b) à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13, de ce qui suit:

«(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au »

... plus tard six mois après l'avoir reçu. On maintient la période de six mois. C'est le rapport de la commission dont on parle. L'article peut porter à confusion si c'est le rapport de la commission ou le rapport du Parlement.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: C'est parce qu'en français, on ne parle pas du six mois?

Le sénateur Joyal: Oui, il y a un six mois. On continue avec le texte de la ligne 14.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Et là, il y a le six mois?

Senator Joyal: Precisely. The only thing added to the French version is "de la Commission" because it is not clear which report is being referred to. It is purely a technicality.

[English]

I think we all understand the point.

The Chairman: At this point, rather than voting on part "(b)," we will go back to part "(a)" because we now have the wording.

Because there are changes to both the English and French versions, we will have to vote on both versions. We will start with the English version. Senator Joyal, will you restate the amendment?

Senator Joyal: The amendment to paragraph "(d)" states:

"any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.";

The Chairman: Shall the English version of clause 6, as further amended, carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Rather than reading the entire clause, it has been moved by Senator Joyal that paragraph "(d)" read:

[Translation]

Tout autre critère objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

Senator Beaudoin: Perfect.

[English]

Senator Nolin: In the introduction of "1.1" we have the word "facteur". We must change that to "critère". I want to ensure that we are talking about the same thing.

Senator Joyal: Personally, I would prefer "facteur" in both paragraph "1.1" and in subparagraph "(d)".

Senator Nolin: My point is to use the same wording in both places.

Senator Beaudoin: But what will we use?

Senator Joyal: We will use the word "facteur".

[Translation]

Senator Joyal: "Facteur."

Senator Nolin: The correct word is "facteur."

Senator Beaudoin: However, in point *d*), we would use "critère objectif"?

Senator Joyal: No, we would use "facteur" to maintain agreement with paragraph 1.1.

Senator Beaudoin: And what do we do with the English version?

[English]

The Chairman: What Senator Joyal is moving is to change his amendment to read, in part "(d)":

Le sénateur Joyal: Oui, exactement. Ce qu'on ajoute tout simplement dans la version française c'est «de la Commission» parce qu'on ne sait pas de quel rapport on parle. C'est purement une technicalité.

[Traduction]

Je crois que nous comprenons tous le point.

La présidente: Maintenant, plutôt que de voter à l'égard de la partie «b)», nous allons revenir à la partie «a)» vu que nous avons le libellé

Vu qu'il y a des changements et à la version anglaise et à la version française, il nous faudra voter sur les deux versions. Nous commençons par la version anglaise. Sénateur Joyal, auriez-vous l'obligeance de reformuler l'amendement?

Le sénateur Joyal: L'amendement proposé au paragraphe «d)» stipule:

«any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.»;

La présidente: La version anglaise de l'article 6 modifié est-elle adoptée?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Adoptée.

Plutôt que de lire l'article au complet, il est proposé par le sénateur Joyal que l'alinéa *d*) se lise comme suit:

[Français]

Tout autre critère objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: C'est parfait.

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Nolin: Dans l'introduction de «1.1», nous avons le mot «facteurs». Nous devons le remplacer par «critères». Je veux être sûr que nous parlons de la même chose.

Le sénateur Joyal: Personnellement, je préférerais «facteurs» tant au paragraphe «1.1» qu'à l'alinéa «d)».

Le sénateur Nolin: Ce que je veux, c'est qu'on utilise le même mot aux deux endroits.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Mais lequel utiliserons-nous?

Le sénateur Joyal: Nous utiliserons le mot «facteurs».

[Français]

Le sénateur Joyal: «facteur».

Le sénateur Nolin: Le vrai mot est «facteur ».

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Mais dans *d*) ce serait «critère objectif»?

Le sénateur Joyal: Non, «facteur», parce qu'on maintient la concordance avec le paragraphe (1.1).

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Et en anglais, qu'est-ce qu'on fait?

[Traduction]

La présidente: Ce que propose le sénateur Joyal, c'est de modifier son amendement pour que l'alinéa «d)» se lise comme suit:

[Translation]

Tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

[English]

All in favour?

Senator Beaudoin: If we leave the word "criteria" in, it is included in "facteur".

Senator Joyal: I totally agree with Senator Beaudoin that in the definition "criteria" is part of "facteur". To ensure that the concordance is maintained, we should include the word "facteur". One includes the other.

The Chairman: All those in favour of the amendment?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed?

Carried.

That clause 6 be further amended by substituting at line 14:

"a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it."

I am informed that the French works as well.

All those in favour of the amendment?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 6, as amended, carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 7 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 8 carry? All those in favour?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: I declare clause 8 carried.

Shall clause 9 carry? All those in favour?

Hon. Senators: No.

The Chairman: All those opposed?

I declare clause 9 negatived.

Shall clause 10 carry?

Hon. Senators: No.

The Chairman: I declare clause 10 negatived.

Shall clause 11 carry?

Hon. Senators: No.

The Chairman: I declare clause 11 negatived.

[Français]

Tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

[Traduction]

Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Le mot «facteur» traduit bien le mot «critère».

Le sénateur Joyal: Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec le sénateur Beaudoin. Pour assurer la concordance, nous devrions utiliser le mot «facteur», l'un incluant l'autre.

La présidente: Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Tous ceux qui sont contre.

Adopté.

Que l'article 6 soit de nouveau modifié par substitution à la ligne 14 du texte anglais par ce qui suit:

«a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.»

On m'informe que ça va aussi pour le texte français.

Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement.

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Quels sont ceux qui sont contre?

Adopté.

L'article 6 modifié est-il adopté?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Tous ceux qui sont contre?

Adopté.

L'article 7 est-il adopté?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Tous ceux qui sont contre.

Adopté.

L'article 8 est-il adopté? Tous ceux qui sont pour?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: L'article 8 est adopté.

L'article 9 est-il adopté? Tous ceux qui sont pour?

Des voix: Non.

La présidente: Tous ceux qui sont contre.

L'article 9 est rejeté.

L'article 10 est-il adopté?

Des voix: Non.

La présidente: L'article 10 est rejeté.

L'article 11 est-il adopté?

Des voix: Non.

La présidente: L'article 11 est rejeté.

There are no changes to clauses 12 to 20. Shall we consider them en masse?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Senator Beaudoin: I wish to confirm one thing. Clause 12 refers to amending section 47. It mentions the word "enfant".

[Translation]

I trust it is not related to the question of the surviving spouse.

Senator Nolin: No, it has to do with the question of children.

Senator Beaudoin: Shall this clause carry?

[English]

Senator Beaudoin: My concerns have been addressed. I wanted to be sure.

The Chairman: Shall clauses 12 to 20 carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 21 carry?

Senator Joyal: Madam Chairman, taking into account that we have amended the previous clauses of the bill, I would like to move an amendment to ensure that we are consistent with the previous clauses of the bill. I would like to move that Bill C-37 be amended in clause 21, on page 13, by replacing lines 1 to 3 with the following:

"21. Sections 2, 3, 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or"

[Translation]

In French, the amendment would read as follows:

Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié, par substitution, aux lignes 3 à 5, page 13, de ce qui suit:

"21. Les articles 2, 3, 7, et 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date".

And it goes on to say on line 6 "à la date fixée par décret".

Senator Nolin: The coming-into-force date is determined by an order of the Governor in Council. A question just occurred to me. I did not put any questions to the department's witnesses when they testified before the committee. Since the coming into force of these amendments affects remuneration, does this clause not put some power in the hands of the executive? Could this not be perceived as the executive branch exercising some control over remuneration? Why would the bill not come into force on the day it receives Royal Assent?

Senator Joyal: I would not venture to speak on behalf of the justice department or the Minister of Justice, but I do believe that some provisions have been put in place.

[English]

One of the main reasons this provision has been added is that there are elements in the bill which needed further consultation with the various levels of the judiciary. In particular, in Ontario,

Aucun changement n'est proposé aux articles 12 à 20. Les membres acceptent-ils de les étudier en bloc?

Des voix: D'accord.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Je veux confirmer une chose. L'article 12 porte modification de l'article 7. On utilise le mot «enfant».

[Français]

J'espère que ce n'est pas relié au conjoint survivant.

Le sénateur Nolin: Non, c'est toute la question des enfants.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Adopté?

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Mes craintes sont apaisées. Je voulais être sûr.

La présidente: Les articles 12 à 20 sont-ils adoptés?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Tous ceux qui sont contre.

Adopté.

L'article 21 est-il adopté?

Le sénateur Joyal: Madame la présidente, étant donné que nous avons modifié ces articles du projet de loi, j'aimerais proposer un amendement qui en assurera la conformité avec les dispositions précédentes du projet de loi. J'aimerais proposer que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié par substitution, aux lignes 3 à 5, page 13, de ce qui suit.

«21. Sections 2, 3, 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or»

[Français]

En français, l'amendement se lirait:

Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié, par substitution, aux lignes 3 à 5, page 13, de ce qui suit:

« 21. Les articles 2, 3, 7, 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date».

Et le texte français se poursuit. C'est à la date fixée par décret, à la fin de la ligne six.

Le sénateur Nolin: Ce sera un décret du pouvoir exécutif. La question me vient à l'instant et je n'ai pas posé de questions aux témoins du ministère lorsqu'ils sont venus témoigner. Comme la mise en vigueur de ces amendements inclut la rémunération, est-ce qu'il n'y a pas, dans cet article de mise en vigueur, un pouvoir entre les mains du pouvoir exécutif? Cela ne pourrait-il pas être perçu comme un contrôle de la rémunération? Pourquoi le projet de loi ne viendrait-il pas en vigueur carrément au moment de sa sanction?

Le sénateur Joyal: Je pense qu'il y a des dispositions, enfin, je ne veux pas risquer de parler au nom du ministère de la Justice ou du ministre de la Justice, certainement pas.

[Traduction]

Cette disposition a été ajoutée en grande partie parce que le projet de loi comporte des éléments qui nécessitaient une consultation plus poussée avec divers paliers de l'appareil

there are discussions about the establishment of the new judges of the family court, and so forth. That is why there are elements that require further discussion with other parties and the necessity of clause 21.

Normally legislation comes into force on the day of its Royal Assent. However, because of the particular elements in the bill with respect to the provincial court, the coming into effect of the bill is fixed by an order of the Governor in Council.

Senator Beaudoin: Having regard to the complexity of the statute, I do not think it detracts from the independence of the judiciary. I understand your point because if the executive branch chooses to delay, the judges may interpret that as going against the independence of the judges." However, in my opinion, this is purely technical, and I would not worry about it.

Senator Nolin: My concern relates to clause 5. As I see it, clause 5 is not included in here. Therefore, I can backtrack on my earlier comments. Clause 5 is the remuneration clause.

Senator Joyal: However, it is not included.

[Translation]

The amendments pertain to clauses 2,3,7, 14 and 20.

Senator Nolin: I withdraw my comments in that case.

[English]

The Chairman: If I may clarify, these technical amendments are being put in because, in conjunction with Ontario's Bill 79, which would rename certain courts of Ontario, clauses 2, 3 and 7 and the transitional provisions of Bill C-37 would make corresponding amendments to various pieces of legislation, including the Judges Act.

Senator Nolin: I would ask members of this committee to forget my previous comments. The Constitution gives that power to Parliament, not to the executive branch of the government.

Senator Beaudoin: It is the power of the purse.

Senator Joyal: It is important that we know which parts of the bill are subject to a decree of the Governor in Council, taking into account the principle of the separation of power, which we discussed this morning. We must be clear that what we are doing is in strict conformity with the separation of power.

The Chairman: The question then is on the amendment to clause 21. All those in favour of the amendment?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 21, as amended, carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Shall the title carry?

judiciaire. Plus particulièrement, en Ontario, il est question de l'installation des nouveaux juges du tribunal de la famille, et cetera. C'est la raison pour laquelle il s'y trouve des éléments qui nécessitent une discussion plus poussée avec d'autres parties et l'ajout de l'article 21.

D'habitude la loi entre en vigueur au moment de la sanction royale. Cependant, étant donné les éléments particuliers du projet de loi en ce qui concerne la cour provinciale, l'entrée en vigueur est fixée par décret.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: Étant donné la complexité de la loi, je ne crois pas qu'elle s'éloigne de l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. Je comprends votre point étant donné que si le pouvoir exécutif choisit de reporter l'entrée en vigueur, les juges pourraient interpréter cela comme allant à l'encontre de leur indépendance. Cependant il s'agit selon moi d'une modification purement technique et je ne m'inquiéterais pas.

Le sénateur Nolin: Je m'interroge au sujet de l'article 5. De la façon dont je vois les choses, l'article 5 n'est pas inclus ici. Par conséquent, je peux retirer ce que j'ai dit. L'article 5 est celui où il est question du calcul du traitement.

Le sénateur Joyal: Cependant, il n'est pas inclus.

[Français]

Ce sont les article 2, 3, 7,14 et 20.

Le sénateur Nolin: Je retire mes commentaires.

[Traduction]

La présidente: Si je peux éclairer votre lanterne, ces amendements techniques sont présentés parce que, conjointement avec le projet de loi 79 de l'Ontario, qui renommerait certains tribunaux de l'Ontario, les articles 2, 3 et 7 de même que les dispositions transitoires du projet de loi C-37 apporteraient des modifications qui s'imposent à diverses mesures législatives, y compris la Loi sur les juges.

Le sénateur Nolin: Je demande aux membres du comité d'oublier ce que j'ai dit. La Constitution donne ce pouvoir au Parlement et non à l'exécutif.

Le sénateur Beaudoin: C'est le pouvoir du Trésor public.

Le sénateur Joyal: Il est important que nous sachions quelles sont les parties du projet de loi qui sont assujetties à un décret, en tenant compte du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs dont nous avons discuté ce matin. Nous devons nous assurer de respecter la séparation des pouvoirs.

La présidente: La mise aux voix porte sur l'amendement proposé à l'article 21. Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

Adopté.

L'article 21 modifié est-il adopté?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Adopté.

Le titre est-il adopté?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Shall the bill, as amended, carry?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Is it agreed that the clauses of the bill be renumbered appropriately?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: Carried.

Shall I report the bill, as amended, to the Senate?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chairman: That completes our agenda for today, honourable senators.

The committee adjourned.

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Adopté.

Le projet de loi modifié est-il adopté?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Adopté.

Plaît-il aux membres du comité que les articles du projet de loi soient renumérotés correctement?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Adopté.

Dois-je faire rapport du projet de loi modifié au Sénat?

Des voix: D'accord.

La présidente: Honorables sénateurs, nous avons épuisé notre ordre du jour.

La séance est levée.

Compensation Review of Federally Appointed Judges

Department of Justice regarding the 2020 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission

26 March 2021

Table of Contents

| | | |
|----|--|----|
| A. | Purpose of Report | 4 |
| B. | Executive Summary | 5 |
| | Increase in Base Judicial Salary as of 1 April 2021..... | 6 |
| C. | Introduction..... | 9 |
| D. | Comments and Opinions on Relevant Compensation Topics..... | 10 |
| | Total Compensation vs Cash Compensation | 10 |
| | Retirement Savings | 10 |
| | Health and Welfare Benefits..... | 11 |
| | Disability..... | 12 |
| | Supernumerary Status..... | 13 |
| | Industrial Aggregate Increases ("IAI")..... | 16 |
| | How Does 2.9 Million Workers Getting Laid-off Cause Average Income to Increase?..... | 18 |
| | Weighted Averages..... | 20 |
| E. | Judicial Total Compensation..... | 23 |
| | Salary..... | 23 |
| | Retirement Savings | 23 |
| | The Judicial Annuity..... | 24 |
| | Value of the Judicial Annuity | 26 |
| | What is Value? | 27 |
| | Health & Welfare Benefits | 32 |
| | Canada Pension Plan Contributions..... | 33 |
| | Base Judicial Total Compensation | 33 |
| F. | Self-Employed Lawyers | 37 |
| | Percentiles..... | 37 |
| | Self-Employed Lawyers' Income | 37 |
| | How can percentiles mislead us? | 46 |
| | Self-Employed Lawyers and Retirement Savings | 48 |

| | | |
|------------|--|----|
| G. | Deputy Ministers Within the Federal Government | 49 |
| | Deputy Minister Compensation | 50 |
| | Government Agency Appointments Compensation..... | 53 |
| | The Block Comparator | 55 |
| | Deputy Minister Tenure..... | 57 |
| H. | Data Tables Utilised in the Report | 58 |
| | Number of Self-Employed Lawyers | 58 |
| | Data Presentation | 59 |
| | Net Incomes for All Regions and All Ages 2015 to 2019..... | 61 |
| | Net Incomes for 10 Largest CMAs and All Ages 2015 to 2019..... | 64 |
| | Net Incomes for Other Regions and All Ages 2015 to 2019 | 67 |
| | Comparison of Net Incomes by Age | 70 |
| | Comparison of Net Incomes by Census Metropolitan Area | 73 |
| | Comparison of Net Incomes by Province..... | 75 |
| | Recent Appointments to Federal Judiciary..... | 77 |
| | Election of Supernumerary Status..... | 82 |
| I. | Summary of Compensation Amounts | 83 |
| | Summary of Base Salaries | 83 |
| | Summary of Total Compensation..... | 85 |
| J. | Certification..... | 88 |
| Appendix 1 | Curriculum Vitae of Peter Gorham, F.S.A, F.C.I.A. | 89 |
| Appendix 2 | Documents Utilised | 90 |
| Appendix 3 | Summary of Judicial Annuity Benefits | 93 |
| Appendix 4 | Actuarial Assumptions Utilised..... | 94 |

A. Purpose of Report

1. I am president and actuary with JDM Actuarial Expert Services Inc. I regularly provide actuarial consulting services as well as actuarial expert testimony. I am a fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and of the Society of Actuaries. I received my Actuarial Fellowship in 1980 and have provided pension, benefits and actuarial consulting services for approximately 43 years. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Appendix 1.
2. I understand and acknowledge that as an expert, I have a duty to provide evidence in this proceeding as follows:
 - a. to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
 - b. to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within my area of expertise; and
 - c. to provide such additional assistance as the 2020 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission (the “**Quadrennial Commission**”) may reasonably require.
3. I acknowledge that the duty referred to above prevails over any obligation that I may owe to any party by whom or on whose behalf I am engaged.
4. This report has been prepared for the Department of Justice of the Government of Canada.
5. The purpose of this report is to:
 - a. review and provide my opinion on data provided by Canada Revenue Agency about self-employed earnings of lawyers in Canada;
 - b. provide comments about issues to consider regarding the total compensation (earnings, benefits, pension and any other remuneration) of self-employed lawyers, deputy ministers and similar positions of the Government of Canada and federally appointed judges;
 - c. provide cost estimates of the judicial annuity that provides a lifetime pension to federally appointed judges upon their retirement as well as providing a pension in the event of permanent disability; and
 - d. provide comments and my opinion about future changes in the Industrial Aggregate Index.
6. The intended users of this report are the Department of Justice, the Quadrennial Commission, and the various parties appearing before the Commission. The report should not be provided to anyone who is not an intended user except as may be required by law. The findings herein should not be relied upon by any party other than an intended user.

B. Executive Summary

7. This report takes a look at the income and total compensation of various jobs with the goal of assisting the Department of Justice prepare their submission to the Quadrennial Commission and also assist the Quadrennial Commission in their review of compensation for federally appointed judges.
8. In this report,
 - a. I determine the value of the Judicial Annuity that is available to federally appointed judges upon retirement from the bench;
 - b. I review recent compensation for self-employed lawyers, deputy ministers and government appointments to senior roles in government agencies;
 - c. I establish a total compensation for each of these positions so that compensation can be viewed on an “apples to apples” basis; and
 - d. I present the results of my analyses along with comments on a number of compensation issues related to these positions, but I make no recommendations.
9. There are many ways to compensate someone for performing work. It starts with salary or wages. Adding to that is commissions, overtime, vacation, bonuses (also referred to as performance pay, at-risk pay, etc.), health and welfare benefits, pension plan, stock options, etc. The sum of all these forms of compensation is referred to as total compensation.
10. Not every job comes with the same components of compensation and even when they do, each of the components are likely worth different amounts. To provide a fair basis for any comparisons, I determine a total compensation for each of the jobs referenced herein. Total compensation allows us to compare like with like.
11. Two jobs may have different salaries, but the total compensation may be the similar. Two jobs may have similar salaries, but the total compensation may be very different. If we compare two jobs on the basis of salary only, it devalues potentially large differences in other aspects of compensation.
12. The *Judges Act* sets out a number of judicial positions and annual salaries, including prothonotaries, puisne judges, and judges of the Supreme Court. I understand that the salary for each of these positions can be expressed as a percentage adjustment to the salary of a puisne judge. In this report, I refer to the salary of a puisne judge as the **Base Judicial Salary**. For the year beginning 1 April 2020, the salary for puisne judges is \$338,800. The salary for a prothonotary is currently set at 80% of the Base Judicial

Salary, which is \$271,000 beginning 1 April 2020. Similar calculations can be performed for other positions.

13. Base Judicial Salary is not appropriate for comparison with other jobs. For a fair comparison, we need to use total compensation. In this report, I have focussed on the total compensation for puisne judges. But, for federally appointed judges, the value of their pension varies based on their age at appointment and therefore their total compensation will vary based on their age at appointment. To simplify matters and to provide a reasonable basis for any comparisons of compensation, I calculate an average amount of total compensation for puisne judges that reflects the age distribution of all judges when appointed. I refer to that as **Base Judicial Total Compensation**. To determine the total compensation of the other judicial positions, one can apply the same percentage as we would apply to the Base Judicial Salary to obtain the base salary of that other position¹.
14. In this report, I review the salaries of the federally appointed judges and of deputy ministers and calculate their total compensation. I was also provided with the net income amounts for self-employed lawyers in Canada between 2015 and 2019 by the Canada Revenue Agency. I have reviewed it and present summaries of that data from various perspectives. The net income of the self-employed lawyers is their total compensation².
15. The goal is to provide a series of total compensation amounts with a fair relationship to each other. Those amounts are set out in Tables 280, 281 and 282.

Increase in Base Judicial Salary as of 1 April 2021

16. Base Judicial Salary is \$338,800 for the year 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021. Under the *Judges Act*, and subject to any adjustments recommended by the Quadrennial Commission, it will be adjusted effective 1 April 2021 by changes in the Industrial

¹ The result of using the same percentage as one would apply to Base Judicial Salary will actually result in a small understatement of the total compensation of prothonotaries and a small overstatement of total compensation for all other judicial positions. Those over and understatements are each less than \$1,000 and are not material for the purposes of this report.

² Normally, the cost of health and welfare benefits form part of total compensation. Self-employed lawyers can provide health and welfare benefits for themselves as part of their business expenses that are paid out of gross income prior to the calculation of net-income. Health and welfare benefits also would normally form part of both judicial and deputy minister total compensation. To avoid having to make hundreds of adjustments to the income amounts herein for each of lawyers, judges and deputy ministers, I have chosen to simply ignore it since its value is not materially different between these positions.

Aggregate, a data series maintained by Statistics Canada that measures changes in the average earnings of Canadians.

17. I have estimated that increase will be 6.74%, raising the Base Judicial Salary to \$361,600 effective 1 April 2021.

Effect on Base Judicial Total Compensation³

18. I determined that on average, the Base Judicial Total Compensation for 2019 to 2020 (based on the \$329,900 Base Judicial Salary effective April 2019) is \$496,000. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$496,000 in 2019, I estimate that would be about the 88th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
19. I determined that on average, the Base Judicial Total Compensation for 2020 to 2021 (based on the \$338,800 Base Judicial Salary) is \$509,400. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$509,400 in 2020, I estimate that would be about the 88th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
20. I also determined that on average, the Base Judicial Total Compensation for 2021 to 2022 (based on the \$361,600 I estimated above) will be \$543,800. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$543,800 in 2021, I estimate that would be about the 89th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

Effect on Total Compensation of Prothonotaries

21. For April 2019 to March 2020, the base salary of a prothonotary was \$263,900, from April 2020 to March 2021 it is \$271,000 and I estimate beginning April 2021 it will be \$289,200 (80% of the Base Judicial Salary).
22. I determined that the total compensation of a prothonotary for 2019 to 2020 (based on 80% of the Base Judicial Total Compensation and adjusting for a \$600 understatement (see footnote 1)) is \$397,300. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$397,300 in 2019, I estimate that would be about the 82nd percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
23. I determined that the total compensation of a prothonotary for 2020 to 2021 (using the same basis as for 2019-2020) is \$408,100. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$408,100 in 2020, I estimate that would be about the 82nd percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

³ Details of these calculations are at paragraphs 153 and following.

24. I also determined that the total compensation of a prothonotary for 2021 to 2022 (using the same basis as for 2019-2020) is estimated to be \$435,500. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$435,500 in 2021, I estimate that would be about the 86th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

C. Introduction

25. I was retained by the Department of Justice to prepare a report to assist the Quadrennial Commission in their review of judicial compensation.
26. In preparing this report, I have assumed that the most appropriate perspective is to look at total compensation and the individual components that comprise total compensation.
27. As with past reports for prior Quadrennial Commissions, I have reviewed data regarding net income for self-employed lawyers to provide one comparator for compensation. I also have reviewed compensation of senior deputy ministers within the Government of Canada and appointments to senior government agencies as another objective factor.
28. I have approached the report in the following order:
 - a. General comments and opinions on compensation topics.
 - b. Review of the current situation for federal judges with respect to salary, the Judicial Annuity, disability income and health and welfare benefits.
 - c. Review of compensation for lawyers in private practice with respect to net income, retirement savings, disability and health and welfare benefits.
 - d. Review of compensation for senior deputy ministers with respect to the same components.
 - e. Relationship of current judicial compensation to that of lawyers and deputy ministers.
29. In this report, where I refer to a lawyer, it should be taken as meaning a self-employed lawyer unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
30. In this report, where I refer to a judge, it should be taken as meaning a federally appointed judge. There are no exceptions.

D. Comments and Opinions on Relevant Compensation Topics

Total Compensation vs Cash Compensation

31. There are many ways that a person can be compensated for work. In almost all situations, compensation starts with salary, base pay, hourly wage rate or some similar measure (herein referred to as “salary”). An individual may also be entitled to other forms of compensation⁴, such as bonuses, commissions, performance incentives, stock options, benefits, retirement savings, health club membership, etc.
32. When comparing compensation between jobs, it is rare that looking only at cash compensation provides a true picture of any differences.
33. Total compensation is a measure that looks at all forms of pay, including cash compensation, and determines a total value. In comparing the compensation between two organisations, total compensation provides a more accurate result. For example, Acme Company might provide their employees with a full suite of health and welfare benefits as well as a generous pension plan. Boden Corporation might prefer to forego the health, welfare and pension plans and instead pay salaries that are about 25% larger. An employee at Acme who discovers the higher salaries at Boden may be led to change employers – at least until finding out about the difference in the other forms of compensation. Presumably they would only change employers if they determine that the total compensation from Acme is less than the total compensation from Boden.
34. Comparing two jobs on the basis of salary only is to devalue potentially large differences in other aspects of compensation.

Retirement Savings

35. One component of compensation is retirement income accumulation. While many Canadians⁵ enjoy an employer-sponsored retirement plan, most Canadians are left to

⁴ Some of these other forms of compensation may also be paid in cash, but they do not form part of “salary” since there is normally an element of risk, or uncertainty regarding the amount to be received or there is a delay before any amount will be payable.

⁵ Obtaining data about membership in an employer-sponsored pension plan is very difficult. Many references are made to the Report on Trusteed Pension Plans published periodically by Statistics Canada. But that report does not include the many pension plans that are not trusteeed. It also ignores the organisations that do not sponsor a registered pension plan but rather provide retirement savings through a group RRSP. Statistics Canada publishes a report on registered pension plan membership (but that also ignores group RRSPs) that shows 37.5% of paid workers are members of a registered pension plan in 2018. [<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200813/t002b-eng.htm>].

look after their personal retirement saving on their own, generally through contributing to a personal Registered Retirement Savings Plan (“RRSP”).

36. There are many different types of retirement plans in Canada. Most retirement plans provided by an employer require part of the annual contribution to be paid by the employees and the balance by the employer. A few plans are funded entirely by the employer with no contribution required from employees⁶. Where there is no retirement plan offered by the employer, the entire cost of retirement savings is borne by the individual employee.
37. For the vast majority, if not all self-employed lawyers, retirement savings are funded entirely out of the individual’s earnings. Under the *Income Tax Act*⁷, self-employed persons are not permitted to sponsor or earn benefits under a registered pension plan leaving the only options an RRSP or non-tax-sheltered savings.
38. For federally appointed judges, the Judicial Annuity provides retirement income with the judges paying 7% of income each year until they are eligible for an unreduced annuity at which time, contributions decrease to 1% of income⁸. Canada is responsible for the balance of the total cost which is paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
39. To properly reflect retirement savings costs for self-employed lawyers and for federally appointed judges, we need to consider their differing opportunities and differing costs for retirement saving.

Health and Welfare Benefits

40. Most employers provide a selection of health and welfare or group insurance benefits. Typically, these include life insurance, medical and drug benefits and dental benefits.
41. The value of these to an individual depends on how much the benefits are used, usually with respect to prescription drugs and dental.
42. Some employers provide these benefits at no cost to employees, while others may require part of the cost to be paid by employees. Canada pays all costs related to the

⁶ In 2019, 5.7 million Canadians were members of a pension plan requiring employee contributions. 0.7 million Canadians were members of a pension plan where they did not have to contribute. [Statistics Canada data table 11-10-0106-01]

⁷ Income Tax Regulations 8503(3)(a)

⁸ Judges Act R.S.C., 1985, c. J-1, section 50(2)

health and welfare benefits of judges. Self-employed lawyers will typically pay for these benefits out of their gross income.

Disability

43. Disability income protection is generally provided through a combination of short-term and long-term disability⁹. In my experience, short-term disability is usually entirely paid by the employer while long-term disability varies – due to income tax implications, usually paid entirely by the employer or entirely by the employee.
44. Self-employed lawyers will typically pay for long-term disability insurance out of their income and will typically self-fund for short-term disability.
45. Short-term disability protection is provided to judges by a continuation of salary. Long-term disability income protection is provided through the Judicial Annuity for a permanent disability and by a continuation of salary for a non-permanent disability.
46. Based on actuarial tables regarding disability claim rates, most people will never claim a disability benefit. In my experience, many people believe it is not an important benefit to have or the cost is too much to be worth having. For those that do have a disability, it is invaluable. As one ages, the chances of having a disability claim increases. At young ages, disability will normally arise from an accident, but as one ages, illnesses such as cancers, cardiovascular and mental health issues become increasingly prevalent in addition to accidents and lead to a greater likelihood of claims.
47. While the incidence rate is small in any single year, it becomes much larger over a number of years and especially as one ages. The actuarial assumptions I used show that 0.02% of judges at age 40 (that's two of every 10,000 judges) are expected to become permanently disabled. That rises to 0.1% by age 52 (10 of every 10,000), to 0.2% by age 60 (20 of every 10,000) and to 1.0% at age 74 (100 of every 10,000).
48. The average annual incidence over all ages is about 0.3% (30 of every 10,000 judges).
49. The Department of Justice provided me with historic data on judges who incurred a permanent disability. From 1985 to 2020, 94 federally appointed judges have become

⁹ Short-term disability usually starts on the first day of absence due to illness or injury or shortly thereafter and continues for anywhere from about three-months to about a year. At the end of that time, long-term disability, if it exists, will commence and normally provide income protection up to recovery or age 65.

permanently disabled. I estimate that the actuarial assumption about disability would result in about the same number of expected permanent disabilities.

50. Both the average and median age of permanent disability was 63 following 11 years of service.
51. For a judge appointed at age 53, there is an 8.8% probability of becoming permanently disabled before age 75. But that 53-year-old would have achieved entitlement to a full retirement annuity at age 68, so there is no additional financial protection from the disability benefit after age 68.
52. For a judge appointed at age 53, there is a 4.3% probability of becoming permanently disabled before age 68.
53. While an annual probability of 0.3% may make the disability benefit sound like it is not worth very much, a probability of 4.3% (1 person out of every 23) becoming permanently disabled over a 15-year period between age 53 and 68 should cause most people to reconsider the value of permanent disability protection.
54. Since 1985, there have been 1,495 judges who have left the bench (retirement, disability or death). 94 of those were due to permanent disability – 6.3% of all judges leaving the bench. That includes judges who became permanently disabled after having qualified for a full retirement annuity and where the disability annuity did not provide any additional financial protection.
55. We can conclude that about 4.3% of judges will become permanently disabled prior to qualifying for a full annuity and 2.0% will become permanently disabled after qualifying for a full annuity.

Supernumerary Status

56. A valuable benefit available to judges is the ability to elect supernumerary status, where the judge is given a reduced workload and continues to receive full compensation. I was informed by the Department of Justice that there is no specific reference, but it is generally accepted that typically, the workload is about 50%.
57. To be eligible for supernumerary status, the judge must have served at least 15 years as a federally appointed judge and have a sum of age plus years of service totalling at least 80, or be at least 70 years old with at least ten years of service as a federally appointed judge. An exception is judges of the Supreme Court who are not eligible for

supernumerary status. Judges may sit as a supernumerary for a maximum of ten years or to age 75, whichever comes first.

58. Judges appointed prior to age 55 who meet the conditions to elect supernumerary status are also eligible to retire on a full unreduced retirement annuity. Judges appointed after age 55 become eligible for supernumerary status prior to their entitlement to a full retirement annuity, but they can grow into a full annuity by continuing in service in either a full-time or supernumerary status. At the time of first eligibility for supernumerary status, the amount of retirement annuity as a percent of Judicial Base Salary is:

Table 58 – Retirement Annuity at First Eligibility for Supernumerary Status

| Age at Appointment | Retirement Annuity as % of Judicial Base Salary |
|--------------------|--|
| 55 or less | 66.7% |
| 56 | 62.2% |
| 57 | 57.8% |
| 58 | 53.3% |
| 59 | 48.9% |
| 60 | 44.4% |
| 61 | 47.6% |
| 62 | 51.3% |
| 63 | 55.6% |
| 64 | 60.6% |
| 65 or more | 66.7% |
| Weighted Average | 62.4% |

59. Basically, once having met the conditions required for electing supernumerary status, the decision for a judge is to:
- a. Continue to work with a full caseload and receive full compensation;
 - b. Elect supernumerary status and continue to work approximately half-time and receive full compensation; or
 - c. Retire and receive a retirement annuity.
60. The financial benefits of this option for a judge are immediately obvious. But it is also a benefit for Canada. Rather than risk losing an experienced judge to retirement, there is a major incentive for the judge to continue in service, but at a reduced caseload. From the financial perspective, if the judge retired, the Judicial Annuity becomes payable at 2/3rds of full compensation (subject to a reduction in some situations due to retiring

early). By continuing as a supernumerary, the judge receives full compensation – a difference of between 33.3% and 55.6% of the full compensation.

61. For Canada, the average cost of a supernumerary judge is about 38% of the full compensation¹⁰ while the supernumerary judge carries about 50% of a full caseload.
62. As of 1 March 2021, there are 1,206 federally appointed judges in Canada of whom 292 are supernumeraries¹¹. That is just under 25% of all judges.
63. I reviewed the statistics of 1,495 judges who left the bench between 1985 and 2020 (see table 267 for additional details). Of those judges,
 - a. 1% of judges did not qualify for supernumerary status prior to age 75;
 - b. 19% retired prior to qualifying for supernumerary status;
 - c. 80% attained eligibility for electing supernumerary status, of whom:
 - i. 8% chose to retire rather than elect supernumerary status; and
 - ii. 72% elected supernumerary status and 90% of them (65% of all judges) so elected within one year of becoming eligible.
64. I estimated the average length of service as a supernumerary during the period 1985 to 2020 was 6.0 years. That lengthened slightly to 6.2 years for the supernumeraries serving between 2000 and 2020. The average age at which a judge elects supernumerary status is 68 with an average of about 18 to 19 years of service.
65. As of the end of 2020, there were 336 judges who had met the eligibility conditions for supernumerary status. 292 had previously elected to serve as supernumeraries (87% of all those eligible) and 44 remained serving full-time (13% of those eligible).
66. In my experience with organisations in the private sector, if an employee is permitted to elect a reduced workload, it is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in pay. But within the private sector, the payment of pensions is normally from a different source¹²

¹⁰ Or slightly less due to some judges delaying their election beyond their first eligibility or never electing supernumerary status. The 37.6% average cost to Canada is the difference between 100% of Base Judicial Salary and the 62.4% average retirement annuity percent from Table 58.

¹¹ <https://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/judges-juges-eng.aspx>

¹² In the private sector, pensions are paid out of the pension plan, which is an entity separate and apart from the employer. Any benefit to an employer from an employee delaying retirement within the private sector is at best indirect. Private sector employers who do not sponsor a pension plan have no economic ... incentive to pay full-time income for part-time work, since an employee's pension is from the employee's own savings and there is no direct or indirect offset to the compensation paid. For the federally appointed judges, both compensation and the Judicial Annuity are paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

than the employer's payroll, so the economic advantage of paying 100% of compensation for about 50% of work is very different.

67. It is clear that the availability of supernumerary status is valued by judges with the majority of them electing to spend their final years on the bench as a supernumerary.
68. I have looked at ways to calculate a value for this benefit and am not satisfied that any of my approaches is sufficiently robust and impartial between the parties. As a result, in my opinion, the availability of electing supernumerary status has a financial value that is intangible. I have not included any value for this as part of the Base Judicial Total Compensation (see paragraph 104).

Industrial Aggregate Increases ("IAI")

69. The *Judges Act* sets out how federally appointed judges' salaries are determined each year. Increases are effective as of 1 April in each calendar year. An adjustment factor is calculated based on the year over year change in the Industrial Aggregate, a data series maintained by Statistics Canada¹³. The factor is based on the most recently available data as of the first day of the period for which the salary amount is determined.
70. The Industrial Aggregate measures the number of working Canadians and their average weekly earnings. There are some types of jobs, like farming, fishing and military that are excluded. Earnings are tracked and the Industrial Aggregate is updated monthly. The Industrial Aggregate can be considered as similar to the Consumer Price Index except the Consumer Price Index tracks prices of items that are typically purchased by Canadian consumers whereas the Industrial Aggregate tracks the number of workers in Canada and their earnings¹⁴.
71. In this report, when referring to the data series, I use the term Industrial Aggregate. Judges' salaries are adjusted annually by the percent change in the Industrial Aggregate value. I will refer to percent changes in the Industrial Aggregate as "IAI".
72. Based on Statistics Canada's publication schedule, there is usually a two-month lag between workers' pay dates and the publication of the Industrial Aggregate. For example, the Industrial Aggregate data that is published in February reports on workers and wages as of the previous December. Based on the data available as of

¹³ I have assumed that the data series referenced is the one identified by Statistics Canada as "Average weekly earnings by industry, monthly, unadjusted for seasonality", series 14-10-0203-01 and specifically, the sub-series "Industrial Aggregate excluding unclassified businesses".

¹⁴ Ibid.

early March 2021 (data for December 2020) and my assumption about how the calculation is to be done¹⁵, I have determined the increase in judges' salaries will likely be 6.74% in 2021.

73. In the past fifteen years, the increase in Base Judicial Salary due to changes in the IAI has varied from 0.40% to 3.60% with an average of 2.42%. The average increase over the past five years (2015 to 2020) was 1.90%.
74. What has given rise to this large increase expected in 2021? Covid-19.
75. Business in Canada was largely shut down in March 2020 and many workers were laid off. The loss of jobs and of income was first reflected in the Industrial Aggregate reported for April 2020. The IAI increased by 5.7% from March to April.
76. The vast majority of workers who lost their jobs and income were from the lower paying jobs – work that could not be performed from home and work that is impacted by lockdowns, such as retail some of the service industry and manufacturing¹⁶. For those with higher paying jobs, their employment status was mainly unaffected by the closure of business as many of those jobs could be performed from home.
77. If a lower-paid worker suffers a large reduction in income but remains employed, the Industrial Aggregate will decrease. But if a lower-paid worker loses their job, they disappear from the calculation of the average and the Industrial Aggregate will increase¹⁷. With Covid-19, that increase in the Industrial Aggregate happened suddenly as about 2.9 million workers lost their jobs or were laid off in the second half of March and early April 2020¹⁸.
78. In particular, the increase in IAI during 2020 was not because of workers receiving large wage increases, it was primarily because of workers losing their income.

¹⁵ The average of the Industrial Aggregate as reported by Statistics Canada in each of the 12-months immediately prior to the date of the increase, divided by the average in each of the 12-months immediately prior to the first averaging period above.

¹⁶ Statistics Canada, Infographic "COVID-19 and the Labour Market in May 2019. Publication 11-627-m/11-627-m2020038. [<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2020038-eng.htm>]

¹⁷ Consider four numbers – 8, 10, 12 and 14. The average is 11. If the 8 is reduced to 4, the average reduces to 10. But if the 8 is simply removed (as would happen with a lay-off or job loss), the average increases to 12.

¹⁸ Change in total number of workers in Canada between February and May, Statistics Canada Table 14-10-0201-01, Employment by industry, monthly, unadjusted for seasonality.

How Does 2.9 Million Workers Getting Laid-off Cause Average Income to Increase?

Suppose that in February there are 2.9 million workers earning between \$13 and \$30 per hour with an average of \$19.00 per hour. They work an average of 1,800 hours per year. That's an average annual income of \$34,200 ($\$19.00 \times 1,800$). These 2.9 million workers do not know it, but they are about to lose their jobs.

In addition, there are 13.5 million workers that make between \$13 per hour and several million dollars per year*. The average weekly income of those 13.5 million workers is \$1,135, or just under \$60,000 per annum.

Very roughly, that is the make-up of Canadian workers.

The average weekly income of all the 16.4 million workers is \$1,051, or \$54,700 per annum. That average income lies between the \$34,200 annual amount for the 2.9 million workers and the \$60,000 for the 13.5 million workers – as we would expect from averages.

Based on these assumptions, the Industrial Aggregate for February would be 1,051 – the average weekly income of the 16.4 million workers.

What happens when those 2.9 million workers get laid off in March and April? Their data simply disappears from the calculation. Instead of calculating the average income of 16.4 million workers, we calculate the average income of the remaining 13.5 million workers. Their incomes have not changed – there were no wage increases in March and April.

In May, the 13.5 million workers are still making an average weekly income of \$1,135 – the same as in the second paragraph above. That is the total for all workers in May. So, the Industrial Aggregate for May is 1,135 - the average weekly income of the 13.5 million remaining workers.

Between February and May, the Industrial Aggregate has increased from 1,051 to 1,135. That's an increase of 8.0% - all because 2.9 million Canadians got laid-off from work.

* This group includes some workers that make between \$13 and \$30 per hour, but they are not at risk for losing their job when Covid-19 hits.

Estimated increase without the Covid-19 Effect

79. If we had not experienced Covid-19 and assuming 2020 would have been similar to the average year with respect to wages of all Canadians, it is likely that the Industrial Aggregate would have increased but just not as much. In this section, I estimate what that increase would have been by looking at the budget plans for wage increases of employers across Canada.
80. A number of employee benefits and compensation consulting firms conduct compensation surveys to gather information on corporate budget plans for compensation increases in the following year.

81. Morneau Shepell¹⁹ reported a budgeted average salary increase of 1.9% for 2021. If those expected to receive no increase are excluded, the average increase is budgeted as 2.5% for 2021. However, they report that 46% of survey respondents remained undecided at the time of responding to the survey. They also reported that in 2020, base salaries increased by 1.6% on average. If those whose salaries were frozen are excluded, the average increase in 2020 was 2.6%. Morneau Shepell's survey results showed that 36% of organisations froze salaries in 2020 compared with only 2% that had budgeted for a freeze. I assume that most, if not all of those changes were a response to Covid-19.
82. Normandin Beaudry²⁰ report an average budgeted salary increase for 2021 of 2.6%, excluding organisations that plan to freeze salaries. When those organisations that plan to freeze salaries are included, the average increase was lower by between 0.1% for organisations that have experienced little negative effect to a positive effect from Covi-19 to 0.5% lower for organisations with a negative effect from Covid-19.
83. Mercer²¹ report that 2021 budgets average 2.3% for total salary increases. If the 13% of organisations that plan to have no salary increase are excluded, the average increase is budgeted to be 2.4% for 2021, compared with 2.6% for 2020.
84. Based on the various surveys of budgeted salary increases for 2021, it appears that the average will be between 2.0% and 2.5%. The survey results indicated a similar average was budgeted for 2020 increases prior to changes resulting from Covid-19.
85. In my opinion, based on the results of these three surveys of employer plans for salary adjustments, had there not been an employment disruption from Covid-19, the increase in the IAI for the 2021 judicial salary increase would likely have been between 2.0% and 2.5% with a similar increase in the IAI for 2022 increases.

Effect on IAI Increases in Future Years

86. In February 2020, there were 16.4 million workers included in the Industrial Aggregate earnings average. Three months later, there were 13.5 million workers, a decrease of

¹⁹ "News & Views", Volume 17, Issue 10, October 2020, page 6.

²⁰ "Update of the 2021 Salary Forecasts", January 2021, [www.normandin-beaudry.ca/en/update-of-the-2021-salary-forecasts/]

²¹ "Moving Forward With Optimism", 24 November 2020, [www.imercer.com/ca/articledetail/moving-forward-with-optimism-1]

2.9 million. The loss of 2.9 million jobs resulted in an immediate 8.0% increase in the average industrial wage in Canada²².

87. By December 2020, 2.3 million workers had returned to work. The Industrial Aggregate has decreased since May due to their return. The 8.0% increase between February and May had dropped to a 7.0% increase between February and December²³.
88. If the 550,000 workers who have still not returned to work are mostly at the bottom of the wage continuum, it is likely the Industrial Aggregate will decrease as and if they return to work. If all 550,000 were to return to work in 2021 and if their average earnings are less than \$20 per hour, I estimate the IAI will further decrease by between 0.5% and 1.0%.
89. It is likely that decrease will be offset by wage increases granted to all workers in 2021. In paragraph 85, I estimated the increase to judicial salaries in the absence of Covid-19 would be between 2.0% and 2.5% for the April 2022 changes. Combining that with the effect of 550,000 more laid-off workers returning to work gives a net change in the IAI of between 1.0% and 2.0%. If less than 550,000 of those laid-off workers return to work, I estimate the change in the IAI for April 2022 will lie in the range of 1.0% to 2.5%.
90. In a letter from François Lemire, Director of the Office of the Chief Actuary for Canada to Anna Dekker dated 26 February 2021, Mr. Lemire sets out the Chief Actuary's current estimate for future changes in the IAI. He references the recent increase in Industrial Aggregate was caused by employment losses and that future decreases in the Industrial Aggregate are expected. His assumption for future changes in the IAI would result in increases to Judicial Base Salary of 6.7% in 2021 and 2.1% in 2022²⁴. That 2.1% increase for 2022 lies within the range I have estimated, but it is at the upper end of the range. Based on my calculations, it likely assumes few of the remaining laid-off workers will return to work.

Weighted Averages

91. In the discussions in this report about income and benefits, many of the items vary by age. Sometimes the variance is by age of appointment and sometimes it is by current

²² Statistics Canada, Industrial Aggregate Index, Table: 14-10-0203-01.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ He included assumptions for future years of 2.6% in 2023, 2.8% in 2024, 2.9% in 2025 and 3.0% in 2026 and beyond.

age. It can be helpful in those situations to also know the average amount. In addition, amounts may vary by province or by Census Metropolitan Areas.

92. Taking a straight average of the values shown in a table can, in some situations, be misleading. For example, in a high-school class, there were only three different grades on the last test – 50, 70 and 90. The average of those marks is 70. But if we are told that there were ten students with a grade of 50, ten with 70 and one with 90, the weighted average is 61²⁵.
93. When we look at incomes that vary by age, we could calculate an average of those amounts – if there are 30 ages involved, we average 30 income amounts. That would give a reasonable answer if the judges or lawyers were evenly distributed across all 30 ages.
94. If we are looking at incomes of 500 people who are distributed across those 30 ages, a more appropriate result is to take an average of the incomes for the 500 people rather than an average of the 30 age groups. We could create a table with the 500 amounts and calculate that average. Or we can achieve the same result by calculating a weighted average. A weighted average is simply a mathematical shortcut to calculating the average for all 500 people²⁶.
95. In this report, the weighted average is not an average of the values shown in a table. It is based on taking those values in the table, determining for each of the many individuals the value that applies, and taking an average over all the individuals.
96. Most of the time in this report where I calculate a weighted average, it is an age-based weighted average.
97. For example, in Table 133, the rightmost column (Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions) shows a weighted average of 34.9%. If we take an average of the values shown in the table for each age, we get 42.1% (not shown in Table 133).
 - a. The 42.1% would be reasonable to use if there are an equal number of judges appointed at each age 40 to 69.
 - b. The 34.9% is appropriate to use to reflect the actual historical distribution of judges by age at appointment.

²⁵ That weighted average can be verified by writing down all 21 marks – 10 students got 50, ten got 70 and one got 90. The average of those 21 marks is 61. Weighted average is a quicker way to achieve the same result without actually listing all 21 (or in many situations, significantly more) values.

²⁶ At least, in this example, it is 500 people.

- c. A different result might be appropriate to use if the future age of judicial appointments is expected to change significantly from past ages at appointment.
98. In this report, I have looked at averages based on the age of the judges upon their appointment to the bench as well as the geographic location of the judges just prior to their appointment. To perform those calculations, I was provided with a summary of the age of all appointments as a federal judge from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2015 and from 1 April 2015 to 23 October 2020²⁷.
99. In total, there were 598 appointments during that 9.5-year period – 226 from 2011 to 2015 and 372 from 2015 to 2020.
100. I examined the distribution by age during each of the two periods as well as the entire 9.5 years and found there was very little difference.
- a. The average age at appointment was 52.4 between 2011 and 2015 and it was 52.7 between 2015 and 2020. Over the entire period, the average age at appointment was 52.6.
 - b. When I calculated the weighted average value for the Judicial Annuity as a percent of compensation (a discussion of the Judicial Annuity begins at paragraph 112), I obtained 37.6%, 38.0% and 37.8% respectively for appointments during 2011 to 2015, 2015 to 2020 and over the entire period 2011 to 2020.
101. In my opinion, those differences are not material for the purposes of this report, and I have therefore only calculated weighted averages based on the distribution of federal judicial appointments over the entire 9.5-year period from 2011 to 2020.

²⁷ The Department of Justice provided me with statistics on judicial appointments from April 2011 to October 2020, made available by the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs.

E. Judicial Total Compensation

102. I understand that there are three main components to federal judicial total compensation²⁸ – salary, health and welfare benefits (often called group insurance benefits) and the Judicial Annuity, encompassing both permanent disability income protection and retirement income. There may be other items included and I have assumed that they are not material for the purposes of this report.
103. The nature of the judicial annuity is that the value varies significantly based on the age at appointment of a judge. Consequently, the total compensation for a federal judge will also differ among judges based on their age at appointment.

Salary

104. The salary for a federally appointed judge in 2020 was \$338,800²⁹. For ease of reference, I refer to the base salary (\$338,800 for 2020 to 2021) as the **Base Judicial Salary**. I will refer to the total compensation for a judge who receives the Base Judicial Salary as the **Base Judicial Total Compensation**³⁰.
105. For this report, I will focus on the Base Judicial Salary and will ignore the effect of any supplemental amounts based on differing positions and geography.
106. Assuming that the increase in the IAI will be 6.74% in April 2021, the Base Judicial Salary will be increased to \$361,600 as of 1 April 2021 – an increase of \$22,800.

Retirement Savings

107. One component of compensation is retirement income accumulation. While many Canadians enjoy an employer-sponsored retirement plan, most Canadians are left to look after their personal retirement saving on their own, generally through contributing to a personal Registered Retirement Savings Plan (“RRSP”).

²⁸ “Guide for Candidates”, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, [www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html]

²⁹ Ibid. In addition, there are supplemental amounts chief justices, associate chief justices, justices of certain courts and northern allowances.

³⁰ As discussed later (Paragraphs 141 to 142), the total compensation for judges varies by their age at appointment. I determine an average amount that reflects the age profile of judges upon appointment and use that – so Base Judicial Total Compensation refers to the average total compensation of all judges based on their ages at appointment.

108. There are many different types of retirement plans in Canada. Most retirement plans provided by an employer require part of the annual contribution to be paid by the employees and the balance by the employer. A few plans are funded entirely by the employer with no contribution required from employees. Where there is no retirement plan offered by the employer, the entire cost of retirement savings is borne by the individual employee.
109. For the vast majority, if not all, self-employed lawyers, retirement savings are funded entirely out of the individual's net income.
110. For federally appointed judges, the Judicial Annuity provides retirement income with the judges paying 7% of income each year until they are eligible for an unreduced annuity at which time, contributions decrease to 1% of income. Canada is responsible for the balance of the total cost.
111. To properly reflect retirement savings costs for self-employed lawyers and for federally appointed judges, we need to consider their differing opportunities, differing costs and differing values for retirement saving.

The Judicial Annuity

112. The Judicial Annuity provides excellent retirement benefits to retired judges. It is one of the best retirement plans in Canada.
 - a. A lifetime annuity equal to $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{rds} of the final year's earnings provided the judge has met one of three thresholds involving age and judicial service³¹. A reduced lifetime annuity is available upon retirement prior to those thresholds.
 - b. A lifetime annuity equal to $\frac{2}{3}$ ^{rds} of the final year's earnings upon permanent disability while serving as a federal judge with no minimum service requirement.
 - c. A surviving spouse income payable following the death of a judge (both before and after retirement) equal to half of the amount payable to the judge.
 - d. Inflation protection based on changes in the Consumer Price Index in each year while the annuity is payable.

³¹ Attained age 75 and served at least ten years; Served at least 15 years and has a total of age plus service of at least 80; Served on the Supreme Court of Canada for a total of at least ten years.

113. In addition to retirement benefits, the Judicial Annuity provides permanent disability income should a judge become permanently disabled³². Within the private sector, if disability income protection is provided, it is usually done through long-term disability insurance which covers both temporary and permanent disabilities.
114. So, the Judicial Annuity is a combination of retirement savings and permanent disability income protection.
115. Judges must contribute part of the cost of the Judicial Annuity through payroll deductions equal to 7% of salary in each year until they are eligible to retire without a reduction to the amount of the annuity, following which the contribution is 1% of salary in each year. Canada is responsible for the balance of the total cost.

Retirement Income Requirements

116. The general rule used by financial planners for retirement income sufficiency has for many decades been 70% of pre-retirement income. For some people, 70% is not sufficient to maintain their lifestyle. For some people, 70% is more than sufficient.³³
117. If we look at averages, the replacement percent decreases as pre-retirement income increases³⁴. For example, a family earning \$30,000 per annum prior to retirement is unlikely to be able to maintain their lifestyle on a 70% (\$21,000) pension. A family earning \$1 million annually is likely to have more than enough to maintain a lifestyle on a 70% (\$700,000) pension. For most families, this is because of savings. The larger the income, generally the larger the amount saved each year. And in most situations, savings are no longer required following retirement.
118. Two other factors that affect retirement income needs are:
- a. whether one owns a home that has become mortgage-free in the last few years;
 - b. the number of children and whether they have become financially independent³⁵.
119. Based on my experiences working with people planning for retirement, it is my opinion that a 70% pension is usually appropriate for families with a total income of \$60,000 to

³² *Judges Act* (s. 42(1.1)(b))

³³ "Is a 70% retirement replacement income target too high?" by Fred Vettese, *Globe & Mail*, 14 Feb 2018, [www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/retirement/retire-planning/book-excerpt-retirement-income-for-life-getting-more-without-savingmore/article37971172/]

³⁴ Based on my working with people preparing for retirement as well as on unpublished research I have done over the past 30 years.

³⁵ "Retirement Income for Life: Getting More Without Saving More" by Fred Vettese, *Milner & Associates Inc.*, 2 March 2018.

\$75,000. A higher percent is needed for lower income amounts and less for those with higher incomes.

120. Consequently, in my opinion, the vast majority of judges will have more income from the Judicial Annuity than is required to maintain their pre-retirement lifestyle.
121. While a judge may not require all of the income payable from the Judicial Annuity to maintain a lifestyle, the Judicial Annuity still delivers a full value to the judges. It provides them with an ability to support an increase in lifestyle if they should so wish, greater confidence in their financial future, as well as possibilities to provide larger inheritances and greater philanthropic activities.

Value of the Judicial Annuity

122. Within the pension industry, one generally expresses the value of retirement savings as a percent of salary (rather than as total dollars), thereby removing salary level as a factor for cost difference. In paragraph 128 below, I present the total dollar value of the Judicial Annuity for all years of service. For the rest of the report, I express the value of the Judicial Annuity as a percent of Base Judicial Salary.
123. Further, there are a number of ways to look at the value of a retirement pension. The two most common ways are:
 - a. **Annual Value:** the amount of funds required as a contribution in each year of service up to retirement, which can be expressed as either a dollar amount or a percent of earnings; and
 - b. **Total Value:** the total amount of funds required to pay for the total amount of retirement income earned as of the date of retirement.
124. There is no method that results in the same value for each person. At the time of retirement, the total value will vary by age of the judge, spousal status and gender. The annual value will vary by age of the judge, expected retirement age, expected spousal status at retirement, years of service as a judge and gender.
 - a. The younger a judge is when appointed to the bench, the more years there will be for the time value of money to discount the value from the future retirement age to the present, so the lower the annual value of the pension.
 - b. The younger a judge is at retirement, the greater will be the value of their pension since they will be retired for a longer time and receive greater total payments than if they retired at an older age.

- c. If the judge has a spouse³⁶, the Judicial Annuity will be worth more than if there is no spouse because the annuity continues following the death of the judge as long as the spouse remains alive.
- d. The value of a pension for a female is greater than for a male since females' life expectancy is greater than for males.
125. The value of a pension is based upon expectations at retirement as well as expectations prior to retirement (age at retirement, future compensation increases, etc.). While future events both before and after retirement will affect the final cost of a pension, the value is always based on expectations about what will happen in the future. While a 60-year-old retiree is expected to live more years than a 75-year-old retiree, that does not always happen.
126. Unless one is willing to wait for the cost of a Judicial Annuity to reveal itself once all retired judges have died, we must determine the value based on actuarial assumptions – expectations for the future.
127. I have focussed on the value for each year of service as a judge and have calculated the expected or average value each year from appointment to expected retirement based on a set of actuarial assumptions. Those assumptions are summarised in Appendix 4.
- a. The assumptions recognise that judges retire at different ages and following different number of years of service. The probability of retirement for each age and service combination was taken from the Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for Federally Appointed Judges as of 31 March 2019 (the most recent as of the date I made the calculations). Those assumptions were developed by the Chief Actuary based on past experience of when judges have retired.

What is Value?

I buy a 50/50 ticket for \$10.00. With 1,000 tickets sold, the payout will be \$5,000. My chance of winning the \$5,000 is 1 in 1,000. My expected winnings are \$5.00 – the \$5,000 payout multiplied by my chance of winning it.

So, the value of that ticket to me is \$5.00. After the draw is made, that ticket's value changes to either zero or \$5,000. But prior to the draw, it always had a value of \$5.00.

It is the same with pensions. The value is based on our expectations for the future, and that requires actuarial calculations and actuarial assumptions about future events.

The value may change over time as our expectations for the future change. But those changes do not change the past values since the past values were based on expectations at each past period of time.

³⁶ And/or children. There is a provision for continuation of the Judicial Annuity to any surviving dependent children. From my calculations, that provision has an immaterial effect on costs.

- b. The retirement assumptions vary from age 55 (where ½ of 1% of judges are assumed to retire) to age 75 (where all judges who are still serving are assumed to retire).
 - c. Based on those assumptions, the average age of retirement varies from age 68 for a judge appointed at 40; to age 72 for a judge appointed at 50; and age 75 for a judge appointed at 60 and above.
 - d. Assumptions are also made for future interest (to recognise the time value of money), future salary increases, gender split of the judges, mortality rates, disability rates and probability of there being a survivor entitled to survivor benefits following the judge's death.
128. The dollar value of the Judicial Annuity is roughly similar regardless of the age at appointment. In the following, I calculated the weighted averages based on the number of judges appointed at each age from 40 to 69 over the past 9.5 years (April 2011 to October 2020)³⁷.
- a. The total value for pension and disability benefits ranges from \$1,775,000 to \$2,172,000 for appointment at ages 40 to 65. The differences are mainly due to the time value of money. The weighted average over all ages is \$1,885,000.
 - b. The total amount of contributions by a judge over their entire period of service varies from \$187,000 to \$356,000 for appointment at ages 40 to 65. The differences are mainly due of the length of time in service – the younger one is appointed, the more the total contributions will total. The weighted average over all ages is \$280,000.
 - c. The total value of the pension and disability benefits, net of judges' contributions ranges from \$1,447,000 to \$1,984,000 for appointment at ages 40 to 65. Those differences are mainly due to the time value of money. The weighted average over all ages is \$1,605,000.
129. The average age of retirement, based on the actuarial assumptions, is about 72. All judges are assumed to retire upon turning 75 or prior to that.
130. These total value amounts are not useful for determining total compensation nor are they useful for a comparison with retirement savings of self-employed lawyers and other professionals. For that, I have expressed the value of the Judicial Annuity as a percent of annual Base Judicial Salary – a percent that remains the same for each year of service as a judge.

³⁷ This averaging method is discussed further at paragraphs 91 to 101.

131. The value of the retirement income portion of the Judicial Annuity varies from 26.3% of Base Judicial Salary for a judge appointed at age 40 to 78.6% of Base Judicial Salary for a judge appointed at age 70. Assuming the judges' contributions are all utilised to fund the retirement income benefit, the value of the pension net of contributions ranges from 20.6% for a judge appointed at age 40 to 71.6% for a judge appointed at age 70.
132. The value of the disability income portion of the Judicial Annuity varies from 2.3% of earnings for a judge appointed at age 40 to 9.4% of earnings for a judge appointed at age 70. That assumes that no portion of the judge's contribution is used for disability income protection.
133. Table 133 sets out the annual value for the retirement income and permanent disability income based on each age at appointment from 40 to 70. Note that these percentages are an average over an entire career. As an example, for a judge appointed at age 50, the value net of judges' contributions for the pension and disability benefits would be 30.3% of Base Judicial Salary each year from appointment to retirement. The average cost to the judge would be 5.41% of Base Judicial Salary each year, which represents an average of the years with a 7% and a 1% contribution rate.

Table 133 – Value of Judicial Annuity by Age at Appointment – percent of Base Judicial Salary

| Age at Appointment | Pension Value | Judges' Contributions | Pension Value Net of Judges' Contributions | Disability Value | Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions |
|--------------------|---------------|-----------------------|--|------------------|--|
| 40 | 30.63% | 5.48% | 25.15% | 2.75% | 27.90% |
| 41 | 31.31% | 5.37% | 25.94% | 2.86% | 28.80% |
| 42 | 30.80% | 5.41% | 25.39% | 3.03% | 28.42% |
| 43 | 30.55% | 5.26% | 25.29% | 3.20% | 28.48% |
| 44 | 30.36% | 5.32% | 25.04% | 3.37% | 28.41% |
| 45 | 30.40% | 5.18% | 25.22% | 3.55% | 28.77% |
| 46 | 30.97% | 5.27% | 25.70% | 3.71% | 29.40% |
| 47 | 32.06% | 5.17% | 26.89% | 3.85% | 30.74% |
| 48 | 32.94% | 5.28% | 27.66% | 4.01% | 31.67% |
| 49 | 33.98% | 5.16% | 28.82% | 4.18% | 33.00% |
| 50 | 34.73% | 5.27% | 29.46% | 4.37% | 33.83% |
| 51 | 35.45% | 5.39% | 30.07% | 4.58% | 34.64% |
| 52 | 36.12% | 5.50% | 30.62% | 4.79% | 35.42% |
| 53 | 36.78% | 5.63% | 31.15% | 5.02% | 36.17% |
| 54 | 37.43% | 5.75% | 31.68% | 5.26% | 36.94% |
| 55 | 38.23% | 5.90% | 32.34% | 5.51% | 37.85% |
| 56 | 39.10% | 6.05% | 33.05% | 5.77% | 38.82% |
| 57 | 40.29% | 6.23% | 34.06% | 6.04% | 40.11% |
| 58 | 41.96% | 6.44% | 35.52% | 6.33% | 41.84% |

| Age at Appointment | Pension Value | Judges' Contributions | Pension Value Net of Judges' Contributions | Disability Value | Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions |
|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------------------|---|
| 59 | 44.01% | 6.69% | 37.32% | 6.61% | 43.93% |
| 60 | 46.87% | 7.00% | 39.87% | 6.93% | 46.80% |
| 61 | 50.58% | 7.00% | 43.58% | 7.22% | 50.80% |
| 62 | 54.89% | 7.00% | 47.89% | 7.50% | 55.39% |
| 63 | 59.95% | 7.00% | 52.95% | 7.76% | 60.70% |
| 64 | 65.95% | 7.00% | 58.95% | 8.01% | 66.96% |
| 65 | 73.20% | 7.00% | 66.20% | 8.26% | 74.45% |
| 66 | 73.87% | 7.00% | 66.87% | 8.49% | 75.37% |
| 67 | 74.57% | 7.00% | 67.57% | 8.73% | 76.30% |
| 68 | 75.28% | 7.00% | 68.28% | 8.97% | 77.25% |
| 69 | 76.02% | 7.00% | 69.02% | 9.23% | 78.25% |
| Weighted Average | 38.52% | 5.78% | 32.74% | 5.10% | 37.84% |

134. By looking at the ages of judicial appointments, we can calculate an age-weighted average overall value of the Judicial Annuity for all federally appointed judges. Net of judges' contributions, that is 37.8% of Base Judicial Salary.

Cost to a Lawyer to Replicate the Judicial Annuity

135. The value of the Judicial Annuity shown above is prior to considering the effects of income taxes. While the judge must contribute towards the cost of the Judicial Annuity, that contribution is tax deductible and the actual value is somewhat less than the actual contribution.
136. After retirement, the entire benefit paid by the Judicial Annuity is taxable in each year as it is paid.
137. For a self-employed lawyer to replicate the benefit of the Judicial Annuity (i.e., 66.7% of the lawyer's income) takes a combination of RRSP contributions and contributions to an investment plan. The tax impact on an RRSP is similar to the tax impact on the Judicial Annuity. But the effect of taxes on an investment plan are very different. Contributions are made with after-tax dollars; any investment income is immediately taxable and withdrawals from the plan are tax-free.
138. I have performed calculations of the total amount of income prior to taxes that a self-employed lawyer would need to use in order to replicate the pension benefits from the Judicial Annuity using a combination of RRSP and investment plan. In doing so, I recognised the differing income tax treatment for the different types of saving, the age

at appointment to the judiciary and the average age of retirement of federal judges of age 72.

Total Value of the Judicial Annuity to a Self-Employed Lawyer

139. The value of the Judicial Annuity shown in Table 133 is prior to recognising that the income tax treatment afforded the Judicial Annuity is not available to individual Canadians, including the self-employed lawyers. Therefore, the value of the Judicial Annuity shown in Table 133 underestimates the actual value to the lawyer.
140. The cost to replicate the pension from the Judicial Annuity ranges from about 8% more for appointment at age 40 compared with the value of the Judicial Annuity to 18% more for appointment at age 65 compared with the value of the Judicial Annuity³⁸.
141. Table 141 shows the value of the Judicial Annuity based on age at appointment including the additional costs required to replicate the Judicial pension by a self-employed lawyer. This table builds on the results presented in Table 133 above.

Table 141 – Total Value of the Judicial Annuity to a Self-Employed Lawyer

| Age at Appointment | Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions | Additional Cost to Replicate Judicial Annuity | Total Value of Judicial Annuity |
|--------------------|--|---|---------------------------------|
| 40 | 27.90% | 11.80% | 39.70% |
| 41 | 28.80% | 12.60% | 41.40% |
| 42 | 28.42% | 11.40% | 39.82% |
| 43 | 28.48% | 11.30% | 39.78% |
| 44 | 28.41% | 10.50% | 38.91% |
| 45 | 28.77% | 10.70% | 39.47% |
| 46 | 29.40% | 10.50% | 39.90% |
| 47 | 30.74% | 10.80% | 41.54% |
| 48 | 31.67% | 10.80% | 42.47% |
| 49 | 33.00% | 11.70% | 44.70% |
| 50 | 33.83% | 11.50% | 45.33% |
| 51 | 34.64% | 11.20% | 45.84% |
| 52 | 35.42% | 11.60% | 47.02% |
| 53 | 36.17% | 11.20% | 47.37% |
| 54 | 36.94% | 10.90% | 47.84% |
| 55 | 37.85% | 11.30% | 49.15% |
| 56 | 38.82% | 11.00% | 49.82% |
| 57 | 40.11% | 10.90% | 51.01% |
| 58 | 41.84% | 11.70% | 53.54% |

³⁸ The extra value varies up and down with age, but generally shows a gradually increasing pattern. The up and down fluctuations are mainly caused by changes in the assumed retirement age that starts at age 72 for appointments at age 40 and increases to retirement at age 75 for appointments at age 60 and above.

| Age at Appointment | Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions | Additional Cost to Replicate Judicial Annuity | Total Value of Judicial Annuity |
|-------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------|
| 59 | 43.93% | 11.90% | 55.83% |
| 60 | 46.80% | 12.40% | 59.20% |
| 61 | 50.80% | 13.40% | 64.20% |
| 62 | 55.39% | 14.50% | 69.89% |
| 63 | 60.70% | 15.80% | 76.50% |
| 64 | 66.96% | 17.40% | 84.36% |
| 65 | 74.45% | 19.20% | 93.65% |
| 66 | 75.37% | 18.70% | 94.07% |
| 67 | 76.30% | 18.30% | 94.60% |
| 68 | 77.25% | 17.90% | 95.15% |
| 69 | 78.25% | 17.50% | 95.75% |
| Weighted Average | 37.84% | 11.67% | 49.51% |

142. By looking at the ages of judicial appointments, we can calculate an age-weighted average value of the Judicial Annuity for all federally appointed judges including the effects of income tax. Net of judges' contributions, that is 49.51% of salary³⁹. A self-employed lawyer would, on average, need to save 49.51% more of their net income than a judge in order to provide savings sufficient to provide the 2/3rds of earnings payable under the Judicial Annuity.

Health & Welfare Benefits

143. Judges receive health and welfare benefits similar to those provided to federal government employees⁴⁰. The cost to the government for that is the total of the claims actually submitted and approved by the individual and their family members plus a small amount to cover claims adjudication and administrative expenses of the insurance company.

144. Self-employed lawyers may also have health and welfare benefits which may be more or less generous than those provided for the judges. The cost of these benefits can be deducted as a business expense in many situations and would therefore normally be paid prior to the determination of net income.

³⁹ That 49.51% applies to all salary amounts. The dollar value is different between people with different salaries, but the percent is the same. That is similar to the benefit payable from the Judicial Annuity. The full amount is 66.7% of a judge's salary – which produces a different dollar amount between judges with different salaries, but the percent is the same.

⁴⁰ "Guide for Candidates", Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, [www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html]

145. While there may be some, or even many, self-employed lawyers who do not buy health and welfare benefits for themselves, I assume that those with net incomes above the median do have these benefits and that the cost is roughly similar as for a judge.
146. The cost of benefits typically forms part of total compensation. Since the costs are likely a wash in most situations, I have chosen to ignore it for purposes of this report.

Canada Pension Plan Contributions

147. There are at least two benefits with a different cost impact between self-employed lawyers and federally appointed judges: part of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) contributions and retirement savings. Retirement savings are addressed above in paragraphs 135 to 142.
148. CPP contributions in 2021 total 10.9% of earnings between \$3,500 and \$61,600. Half is paid by the employee and half by the employer. For self-employed Canadians, the entire amount is paid by the self-employed person. For a person earning over \$61,600 in 2021, the employee portion is \$3,166 and the self-employed total contribution is \$6,333. Those contributions are made out of net income. A judge therefore has \$3,166 less in CPP contributions than the self-employed lawyer.
149. To properly reflect this difference in the CPP contributions, we could either reduce each of the net income amounts of self-employed lawyers shown in the tables in this report by the \$3,166 difference or we could include the \$3,166 as a benefit available to the judges as part of total compensation. In my opinion, it is easier to include this benefit as a part of the judges' total compensation since that involves adjusting only one amount.

Base Judicial Total Compensation

150. The Base Judicial Total Compensation is equal to the Base Judicial Salary plus an amount for Canada Pension Plan contributions plus the value for the Judicial Annuity plus the value of any other items or perquisites. I have assumed that the value of any other items or perquisites is not material and I have assigned a zero value to them for purposes of this report.
151. For a judge appointed at age 40, the Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2020 is \$338,800 plus 39.7% (from table 141) for the Judicial Annuity plus \$3,166 for CPP

contributions giving a total of \$476,500⁴¹. For a judge appointed at age 69, the Base Judicial Total Compensation is \$666,400. Table 151 shows the Base Judicial Total Compensation by age for each year 2019 to 2021. Note that the 2021 amounts are based on my estimate assuming an increase to Base Judicial Salary for 2021 of 6.74% (paragraph 106). The age-weighted average is based on the actual ages of the judges appointed during the period 1 April 2011 to 23 October 2020.

Table 151 – Base Judicial Total Compensation by Age at Appointment – 2019, 2020 and 2021

| Age at Appointment | April 2019 to March 2020 | April 2020 to March 2021 | Estimated Effective April 2021 |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 40 | 464,000 | 476,500 | 508,300 |
| 41 | 469,600 | 482,200 | 514,500 |
| 42 | 464,400 | 476,900 | 508,700 |
| 43 | 464,300 | 476,800 | 508,600 |
| 44 | 461,400 | 473,800 | 505,500 |
| 45 | 463,300 | 475,700 | 507,500 |
| 46 | 464,700 | 477,200 | 509,100 |
| 47 | 470,100 | 482,700 | 515,000 |
| 48 | 473,200 | 485,900 | 518,300 |
| 49 | 480,500 | 493,400 | 526,400 |
| 50 | 482,600 | 495,600 | 528,700 |
| 51 | 484,300 | 497,300 | 530,500 |
| 52 | 488,200 | 501,300 | 534,800 |
| 53 | 489,300 | 502,500 | 536,100 |
| 54 | 490,900 | 504,000 | 537,800 |
| 55 | 495,200 | 508,500 | 542,500 |
| 56 | 497,400 | 510,800 | 544,900 |
| 57 | 501,300 | 514,800 | 549,200 |
| 58 | 509,700 | 523,400 | 558,400 |
| 59 | 517,200 | 531,100 | 566,600 |
| 60 | 528,400 | 542,500 | 578,800 |
| 61 | 544,900 | 559,500 | 596,900 |
| 62 | 563,600 | 578,700 | 617,500 |
| 63 | 585,500 | 601,200 | 641,400 |
| 64 | 611,400 | 627,800 | 669,800 |
| 65 | 642,000 | 659,300 | 703,400 |
| 66 | 643,400 | 660,700 | 704,900 |
| 67 | 645,100 | 662,500 | 706,800 |
| 68 | 647,000 | 664,300 | 708,800 |
| 69 | 648,900 | 666,400 | 711,000 |
| Weighted Average | \$496,000 | \$509,400 | \$543,800 |

⁴¹ In this report, I round compensation amounts to the nearest \$100.

Effect on Base Judicial Total Compensation

152. The Base Judicial Total Compensation shown in Table 151 is comprised of three items – Base Judicial Salary which is the same at each age, the value of the Judicial Annuity which varies by age at appointment and the portion of the judge’s Canada Pension Plan contributions paid by Canada which is the same at each age. To determine a single value representative of all judges, I have calculated the “weighted average for age at appointment” of Base Judicial Total Compensation effective April 2019 to be \$496,000.
153. The similar age-weighted average Base Judicial Total Compensation effective April 2020 is \$509,400.
154. If the 2021 Base Judicial Salary increases as I estimated (paragraph 106) to 361,600, the age-weighted average Base Judicial Total Compensation effective April 2021 will be \$543,800.
155. I have estimated at which percentile of net income for self-employed lawyers in all regions of Canada these judicial compensation amounts fall⁴². I took the 2019 net-income amounts for all self-employed lawyers in all regions of Canada and adjusted them to 2020 and to 2021 using an increase based on the average annual increases between 2015 to 2019. Those average increase percentages were determined separately for each of the percentile ranges⁴³.
156. I estimate that the average Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2019 of \$496,000 is approximately at the 88th percentile of the self-employed lawyers in 2019⁴⁴.
157. I estimate that the average Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2020 of \$509,400 is approximately at the 88th percentile of the self-employed lawyers in 2020⁴⁵.

⁴² The net incomes for self-employed lawyers in Canada are discussed in Section F and detailed tables of net-income are found in Section H.

⁴³ That produced an annual increase in the self-employed lawyers’ net income for 2020 and again for 2021 by percentile of:

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| 65-70 th percentile: | 1.39% |
| 70-75 th percentile: | 1.21% |
| 75-80 th percentile: | 1.09% |
| 80-85 th percentile: | 0.80% |
| 85-90 th percentile: | 1.07% |
| 90-95 th percentile: | 1.21% |
| 95-100 th percentile: | 1.72% |

⁴⁴ If the self-employed lawyer’s with net income below \$60,000 are excluded, this is the 84th percentile of the approximately 70% of all self-employed lawyers who have net incomes greater than \$60,000.

⁴⁵ If the self-employed lawyer’s with net income below \$60,000 are excluded, this is the 84th percentile of the approximately 70% of all self-employed lawyers who have net incomes greater than \$60,000.

158. I estimate that the average Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2021 of \$543,800 will be approximately at the 89th percentile of the self-employed lawyers in 2021⁴⁶.

Effect on Total Compensation of Prothonotaries

159. For April 2019 to March 2020, the base salary of a prothonotary was \$263,900, from April 2020 to March 2021 it is \$271,000 and I estimate beginning April 2021 it will be \$289,200 (80% of the Base Judicial Salary).

160. Using the same adjustments to obtain total compensation as used for puisne judges⁴⁷, I determined the total compensation of a prothonotary.

161. The 2019 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$397,300. That is about the 84th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

162. The 2020 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$408,100. That is about the 84th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

163. The 2021 average total compensation of a prothonotary is estimated to be \$435,500. That is about the 86th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

⁴⁶ If the self-employed lawyer's with net income below \$60,000 are excluded, this is the 85th percentile of the approximately 70% of all self-employed lawyers who have net incomes greater than \$60,000.

⁴⁷ Take the base salary, add the value of the Judicial Annuity (based on the average value of 49.51%) and add the value of the government paying half of the Canada Pension plan contribution. This implicitly assumes that prothonotaries have a similar age profile at appointment as do the federally appointed judges.

F. Self-Employed Lawyers

164. About 2/3rds of the federal judicial appointees (2011 to 2020) are lawyers from private practice. That includes the self-employed lawyers as well as lawyers practicing in a corporation including professional corporations. Judges are also appointed from lawyers who are employed by organisations within the broader public sector. Canada Revenue Agency provided anonymous net income data for self-employed lawyers but was not able to provide sufficiently reliable employment information for lawyers working for a corporation or within the broader public sector. Consequently, I have utilised only self-employed lawyers as an income comparator.

165. A self-employed lawyer must cover all business expenses out of the gross income. The amount left over, or net income, is available to provide a personal income, retirement savings, and health and welfare benefits.

Self-Employed Lawyers' Income

166. Canada Revenue Agency provided a data file of the net earnings of self-employed lawyers in Canada. I have analysed those and set out various analyses in section A.

167. Similar data has been provided and included in reports prepared for prior Quadrennial Commissions. I have provided results using similar analyses as was done in prior years. There is an issue with those analyses that I discuss later (see the call-out box on page 46). However, data that would have permitted me to address the issue was not available.

168. Compensation comparisons are a normal part of compensation reviews and are used mainly to determine how an organisation's total compensation amounts compare with similar organisations. It is normal to select other organisations that are in the same industry and similar sized organisations that compete for people with the same skills.

169. Once the data has been collected, one must determine what points in the range of salaries you want to utilise. If the evaluation is for employees with average skills and

Percentiles

Percentiles help us easily rank a range of numbers, like compensation. When dealing with compensation, the 40th percentile refers to the compensation amount where 40% of all lawyers earn less and the rest (60%) earn more. The 75th percentile is the amount where 75% of lawyers earn less and the balance (25%) earn more.

The 50th percentile is also referred to as the median. Note that the median and the average are not the same. They are sometimes close in value, but they can also be very different – indicating the underlying data is skewed.

Consider the numbers 2, 3, 8, 15, 27. The average is 11. The median is 8 – the value that is in the middle – in this case where there are 2 values below it and two values above it.

average performance, the focus would be on the average or the median compensation from the study. To pay an average performing employee compensation measured at the 75th percentile would be overpaying and could lead to wage inflation within that job sector. If the evaluation is for high performing employees, the focus would likely be on compensation at the 70th to 80th percentile – or even higher if the individual is a star performer. To pay average compensation to a high performing employee could lead to them quitting or a cessation of performing well.

170. In this section, I will focus on the compensation of self-employed lawyers⁴⁸. Specifically, I use the net income of self-employed lawyers. Net income is equal to the total income from all services provided less business expenses, such as compensation for employees, office expenses, etc. Net income is basically the total compensation available to the self-employed lawyer.
171. There is a wide range of net income among lawyers and an individual lawyer’s net income could fluctuate greatly from year to year. For example, in 2019 the average income reported by Canada Revenue Agency in metropolitan areas ranged from \$7,530 to \$1,037,000 (\$8,800 to \$1,223,000 in Toronto)⁴⁹. What the data does not show is whether and by how much an individual lawyer’s income fluctuates.

Salary Exclusion

172. Within the compensation industry, median is frequently used – but that depends on the type of candidate one wants to attract. This process may not completely translate to the relationship of lawyers and judges’ compensation because income is not a perfect indicator of suitability for a judicial position.
173. Some of the data provided to prior Quadrennial Commissions has been based on income amounts that excluded net incomes below a threshold of \$60,000 or \$80,000. Excluding lower salaries is a very unusual method that results in distorted results. I am unable to determine a valid and appropriate reason for such an exclusion.

⁴⁸ It would be better to also include compensation of lawyers who are employed by an organisation, but Canada Revenue Agency advised there are practical issues with being able to extract that data and ensure the accuracy of it.

⁴⁹ Canada Revenue Agency use a modified percentile method of reporting net earnings. The lowest earnings reported (referred to as the “1st decile mean”) is described as the average of the net income for lawyers who fall between the 5th percentile and 10th percentile. For clarity, there is no information provided on the bottom 5 percent of incomes, although those incomes are utilised in calculating some of the numbers.

The highest earnings reported (referred to as the “10th decile mean”) is the average of the net income for the top 5% of lawyers – that is the average of incomes from the 95th percentile to the 100th percentile.

174. For example, by excluding those with a net income less than \$60,000 for the 2019 data, one excludes about 34% of the self-employed lawyers in British Columbia, 30% in Alberta, 29.5% in Ontario, 39% in Quebec, and 29% in Atlantic Canada. There were not enough lawyers in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the three Territories to preserve confidentiality, and Canada Revenue Agency therefore suppressed almost all data. As a result, the effect of an income exclusion could not be determined for those five jurisdictions.
175. If we assume that income is one indicator of suitability for a federal judicial appointment, those percentages suggest that only 30% of the self-employed lawyers in Alberta, Ontario and Atlantic Canada are unsuitable while almost 40% of those in Quebec are unsuitable.
176. Based on my past experience of working with large amounts of data, it is my opinion that there are likely no or very few regional differences in the percentage of lawyers that possess specific qualities. That implies there are no or few regional differences in the percentage of lawyers that possess the specific qualities desired for a federal judicial appointment.
177. Normally, when looking at compensation data, we look at data in the range of where one wants to attract employees. In most industries, one looks for candidates from a similar position in other organisations. If you want to have a staff of average performers, you would tend to look to the median income. If you want above average performers, you will tend to look to the 60th to 70th percentiles. If you want outstanding performers, you will tend to look to the 70th and higher percentiles.
178. By excluding incomes below a threshold, the income amounts at each of the percentiles is simply increased while the number of people (or data points) is decreased. The median income becomes the income for above-average performers. The 75th percentile becomes the income for very outstanding performers.
179. Even if there is a valid reason to exclude low earnings, doing so leaves a perception that the exclusion is artificial and was done in order to obtain a pre-conceived result. If we know that we need to focus primarily on incomes of the top 25% of all lawyers in order to attract quality candidates, we look to the income statistics of those at the 75th and higher percentiles.
180. To exclude those with net incomes below \$60,000 and then determine the percentiles results in inflating the incomes at each percentile. The top 25% of those earning more than \$60,000 may be the top 20% of all lawyers (an even smaller percent in Quebec). To actually include the top 25% of all lawyers, we would need to adjust our sights to look

at roughly the top 30% (lower percent in Quebec) of all lawyers earning more than \$60,000. That becomes a communication challenge when trying to explain to others why the top 25% of all lawyers includes those in the top 30%.

181. Since we can obtain the same end result without excluding any income, one needs to ask why an income exclusion was used. Say we end up selecting the income amount at the 80th percentile of the lawyers earning more than \$60,000. That same result could be obtained by selecting the income amount at (approximately) the 85th percentile of all lawyers (no income exclusion).
182. If we exclude any data due to the amount of income, the results become inconsistent between geographic areas. If we make no exclusions, the data is consistent.
183. The report of the fifth Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission (the “**2015 Quadrennial Commission**”) submitted 30 June 2016 addressed the issue of excluding salaries. They summarised the position of the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association (the “**Association**”) and the Canadian Judicial Council (the “**Council**”) by stating “*their rationale was that those who earn below a certain threshold are not suitable candidates for the judiciary: low income reflects a lack of success or time commitment incommensurate with the demands of a judicial appointment.*”
184. There are many reasons why an individual lawyer may have a low income, including issues around competence and commitment as suggested by the Association and Council. But there are also reasons, such as personal passions, practice areas and location, that could result in low income without implying unsuitability for a judicial appointment⁵⁰.
185. I also note that due to the variabilities of net income, it is likely that many lawyers will fluctuate between net incomes that are above and below a low-income threshold.
186. If we accept the position of the Association and Council that it is reasonable to exclude low net incomes from the compensation comparators, we should also consider an exclusion of high net incomes. In many situations, high income more likely implies business success (as opposed to legal acumen), a willingness to hustle to obtain clients and a focus on financial rewards rather than implying qualities commensurate with a judicial appointment. Excluding low net-income as well as high net-income does not

⁵⁰ “Guide for Candidates”, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. In describing the assessment process and considerations, there is no mention made of the salary of an applicant. Reference is made to “professional competence and experience, personal characteristics, and potential impediments to appointment.”

mean that those lawyers are necessarily unsuitable for appointment, but rather that the likelihood of their having suitable characteristics is less than for the non-excluded lawyers.

187. If it is appropriate to exclude those with lower compensation, it is my opinion that there should also be a high-compensation exclusion. I suggest that excluding lawyers with net compensation above about \$650,000 would be appropriate⁵¹ – but only if there is also a low-compensation exclusion. I suggest that excluding net compensation below \$60,000 would be appropriate – but only if there is also a high-compensation exclusion. (In my opinion there should be no income exclusion at either the top or bottom of the income range. But if there is to be an income exclusion, it should be at both the top and bottom.)
188. Unfortunately, the format of the data from the Canada Revenue Agency does not permit an *accurate* calculation of the effect of including a high-income exclusion but it does permit an *estimated* calculation. I have estimated the effect of using both a low and high-income exclusion in Table 188.

Table 188 - Percentile Levels for Compensation with Various Exclusions

| Age Range | Compensation Excluded | 65-70 th percentile | 75-80 th percentile | 85-90 th percentile | 95-100 th percentile |
|-----------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 35 - 69 | None | 203,280 | 274,950 | 413,900 | 937,480 |
| | Below \$60,000 | 277,970 | 363,080 | 525,260 | 1,085,320 |
| | Below \$80,000 | 302,780 | 394,430 | 560,130 | 1,132,330 |
| | Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000 | 241,000 | 297,000 | 384,000 | 559,000 |
| 35 - 46 | None | 217,340 | 273,400 | 376,690 | 741,350 |
| | Below \$60,000 | 266,490 | 326,230 | 448,060 | 824,300 |
| | Below \$80,000 | 282,960 | 346,420 | 472,330 | 851,820 |
| | Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000 | 247,000 | 295,000 | 378,000 | 570,000 |

⁵¹ I selected \$650,000 after examining the percentiles for net income. For the Other Regions (all of Canada except the 10 largest census metropolitan areas or CMAs), all the percentile points are less than \$650,000. That does not mean there is no one earning over \$650,000 outside the 10 CMAs, but that if there are such people, they are most likely less than 2.5% of all lawyers outside those 10 CMAs.

For the largest CMAs other than Calgary and Toronto, the income situation is similar to Other Regions except that there could be between 2.5% and 7.5% of all lawyers who earn more than \$650,000. For Calgary and Toronto, this would result in excluding about 10% to 15% of all lawyers in those cities.

Other thresholds could be equally valid. At income levels over \$650,000, the amount of income between percentiles gets wider and wider. There is less and less congestion around a specific income amount as the amount of net income increases. For example, if the exclusion was set at \$750,000, it would have a small impact on the number of lawyers excluded compared with the \$650,000 I have used.

| Age Range | Compensation Excluded | 65-70 th percentile | 75-80 th percentile | 85-90 th percentile | 95-100 th percentile |
|-----------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 47 - 54 | None | 261,160 | 367,380 | 578,250 | 1,189,810 |
| | Below \$60,000 | 346,400 | 477,690 | 691,970 | 1,322,200 |
| | Below \$80,000 | 378,350 | 518,960 | 727,040 | 1,368,460 |
| | Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000 | 273,000 | 335,000 | 445,000 | 606,000 |
| 55 - 69 | None | 166,900 | 237,100 | 375,100 | 925,020 |
| | Below \$60,000 | 257,870 | 346,740 | 507,170 | 1,124,970 |
| | Below \$80,000 | 287,580 | 383,760 | 546,940 | 1,185,670 |
| | Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000 | 220,000 | 278,000 | 357,000 | 545,000 |

189. By excluding only compensation at the low end, all percentile amounts are increased significantly. By excluding compensation at both the upper and lower end, the income amounts are increased at percentiles up to 80th (with the exception of ages 47 to 54) and the income amounts decrease at percentiles above the 80th.
190. When looking for comparators (whether for compensation or for other items), excluding any data is only appropriate if there are some obvious outliers that will distort the results if they are included. Given the large amount of data provided by Canada Revenue Agency, the effect of including an outlier with extremely large or small income would be immaterial for the purposes of this report.
191. If there is one lawyer in the data with a net income of \$25 million, I have estimated there would be no change to any of the percentile amounts (except the 100th) and the 2019 average net income of all lawyers would be increased by \$1,600. Because the sample size is smaller, the effect on the average net income for lawyers aged 47 to 54 would be about \$7,600 increase if the outlier lawyer was aged between 47 and 54 – an amount that is unlikely to affect the results of the income relationships in this report⁵².
192. While the 2015 Quadrennial Commission neither endorsed nor rejected the method of salary exclusions, they did find that there was no basis to apply an \$80,000 threshold for such an exclusion.
193. In my opinion, excluding any compensation amounts distorts the results and creates a perception of possible manipulation.

⁵² For the other age groups, the dollar effect would be less.

194. In the submission of the Association and Council, to the 2015 Quadrennial Commission, they utilised the average earnings of self-employed lawyers based on the ages between 44 and 56. That is the age range at which the majority of judges are appointed. But there have been judges appointed at ages below 44 and above 56. To exclude them from the analysis amounts to age exclusion – similar to earnings exclusion.
195. If we look at the net earnings data for self-employed lawyers (Table 256a), we can see that the ages with the lowest earnings are 35 to 43 and 56 to 69⁵³.
196. Calculating an average income amount by looking only at ages 44 to 56 is the same as excluding lawyers with low earnings – it is similar to a belief that younger and older lawyers are irrelevant for the purposes of reviewing judicial compensation.
197. It is true that relatively fewer lawyers (30% of appointments between 2011 and 2020) are appointed at ages outside the range 44 to 56 compared to those who are within that range (70% of appointments between 2011 and 2020). One way to reflect the smaller number of judges appointed at younger and older ages is to calculate a weighted average that is based on the relative number of judges appointed at each age. Because the younger and older appointees are relatively fewer, including them in the weighted average has a smaller effect on the average than those aged 44 to 56. But including them recognises that they exist and do get appointed.
198. Unless it can be shown that the data includes only a few outliers that will distort the results, there is no valid reason to exclude any data when calculating an average for a group.
199. For example, we can compare the net incomes of all self-employed lawyers as provided by the Canada Revenue Agency (ages 35 to 69) with the net incomes of self-employed lawyers aged 44 to 56 and with the average net incomes of all lawyers weighted to reflect the distribution of ages at appointment. For this I use the 2019 net income amounts for all lawyers in all regions of Canada.

Table 209 – Effect of Age Exclusion – 2019 Net Earnings

| Ages | 65-70 th percentile | 75-80 th percentile | 85-90 th percentile | 95-100 th percentile | Average |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|
| 35 - 69 | 203,280 | 274,950 | 413,900 | 937,480 | 224,140 |
| Age weighted | 230,840 | 321,080 | 499,160 | 1,065,810 | 259,270 |
| 44 - 56 | 251,630 | 349,530 | 539,060 | 1,124,160 | 277,930 |

⁵³ However, for regions other than the top ten CMAs, income remains high through to age 59 and then drops off at ages 60 to 69.

200. Table 209 shows the effect of excluding the younger and older ages at appointment – at the 75th percentile, the net income of all lawyers in 2019 was \$270,000, but by excluding the younger and older lawyers, it is boosted to \$340,000 – an increase of 26%.
201. Instead of using the average net income of all self-employed lawyers, we could calculate a weighted average that reflects the age distribution of judges at their appointment. This method gives greater weight to the incomes at ages where more judges are appointed and less weight to the ages where fewer judges get appointed. The net income in 2019 weighted by age at appointment was \$320,000 (79th percentile), but by excluding the younger and older lawyers, it is boosted to \$350,000 (81st percentile) – an increase of 9%.
202. For the balance of the body of this report, I will look at net income amounts with no exclusions – either for age or income. For the sake of completeness, the data included in Section H does include compensation exclusions of incomes below both \$60,000 and \$80,000. Because of the significant amount of work required to add an exclusion at the high end of incomes, I have not made any calculations with a high-income exclusion other than those shown in Table 188.

Self-Employed Lawyers' Income Comparators

203. Table 205 shows the percentile net income amounts by age groupings and by calendar year 2015 to 2019. Ages 35 to 69 covers all of the lawyers within the data from Canada Revenue Agency. The next three age groups (35–46, 47–54, 55–69) follow the lawyers as they move through their careers. The last grouping (44 to 56) was used by the Association and Council in past years to be representative of the ages at which most new judicial appointments are made.
204. Net income fluctuates up and down from year to year, but generally with an upward trend.
205. In general, compensation increases with age and peaks somewhere between ages 47 and 54. Compensation then declines as lawyers approach retirement.

Table 205 - Changes in Net Income 2015 to 2019 by Ages - no income exclusion

| Age Range | Year | 65-70 th percentile | 75 th percentile | 75-80 th percentile | 85-90 th percentile | 95-100 th percentile | Average |
|-----------|------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|
| 35 - 69 | 2015 | 188,590 | 260,000 | 259,720 | 394,710 | 868,420 | 210,390 |
| | 2016 | 188,790 | 250,000 | 252,540 | 370,480 | 806,250 | 201,940 |
| | 2017 | 192,820 | 260,000 | 259,620 | 385,070 | 825,440 | 206,950 |
| | 2018 | 197,340 | 270,000 | 273,550 | 416,440 | 929,160 | 221,020 |
| | 2019 | 203,280 | 270,000 | 274,950 | 413,900 | 937,480 | 224,140 |
| 35 - 46 | 2015 | 199,590 | 260,000 | 260,040 | 372,080 | 753,810 | 200,820 |
| | 2016 | 199,540 | 250,000 | 250,610 | 346,710 | 699,260 | 194,010 |
| | 2017 | 202,370 | 250,000 | 256,040 | 354,510 | 668,130 | 193,600 |
| | 2018 | 208,230 | 270,000 | 270,960 | 380,770 | 752,980 | 205,720 |
| | 2019 | 217,340 | 270,000 | 273,400 | 376,690 | 741,350 | 209,220 |
| 47 - 54 | 2015 | 224,110 | 320,000 | 319,240 | 481,370 | 1,000,220 | 247,980 |
| | 2016 | 221,050 | 300,000 | 306,640 | 444,560 | 941,220 | 236,950 |
| | 2017 | 232,330 | 320,000 | 325,200 | 482,460 | 998,450 | 251,610 |
| | 2018 | 249,040 | 350,000 | 353,020 | 562,010 | 1,152,910 | 279,780 |
| | 2019 | 261,160 | 360,000 | 367,380 | 578,250 | 1,189,810 | 292,580 |
| 55 - 69 | 2015 | 165,860 | 230,000 | 232,730 | 363,930 | 861,390 | 197,360 |
| | 2016 | 166,300 | 230,000 | 228,990 | 346,100 | 796,820 | 189,210 |
| | 2017 | 167,590 | 230,000 | 233,430 | 356,020 | 828,010 | 193,390 |
| | 2018 | 167,290 | 240,000 | 239,340 | 377,660 | 909,990 | 202,520 |
| | 2019 | 166,900 | 240,000 | 237,100 | 375,100 | 925,020 | 203,360 |
| 44 - 56 | 2015 | 227,440 | 320,000 | 320,770 | 477,460 | 997,070 | 249,820 |
| | 2016 | 223,540 | 300,000 | 306,030 | 443,370 | 941,030 | 238,960 |
| | 2017 | 232,750 | 320,000 | 319,270 | 471,910 | 955,380 | 246,560 |
| | 2018 | 244,640 | 340,000 | 343,940 | 537,310 | 1,094,120 | 269,580 |
| | 2019 | 251,630 | 340,000 | 349,530 | 394,710 | 868,420 | 210,390 |

How can percentiles mislead us?

1. It is important to note that these percentile numbers do not necessarily reflect the income levels of individual lawyers over a period of years. As a simplified example of this, consider a group of 100 lawyers. Each lawyer in the group normally has net income of \$200,000 give or take \$20,000 each year. Some lawyers are down, and some are up each year. The median net income is \$200,000, the 90th percentile is \$216,000 and the 100th percentile is \$220,000.
2. However, in each year, five of those lawyers have a windfall year with a net income of \$400,000. No lawyer has more than one windfall year in each decade. The statistics will still show a median income of about \$200,000 and a 90th percentile of about \$216,000, but the 100th percentile is \$400,000.
3. Each year, the statistics will show the same result. The statistics will, at first glance, suggest that there are a few lawyers who have a net income of \$400,000 consistently in each year with the rest having income between \$180,000 and \$220,000. And yet based on the scenario I laid out, there is no one who regularly makes more than \$220,000.
4. In this example, if we focus on the \$400,000 data point for a decision about individual incomes of high achievers, we will be led astray. Even if we focus on the 90th percentile and use the \$216,000 net income amount, we will miss the approximately one year in ten with a huge income increase. That one year in ten amount would raise the *average annual net income* for the 90th percentile group from \$216,000 to \$236,000.
5. What we do not know from the data provided by Canada Revenue Agency is how much variability there is in year-to-year incomes of individuals nor the frequency and effect of any windfall years. With the large sample size used by Canada Revenue Agency, it is unlikely that the data would be as misleading as the above example, but there could be issues hidden within the data that we are not able to identify. For example, if we rank lawyers based on average net income over five or ten years, are the decile breaks lower, higher or approximately the same? How many lawyers have windfall years; how often does that occur and what is the effect on the income statistics?
6. In my opinion, if this issue affects the self-employed lawyers' income amounts, it will primarily do so at the upper and lower percentiles. It is possible that the income amounts at the upper percentiles may be significantly overstated and the amounts at the lower percentiles understated.
7. For that reason, I requested data on a sample set of individuals showing their net income over a ten-year period on an individual basis – either as a dollar amount or as a percentage of their 2010 income. The goal was to understand how income fluctuates and how it can affect the percentile rankings of all self-employed lawyers. Canada Revenue Agency advised they are unable to ensure confidentiality of individuals if data was provided in that format and consequently, they are not permitted to release that information.

206. The net-income data was provided based on a number of age groupings. That allows us to look at how net income changes as one ages and presumably gains experience and reputation.
207. Overall, self-employed lawyers have seen their income increase roughly in line with the IAI over the four-year period 2015 to 2019 (the most recent data available from Canada Revenue Agency). This is based on data for lawyers aged 35 to 69 in all areas of Canada without any income exclusion.

Table 207 - Increase in Net Income of Self-Employed Lawyers - 2015 to 2019

| Grouping | Total Increase over 4-Years | Average Annual Increase |
|---|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 45 to 50 th percentile | 6.6% | 1.6% |
| 55 to 60 th percentile | 8.2% | 2.0% |
| 65 to 70 th percentile | 7.8% | 1.9% |
| 75 to 80 th percentile | 5.9% | 1.4% |
| 85 to 90 th percentile | 4.9% | 1.2% |
| 95 to 100 th percentile | 8.0% | 1.9% |
| Average net income | 6.5% | 1.6% |
| Average of 65 to 100 th percentile | 6.9% | 1.7% |
| IAI Change | 7.0% | 1.7% |

208. While some of the net income brackets experienced increases in the 2015 to 2019 period greater than the IAI and other brackets less than the IAI, the average over all net income levels (6.5%) as well as the average over the 65th to 100th percentiles (6.9%)⁵⁴ were similar to the four-year total IAI increase (7.0%).
209. In my opinion, over the most recent four-year period for which we have data (2015 to 2019), the increase in the IAI has been approximately the same as the increase in net income of self-employed lawyers.
210. Based on that, we can state that the relationship between self-employed lawyers' net income and Base Judicial Total Compensation of judges has remained unchanged.
211. While we do not know how much self-employed lawyers net incomes changed in 2020, in my opinion, it is highly unlikely that they increased as much as the IAI. Therefore, I

⁵⁴ The average increase for the 75th to 100th percentile was slightly lower at 6.8% over the four-year period 2015 to 2019, giving an average of 1.66% per year.

conclude that the Base Judicial Salary will likely increase more in April 2021 than will self-employed lawyers' net income.

Self-Employed Lawyers and Retirement Savings

212. For self-employed Canadians, saving for retirement involves making contributions to an RRSP and once the maximum contribution is reached, contributing to a non-registered investment account. RRSPs have income tax advantages that make them more efficient for retirement savings than other options.
213. It is important to recognise that the Judicial Annuity provides a retirement income that exceeds the maximum tax-assisted pension permitted under the *Income Tax Act* for the private sector. The same retirement income savings are available within the private sector, but the majority of that amount must be funded without the tax-sheltering of registered pension plans and RRSPs. Consequently, the cost of having equivalent savings is higher than the value of the Judicial Annuity.
214. If a Canadian wants to enjoy a retirement lifestyle more expensive than can be provided out of government benefits (CPP and Old Age Security), they will need to save. I have assumed that all judges and all self-employed lawyers with incomes above the median want more income than provided by government benefits. The Judicial Annuity serves that purpose for judges and so they most likely do not need to save any additional monies for retirement beyond their contributions towards the Judicial Annuity. Any savings for retirement by a self-employed lawyer will come out of net income because the *Income Tax Act* does not permit the self-employed to have a retirement savings plan where contributions are permitted as a business expense.
215. Table 141 shows the value of replicating the Judicial Annuity for a self-employed lawyer. To maintain consistency in any review of income relationships⁵⁵, we can either reduce the self-employed lawyers' net income by the required amount for retirement saving and compare that to the Base Judicial Salary, or we can use the total amount of the self-employed net income and compare that with the Base Judicial Total Compensation which includes the value of the Judicial Annuity is fully reflected. Either basis is comparing like with like. I have chosen the latter as it involves fewer calculations.

⁵⁵ That is, to ensure we are looking at "apples and apples" and have not included any oranges in the review.

G. Deputy Ministers Within the Federal Government

216. Past Quadrennial Commissions have reviewed the compensation of deputy ministers in relation to the compensation of federally appointed judges.
217. Like judges, deputy ministers receive both health and welfare benefits and pension benefits in addition to their salary. They both are required to make contributions towards the pension. CPP contributions are the same – the government pays half and the employee pays the other half. There are two significant differences – performance pay and the value of the pension⁵⁶.
218. Deputy ministers are eligible for performance pay in addition to their base salary. That has been reflected in the tables in this section.
219. The pension arrangements for deputy ministers differs from that for federally appointed judges. To obtain a similar pension income, a deputy minister needs to work within the public service for about 35 years and to contribute to the Public Service Superannuation Plan for those years. That likely includes many years of service prior to being appointed as a deputy minister.
220. The contribution rates are slightly greater than the 7% of base compensation for the judges – 9.83% on the first \$61,600 of income and 12.26% on the balance⁵⁷. For a deputy minister earning \$300,000 per annum, that is a contribution of about 11.75% of base compensation, or about 4.75% more than a judge is required to contribute.
221. I estimate that the annual value of the pension for a deputy minister, net of contributions, is roughly 17.0% of a deputy minister's base compensation⁵⁸.

⁵⁶ There is also a difference in contributions to the pension plan, but that will be included as part of the pension plan difference.

⁵⁷ Lower contribution rates apply to those hired after 2012, but the provisions of the pension are less generous for retirement prior to age 65.

⁵⁸ A Deputy Minister requires about 35 years of federal government service to earn a pension equivalent to a judicial pension. The average tenure of a judge, based on the assumptions used in the valuation of the judicial annuity, is 20.7 years. The average value of the judicial annuity for appointments between ages 40 and 65 is 36.7% of base compensation. Adjusting that 36.7% for the differences in tenure and then subtracting 4.75% to reflect the higher contributions required of a deputy minister results in an estimated value for a deputy minister's pension of 17.0% of compensation. A small additional adjustment should be made to reflect the differences in income tax treatment between the pension plan and retirement savings available to self-employed lawyers. I have ignored that adjustment.

222. To be able to make a valid and fair comparison of earnings, we need to use the total compensation of a deputy minister. In particular, there is a large difference between the value of a judge's pension and the value of a deputy minister's pension. To calculate the total compensation of a deputy minister so that the relationship with Base Judicial Total Compensation is a fair and proper one, we should gross-up the deputy ministerial compensation by 17.0%.

Deputy Minister Compensation

223. I was provided with a history of compensation for deputy ministers. There are four levels of deputy minister – DM-1, DM-2, DM-3, and DM-4.

224. The compensation information set out the salary range for each year (April to March), the average base compensation and average amount of at-risk pay. I was also provided with the maximum amount that could be payable as at-risk pay, expressed as a percentage of base compensation. The amount of at-risk pay varies by individual and is awarded at year-end based on the individual's performance.

Block Comparator

225. The 2015 Quadrennial Commission discussed⁵⁹ using compensation of deputy ministers at the DM-3 level, and their year-over-year increases as a reference for judicial compensation (the "**Block Comparator**"). The Block Comparator in each year is the mid-point of the DM-3 base salary range plus half of the total at-risk pay⁶⁰.

226. The 2015 Quadrennial Commission commented on a proposal from the Association and Council that the Block Comparator be changed to equal the total average compensation of DM-3s⁶¹. The number of DM-3s is small and average compensation can vary considerably based on the composition of the deputy ministers. They concluded that using average pay of DM-3s would not "provide a consistent reflection of year over year changes in compensation." I agree.

⁵⁹ "Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada" by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 30 June 2016, paragraphs 45-56.

⁶⁰ Total at-risk pay is the maximum amount that a deputy minister can earn based upon performance. The amount of at-risk pay actually paid will vary from year to year and from person to person.

⁶¹ "Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada" by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 30 June 2016, paragraph 49 - 51.

227. The Block Comparator is based on only two of the components of total compensation – salary and at-risk pay (see paragraphs 31 to 34). It ignores the pension plan and other forms of compensation available to deputy ministers. In essence, it assumes the value of a deputy minister’s pension plan is equivalent to the value of the Judicial Annuity. Consequently, in my opinion, the Block Comparator should be used with care and recognition should be made either directly or indirectly to the large difference in value of the two pension plans.
228. In this section, I first review the total compensation of deputy ministers and of senior government agency appointments over the past five years and then I calculate the Block Comparator.

Total Compensation for Deputy Ministers.

229. The amount of at-risk pay shown in the tables below is the average amount paid to all deputy ministers at each level and is likely different by individual. The at-risk pay for the year beginning 2020 was not available as of the date of this report and so I have estimated it to be the same percentage of mid-point salary as in 2019 (shown in red). The total compensation includes the value of the pension net of contributions (paragraph 221).
230. I note the salary ranges have not changed in the last four years, but the deputy ministers’ base compensation has increased, likely as a result of their progressing through the salary grids. With the possible exception of DM-4⁶², base compensation is nearing the top-end of the salary range and it is likely that at least some of the deputy ministers have not received an increase in compensation in the past few years.

⁶² The possible exception of DM-4 is because there is not enough data disclosed to be able to make a finding on this issue.

Table 230a – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-1

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 195,500 - 229,900 | 212,700 | 225,288 | 38,323 | 263,611 | 308,306 |
| 2016 | 200,000 - 235,200 | 217,600 | 227,721 | 39,412 | 267,133 | 312,425 |
| 2017 | 202,500 - 238,200 | 220,350 | 230,810 | 38,876 | 269,686 | 315,411 |
| 2018 | 202,500 - 238,200 | 220,350 | 233,556 | 37,404 | 270,960 | 316,901 |
| 2019 | 202,500 - 238,200 | 220,350 | 234,956 | 39,187 | 274,143 | 320,624 |
| 2020 | 202,500 - 238,200 | 220,350 | 236,754 | 39,487 | 276,241 | 323,078 |

Table 230b – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-2

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 224,700 - 264,300 | 244,500 | 259,432 | 52,945 | 312,377 | 365,341 |
| 2016 | 229,800 - 270,300 | 250,050 | 261,816 | 46,723 | 308,539 | 360,852 |
| 2017 | 232,700 - 273,700 | 253,200 | 265,894 | 53,937 | 319,831 | 374,058 |
| 2018 | 232,700 - 273,700 | 253,200 | 265,791 | 55,318 | 321,109 | 375,553 |
| 2019 | 232,700 - 273,700 | 253,200 | 266,944 | 63,881 | 330,825 | 386,916 |
| 2020 | 232,700 - 273,700 | 253,200 | 270,682 | 64,776 | 335,458 | 392,334 |

Table 230c – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-3

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 251,600 - 296,000 | 273,800 | 291,950 | 65,875 | 357,825 | 418,494 |
| 2016 | 257,300 - 302,700 | 280,000 | 298,200 | 62,578 | 360,778 | 421,948 |
| 2017 | 260,600 - 306,500 | 283,550 | 298,900 | 64,110 | 363,010 | 424,558 |
| 2018 | 260,600 - 306,500 | 283,550 | 298,143 | 67,371 | 365,514 | 427,487 |
| 2019 | 260,600 - 306,500 | 283,550 | 303,545 | 79,909 | 383,454 | 448,469 |
| 2020 | 260,600 - 306,500 | 283,550 | 304,450 | 80,147 | 384,597 | 449,806 |

Table 230d – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-4

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay* | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 281,700 - 331,300 | 306,500 | 323,849 | 106,870 | 430,719 | 503,748 |
| 2016 | 288,000 - 338,800 | 313,400 | 331,140 | 109,276 | 440,416 | 515,088 |
| 2017 | 291,700 - 343,100 | 317,400 | 335,366 | 110,671 | 446,037 | 521,662 |
| 2018 | 291,700 - 343,100 | 317,400 | 335,366 | 110,671 | 446,037 | 521,662 |
| 2019 | 291,700 - 343,100 | 317,400 | 335,366 | 110,671 | 446,037 | 521,662 |
| 2020 | 291,700 - 343,100 | 317,400 | 335,366 | 110,671 | 446,037 | 521,662 |

* The average basic compensation and the at-risk pay was not provided for DM-4 due to the small number of incumbents and confidentiality issues. The amounts shown in Table 230d are estimated by me. I calculated the average ratio of the average basic compensation to the mid-point salary for DM-1, DM-2 and DM-3 over the period 2015 to 2019. I assumed that average would apply at DM-4 (shown in red). I examined the at-risk pay as a percent of average basic compensation for DM-1, DM-2 and DM-3 and assumed the actual amount paid at DM-4 would have been 33% (shown in red). Consequently, the total compensation for DM-4 is based on assumptions that I made and does not necessarily reflect the actual amounts.

Government Agency Appointments Compensation

231. I was provided with compensation information for positions within government agencies and similar organisations with a job classification of GC-09, GC-10, GCQ-09 and GCQ- 10. In each of these classifications, there are between 1 and 5 individuals and for confidentiality purposes, average salary was not provided. I note that as with the DM compensation grids, these grids have been frozen since 2017. It is therefore likely that the incumbents are close to if not at the upper end of their grid as with the deputy ministers. I have therefore assumed that the average basic compensation in each year 2015 to 2020 for GC and GCQ positions is the same as I assumed for DM-4 positions -- 105.5% of the mid-point salary in each year (shown in red).
232. The specifics of the pension plan available to each of these positions may vary from the Public Sector Pension Plan. I have assumed that any variance is not material and have applied the same value for the pension as I used for deputy ministers – 17.0%
233. I was informed by the Department of Justice that these two GC positions are eligible for at-risk pay, but the GCQ positions are not eligible.

Table 233a – Compensation for Government Appointments at GC-09

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay* | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 229,500 – 269,900 | 249,700 | 263,834 | 61,737 | 325,571 | 380,772 |
| 2016 | 234,700 – 276,100 | 255,400 | 269,857 | 63,146 | 333,003 | 389,464 |
| 2017 | 237,700 – 279,600 | 258,650 | 273,291 | 63,950 | 337,241 | 394,420 |
| 2018 | 237,700 – 279,600 | 258,650 | 273,291 | 63,950 | 337,241 | 394,420 |
| 2019 | 237,700 – 279,600 | 258,650 | 273,291 | 63,950 | 337,241 | 394,420 |
| 2020 | 237,700 – 279,600 | 258,650 | 273,291 | 63,950 | 337,241 | 394,420 |

* Average at-risk pay was assumed to be a consistent 23.4% of average basic compensation each year.

Table 233b – Compensation for Government Appointments at GC-10

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay* | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 263,700 - 310,200 | 286,950 | 303,192 | 86,107 | 389,299 | 455,305 |
| 2016 | 269,800 - 317,300 | 293,550 | 310,166 | 88,087 | 398,253 | 465,777 |
| 2017 | 273,200 - 321,300 | 297,250 | 314,075 | 89,197 | 403,273 | 471,648 |
| 2018 | 273,200 - 321,300 | 297,250 | 314,075 | 89,197 | 403,273 | 471,648 |
| 2019 | 273,200 - 321,300 | 297,250 | 314,075 | 89,197 | 403,273 | 471,648 |
| 2020 | 273,200 - 321,300 | 297,250 | 314,075 | 89,197 | 403,273 | 471,648 |

* Average at-risk pay was assumed to be a consistent 28.4% of average basic compensation each year.

Table 233c – Compensation for Government Appointments at GCQ-09

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 269,300 - 316,800 | 293,050 | 309,638 | - | 309,638 | 362,137 |
| 2016 | 275,400 - 324,000 | 299,700 | 316,664 | - | 316,664 | 370,355 |
| 2017 | 278,900 - 328,100 | 303,500 | 320,679 | - | 320,679 | 375,050 |
| 2018 | 278,900 - 328,100 | 303,500 | 320,679 | - | 320,679 | 375,050 |
| 2019 | 278,900 - 328,100 | 303,500 | 320,679 | - | 320,679 | 375,050 |
| 2020 | 278,900 - 328,100 | 303,500 | 320,679 | - | 320,679 | 375,050 |

Table 233d – Compensation for Government Appointments at GCQ-10

| Year Beginning 1 April | Salary Range | Mid-Point Salary | Average Basic Compensation | At-Risk Pay | Cash Compensation | Total Compensation |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| 2015 | 317,600 - 373,600 | 345,600 | 365,162 | - | 365,162 | 427,076 |
| 2016 | 324,800 - 382,100 | 353,450 | 373,457 | - | 373,457 | 436,776 |
| 2017 | 328,900 - 386,900 | 357,900 | 378,158 | - | 378,158 | 442,275 |
| 2018 | 328,900 - 386,900 | 357,900 | 378,158 | - | 378,158 | 442,275 |
| 2019 | 328,900 - 386,900 | 357,900 | 378,158 | - | 378,158 | 442,275 |
| 2020 | 328,900 - 386,900 | 357,900 | 378,158 | - | 378,158 | 442,275 |

234. I determined that the Base Judicial Total Compensation beginning April 2020 is \$509,400 (paragraph 153). That is 113% of the Total Compensation of a DM-3 and 98% of the estimated Total Compensation of a DM-4.

235. I determined that the Base Judicial Total Compensation beginning April 2021 will be approximately \$543,800 (paragraph 154). Assuming there are no increases effective April 2021 for deputy ministers, that is 121% of the Total Compensation of a DM-3 and 104% of the estimated Total Compensation of a DM-4.

The Block Comparator

236. In this section, I determine the amount of the Block Comparator (see paragraphs 225 to 228) for 2015 to 2020 in relation to the Base Judicial Salary.

Table 236 – Block Comparator and Base Judicial Salary

| Year Beginning 1 April | Mid-point of Salary range for DM-3 | 50% of At-Risk Pay | Block Comparator | Base Judicial Salary | Percent of Block Comparator |
|------------------------------|--|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2015 | 273,800 | 45,180 | 318,980 | 308,600 | 96.7% |
| 2016 | 280,000 | 46,200 | 326,200 | 314,100 | 96.3% |
| 2017 | 283,550 | 46,790 | 330,340 | 315,300 | 95.4% |
| 2018 | 283,550 | 46,790 | 330,340 | 321,600 | 97.4% |
| 2019 | 283,550 | 46,790 | 330,340 | 329,900 | 99.9% |
| 2020 | 283,550 | 46,790 | 330,340 | 338,800 | 102.6% |

237. In 2016 and 2017, the Block Comparator increased more than did Base Judicial Salary – 3.6% over the two years compared with IAI increases of 2.2% over the same two years. That is the smallest increase in the IAI over any two-year period since the IAI was introduced in 2005 as the automatic driver of judicial salary increases.
238. DM-3 salary ranges were frozen for 2018, and no increases have been given to DM-3s since April 2017 other than for progression through the salary range. Since 2017, the Base Judicial Salary has increased a total of 7.5% with no increase to the Block Comparator.
239. As discussed in paragraph 227, the Block Comparator ignores the unequal value of the pension arrangements for judges and deputy ministers. The value of the Judicial Annuity is about 32.5% more as a percent of salary than the value of the deputy minister’s pension. One way to address that is to adjust the Block Comparator to reflect the value of a deputy minister’s pension and the portion of the CPP contributions paid by the government⁶³ – which gives a comparator equivalent to the expected total compensation of a DM-3. That gives a like-for-like relationship between the Block Comparator and Base Judicial Total Compensation.

Table 239 – Adjusted Block Comparator and Base Judicial Total Compensation

| Year Beginning 1 April | Block Comparator | Adjusted Block Comparator* | Base Judicial Total Compensation | Percent of Adjusted Block Comparator |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| 2015 | 318,980 | 375,543 | 463,867 | 123.5% |
| 2016 | 326,200 | 384,052 | 472,154 | 122.9% |
| 2017 | 330,340 | 388,913 | 473,968 | 121.9% |
| 2018 | 330,340 | 388,943 | 483,417 | 124.3% |
| 2019 | 330,340 | 389,098 | 495,981 | 127.5% |
| 2020 | 330,340 | 389,247 | 509,437 | 130.9% |

* Block Comparator plus value of DM Pension and CPP Value

⁶³ The amount of the CPP contributions paid by the government varies from year to year as the total CPP contribution amount changes. The Adjusted Block Comparator shown here reflects that changing value - \$2,480 in 2015 increasing annually to \$2,898 in 2020. (The 2021 amount, which is used elsewhere in this report for the 2021 Base Judicial Total Compensation is \$3,166).

Deputy Minister Tenure

240. I was provided with details of past deputy ministers setting out their positions, initial appointment as a deputy minister and the date they left the ranks of deputy minister. From that, I calculated the time served as a deputy minister and the average tenure of deputy ministers. The data included 107 people whose term ended at either a DM-3 or DM-4 level. Two of those were acting deputy minister and had a term of less than one month, and I have excluded them. That leaves 105 with terms of more than one month.
241. The tenures for deputy ministers who were DM-3 or DM-4 at the end of their service ranged from five months to 20.7 years. The average tenure of those 105 deputy ministers was 8.75 years.
242. The average tenure of these deputy ministers is significantly shorter than the average expected tenure of a judge. Based on the assumptions used in valuing the Judicial Annuity, the average tenure of a federally appointed judge is 20.3 years – over twice the length of a deputy minister who reached a DM-3 or DM-4 level.
243. In my opinion, there are three possible reasons for this differential in tenure.
- a. Deputy ministers retire much earlier than judges. Under the Public Service Superannuation Act, most government employees retire at or prior to age 65. For long-term employees, there is little or no incentive to remain working beyond age 65. Based on the assumptions used in valuing the Judicial Annuity, the average expected retirement age for judges is about age 72. Retirement could account for between 7 and 12-years differential in tenure.
 - b. Deputy ministers serve at the pleasure of the government and could be terminated at any time. The job security of a deputy minister may not be as high as it is with judges.
 - c. Deputy ministers may be subject to more stress and/or different stressors and may be unable to function at the high level demanded of their position for as long as a judge.
244. I am not able to offer an opinion as to whether and to what extent this differential in tenure should or could be reflected in any relationship between total compensation of deputy ministers and Judicial Total Compensation.

H. Data Tables Utilised in the Report

245. As was done for prior Quadrennial Commissions, Canada Revenue Agency provided a number of files with data on the past net income of self-employed lawyers in Canada. The data provided was already grouped by age brackets, census metropolitan areas (“**CMAs**”) and provinces. If there are not enough lawyers within a grouping to preserve confidentiality, then no income amount was provided.

Number of Self-Employed Lawyers

246. The total number of self-employed lawyers for whom net income data was provided decreased from 2015 to 2020. This continued the trend seen in prior years. I obtained the number of self-employed lawyers for the 2010 to 2014 period from the Report on the Earnings of Self-Employed Lawyers for the Department of Justice Canada in Preparation for the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission by Mr. Haripaul Pannu, dated 25 February 2016.

Table 246 – Total Number of Self-Employed Lawyers – 2010 to 2019⁶⁴

| Year | Number of Self-Employed Lawyers |
|---------|---------------------------------|
| 2010 | 22,110 |
| 2011 | 19,310 |
| 2012 | 19,190 |
| 2013 | 19,360 |
| 2014 | 18,550 |
| 2015 | 18,740 |
| 2016 | 18,330 |
| 2017 | 17,270 |
| 2018 | 17,640 |
| 2019 | 15,510 |
| Average | 18,600 |

247. The most likely reason for this decrease in numbers is a gradual process of self-employed lawyers converting their practice to a professional corporation. The number

⁶⁴ These are the total number of self-employed lawyers in Canada for whom Canada Revenue Agency provided data in each year. Only lawyers between ages 35 and 69 were included. There were some within that age range that were excluded for data reasons.

of self-employed lawyers could also be affected by a shift in the age of such lawyers – reducing the numbers between 35 and 69. In my opinion, that is likely to have a much smaller effect than the conversion of practices.

248. Canada Revenue Agency advise that they are not able to provide accurate income amounts from a professional corporation. The reporting of income from the provision of legal services is not separated from other types of income provided on income tax returns and so any information could be misleading. That is much less likely to happen with net income from the self-employed.

Data Presentation

249. There are many ways the data can be presented and reviewed. In the tables that follow in this section, I have presented the data in several ways that in my opinion provide differing ways to consider the relationships. With the exception of the first three groups of tables (Tables 253a to 255c), I have only shown the 65th and higher percentile ranges along with the median income and 75th percentile.

250. Definitions:

- a. **Median:** the net income amount where half of all lawyers make less and half make more.
- b. **Average or Mean:** the income amount that is the average of all the net incomes for all lawyers in the group. If the average is greater than the median, it indicates that the net incomes are skewed towards the high end – that is, there are some lawyers with very high net incomes relative to the entire group.
- c. **Percentile:** A system of ranking data from the smallest to the largest. For income ranking, the 65th percentile is the amount where 65% of all self-employed lawyers make less and 35% make more. Refer also to the call-out box on page 37.
- d. **Percentile range:** In the data from Canada Revenue Agency, the actual percentiles were not provided, but instead the average income amount for the five percentiles below the indicated percentile was given. For example, the 75th percentile is the average of the net incomes for all lawyers with incomes between the 70th and 75th percentiles. The 100th percentile is the average of the net incomes of the top five percent of self-employed lawyers. Where I refer to the percentile data provided by Canada Revenue Agency, I show the range, such as 70-75th percentile. We can estimate with sufficiently high accuracy the actual single-point percentile

represented by a range of percentiles is the mid-point. For example, the range 70-75th percentile is the 72.5th percentile⁶⁵.

- e. **All Ages:** The data provided includes self-employed lawyers aged 35 to 69. So a reference to “All Ages” should be considered as ages 35 to 69.
- f. **CMAs:** The lawyers were grouped within the ten largest Census Metropolitan Areas (**CMAs**) – in order of decreasing size, Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Québec City and combined into one group for confidentiality purposes, Hamilton and the Kitchener, Cambridge, Waterloo areas). All other regions of Canada were combined and are referenced as “**Other Regions**”).

- 251. Canada Revenue Agency rounded all income amounts to the nearest \$10 with the exception of the median and the 75th percentiles which were rounded to the nearest \$10,000. The data contains a couple of apparent anomalies that are the result of the different rounding⁶⁶. In my opinion, those anomalies are not material for the purposes of this report, and I have not drawn attention to them elsewhere.
- 252. While it is my opinion that income exclusions should have no place in a compensation comparison, I have included tables based on an income exclusion since that data was provided by Canada Revenue Agency and may have been utilised by prior Quadrennial Commissions in their deliberations.

⁶⁵ This works well up to the 75th percentile. From the 75th to 90th percentile, it gives a result that is approximately equal to the correct value and above the 90th percentile, it will give a result that is low.

⁶⁶ For example, the 70-75th percentile is slightly greater than the 75th percentile. If rounding were done consistently, the 70-75th percentile should never be larger than the 75th percentile.

Net Incomes for All Regions and All Ages 2015 to 2019

253. The following three tables present information for all of the self-employed lawyers in Canada over the period 2015 to 2019 based on (a) no income exclusion and (b) excluding those with net incomes less than \$60,000 and (c) excluding those with net incomes less than \$80,000.

Table 253a - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - No Income Exclusion
All Regions, All Ages

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|
| 0 to 5 | 3,840 | 4,030 | 3,930 | 3,180 | 3,430 | 3,682 |
| 5 to 10 | 12,220 | 12,740 | 13,060 | 11,190 | 11,310 | 12,104 |
| 10 to 15 | 21,430 | 22,040 | 22,360 | 19,620 | 20,240 | 21,138 |
| 15 to 20 | 30,910 | 31,810 | 32,210 | 28,840 | 29,890 | 30,732 |
| 20 to 25 | 41,420 | 42,950 | 43,240 | 39,380 | 41,320 | 41,662 |
| 25 to 30 | 52,970 | 54,990 | 54,600 | 51,540 | 53,610 | 53,542 |
| 30 to 35 | 65,450 | 67,250 | 67,480 | 64,500 | 67,470 | 66,430 |
| 35 to 40 | 78,470 | 80,390 | 81,660 | 77,910 | 81,930 | 80,072 |
| 40 to 45 | 92,540 | 95,160 | 96,230 | 93,270 | 98,200 | 95,080 |
| 45 to 50 | 109,020 | 111,770 | 112,800 | 111,320 | 116,600 | 112,302 |
| 50 to 55 | 127,490 | 129,900 | 131,920 | 131,780 | 138,140 | 131,846 |
| 55 to 60 | 149,680 | 150,040 | 154,280 | 155,250 | 161,680 | 154,186 |
| 60 to 65 | 173,830 | 174,810 | 178,680 | 182,280 | 188,710 | 179,662 |
| 65 to 70 | 203,340 | 202,790 | 207,020 | 212,410 | 217,890 | 208,690 |
| 70 to 75 | 237,500 | 232,500 | 239,140 | 250,210 | 252,250 | 242,320 |
| 75 to 80 | 281,940 | 272,580 | 280,070 | 296,910 | 297,680 | 285,836 |
| 80 to 85 | 347,750 | 329,830 | 339,630 | 363,280 | 361,970 | 348,492 |
| 85 to 90 | 441,670 | 411,080 | 430,450 | 469,590 | 465,890 | 443,736 |
| 90 to 95 | 601,490 | 552,270 | 573,980 | 646,740 | 638,900 | 602,676 |
| 95 to 100 | 1,135,630 | 1,060,510 | 1,076,910 | 1,211,900 | 1,236,440 | 1,144,278 |
| Average | 210,390 | 201,940 | 206,950 | 221,020 | 224,140 | 212,888 |
| Median | 118,000 | 121,000 | 122,000 | 121,000 | 127,000 | 121,800 |
| Number of lawyers | 18,740 | 18,330 | 17,270 | 17,640 | 15,510 | 17,498 |

**Table 253b - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$60,000 Income Exclusion
All Regions, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 5 | 64,490 | 64,210 | 64,840 | 64,460 | 64,810 | 64,562 |
| 5 to 10 | 73,340 | 73,250 | 74,690 | 73,500 | 74,750 | 73,906 |
| 10 to 15 | 82,840 | 82,820 | 84,660 | 83,410 | 85,220 | 83,790 |
| 15 to 20 | 92,650 | 93,190 | 94,950 | 94,480 | 96,700 | 94,394 |
| 20 to 25 | 103,930 | 104,480 | 106,040 | 106,680 | 109,290 | 106,084 |
| 25 to 30 | 116,150 | 116,860 | 118,570 | 120,430 | 123,020 | 119,006 |
| 30 to 35 | 129,500 | 129,650 | 132,200 | 135,030 | 138,700 | 133,016 |
| 35 to 40 | 145,150 | 143,640 | 148,110 | 151,350 | 154,880 | 148,626 |
| 40 to 45 | 160,860 | 158,940 | 164,040 | 169,150 | 172,870 | 165,172 |
| 45 to 50 | 179,030 | 177,630 | 182,010 | 188,860 | 192,250 | 183,956 |
| 50 to 55 | 199,640 | 197,340 | 201,770 | 209,770 | 212,830 | 204,270 |
| 55 to 60 | 222,330 | 217,470 | 223,650 | 233,970 | 234,560 | 226,396 |
| 60 to 65 | 248,150 | 239,630 | 247,170 | 263,610 | 261,840 | 252,080 |
| 65 to 70 | 280,110 | 268,590 | 276,450 | 296,290 | 294,120 | 283,112 |
| 70 to 75 | 322,690 | 305,530 | 315,480 | 338,910 | 334,190 | 323,360 |
| 75 to 80 | 377,950 | 352,680 | 364,990 | 397,160 | 391,910 | 376,938 |
| 80 to 85 | 447,570 | 413,650 | 434,570 | 478,490 | 469,850 | 448,826 |
| 85 to 90 | 549,570 | 501,250 | 525,930 | 595,310 | 580,560 | 550,524 |
| 90 to 95 | 720,860 | 661,050 | 678,440 | 769,300 | 761,630 | 718,256 |
| 95 to 100 | 1,287,530 | 1,200,970 | 1,219,710 | 1,379,180 | 1,409,020 | 1,299,282 |
| Average | 290,180 | 275,090 | 282,880 | 307,400 | 308,090 | 292,728 |
| Median | 190,000 | 187,000 | 191,000 | 199,000 | 202,000 | 193,800 |
| Number of lawyers | 13,050 | 12,920 | 12,120 | 12,210 | 10,890 | 12,238 |

**Table 253c - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$80,000 Income Exclusion
All Regions, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 5 | 84,150 | 84,550 | 84,410 | 84,400 | 85,080 | 84,518 |
| 5 to 10 | 92,940 | 93,770 | 93,610 | 94,370 | 95,340 | 94,006 |
| 10 to 15 | 103,000 | 103,830 | 103,340 | 105,070 | 106,450 | 104,338 |
| 15 to 20 | 113,800 | 114,750 | 114,380 | 117,380 | 118,470 | 115,756 |
| 20 to 25 | 125,170 | 125,980 | 126,020 | 129,860 | 131,870 | 127,780 |
| 25 to 30 | 138,600 | 138,110 | 139,590 | 144,030 | 146,410 | 141,348 |
| 30 to 35 | 152,690 | 150,850 | 153,840 | 159,080 | 161,220 | 155,536 |
| 35 to 40 | 167,100 | 165,830 | 168,570 | 175,740 | 178,230 | 171,094 |
| 40 to 45 | 184,400 | 183,100 | 185,100 | 193,860 | 195,530 | 188,398 |
| 45 to 50 | 202,800 | 200,630 | 203,130 | 212,490 | 214,330 | 206,676 |
| 50 to 55 | 223,320 | 218,590 | 222,800 | 234,540 | 233,770 | 226,604 |
| 55 to 60 | 246,240 | 238,130 | 243,620 | 260,900 | 257,710 | 249,320 |
| 60 to 65 | 273,660 | 263,290 | 268,370 | 289,490 | 286,160 | 276,194 |
| 65 to 70 | 309,150 | 293,940 | 301,360 | 324,730 | 319,400 | 309,716 |
| 70 to 75 | 354,260 | 333,090 | 340,370 | 370,630 | 362,950 | 352,260 |
| 75 to 80 | 409,500 | 380,500 | 394,460 | 433,320 | 425,920 | 408,740 |
| 80 to 85 | 481,180 | 442,890 | 463,140 | 517,080 | 503,700 | 481,598 |
| 85 to 90 | 586,710 | 534,810 | 555,870 | 632,940 | 616,560 | 585,378 |
| 90 to 95 | 759,660 | 698,490 | 711,950 | 808,830 | 799,860 | 755,758 |
| 95 to 100 | 1,339,640 | 1,250,110 | 1,265,050 | 1,434,530 | 1,465,470 | 1,350,960 |
| Average | 317,340 | 300,760 | 306,880 | 336,060 | 335,100 | 319,228 |
| Median | 213,000 | 210,000 | 213,000 | 222,000 | 223,000 | 216,200 |
| Number of lawyers | 11,610 | 11,480 | 10,900 | 10,900 | 9,780 | 10,934 |

Net Incomes for 10 Largest CMAs and All Ages 2015 to 2019

254. The following three tables present information for all of the self-employed lawyers in the ten largest CMAs over the period 2015 to 2019 based on (a) no income exclusion and (b) excluding those with net incomes less than \$60,000 and (c) excluding those with net incomes less than \$80,000.

**Table 254a - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - No Income Exclusion
10 CMAs, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|
| 0 to 5 | 3,980 | 4,360 | 4,150 | 3,460 | 3,600 | 3,910 |
| 5 to 10 | 12,590 | 13,130 | 13,290 | 11,500 | 11,470 | 12,396 |
| 10 to 15 | 21,840 | 22,380 | 22,510 | 20,120 | 20,610 | 21,492 |
| 15 to 20 | 31,970 | 32,450 | 32,630 | 29,750 | 30,810 | 31,522 |
| 20 to 25 | 43,680 | 44,670 | 44,650 | 41,090 | 42,950 | 43,408 |
| 25 to 30 | 56,280 | 57,600 | 57,400 | 54,620 | 56,570 | 56,494 |
| 30 to 35 | 70,640 | 71,430 | 72,410 | 68,870 | 71,930 | 71,056 |
| 35 to 40 | 86,360 | 87,230 | 88,490 | 84,570 | 88,420 | 87,014 |
| 40 to 45 | 103,510 | 104,440 | 105,300 | 102,620 | 107,120 | 104,598 |
| 45 to 50 | 123,190 | 124,340 | 124,640 | 124,670 | 129,350 | 125,238 |
| 50 to 55 | 147,060 | 146,190 | 148,650 | 149,890 | 154,510 | 149,260 |
| 55 to 60 | 173,140 | 171,800 | 175,040 | 178,640 | 182,800 | 176,284 |
| 60 to 65 | 203,280 | 200,700 | 203,460 | 208,390 | 213,070 | 205,780 |
| 65 to 70 | 235,530 | 229,130 | 235,280 | 244,040 | 245,780 | 237,952 |
| 70 to 75 | 277,460 | 265,370 | 271,890 | 287,270 | 286,950 | 277,788 |
| 75 to 80 | 334,550 | 314,510 | 321,420 | 344,490 | 340,720 | 331,138 |
| 80 to 85 | 408,670 | 377,810 | 392,840 | 428,370 | 422,340 | 406,006 |
| 85 to 90 | 510,360 | 467,620 | 491,440 | 547,900 | 536,150 | 510,694 |
| 90 to 95 | 683,910 | 624,550 | 643,270 | 726,560 | 719,340 | 679,526 |
| 95 to 100 | 1,227,470 | 1,162,550 | 1,176,690 | 1,324,130 | 1,355,050 | 1,249,178 |
| Average | 237,740 | 226,080 | 231,240 | 248,990 | 250,930 | 238,996 |
| Median | 134,000 | 135,000 | 136,000 | 137,000 | 142,000 | 136,800 |
| Number of lawyers | 13,990 | 13,670 | 12,920 | 13,070 | 11,590 | 13,048 |

**Table 254b - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$60,000 Income Exclusion
10 CMAs, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 5 | 65,140 | 64,890 | 65,420 | 65,120 | 65,420 | 65,198 |
| 5 to 10 | 76,160 | 75,200 | 76,850 | 75,620 | 76,630 | 76,092 |
| 10 to 15 | 87,290 | 86,810 | 88,300 | 87,140 | 88,620 | 87,632 |
| 15 to 20 | 99,290 | 98,680 | 99,960 | 99,690 | 101,640 | 99,852 |
| 20 to 25 | 112,590 | 112,130 | 113,130 | 114,480 | 116,150 | 113,696 |
| 25 to 30 | 127,220 | 126,810 | 127,390 | 131,290 | 133,180 | 129,178 |
| 30 to 35 | 144,610 | 142,460 | 144,760 | 149,230 | 150,960 | 146,404 |
| 35 to 40 | 162,450 | 159,380 | 163,340 | 169,080 | 170,560 | 164,962 |
| 40 to 45 | 182,940 | 179,340 | 182,550 | 190,170 | 191,390 | 185,278 |
| 45 to 50 | 204,060 | 200,310 | 203,230 | 211,130 | 213,420 | 206,430 |
| 50 to 55 | 226,700 | 220,350 | 225,710 | 235,820 | 235,740 | 228,864 |
| 55 to 60 | 252,760 | 242,240 | 249,560 | 265,030 | 262,620 | 254,442 |
| 60 to 65 | 285,670 | 270,780 | 277,630 | 297,010 | 293,400 | 284,898 |
| 65 to 70 | 326,590 | 305,900 | 313,160 | 338,150 | 331,830 | 323,126 |
| 70 to 75 | 376,010 | 347,980 | 357,740 | 392,110 | 382,610 | 371,290 |
| 75 to 80 | 434,150 | 398,070 | 417,640 | 462,080 | 450,660 | 432,520 |
| 80 to 85 | 510,040 | 465,900 | 489,900 | 551,050 | 535,310 | 510,440 |
| 85 to 90 | 622,110 | 563,990 | 587,570 | 666,400 | 653,460 | 618,706 |
| 90 to 95 | 798,420 | 733,520 | 749,260 | 848,150 | 840,370 | 793,944 |
| 95 to 100 | 1,374,410 | 1,305,520 | 1,319,900 | 1,493,240 | 1,531,710 | 1,404,956 |
| Average | 323,390 | 304,970 | 312,560 | 342,050 | 341,210 | 324,836 |
| Median | 215,000 | 210,000 | 214,000 | 222,000 | 224,000 | 217,000 |
| Number of lawyers | 9,940 | 9,780 | 9,240 | 9,220 | 8,270 | 9,290 |

**Table 254c - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$80,000 Income Exclusion
10 CMAs, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 5 | 84,950 | 85,450 | 85,210 | 85,130 | 85,750 | 85,298 |
| 5 to 10 | 95,410 | 96,010 | 95,580 | 96,290 | 97,210 | 96,100 |
| 10 to 15 | 107,210 | 107,690 | 106,960 | 108,990 | 110,150 | 108,200 |
| 15 to 20 | 119,780 | 120,680 | 119,350 | 123,480 | 124,280 | 121,514 |
| 20 to 25 | 134,290 | 134,530 | 133,410 | 139,240 | 140,400 | 136,374 |
| 25 to 30 | 150,610 | 148,770 | 149,990 | 156,160 | 156,840 | 152,474 |
| 30 to 35 | 166,840 | 165,160 | 167,040 | 174,790 | 175,340 | 169,834 |
| 35 to 40 | 186,250 | 183,660 | 184,580 | 193,820 | 194,160 | 188,494 |
| 40 to 45 | 205,170 | 202,530 | 203,580 | 212,870 | 214,440 | 207,718 |
| 45 to 50 | 225,800 | 220,620 | 224,120 | 235,450 | 234,640 | 228,126 |
| 50 to 55 | 248,940 | 240,040 | 245,490 | 261,760 | 258,580 | 250,962 |
| 55 to 60 | 277,520 | 265,310 | 269,810 | 290,050 | 285,970 | 277,732 |
| 60 to 65 | 313,080 | 295,090 | 300,450 | 324,810 | 318,590 | 310,404 |
| 65 to 70 | 354,660 | 331,360 | 336,350 | 369,190 | 359,090 | 350,130 |
| 70 to 75 | 403,940 | 372,990 | 385,200 | 426,360 | 415,340 | 400,766 |
| 75 to 80 | 462,740 | 425,170 | 445,030 | 495,970 | 481,910 | 462,164 |
| 80 to 85 | 540,900 | 493,470 | 516,000 | 586,270 | 568,320 | 540,992 |
| 85 to 90 | 654,040 | 595,850 | 614,140 | 699,480 | 687,600 | 650,222 |
| 90 to 95 | 832,140 | 767,580 | 779,960 | 884,220 | 874,980 | 827,776 |
| 95 to 100 | 1,417,040 | 1,350,040 | 1,360,020 | 1,543,880 | 1,585,160 | 1,451,228 |
| Average | 349,010 | 330,100 | 336,110 | 370,310 | 368,300 | 350,766 |
| Median | 237,000 | 229,000 | 234,000 | 248,000 | 245,000 | 238,600 |
| Number of lawyers | 9,030 | 8,840 | 8,420 | 8,360 | 7,520 | 8,434 |

Net Incomes for Other Regions and All Ages 2015 to 2019

255. The following three tables present information for all of the self-employed lawyers in the Other Regions over the period 2015 to 2019 based on (a) no income exclusion and (b) excluding those with net incomes less than \$60,000 and (c) excluding those with net incomes less than \$80,000.

**Table 255a - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - No Income Exclusion
Other Regions, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
| 0 to 5 | 3,430 | 3,220 | 3,420 | 2,520 | 2,960 | 3,110 |
| 5 to 10 | 11,260 | 11,590 | 12,310 | 10,210 | 10,890 | 11,252 |
| 10 to 15 | 20,300 | 21,040 | 21,990 | 18,490 | 19,300 | 20,224 |
| 15 to 20 | 28,610 | 30,310 | 31,240 | 26,610 | 27,560 | 28,866 |
| 20 to 25 | 36,750 | 39,300 | 40,280 | 35,710 | 37,630 | 37,934 |
| 25 to 30 | 45,760 | 49,190 | 49,200 | 45,190 | 47,280 | 47,324 |
| 30 to 35 | 55,510 | 58,860 | 58,020 | 55,590 | 58,150 | 57,226 |
| 35 to 40 | 65,460 | 68,690 | 68,350 | 65,880 | 69,260 | 67,528 |
| 40 to 45 | 73,900 | 78,200 | 79,000 | 76,250 | 80,490 | 77,568 |
| 45 to 50 | 83,750 | 88,610 | 89,550 | 87,660 | 93,480 | 88,610 |
| 50 to 55 | 94,580 | 101,280 | 101,970 | 101,330 | 107,300 | 101,292 |
| 55 to 60 | 107,830 | 114,460 | 116,410 | 116,740 | 122,610 | 115,610 |
| 60 to 65 | 122,090 | 127,610 | 131,980 | 130,980 | 139,980 | 130,528 |
| 65 to 70 | 138,630 | 142,770 | 148,980 | 149,460 | 158,370 | 147,642 |
| 70 to 75 | 156,030 | 160,510 | 165,840 | 169,730 | 180,100 | 166,442 |
| 75 to 80 | 176,810 | 184,270 | 189,370 | 196,430 | 204,730 | 190,322 |
| 80 to 85 | 205,820 | 211,320 | 218,370 | 230,770 | 233,760 | 220,008 |
| 85 to 90 | 247,030 | 249,630 | 255,290 | 279,580 | 281,290 | 262,564 |
| 90 to 95 | 307,710 | 315,350 | 330,230 | 351,270 | 356,890 | 332,290 |
| 95 to 100 | 618,060 | 570,470 | 584,420 | 666,910 | 669,730 | 621,918 |
| Average | 129,890 | 131,280 | 134,750 | 140,830 | 145,030 | 136,356 |
| Median | 89,000 | 95,000 | 96,000 | 95,000 | 100,000 | 95,000 |
| Number of lawyers | 4,750 | 4,670 | 4,350 | 4,560 | 3,920 | 4,450 |

**Table 255b - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$60,000 Income Exclusion
Other Regions, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| 0 to 5 | 63,200 | 62,850 | 63,620 | 63,300 | 63,440 | 63,282 |
| 5 to 10 | 69,340 | 69,630 | 70,520 | 69,340 | 70,920 | 69,950 |
| 10 to 15 | 74,400 | 76,010 | 77,720 | 76,570 | 78,360 | 76,612 |
| 15 to 20 | 81,030 | 82,390 | 84,510 | 83,570 | 86,330 | 83,566 |
| 20 to 25 | 87,690 | 89,750 | 91,980 | 92,250 | 95,610 | 91,456 |
| 25 to 30 | 94,870 | 98,400 | 100,370 | 101,200 | 104,810 | 99,930 |
| 30 to 35 | 103,390 | 107,020 | 109,220 | 111,250 | 114,690 | 109,114 |
| 35 to 40 | 112,680 | 115,990 | 119,460 | 121,170 | 124,660 | 118,792 |
| 40 to 45 | 121,930 | 124,530 | 129,340 | 129,860 | 136,500 | 128,432 |
| 45 to 50 | 132,100 | 134,150 | 141,270 | 142,360 | 149,100 | 139,796 |
| 50 to 55 | 144,110 | 144,910 | 152,140 | 154,670 | 161,200 | 151,406 |
| 55 to 60 | 154,860 | 156,360 | 162,940 | 168,080 | 175,830 | 163,614 |
| 60 to 65 | 167,770 | 171,250 | 177,310 | 183,620 | 191,920 | 178,374 |
| 65 to 70 | 182,870 | 187,620 | 193,830 | 204,010 | 208,840 | 195,434 |
| 70 to 75 | 202,260 | 205,550 | 213,780 | 226,190 | 227,110 | 214,978 |
| 75 to 80 | 227,960 | 227,410 | 234,540 | 255,660 | 253,810 | 239,876 |
| 80 to 85 | 256,690 | 256,390 | 263,480 | 290,830 | 290,650 | 271,608 |
| 85 to 90 | 293,730 | 297,840 | 315,000 | 337,100 | 336,320 | 315,998 |
| 90 to 95 | 370,110 | 374,940 | 389,120 | 415,460 | 425,040 | 394,934 |
| 95 to 100 | 736,060 | 653,170 | 670,050 | 786,080 | 777,010 | 724,474 |
| Average | 183,790 | 181,720 | 187,920 | 200,540 | 203,600 | 191,514 |
| Median | 138,000 | 140,000 | 147,000 | 148,000 | 155,000 | 145,600 |
| Number of lawyers | 3,100 | 3,130 | 2,890 | 2,990 | 2,620 | 2,946 |

**Table 255c - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$80,000 Income Exclusion
Other Regions, All Ages**

| Percentiles | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 5-Year Average |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 5 | 82,740 | 82,770 | 83,070 | 82,880 | 83,530 | 82,998 |
| 5 to 10 | 88,370 | 88,870 | 88,790 | 90,160 | 91,330 | 89,504 |
| 10 to 15 | 94,310 | 96,210 | 96,330 | 97,790 | 99,060 | 96,740 |
| 15 to 20 | 101,120 | 103,380 | 103,140 | 105,490 | 107,220 | 104,070 |
| 20 to 25 | 108,810 | 110,920 | 111,220 | 114,820 | 116,060 | 112,366 |
| 25 to 30 | 116,690 | 118,330 | 120,180 | 122,570 | 124,500 | 120,454 |
| 30 to 35 | 124,310 | 125,500 | 128,440 | 129,990 | 134,540 | 128,556 |
| 35 to 40 | 133,130 | 133,720 | 138,720 | 140,850 | 145,530 | 138,390 |
| 40 to 45 | 143,220 | 142,670 | 148,360 | 151,100 | 155,850 | 148,240 |
| 45 to 50 | 152,140 | 152,130 | 157,220 | 162,190 | 166,970 | 158,130 |
| 50 to 55 | 162,190 | 162,820 | 167,270 | 174,130 | 180,960 | 169,474 |
| 55 to 60 | 173,780 | 176,920 | 180,780 | 188,740 | 194,480 | 182,940 |
| 60 to 65 | 187,060 | 190,330 | 194,990 | 206,430 | 209,450 | 197,652 |
| 65 to 70 | 204,260 | 205,820 | 212,240 | 225,440 | 224,750 | 214,502 |
| 70 to 75 | 225,520 | 223,820 | 229,610 | 249,880 | 246,550 | 235,076 |
| 75 to 80 | 249,350 | 246,910 | 251,090 | 279,840 | 275,810 | 260,600 |
| 80 to 85 | 276,070 | 276,820 | 286,090 | 311,940 | 309,740 | 292,132 |
| 85 to 90 | 318,180 | 320,560 | 336,150 | 359,630 | 359,540 | 338,812 |
| 90 to 95 | 398,830 | 400,830 | 411,790 | 443,450 | 450,250 | 421,030 |
| 95 to 100 | 794,510 | 690,940 | 707,280 | 835,310 | 820,840 | 769,776 |
| Average | 206,650 | 202,510 | 207,490 | 223,540 | 224,770 | 212,992 |
| Median | 157,000 | 157,000 | 162,000 | 168,000 | 173,000 | 163,400 |
| Number of lawyers | 2,580 | 2,640 | 2,480 | 2,540 | 2,260 | 2,500 |

Comparison of Net Incomes by Age

256. The Canada Revenue Agency provided net income amounts by age groupings for each year 2015 to 2019. To reduce the amount of data included herein, I show only the data for 2019. I have examined the other years and while the income progressions differ somewhat, they do follow the same pattern of increasing as one ages from 35 to about 50 and then gradually falling off by age 69.

**Table 256a – Comparison of Net incomes by Age groups – No Income Exclusion
All Regions, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above**

| Region | Age Group | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|---------------|-----------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| All Regions | 35-43 | 208,380 | 256,860 | 339,970 | 640,680 | 190,900 | 141,000 | 250,000 |
| | 44-47 | 264,630 | 359,800 | 535,130 | 1,002,360 | 272,460 | 170,000 | 350,000 |
| | 48-51 | 258,170 | 363,270 | 559,510 | 1,168,540 | 286,850 | 160,000 | 360,000 |
| | 52-55 | 239,300 | 339,380 | 559,350 | 1,189,660 | 281,210 | 150,000 | 330,000 |
| | 56-59 | 210,780 | 289,900 | 445,210 | 1,038,000 | 242,700 | 130,000 | 290,000 |
| | 60-63 | 171,990 | 247,220 | 398,210 | 1,009,360 | 218,020 | 110,000 | 240,000 |
| | 64-69 | 131,560 | 188,760 | 295,930 | 755,020 | 161,790 | 78,000 | 190,000 |
| 10 CMAs | 35-43 | 221,580 | 275,000 | 369,650 | 678,010 | 202,720 | 150,000 | 270,000 |
| | 44-47 | 293,770 | 407,660 | 590,050 | 1,062,810 | 296,460 | 190,000 | 410,000 |
| | 48-51 | 289,090 | 412,470 | 634,840 | 1,264,470 | 314,340 | 180,000 | 410,000 |
| | 52-55 | 283,310 | 418,740 | 662,890 | 1,320,390 | 321,410 | 160,000 | 410,000 |
| | 56-59 | 235,050 | 327,230 | 507,670 | 1,157,850 | 268,900 | 150,000 | 330,000 |
| | 60-63 | 203,440 | 299,360 | 482,540 | 1,153,310 | 252,110 | 120,000 | 300,000 |
| | 64-69 | 154,880 | 227,660 | 360,390 | 875,660 | 189,320 | 90,000 | 230,000 |
| Other Regions | 35-43 | 167,680 | 203,670 | 250,430 | 430,100 | 146,700 | 120,000 | 200,000 |
| | 44-47 | 187,270 | 232,980 | 298,420 | 595,000 | 175,360 | 100,000 | 200,000 |
| | 48-51 | 196,350 | 241,780 | 339,220 | 609,780 | 183,420 | 100,000 | 200,000 |
| | 52-55 | 166,440 | 211,730 | 276,850 | 484,150 | 153,790 | 120,000 | 210,000 |
| | 56-59 | 166,270 | 214,640 | 295,530 | 609,150 | 168,840 | 110,000 | 210,000 |
| | 60-63 | 134,540 | 169,130 | 239,590 | 546,550 | 140,110 | 90,000 | 170,000 |
| | 64-69 | 97,950 | 135,850 | 191,870 | 434,180 | 106,420 | 60,000 | 140,000 |

**Table 256b – Comparison of Net incomes by Age groups – \$60,000 Income Exclusion
All Regions, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above**

| Region | Age Group | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|--------------|-----------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| All | | | | | | | | |
| Regions | 35-43 | 251,840 | 303,480 | 398,130 | 712,020 | 250,070 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 44-47 | 333,330 | 448,700 | 624,040 | 1,090,460 | 345,110 | 240,000 | 440,000 |
| | 48-51 | 348,520 | 469,330 | 678,260 | 1,302,950 | 376,150 | 240,000 | 460,000 |
| | 52-55 | 323,740 | 458,250 | 684,310 | 1,333,400 | 368,940 | 220,000 | 460,000 |
| | 56-59 | 284,780 | 380,520 | 551,690 | 1,193,460 | 324,070 | 200,000 | 370,000 |
| | 60-63 | 261,200 | 357,710 | 532,770 | 1,206,150 | 311,090 | 180,000 | 350,000 |
| | 64-69 | 227,870 | 301,440 | 438,220 | 971,590 | 263,480 | 160,000 | 300,000 |
| 10 | | | | | | | | |
| CMA's | 35-43 | 269,770 | 325,590 | 434,510 | 747,220 | 265,390 | 214,000 | 330,000 |
| | 44-47 | 377,040 | 494,340 | 676,540 | 1,148,990 | 373,390 | 260,000 | 490,000 |
| | 48-51 | 394,140 | 544,000 | 754,190 | 1,402,120 | 413,780 | 270,000 | 550,000 |
| | 52-55 | 395,950 | 557,970 | 779,770 | 1,478,550 | 422,380 | 270,000 | 560,000 |
| | 56-59 | 318,310 | 435,400 | 617,870 | 1,325,870 | 358,450 | 220,000 | 440,000 |
| | 60-63 | 312,940 | 430,330 | 629,800 | 1,360,090 | 357,060 | 210,000 | 430,000 |
| | 64-69 | 264,190 | 354,620 | 503,740 | 1,102,720 | 299,350 | 180,000 | 350,000 |
| Other | | | | | | | | |
| Regions | 35-43 | 202,450 | 231,440 | 280,210 | 481,050 | 191,640 | 160,000 | 230,000 |
| | 44-47 | 227,320 | 271,850 | 345,640 | 669,730 | 225,830 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 48-51 | 232,110 | 298,840 | 377,920 | 670,640 | 235,890 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 52-55 | 208,220 | 250,730 | 310,800 | 538,780 | 198,440 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 56-59 | 214,020 | 266,620 | 354,460 | 696,870 | 224,310 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 60-63 | 179,640 | 221,870 | 316,790 | 663,270 | 200,610 | 100,000 | 200,000 |
| | 64-69 | 168,060 | 205,360 | 275,050 | 576,320 | 180,710 | 130,000 | 210,000 |

**Table 256c – Comparison of Net incomes by Age groups – \$80,000 Income Exclusion
All Regions, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above**

| Region | Age Group | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|--------------|-----------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| All | | | | | | | | |
| Regions | 35-43 | 267,010 | 318,240 | 417,890 | 734,260 | 268,450 | 216,000 | 320,000 |
| | 44-47 | 365,390 | 480,720 | 656,920 | 1,123,710 | 374,050 | 260,000 | 480,000 |
| | 48-51 | 374,990 | 505,600 | 710,310 | 1,342,990 | 403,670 | 260,000 | 500,000 |
| | 52-55 | 356,590 | 502,780 | 722,850 | 1,385,150 | 400,090 | 250,000 | 500,000 |
| | 56-59 | 308,330 | 411,540 | 581,910 | 1,241,820 | 349,240 | 220,000 | 410,000 |
| | 60-63 | 294,500 | 395,270 | 580,200 | 1,270,650 | 341,900 | 200,000 | 390,000 |
| | 64-69 | 257,690 | 340,710 | 477,980 | 1,041,950 | 295,810 | 190,000 | 340,000 |
| 10 | | | | | | | | |
| CMA's | 35-43 | 284,520 | 342,810 | 455,510 | 769,020 | 284,410 | 230,000 | 340,000 |
| | 44-47 | 412,200 | 530,050 | 710,020 | 1,183,550 | 405,190 | 290,000 | 520,000 |
| | 48-51 | 425,880 | 575,130 | 787,780 | 1,437,210 | 441,610 | 290,000 | 580,000 |
| | 52-55 | 432,470 | 596,110 | 809,230 | 1,527,530 | 450,240 | 290,000 | 590,000 |
| | 56-59 | 345,930 | 466,670 | 649,600 | 1,373,770 | 385,420 | 240,000 | 470,000 |
| | 60-63 | 346,730 | 468,660 | 672,530 | 1,419,940 | 388,180 | 240,000 | 470,000 |
| | 64-69 | 296,060 | 392,330 | 539,430 | 1,166,350 | 330,180 | 220,000 | 390,000 |
| Other | | | | | | | | |
| Regions | 35-43 | 212,960 | 242,300 | 290,820 | 499,630 | 206,320 | 180,000 | 240,000 |
| | 44-47 | 239,980 | 283,320 | 364,250 | 687,700 | 242,570 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 48-51 | 252,790 | 322,160 | 395,260 | 700,190 | 256,520 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 52-55 | 227,430 | 274,360 | 330,940 | 571,060 | 223,280 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 56-59 | 232,700 | 282,060 | 374,380 | 721,050 | 242,070 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| | 60-63 | 198,730 | 250,010 | 341,820 | 705,500 | 223,780 | 200,000 | 200,000 |
| | 64-69 | 191,870 | 229,560 | 317,510 | 628,050 | 208,430 | 160,000 | 230,000 |

Comparison of Net Incomes by Census Metropolitan Area

257. The Canada Revenue Agency provided net income amounts by CMA for each year 2015 to 2019. To reduce the amount of data included herein, I show only the data for 2019. I have examined the other years and while the income relationships differ somewhat, they do follow roughly the same pattern of increasing and decreasing from year to year.

**Table 257a – Comparison of Net incomes by CMAs – No Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above**

| Region | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Toronto | 287,980 | 414,060 | 642,550 | 1,598,410 | 295,880 | 161,000 | 370,000 |
| Montréal | 212,690 | 296,760 | 495,970 | 1,151,030 | 215,740 | 105,000 | 270,000 |
| Vancouver | 241,780 | 330,440 | 499,540 | 1,187,490 | 235,040 | 150,000 | 300,000 |
| Calgary | 247,240 | 322,370 | 461,610 | 1,082,320 | 222,990 | 140,000 | 300,000 |
| Edmonton | 234,560 | 283,000 | 409,920 | 673,030 | 199,600 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| Ottawa | 253,360 | 341,760 | 497,080 | 1,470,080 | 256,370 | 160,000 | 310,000 |
| Winnipeg | 169,980 | 223,110 | 312,870 | 682,620 | 157,220 | 100,000 | 200,000 |
| Québec City | 210,180 | 256,410 | 345,490 | 895,680 | 190,350 | 140,000 | 240,000 |
| Hamilton & KCW | 203,850 | 260,460 | 370,970 | 831,940 | 184,350 | 120,000 | 240,000 |
| 10 CMAs | 245,780 | 340,720 | 536,150 | 1,355,050 | 250,930 | 142,000 | 310,000 |
| Other Regions | 158,370 | 204,730 | 281,290 | 669,730 | 145,030 | 100,000 | 190,000 |
| All Regions | 217,890 | 297,680 | 465,890 | 1,236,440 | 224,140 | 127,000 | 270,000 |

Table 257b – Comparison of Net incomes by CMAs – \$60,000 Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above

| Region | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Toronto | 386,860 | 526,360 | 762,040 | 1,777,320 | 390,700 | 246,000 | 490,000 |
| Montréal | 314,520 | 440,800 | 663,490 | 1,292,520 | 321,860 | 220,000 | 400,000 |
| Vancouver | 325,230 | 417,240 | 602,820 | 1,331,230 | 319,690 | 220,000 | 390,000 |
| Calgary | 321,580 | 416,350 | 559,950 | 1,286,800 | 310,460 | 200,000 | 400,000 |
| Edmonton | 268,790 | 325,520 | 452,410 | 701,910 | 246,030 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| Ottawa | 324,220 | 427,610 | 583,020 | 1,729,730 | 339,030 | 220,000 | 400,000 |
| Winnipeg | 210,280 | 266,790 | 366,640 | 744,360 | 201,870 | 100,000 | 200,000 |
| Québec City | 247,490 | 289,760 | 410,680 | 1,023,980 | 245,650 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| Hamilton & KCW | 257,470 | 333,130 | 475,860 | 895,040 | 253,470 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| 10 CMAs | 331,830 | 450,660 | 653,460 | 1,531,710 | 341,210 | 224,000 | 410,000 |
| Other Regions | 208,840 | 253,810 | 336,320 | 777,010 | 203,600 | 155,000 | 240,000 |
| All Regions | 294,120 | 391,910 | 580,560 | 1,409,020 | 308,090 | 202,000 | 360,000 |

Table 257c – Comparison of Net incomes by CMAs – \$80,000 Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above

| Region | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Toronto | 420,170 | 558,050 | 792,620 | 1,827,930 | 418,200 | 274,000 | 520,000 |
| Montréal | 352,150 | 482,860 | 705,010 | 1,333,450 | 354,040 | 240,000 | 450,000 |
| Vancouver | 343,970 | 446,740 | 635,080 | 1,386,440 | 344,130 | 240,000 | 410,000 |
| Calgary | 344,710 | 435,140 | 575,370 | 1,327,500 | 334,600 | 300,000 | 400,000 |
| Edmonton | 274,430 | 339,880 | 461,480 | 710,200 | 257,380 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| Ottawa | 349,150 | 450,810 | 607,830 | 1,802,000 | 363,550 | 240,000 | 420,000 |
| Winnipeg | 241,010 | 289,840 | 389,130 | 780,880 | 230,520 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| Québec City | 258,600 | 303,880 | 431,600 | 1,053,030 | 262,940 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| Hamilton & KCW | 277,120 | 345,740 | 506,570 | 922,020 | 271,200 | 200,000 | 300,000 |
| 10 CMAs | 359,090 | 481,910 | 687,600 | 1,585,160 | 368,300 | 245,000 | 450,000 |
| Other Regions | 224,750 | 275,810 | 359,540 | 820,840 | 224,770 | 173,000 | 260,000 |
| All Regions | 319,400 | 425,920 | 616,560 | 1,465,470 | 335,100 | 223,000 | 390,000 |

Comparison of Net Incomes by Province

258. Canada Revenue Agency provided net income amounts by provinces and territories for each year 2015 to 2019. However, for Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the three territories, almost all of the data was suppressed due to confidentiality issues. To reduce the amount of data included herein, I show only the data for 2019. I have examined the other years and while the income relationships differ somewhat, they do follow roughly the same pattern of increasing and decreasing from year to year with the exception of Alberta. I have included a table that shows the data for all years for Alberta.

Table 258a – Comparison of Net incomes by Province – No Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above

| Province | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | | | | 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
| British Columbia | 197,350 | 263,420 | 398,080 | 1,066,110 | 196,510 | 110,000 | 240,000 |
| Alberta | 228,580 | 294,690 | 423,230 | 881,860 | 203,780 | 140,000 | 270,000 |
| Saskatchewan & Manitoba | - | - | - | - | 153,400 | 100,000 | 200,000 |
| Ontario | 243,100 | 343,290 | 543,390 | 1,439,770 | 258,490 | 145,000 | 310,000 |
| Quebec | 183,720 | 261,800 | 408,050 | 1,063,760 | 191,520 | 98,000 | 240,000 |
| Atlantic | 200,840 | 250,910 | 318,690 | 576,320 | 165,560 | 130,000 | 230,000 |
| Territories | - | - | - | - | 158,470 | - | - |
| Total | 217,890 | 297,680 | 465,890 | 1,236,440 | 224,140 | 127,000 | 270,000 |

Table 258b – Comparison of Net incomes by Province – \$60,000 Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above

| Province | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | | | | 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
| British Columbia | 264,740 | 344,170 | 512,710 | 1,212,740 | 275,030 | 190,000 | 320,000 |
| Alberta | 286,990 | 362,810 | 484,060 | 981,540 | 270,680 | 210,000 | 330,000 |
| Saskatchewan & Manitoba | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ontario | 327,970 | 448,440 | 657,420 | 1,624,030 | 343,920 | 216,000 | 410,000 |
| Quebec | 277,650 | 363,490 | 563,630 | 1,211,520 | 285,940 | 188,000 | 330,000 |
| Atlantic | 243,160 | 289,180 | 354,550 | 625,080 | 215,320 | 190,000 | 280,000 |
| Territories | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 294,120 | 391,910 | 580,560 | 1,409,020 | 308,090 | 202,000 | 360,000 |

Table 258c – Comparison of Net incomes by Province – \$80,000 Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above

| Province | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--|--------------------------------|
| British Columbia | 292,650 | 372,930 | 551,920 | 1,271,970 | 301,980 | 210,000 | 350,000 |
| Alberta | 300,620 | 384,150 | 500,940 | 1,001,810 | 287,690 | 220,000 | 350,000 |
| Saskatchewan & Manitoba | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Ontario | 353,540 | 479,700 | 692,290 | 1,680,050 | 370,580 | 237,000 | 440,000 |
| Quebec | 301,650 | 405,790 | 610,040 | 1,255,650 | 316,350 | 218,000 | 370,000 |
| Atlantic Territories | 258,160 | 300,930 | 372,380 | 639,230 | 233,210 | 200,000 | 290,000 |
| Total | 319,400 | 425,920 | 616,560 | 1,465,470 | 335,100 | 223,000 | 390,000 |

259. Since the year-to-year net income amounts for Alberta fluctuated significantly and differently from the other provinces, but only at the 60th percentile and above, I have included the data for Alberta and for all other provinces in the two tables below. In 2016, the net incomes for those at the 60th percentile and above in Alberta decreased by between 14% and 40% from the 2015 amounts. For all other provinces, there was a small increase except in Ontario where there was a small decrease.

Table 259a – Comparison of Net Incomes for Alberta – No Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Years 2015 to 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above

| Alberta | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|---------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|--|--------------------------------|
| 2015 | 238,730 | 305,980 | 461,760 | 1,102,930 | 225,070 | 150,000 | 290,000 |
| 2016 | 203,470 | 257,790 | 349,200 | 661,860 | 174,450 | 130,000 | 240,000 |
| 2017 | 212,380 | 280,590 | 392,680 | 806,000 | 190,350 | 130,000 | 260,000 |
| 2018 | 212,050 | 288,450 | 409,680 | 848,470 | 192,190 | 120,000 | 270,000 |
| 2019 | 228,580 | 294,690 | 423,230 | 881,860 | 203,780 | 140,000 | 270,000 |

**Table 259b – Comparison of Net Incomes for All Provinces ex Alberta – No Income Exclusion
All Ages, Calendar Years 2015 to 2019, 65-70th Percentile and Above**

| All Provinces Other than Alberta | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th Percentile | 75 th Percentile |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|--|--------------------------------|
| 2015 | 206,377 | 291,957 | 451,270 | 1,126,649 | 218,592 | 123,154 | 270,000 |
| 2016 | 205,616 | 281,502 | 426,991 | 1,071,436 | 212,661 | 126,289 | 270,000 |
| 2017 | 210,700 | 288,770 | 442,319 | 1,086,044 | 217,182 | 129,037 | 270,000 |
| 2018 | 216,479 | 308,198 | 487,353 | 1,228,391 | 232,464 | 127,494 | 285,000 |
| 2019 | 219,706 | 307,591 | 479,232 | 1,253,421 | 235,702 | 131,819 | 290,000 |

Recent Appointments to Federal Judiciary

260. The Department of Justice provided me with a summary of the number of appointments to the federal judiciary. The data covered the period 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2015 and from 1 April 2015 to 23 October 2020. In total, that data covers about 9.5 years of appointments.
261. The first such table is age at appointment. The average age of appointment was 52.4 from 2011 to 2015; 52.7 from 2015 to 2020 and 52.6 from 2011 to 2020. The median age at appointment was 52, 53 and 52 respectively.
262. There was a total of 598 appointments during the 9.5-year period.

Table 262 - Age at Appointment to Federal Judiciary 2011 to 2020

| Age | Number Appointed | | | Percent Appointed | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2015 | Percentage 2015-2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
| 35 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 36 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 37 | 1 | - | 1 | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.2% |
| 38 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 39 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 40 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| 41 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0.4% | 1.1% | 0.8% |
| 42 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 0.9% | 0.5% | 0.7% |
| 43 | 5 | 8 | 13 | 2.2% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| 44 | 11 | 8 | 19 | 4.9% | 2.2% | 3.2% |
| 45 | 10 | 16 | 26 | 4.4% | 4.3% | 4.3% |
| 46 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 4.4% | 5.4% | 5.0% |
| 47 | 15 | 17 | 32 | 6.6% | 4.6% | 5.4% |
| 48 | 10 | 16 | 26 | 4.4% | 4.3% | 4.3% |
| 49 | 15 | 21 | 36 | 6.6% | 5.6% | 6.0% |
| 50 | 9 | 20 | 29 | 4.0% | 5.4% | 4.8% |
| 51 | 12 | 30 | 42 | 5.3% | 8.1% | 7.0% |
| 52 | 18 | 18 | 36 | 8.0% | 4.8% | 6.0% |
| 53 | 12 | 27 | 39 | 5.3% | 7.3% | 6.5% |
| 54 | 8 | 24 | 32 | 3.5% | 6.5% | 5.4% |
| 55 | 13 | 24 | 37 | 5.8% | 6.5% | 6.2% |
| 56 | 14 | 23 | 37 | 6.2% | 6.2% | 6.2% |
| 57 | 9 | 15 | 24 | 4.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% |
| 58 | 9 | 17 | 26 | 4.0% | 4.6% | 4.3% |
| 59 | 11 | 9 | 20 | 4.9% | 2.4% | 3.3% |
| 60 | 7 | 16 | 23 | 3.1% | 4.3% | 3.8% |
| 61 | 7 | 9 | 16 | 3.1% | 2.4% | 2.7% |
| 62 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
| 63 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 1.3% | 1.9% | 1.7% |
| 64 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 2.2% | 0.8% | 1.3% |
| 65 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.3% |
| 66 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| 67 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.7% |
| 68 | - | 1 | 1 | - | 0.3% | 0.2% |
| 69 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 70 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 226 | 372 | 598 | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

263. We can summarise the age at appointment data into the age categories that were used by Canada Revenue Agency in compiling the net-income data.

Table 263a - Age at Appointment to Federal Judiciary 2011 to 2020 – 4-Year Bands⁶⁷

| Age Bracket | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 35-44 | 10 | 16 | 26 | 4.3% |
| 44-47 | 46 | 61 | 107 | 17.9% |
| 48-51 | 46 | 87 | 133 | 22.2% |
| 52-55 | 51 | 93 | 144 | 24.1% |
| 56-59 | 43 | 64 | 107 | 17.9% |
| 60-63 | 20 | 37 | 57 | 9.5% |
| 64+ | 10 | 14 | 24 | 4.0% |
| Totals | 226 | 372 | 598 | 100.0% |

Table 263b - Age at Appointment to Federal Judiciary 2011 to 2020 – Broad Bands

| Age Bracket | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 35-46 | 41 | 60 | 101 | 16.9% |
| 47-54 | 99 | 173 | 272 | 45.5% |
| 55-69 | 86 | 139 | 225 | 37.6% |
| 44-56 | 157 | 264 | 421 | 70.4% |
| 35-69 | 226 | 372 | 598 | 100.0% |

264. I also received details on the number of appointments by CMA over the same 9.5 years. This data showed the total number of appointments in each CMA as well as the number of appointments from private practice in each CMA.

⁶⁷ Note that the first age band (35 to 44) is actually nine years. The balance are four years each.

Table 264a – Number of Appointments by CMA – 2011 to 2020

| CMA | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Calgary | 8 | 20 | 28 | 4.7% |
| Edmonton | 9 | 26 | 35 | 5.9% |
| Hamilton | 6 | 5 | 11 | 1.8% |
| Kitchener/Cambridge/ Waterloo | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0.8% |
| Montréal | 29 | 43 | 72 | 12.0% |
| Ottawa -Gatineau | 13 | 27 | 40 | 6.7% |
| Québec | 12 | 15 | 27 | 4.5% |
| Toronto | 32 | 60 | 92 | 15.4% |
| Vancouver | 20 | 40 | 60 | 10.0% |
| Winnipeg | 8 | 11 | 19 | 3.2% |
| Other Regions | 89 | 120 | 209 | 34.9% |
| Totals | 226 | 372 | 598 | 100.0% |

Table 264b – Number of Appointments from Private Practice by CMA – 2011 to 2020

| CMA | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Calgary | 5 | 13 | 18 | 4.7% |
| Edmonton | 6 | 14 | 20 | 5.3% |
| Hamilton | 5 | 2 | 7 | 1.8% |
| Kitchener/Cambridge/ Waterloo | 0 | 4 | 4 | 1.1% |
| Montréal | 22 | 29 | 51 | 13.5% |
| Ottawa -Gatineau | 4 | 10 | 14 | 3.7% |
| Québec | 10 | 11 | 21 | 5.5% |
| Toronto | 17 | 39 | 56 | 14.8% |
| Vancouver | 14 | 26 | 40 | 10.6% |
| Winnipeg | 6 | 8 | 14 | 3.7% |
| Other Regions | 56 | 78 | 134 | 35.3% |
| Totals | 145 | 234 | 379 | 100.0% |

265. I was provided with a distribution of the judicial appointments over the same 9.5 years by province and territory.

Table 265 – Number of Appointments by CMA – 2011 to 2020

| Province | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Alberta | 17 | 47 | 64 | 10.7% |
| British Columbia | 24 | 47 | 71 | 11.9% |
| Manitoba | 10 | 13 | 23 | 3.8% |
| New Brunswick | 5 | 12 | 17 | 2.8% |
| Newfoundland & Labrador | 7 | 10 | 17 | 2.8% |
| Northwest Territories | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0.3% |
| Nova Scotia | 11 | 17 | 28 | 4.7% |
| Nunavut | 2 | 3 | 5 | 0.8% |
| Ontario | 94 | 134 | 228 | 38.1% |
| Prince Edward Island | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0.8% |
| Québec | 41 | 68 | 109 | 18.2% |
| Saskatchewan | 12 | 15 | 27 | 4.5% |
| Yukon | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0.3% |
| Totals | 226 | 372 | 598 | 100.0% |

266. The number of appointments by gender was also provided.

Table 266 – Number of Appointments by Gender – 2011 to 2020

| Gender | 1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015 | 1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020 | 1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020 | Percentage 2011-2015 | Percentage 2015-2020 | Percentage 2011-2020 |
|---------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Female | 76 | 204 | 280 | 33.6% | 54.8% | 46.8% |
| Male | 150 | 168 | 372 | 66.4% | 45.2% | 53.2% |
| Totals | 226 | 372 | 598 | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Election of Supernumerary Status

267. I was provided the following data for the number of judges electing supernumerary status between 1985 and 2020.

| Years from Eligibility to Supernumerary Election | Years of Supernumerary Service | | | | | | | | | | Total Number | Percent of All Judges | Percent of All Elections |
|--|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| | Less than 1 | 1 to 1.9 | 2 to 2.9 | 3 to 3.9 | 4 to 4.9 | 5 to 6.9 | 7 to 10 | Never Elected | | | | | |
| Never Qualified Prior to 75 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 17 | 1.1% | 0.0% |
| Did Not Elect Supernumerary | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 121 | 8.1% | 0.0% |
| Retired Before Qualifying | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 282 | 18.9% | 0.0% |
| Within 1 Year of First Eligibility | 33 | 63 | 74 | 81 | 183 | 177 | 353 | - | - | - | 964 | 64.5% | 89.7% |
| 1 to < 2 Years After First Eligible | 2 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 18 | - | - | - | 40 | 2.7% | 3.7% |
| 2 to < 3 Years After First Eligible | 1 | - | 6 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 10 | - | - | - | 27 | 1.8% | 2.5% |
| 3 to < 4 Years After First Eligible | - | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 1 | - | - | - | 14 | 0.9% | 1.3% |
| 4 to < 5 Years After First Eligible | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 2 | - | - | - | - | 8 | 0.5% | 0.7% |
| 5 to < 7 Years After First Eligible | - | 3 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 16 | 1.1% | 1.5% |
| 7 to < 10 Years After First Eligible | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | 5 | 0.3% | 0.5% |
| 10 or More Years After First Eligible | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Totals | 41 | 74 | 88 | 95 | 197 | 197 | 383 | 420 | 1,495 | 100% | 1,495 | 100% | 100% |

I. Summary of Compensation Amounts

268. In this section, I summarise the compensation amounts for federally appointed judges, self-employed lawyers and deputy ministers (including government appointments to GC and GCQ senior positions) for 2015 to the most recent year data is available.
269. The first set of tables shows the base salary⁶⁸ for these positions. Note that these numbers should not be compared between tables as that would be an “apples and Oranges” comparison. The second set of tables shows the total compensation⁶⁹ for these positions

Summary of Base Salaries

270. Table 270 shows the Base Judicial Salary for selected judicial offices. There are other offices not shown here that receive a supplement in addition to the amounts shown in this table. The amounts shown for the year beginning April 2021 are calculated by me based on my estimate of the increase in the Industrial Aggregate.

Table 270 - Base Judicial Salary - 2015 to 2021

| Year beginning 1 April | Supreme Court of Canada | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Chief Justice | Puisne Justices | Other Chief Justices | Puisne Justices | Protho- notaries |
| 2015 | \$ 396,800 | \$ 367,300 | \$ 338,400 | \$ 308,600 | \$ 234,500 |
| 2016 | 403,900 | 373,900 | 344,400 | 314,100 | 251,200 |
| 2017 | 405,400 | 375,300 | 345,700 | 315,300 | 252,200 |
| 2018 | 413,500 | 382,800 | 352,600 | 321,600 | 257,200 |
| 2019 | 424,200 | 392,700 | 361,700 | 329,900 | 263,900 |
| 2020 | 435,600 | 403,300 | 371,400 | 338,800 | 271,000 |
| 2021 | 464,900 | 430,400 | 396,400 | 361,600 | 289,200 |

271. Table 271 shows the net incomes of self-employed lawyers at the 70th percentile and above based on all ages (34 to 69) and all regions of Canada.

⁶⁸ Base Judicial Salary, net income and base salary respectively for judges, self-employed lawyers and deputy ministers and senior government appointees.

⁶⁹ Base Judicial Total Compensation, net income and total compensation respectively for judges, self-employed lawyers and deputy ministers and senior government appointees.

Table 271 – Net Income of Self-Employed Lawyers – 2015 to 2019

| Calendar Year | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th percentile | 75 th percentile |
|---------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2015 | \$ 188,590 | \$ 259,720 | \$ 394,710 | \$ 868,420 | \$ 210,390 | \$ 118,000 | \$ 260,000 |
| 2016 | 188,790 | 252,540 | 370,480 | 806,250 | 201,940 | 121,000 | 250,000 |
| 2017 | 192,820 | 259,620 | 385,070 | 825,440 | 206,950 | 122,000 | 260,000 |
| 2018 | 197,340 | 273,550 | 416,440 | 929,160 | 221,020 | 121,000 | 270,000 |
| 2019 | 203,280 | 274,950 | 413,900 | 937,480 | 224,140 | 127,000 | 270,000 |

272. Table 272 shows the average base salary plus average at-risk pay for deputy ministers and government appointees to senior positions at GC and GCQ classifications⁷⁰.

Table 272 – Base Salary and At-Risk Pay for DM, GC and GCQ positions: 2015 - 2020

| Beginning 1 April | DM-1 | DM-2 | DM-3 | DM-4 | GC-09 | GC-10 | GCQ-09 | GCQ-10 |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 2015 | \$263,611 | \$312,377 | \$357,825 | \$430,719 | \$325,571 | \$389,299 | \$309,638 | \$365,162 |
| 2016 | 267,133 | 308,539 | 360,778 | 440,416 | 333,003 | 398,253 | 316,664 | 373,457 |
| 2017 | 269,686 | 319,831 | 363,010 | 446,037 | 337,241 | 403,273 | 320,679 | 378,158 |
| 2018 | 270,960 | 321,109 | 365,514 | 446,037 | 337,241 | 403,273 | 320,679 | 378,158 |
| 2019 | 274,143 | 330,825 | 383,454 | 446,037 | 337,241 | 403,273 | 320,679 | 378,158 |
| 2020 | 276,241 | 335,458 | 384,597 | 446,037 | 337,241 | 403,273 | 320,679 | 378,158 |

273. Past Quadrennial Commissions have been provided with the percentile comparisons of Base Judicial Salary with the net earnings of self-employed lawyers. As discussed above (paragraphs 31 to 34), in my opinion this is a misleading and inappropriate comparison.

Base Judicial Salary

274. The 2019 Base Judicial Salary of \$329,900 is about the 80th percentile of self-employed lawyers.

275. The 2020 Base Judicial Salary of \$338,800 is about the 80th percentile of self-employed lawyers.

⁷⁰ For DM-4, GC-09 and GC-10 positions, the amounts were estimated by me as described in the footnotes to Tables 231 and 234a.

276. The 2021 Base Judicial Salary of \$361,600 is about the 82nd percentile of self-employed lawyers.

Base Salary of Prothonotaries

277. The 2019 base salary of a prothonotary of \$263,900 is about the 74th percentile of self-employed lawyers.

278. The 2020 base salary of a prothonotary of \$271,000 is about the 74th percentile of self-employed lawyers.

279. The 2021 estimated base salary of a prothonotary of \$289,200 is about the 76th percentile of self-employed lawyers.

Summary of Total Compensation

280. Table 280 shows the Base Judicial Total Compensation for selected judicial offices. There are other offices not shown here that receive a supplement in addition to the amounts shown in this table. The amounts shown for the year beginning April 2021 are calculated by me based on my estimate of the increase in the Industrial Aggregate.

Table 280 - Base Judicial Total Compensation - 2015 to 2021

| Year Beginning 1 April | Supreme Court of Canada | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Chief Justice | Puisne Justices | Other Chief Justices | Puisne Justices | Protho- notaries |
| 2015 | \$ 595,700 | \$ 551,600 | \$ 508,400 | \$ 463,900 | \$ 353,100 |
| 2016 | 606,400 | 561,600 | 517,500 | 472,200 | 378,100 |
| 2017 | 608,700 | 563,700 | 519,400 | 474,000 | 379,600 |
| 2018 | 620,800 | 574,900 | 529,800 | 483,400 | 387,100 |
| 2019 | 637,000 | 589,900 | 543,500 | 496,000 | 397,300 |
| 2020 | 654,200 | 605,900 | 558,200 | 509,400 | 408,100 |
| 2021 | 698,200 | 646,700 | 595,800 | 543,800 | 435,500 |

281. Table 281 shows the net incomes of self-employed lawyers at the 70th percentile and above based on all ages (34 to 69) and all regions of Canada⁷¹.

⁷¹ This is the same as Table 271 since there is no difference between the concept of a base salary and total compensation for a self-employed lawyer.

Table 281 – Net Income of Self-Employed Lawyers – 2015 to 2019

| Calendar Year | 65-70 th Percentile | 75-80 th Percentile | 85-90 th Percentile | 95-100 th Percentile | Average | Median - 50 th percentile | 75th percentile |
|---------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 2015 | \$ 188,590 | \$ 259,720 | \$ 394,710 | \$ 868,420 | \$ 210,390 | \$ 118,000 | \$ 260,000 |
| 2016 | 188,790 | 252,540 | 370,480 | 806,250 | 201,940 | 121,000 | 250,000 |
| 2017 | 192,820 | 259,620 | 385,070 | 825,440 | 206,950 | 122,000 | 260,000 |
| 2018 | 197,340 | 273,550 | 416,440 | 929,160 | 221,020 | 121,000 | 270,000 |
| 2019 | 203,280 | 274,950 | 413,900 | 937,480 | 224,140 | 127,000 | 270,000 |

282. Table 282 shows the total compensation including at-risk pay for deputy ministers and government appointees to senior positions at GC and GCQ classifications⁷².

Table 282 – Total Compensation for DM, GC and GCQ positions: 2015 - 2020

| Beginning 1 April | DM-1 | DM-2 | DM-3 | DM-4 | GC-09 | GC-10 | GCQ-09 | GCQ-10 |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 2015 | \$308,306 | \$365,341 | \$418,494 | \$503,748 | \$380,772 | \$455,305 | \$362,137 | \$427,076 |
| 2016 | 312,425 | 360,852 | 421,948 | 515,088 | 389,464 | 465,777 | 370,355 | 436,776 |
| 2017 | 315,411 | 374,058 | 424,558 | 521,662 | 394,420 | 471,648 | 375,050 | 442,275 |
| 2018 | 316,901 | 375,553 | 427,487 | 521,662 | 394,420 | 471,648 | 375,050 | 442,275 |
| 2019 | 320,624 | 386,916 | 448,469 | 521,662 | 394,420 | 471,648 | 375,050 | 442,275 |
| 2020 | 323,078 | 392,334 | 449,806 | 521,662 | 394,420 | 471,648 | 375,050 | 442,275 |

Base Judicial Total Compensation and Self-Employed Lawyers Net Income

283. The 2019 Base Judicial Total Compensation (the \$496,000 shown in Table 280 for Puisne Judges) is at about the 88th percentile of self-employed lawyers.

284. The 2020 Base Judicial Total Compensation (the \$509,400 shown in Table 280 for Puisne Judges) is at about the 88th percentile of self-employed lawyers based on my estimation of the increase in self-employed lawyers net income for 2020⁷³.

285. The 2021 Base Judicial Total Compensation (the \$543,800 shown in Table 280 for Puisne Judges) is at about the 89th percentile of self-employed lawyers based on my estimation of the increase in self-employed lawyers net income for 2021⁷⁴.

⁷² For DM-4, GC-09 and GC-10 positions, the amounts were estimated by me as described in the footnotes to Tables 230d and 233a and b.

⁷³ To estimate the net income of self-employed lawyers in 2020, I projected their 2019 net income together with an increase based on the average annual increases from 2015 to 2019.

⁷⁴ To estimate the net income of self-employed lawyers in 2021, I projected their 2019 net income together with two years of increase based on the average annual increases from 2015 to 2019.

Total Compensation of Prothonotaries

286. The 2019 base salary of a prothonotary was \$263,900, beginning April 2020 it is \$271,000 and I estimate beginning April 2021 it will be \$289,200 (80% of the Base Judicial Salary).
287. Using the same adjustments to obtain total compensation as used for puisne judges⁷⁵, I determined the total compensation of a prothonotary.
288. The 2019 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$397,300 (Table 280). That is about the 84th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
289. The 2020 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$408,100 (Table 280). That is about the 84th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
290. The 2021 average total compensation of a prothonotary is estimated to be \$435,500. (Table 280). That is about the 86th percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.


⁷⁵ Take the base salary, add the value of the Judicial Annuity (based on the average value of 49.51%) and add the value of the government paying half of the Canada Pension plan contribution. This implicitly assumes that prothonotaries have a similar age profile at appointment as do the federally appointed judges.

J. Certification

291. I hereby certify that:

- a. in my opinion, the data used is sufficient and reliable for the purposes of the report;
- b. in my opinion, the actuarial methods employed are appropriate for the purposes of this report;
- c. in my opinion, the assumptions used are, in aggregate, appropriate for the purposes of the work;
- d. the calculations were prepared in accordance with the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of Practice;
- e. there are no subsequent events other than those discussed in this report that I am aware of that would have an impact on the results presented herein; and
- f. this report has been prepared and my opinions given in accordance with accepted actuarial practice in Canada.

JDM ACTUARIAL EXPERT SERVICES INC.



Peter Gorham

Fellow, Canadian Institute of Actuaries
Fellow, Society of Actuaries

26 March 2021

Date

Appendix 1 Curriculum Vitae of Peter Gorham, F.S.A, F.C.I.A.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Position & Responsibilities | <p>Peter is the President and Actuary of JDM Actuarial Expert Services Inc. (JDM Actuarial). He provides pension and actuarial consulting advice, expert testimony, retirement planning and governance services.</p> |
| Areas of Specialization | <p>Peter has provided expert advice and testimony to the legal profession since 1987. His experience includes determining:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• certification of criminal rates of interest,• lost benefits for wrongful dismissal,• the present value of future income and future care costs,• valuation of life estates,• present value of future trust plan benefits and present value of past funds under various possible investment scenarios,• present value of future contingent events. <p>In the past, Peter has also provided expert evidence for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• family law pension valuations. <p>He has provided expert testimony to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, La Cour Supérieure du Québec, the Ontario Unified Family Court, the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, the Supreme Court of Bermuda, Ontario Employment Standards Tribunal, Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Tribunal, Canada Human Rights Tribunal and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Disciplinary Tribunal.</p> <p>Within the pension and actuarial consulting practice, Peter’s main areas of expertise include the design, financing, administration and governance of pension and benefit plans. His strengths lie in providing innovative and workable solutions that address a client’s needs. He is effective in communicating actuarial concepts in simple and understandable terms.</p> <p>Peter is an experienced public speaker and an author of numerous articles related to pensions and benefits.</p> |
| Background | <p>Peter is an actuary, receiving his fellowship in 1980. He attended the University of Toronto, graduating with a B.Sc. in Actuarial and Computer Sciences. Prior to founding JDM Actuarial in 2011, Peter spent 13 years as a partner at Morneau Shepell, and prior to that, 20 years with Aon Consulting, (formerly MLH + A inc), serving clients in the area of pension and employee benefits.</p> |
| Professional & Other Affiliations | <p>Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Fellow of the Society of Actuaries Faculty, Humber College PPAC program Past-President, Rotary Club of Whitby Sunrise</p> |

Appendix 2 Documents Utilised

292. The following documents and data were provided to me for use in preparing this report:
- a. “Report on the Earnings of Self-Employed Lawyers for the Department of Justice Canada in Preparation for the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission”, by Haripaul Pannu, 25 February 2016
 - b. “Report on the Value of the Judicial Annuity” prepare for Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP 29 March 2016 by Dean Newell;
 - c. Letter from Nick Leswick, Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic and Fiscal Policy Branch, Department of Finance to Christopher Rugar dated 9 December 2020 summarising the prevailing economic conditions in Canada;
 - d. Letter from Francois Lemire, Director, Office of the Chief Actuary, to Anna Dekker dated 2 November 2020 setting out estimates for future increases in federally appointed judges’ salaries;
 - e. Letter from Francois Lemire, Director, Office of the Chief Actuary, to Anna Dekker date 26 February 2021 setting out updated estimates for future increases in federally appointed judges’ salaries;
 - f. A series of 96 excel data files prepared by Canada Revenue Agency with data regarding net incomes of self-employed lawyers in Canada;
 - g. An excel file “2011-2020 Appointment Profile Extract for PG.xlsx” providing summary details (location, type of practice) of judicial appointments made from 1 April 2011 to 23 October 2020;
 - h. An excel file “Appointment Profiles For Peter Gorham Dec 7 2020.xlsx” providing a summary analysis (age, location, type of practice) of judicial appointments made from 1 April 2011 to 23 October 2020;
 - i. A document “27 - Quad Comm 2020 - DM Average Salary Mid-Point and Counts.doc” from the Department of Justice setting out current and historic salary levels of deputy ministers;
 - j. A document “22 - Quad Comm 2020 - DM Distribution of At-Risk Pay.doc” from the Department of Justice setting out current and historic at-risk pay of deputy ministers;

- k. A document “28 - Quad Comm 2020 - GC and GCQ Income Information.doc” from the Department of Justice setting out current and historic salary information and at-risk pay for the most senior positions in government agencies;
 - l. A spreadsheet “26 - Quad Comm 2020 - DM Tenure.xlsx” setting out the positions held by individuals over their career at deputy minister level together with the dates served.
293. The following documents and data were obtained by me and were utilised in the preparation of this report:
- a. “Judges Act”, as amended to 12 April 2019;
 - b. “Guide for Candidates”, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, downloaded from the internet 2 February 2021 [www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html]
 - c. Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for the Federally Appointed Judges as at 31 March 2019;
 - d. Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for the Federally Appointed Judges as at 31 March 2016;
 - e. Submission of the Government of Canada to the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 29 February 2016;
 - f. Submission of the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association and the Canadian Judicial Council to the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 29 February 2016;
 - g. Letter to Louise Meagher from Haripaul Pannu and Dean Newell dated 26 May 2016 identifying the differences in their respective reports regarding the value of the Judicial annuity;
 - h. Letter to Louise Meagher from Haripaul Pannu and Dean Newell dated 15 June 2016 providing a supplement to their 26 May 2016 letter;
 - i. “Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada” by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 30 June 2016;
 - j. “Response of The Government of Canada to the Report of the 2015 Judicial Compensation and benefits Commission”, 30 November 2016;

- k. "Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada pursuant to section 26(4) of the Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1" by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 28 October 2019;
- l. Historic data for the Industrial Aggregate Index downloaded from Statistics Canada (Table 14-10-0222-01) showing for each month from December 2001 to November 2020 the number of working Canadians included in the index along with their average weekly earnings.

Appendix 3 Summary of Judicial Annuity Benefits

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Full Benefit | 66.7% of final year salary |
| Eligibility for Full Benefit | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Age 75 with at least 10 years of service. 2. At least 15 years of service with the sum of age plus service equalling 80 or more. 3. At least 10 years of service while a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. 4. Permanent disability. |
| Eligibility for a reduced benefit | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Age 75 2. Age 55 with at least 10 years of service |
| Reduced benefit amount | <p>At age 75 with less than 10 years of service, the reduced benefit is pro rata to service. e.g. with 7 years of service, the reduced benefit is 70% of the Full Benefit.</p> <p>For ages 60 to 74, where age plus service is less than 80, the reduced benefit is pro rata to service. e.g. with 10 years of service at age 60, the sum of age and service is 70. It will take 5 more years of service to reach a total of 80 (at age 65 with 15 years of service). the reduced benefit is 10/15^{ths}, or 66.7% of the Full Benefit.</p> <p>For ages under 60 with age plus service less than 80, the reduced benefit is pro rata as in the previous paragraph plus an additional 5% reduction for each year prior to age 60.</p> |
| Indexing | The benefit payable is adjusted each year based on the changes in the Consumer Price Index as of 30 September. |
| Survivor benefit | If the judge's spouse at the time of retirement is alive following the judge's death, a surviving spouse benefit equal to 50% of the amount payable to the judge will continue for the surviving spouse's lifetime. |
| Refund of contributions | If both the judge and spouse should die prior to receiving a total benefit at least equal to the judge's contributions plus interest, the difference is paid as a lump sum. |
| Death before retirement | <p>A lump sum equal to 16.7% of earnings; plus</p> <p>A survivor annuity equal to 33.3% of final year salary is payable to a surviving spouse; plus</p> <p>A survivor annuity equal to 6.7% of final year salary is paid to each dependent child (maximum of 4) which amount is doubled if there is no surviving spouse.</p> |
| Termination | A refund of contributions plus interest. |
| Contributions | The judge makes contributions each year prior to becoming eligible for a Full Benefit equal to 7% of salary and thereafter, 1% of salary. |
| Interest | Interest is credited on judges' contributions at the same rate that is paid on income tax refunds. |

Appendix 4 Actuarial Assumptions Utilised

The actuarial assumptions I utilised for determining a value of the Judicial Annuity are the same as used in the Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for the Federally Appointed Judges as at 31 March 2019 (the “**Actuarial Report**”), except where indicated otherwise.

| | |
|----------------|----------------|
| Valuation Date | 1 January 2021 |
|----------------|----------------|

Economic Assumptions (Expectations for the Future)

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| Interest Rate | 4.50% |
| Inflation Rate | 2.00% |
| Real Salary Increase | 1.00% |
| Indexing of annuity after retirement | 2.00% |
| Interest on Contributions | 4.50% |

Demographic Assumptions

| | |
|---|--|
| Gender | 41% of judges are assumed to be female and 59% male. |
| Appointment to Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice | 4 appointments annually |
| Appointment to Supreme Court | 0.4 appointments annually |
| Retirement | Varies by age and service. The rates used in the Actuarial Report assume the probability of retirement increases after 14 complete years of service. At that point, many of the judges will be 12-months from earnings a full pension and I have assumed they will most likely work that additional year unless in poor health. I therefore utilised the same rates as set out in the Actuarial Report, but based on one additional year of service. |

Sample Rates of Retirement

| Age Last Birthday | Completed Years of Service | | | | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | 0 to 9 | 10 to 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 20 | 25+ |
| Under 55 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 55 | - | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 15.0% |
| 60 | - | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 13.0% | 2.0% |
| 65 | - | 0.5% | 6.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 5.0% | 6.0% |
| 70 | - | 0.5% | 12.0% | 4.0% | 8.0% | 8.0% | 8.0% |
| 75 | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

| | |
|----------------------|----------------|
| Permanent Disability | Varies by age. |
|----------------------|----------------|

Sample Rates of Disability

| Age Last Birthday | Male | Female |
|-------------------|------|--------|
| 40 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| 50 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| 60 | 2.0 | 3.1 |
| 70 | 6.4 | 10.1 |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Termination | Judges are assumed to leave the bench without qualifying for an annuity with a probability of 3% in their first year of service, 2% in the second year and 1% per annum for years 3 to 9. After reaching 10 years of service, all departures from the bench are treated as a retirement, disability or death. |
| Death | Ignored prior to retirement. Based on the mortality assumptions after retirement |
| Mortality | Canadian Pensioner Mortality Table for public sector workers with allowance or future mortality improvements based on the CPM-B projection factors. An adjustment for the size of the retirement income was made -- for males, 74% of those rates were used and for females, 92%. |
| Surviving Spouse | <p>The probability of having a surviving spouse at death as well as the number of surviving children and their assumed age was taken from the 2016 Actuarial Report (Table 23) as that report contained more detail about this assumption. The 2019 Actuarial report stated the assumptions were the same as in 2016.</p> <p>For males, the probability of having a surviving spouse is 98% at age 60 decreasing to 74% at 80 and to 17% at 100.</p> <p>For females, the probability of having a surviving spouse is 83% at age 60 decreasing to 35% at 80 and to 2% at 100.</p> <p>Spouses are assumed to be of the opposite gender from the judge with the male spouse being about 3 years older (spousal age differences vary by age of the judge)</p> |



March 23, 2021

Our File: 474119

Civil Litigation Section
Department of Justice
50 O'Connor Street, 5th Floor
Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8

Attention of Mr. Kirk G. Shannon

Dear Sirs/Mesdames:

Re: Judicial Compensation in Canada

INTRODUCTION

1. Columbia Pacific Consulting Ltd. was retained by the Department of Justice to comment on the following matters:
 - (a) How does the salary of a federally appointed judge in Canada compare with that of other high-level professionals in Canada?
 - (b) How does the salary of a federally appointed judge in Canada compare to that of judges in other jurisdictions?
2. This report contains three sections:
 - (a) Part A (pages 2 to 5) reviews the compensation structure that applies to federally appointed judges in Canada.
 - (b) Part B (pages 5 to 9) compares salaries of federally appointed judges in Canada to those of other high-level professionals in Canada.
 - (c) Part C (pages 10 to 12) compares salaries of federally appointed judges in Canada to those of judges in other jurisdictions.

A. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION IN CANADA

3. Federally appointed judges in Canada receive compensation in the form of salary, judicial annuity, and other benefits. [1]

Judicial Salary

4. Table 1 (page 3) shows salaries applicable to Canada's federally appointed judiciary from April 1, 2011 to present.¹ [2, 3, 4] Salaries of April 1, 2011 were as follows:
 - (a) \$361,300 for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 - (b) \$334,500 for other Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 - (c) \$308,200 for Chief Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces;
 - (d) \$281,100 for other Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces; and,
 - (e) \$194,000 for Federal Court Prothonotaries.
5. Salaries for federally appointed judges are indexed to the growth rate of average wages and salaries, as measured by the Industrial Aggregate Index, up to a maximum increase of 7% for any one year and rounded down to the nearest \$100.²
6. Salaries of April 1, 2021 are projected to be as follows:
 - (a) \$464,700 for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 - (b) \$430,300 for other Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada;

¹The period since April 1, 2011 corresponds roughly to the periods of the two most recent Quadrennial Commissions. The Fourth Commission was announced in December 2011 and lasted four years ending August 31, 2015. The Fifth Commission was announced in December 2015 and lasted four years ending September 30, 2019.

²Salaries for Federal Court Prothonotaries are set as a percentage of the salary of federally appointed judges. This percentage had been 69% prior to April 1, 2011, but then was increased to 76% effective April 1, 2011 and to 80% effective April 1, 2016. Because of the increase in this percentage over time, the salaries for Federal Court Prothonotaries have risen more rapidly than the salaries of federally appointed judges.

Table 1
Salaries for Federally Appointed Judges and Prothonotaries

| | Supreme Court of Canada | | Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Court Martial Appeal Court, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces | | Federal Court Prothonotaries |
|---|-------------------------|-----------|---|-----------|------------------------------|
| | Chief Justice | Justice | Chief Justice | Justice | |
| April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012 (+ 3.6%) | \$361,300 | \$334,500 | \$308,200 | \$281,100 | \$194,000 |
| April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013 (+ 2.5%) | \$370,300 | \$342,800 | \$315,900 | \$288,100 | \$218,900 |
| April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014 (+ 2.6%) | \$379,900 | \$351,700 | \$324,100 | \$295,500 | \$224,500 |
| April 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015 (+ 1.8%) | \$386,700 | \$358,000 | \$329,900 | \$300,800 | \$228,600 |
| April 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016 (+ 2.6%) | \$396,700 | \$367,300 | \$338,400 | \$308,600 | \$234,500 |
| April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017 (+ 1.8%) | \$403,800 | \$373,900 | \$344,400 | \$314,100 | \$251,200 |
| April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 (+ 0.4%) | \$405,400 | \$375,300 | \$345,700 | \$315,300 | \$252,200 |
| April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019 (+ 2.0%) | \$413,500 | \$382,800 | \$352,600 | \$321,600 | \$257,200 |
| April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020 (+ 2.6%) | \$424,200 | \$392,700 | \$361,700 | \$329,900 | \$263,900 |
| April 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021 (+ 2.7%) | \$435,600 | \$403,300 | \$371,400 | \$338,800 | \$271,000 |
| April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022 (+ 6.7%) ³ | \$464,700 | \$430,300 | \$396,200 | \$361,400 | \$289,100 |

³ Values for April 1, 2021 are forecasts and may be subject to revision.

- (c) \$396,200 for Chief Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Court Martial Appeal Court,⁴ Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces;
 - (d) \$361,400 for other Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces; and,
 - (e) \$289,100 for Federal Court Prothonotaries.
7. Over the ten-year period from April 1, 2011 to April 1, 2021, the salaries of Canada's federally appointed judiciary, excluding Federal Court Prothonotaries, will have increased by 28.6%. This works out to an average increase of 2.5% per year.⁵

Judicial Annuity

8. Retiring judges become entitled to an annuity as set out in the Judges Act:

“42 (1) A judge shall be paid an annuity equal to two thirds of the salary annexed to the office held by the judge at the time of his or her resignation, removal or attaining the age of retirement, as the case may be, if the judge

“(a) has continued in judicial office for at least 15 years, has a combined age and number of years in judicial office that is not less than 80 and resigns from office;

“(b) has attained the age of retirement and has held judicial office for at least 10 years; or

“(c) has continued in judicial office on the Supreme Court of Canada for at least 10 years and resigns from office.”

Other Benefits

9. Judges receive extended health and dental coverage under the Public Service Health Care Plan and the Public Service Dental Care Plan while holding office and during retirement. Other benefits provided to judges include life insurance, dependents' life insurance, and accidental death and dismemberment insurance.

⁴ The Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court was added to this group on April 1, 2016. Prior to April 1, 2016, the Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court had been paid as a Federal Court judge.

⁵ Over the same ten years, salaries for Federal Court Prothonotaries will have increased by about 49.0%. This works out to an average increase of 4.1% per year.

Advancement of Judicial Salaries Compared to those of the DM-3 Group

10. Judicial salaries have increased more rapidly than the salaries of deputy ministers in the DM-3 group.
11. During the nine-year period from April 1, 2011 to April 1, 2020, the base salaries of deputy ministers in the DM-3 group increased by 8.9% [5]. This works out to an average increase in base salary of less than 1.0% per year.⁶ In addition to base salary, deputy ministers in the DM-3 group receive “at-risk pay” (variable compensation) in an amount of up to 33% of base salary. Overall salaries the DM-3 group (including “at-risk” pay) have risen, on average, from \$288,709 as of March 31, 2015 to \$303,545 as of March 31, 2020. This represents a 5.1% increase over five years, which works out to an average of about 1.0% per year over the five-year period from March 31, 2015 to March 31, 2020.
12. From paragraph 7, the salaries of Canada’s federally appointed judges will have increased by about 2.5% per year over the ten years from April 1, 2011 to April 1, 2021. This rate changed over time, and for the five-year period ending March 31, 2020, judicial salaries increased by 9.7%. This works out to an average of 1.9% per year.

B. SALARIES OF OTHER HIGH-LEVEL PROFESSIONALS IN CANADA

13. This section considers the salaries of other high-level professionals in Canada.
14. We first consider the earnings of Canadian law school deans and the top salary bands for Canadian public sector lawyers. Earnings for these groups may be of interest, insofar as they represent alternative career paths for judicial candidates. We also examine the earnings of Canadian physicians. While a career in medicine would not represent an alternative path for most judicial candidates, earnings in medicine offers another perspective on the levels earned by other high-level professionals in Canada.

Earnings of Canadian Law School Deans

15. Table 2 (page 6) shows salaries (excluding expenses) for law school deans for 2018 onward.⁷

⁶ As of April 1, 2011, base salaries applicable to the DM-3 group were in the range of \$239,200 to \$281,400. Since April 1, 2017, the range has remained frozen at \$260,600 to \$306,500.

⁷ The sources for the salaries in Table 2 are identified at pages 13 to 15 as items [6] to [22].

Table 2
Salaries for Canadian Law School Deans

| | 2018 Calendar Year | | 2019 Calendar Year | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------|--|-----------|
| | Name | Salary | Name | Salary |
| University of Toronto | Edward Iacobucci | \$357,715 | Edward Iacobucci | \$364,911 |
| McGill University* | Robert Leckey | \$240,000 | | |
| University of British Columbia* | Catherine Dauvergne | \$344,577 | Catherine Dauvergne | \$348,365 |
| University of Montréal* | Jean-Francois Gaudreault-Desbiens | \$221,070 | | |
| University of Ottawa | | | | |
| - Common Law Section | Adam Dodek | \$216,565 | Adam Dodek | \$224,331 |
| - Civil Law Section | Céline Levesque | \$218,552 | Céline Lévesque (to end of June 2019) | \$225,523 |
| | | | Marie-Eve Sylvestre (from July 2019) | \$201,490 |
| York University | Lorne Sossin (to end of April 2018) | \$309,915 | Mary Condon | \$292,051 |
| | Mary Condon (from May 2018) | \$240,503 | | |
| Queen's University | William Flanagan | \$293,808 | William Flanagan (to end of June 2019) | \$291,371 |
| | | | Mark Walters (from July 2019) | \$130,000 |
| University of Alberta | Paul Paton | \$357,627 | Paul Paton (to end of June 2019) | \$345,161 |
| | | | David Percy (from July 2019) | \$326,072 |
| Western University | Erika Chamberlain | \$232,500 | Erika Chamberlain | \$259,493 |
| University of Calgary | Ian Holloway | \$326,017 | Ian Holloway | \$326,017 |
| University of Windsor | Christopher Waters | \$238,464 | Christopher Waters | \$248,460 |
| University of Victoria* | Jeremy Webber (to end of June 2018) | \$201,036 | Susan Breau | \$226,504 |
| | Susan Breau (from July 2018) | \$163,407 | | |
| Dalhousie University* | Camille Cameron | \$280,288 | Camille Cameron | \$282,525 |
| Laval University* | Anne-Marie Laflamme | \$174,541 | | |
| University of Quebec* | Monique Brodeur | \$174,024 | | |
| University of Sherbrooke* | Sébastien Lebel-Grenier | \$172,751 | | |
| University of Manitoba | | | Johnathan Black-Branch | \$318,505 |
| University of Saskatchewan | Martin Phillipson | \$249,675 | | |
| Thompson Rivers University** | Bradford Morse | \$203,393 | | |

Notes:

*Reported salary for fiscal year (year-end March 31 of following year).

**Reported salary for 2017/2018 fiscal year.

16. Most salaries for Canadian law school deans are lower than judicial salaries. The salaries for Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces were \$321,600 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019, and were \$329,900 from April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020.

Top Salary Bands for Canadian Public Sector Lawyers

17. Examples of the top salary bands for public sector lawyers in Canada are as follows:

- (a) For lawyers with the federal government, the highest classification is LP-05. As of May 10, 2021, rates of pay for LP-05 are **\$181,624 to \$222,210**. Any performance pay would be additional. [23]
- (b) For lawyers with the Province of Ontario, the highest classification is Crown Counsel 4. As of December 2019, rates of pay for this classification were **\$176,568 to \$231,920**. Any performance pay would be additional. [24]
- (c) For lawyers with the Province of British Columbia, the highest classification is Level 4. As of April 1, 2020, the top end of the pay scale for Level 4 was **\$233,779**. [25]
- (d) For lawyers with the Province of Manitoba, the highest classification is Supervising Legal Counsel. From September 29, 2018 to March 29, 2019, the top pay step for this classification was **\$157,395**. [26]
- (e) For lawyers with the Province of Nova Scotia, the highest classification is Senior Crown Counsel. For Senior Crown Counsel with 17 years or more relevant experience, the top rate of pay for 2021 is **\$161,962**. [27]
- (f) For lawyers with the Province of New Brunswick, the highest classification would be a Lawyer 2 at Pay Step 26. As of July 1, 2020, the annual rate of pay for this position was **\$140,088**. [28]

18. Salaries for public sector lawyers are generally lower than the judicial salaries shown in Table 1 (page 3).

Earnings of Physicians in Canada

19. Canada's physicians work in a single payer system with their payments tracked by the provinces and made available by the Canadian Institute for Health Information. Estimates of overhead costs are available from the Canadian Medical Association.
20. Table 3 (page 9) estimates annual earnings for physicians in Canada by specialty. Average clinical amounts paid were obtained from the Canadian Institute for Health Information's National Physician Database. [29, 30] Values are shown by specialty. To estimate earnings, revenues are reduced by the overhead percentages from the Canadian Medical Association's 2017 Workforce Survey. [31]
21. Family doctors comprised the largest group of physicians. For fiscal 2019, Canada had 36,659 family doctors, and their average earnings are estimated in Table 3 to have been **\$204,348**.
22. The earnings of specialist physicians varied by medical or surgical field. For example, Canada had 2,054 general surgery specialists in fiscal 2019, and their average earnings are estimated in Table 3 to have been **\$358,594**.
23. The salaries for Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces were \$315,300 from April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 and were \$321,600 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019. While physicians in some specialties had earnings that exceeded judicial salaries, physicians in other specialties earned less.

Economic Effects of COVID-19

24. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has negatively affected the labour market with uneven effects across sectors. For example, while Canada's total unemployment rate increased from 5.7% in February 2020 to 9.4% in January 2021, the unemployment rate in Canada's Accommodation and Food Services industry increased from 5.6% to 18.7% over the same period. [32]
25. The Government of Canada's Fall Economic Statement shows that \$382.4 billion had been spent as of November 13, 2020 on direct measures to fight COVID-19 and support people. This includes \$322.3 billion spent by the federal government and an additional \$60.1 billion spent by provincial and territorial governments. The federal debt before accounting for any planned stimulus spending was projected to increase from 31.2% for Fiscal 2020 to 50.7% for Fiscal 2021. The above deficits do not consider impacts relating to the federal government's plans to spend an additional sum of up to \$100 billion in stimulus spending over three years. [33]

Table 3
Estimated Earnings per Physician by Specialty, Canada

| | April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 | | | | April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019 | | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| | Count of physicians | Mean clinical amount paid | Over-head | Estimated Earnings | Count of physicians | Mean clinical amount paid | Over-head | Estimated Earnings |
| Family medicine | 35,919 | \$280,231 | 27% | \$204,568 | 36,659 | \$279,929 | 27% | \$204,348 |
| Medical specialists | | | | | | | | |
| Internal medicine | 9,574 | \$403,475 | 21% | \$318,745 | 9,916 | \$407,171 | 21% | \$321,665 |
| Cardiology | 1,365 | \$600,413 | 23% | \$462,318 | 1,396 | \$610,793 | 23% | \$470,311 |
| Gastroenterology | 687 | \$541,682 | 25% | \$406,262 | 716 | \$551,900 | 25% | \$413,925 |
| Neurology | 998 | \$309,700 | 24% | \$235,372 | 1,032 | \$316,133 | 24% | \$240,261 |
| Psychiatry | 4,809 | \$277,523 | 19% | \$224,794 | 4,799 | \$281,614 | 19% | \$228,107 |
| Pediatrics | 3,114 | \$297,832 | 24% | \$226,352 | 3,209 | \$296,010 | 24% | \$224,968 |
| Dermatology | 558 | \$383,410 | 35% | \$249,216 | 571 | \$384,815 | 35% | \$250,130 |
| Physical medicine | 423 | \$285,969 | 19% | \$231,635 | 438 | \$289,497 | 19% | \$234,493 |
| Anesthesia | 3,195 | \$430,744 | 13% | \$374,747 | 3,249 | \$436,983 | 13% | \$380,175 |
| Surgical specialists | | | | | | | | |
| General surgery | 2,027 | \$451,766 | 23% | \$347,860 | 2,054 | \$465,707 | 23% | \$358,594 |
| Thoracic/cardiovascular surgery | 415 | \$599,196 | 28% | \$429,024 | 417 | \$587,585 | 28% | \$420,711 |
| Urology | 666 | \$479,976 | 25% | \$359,982 | 666 | \$499,668 | 25% | \$374,751 |
| Orthopedic surgery | 1,478 | \$427,130 | 23% | \$328,890 | 1,506 | \$438,037 | 23% | \$337,288 |
| Plastic surgery | 523 | \$384,140 | 31% | \$265,057 | 531 | \$394,176 | 31% | \$271,981 |
| Neurosurgery | 293 | \$529,651 | 28% | \$379,230 | 276 | \$557,925 | 28% | \$399,474 |
| Ophthalmology | 1,183 | \$766,367 | 40% | \$459,820 | 1,191 | \$791,466 | 40% | \$474,880 |
| Otolaryngology | 728 | \$441,765 | 32% | \$300,400 | 736 | \$443,596 | 32% | \$301,645 |
| Obstetrics/gynecology | 2,117 | \$390,939 | 30% | \$273,658 | 2,127 | \$392,115 | 30% | \$274,481 |

C. JUDICIAL REMUNERATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

26. Since judicial systems differ between countries, it is difficult to directly compare salaries of judges across different countries. Unlike Canada, where all superior court judges across the country are paid the same at both the trial and appellate levels, other countries set judicial salaries that differ by region and by court hierarchy.
27. Salaries as of 2020 for judges in Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States are considered below.⁸

Australia

28. In Australia, salaries of federally appointed judges are recommended by the Government of Australia Remuneration Tribunal (Judicial and Related Offices – Remuneration and Allowances). Determinations from the Tribunal must then be approved by the House of Parliament. [36]
29. Salaries for federal judges, as of July 1, 2020, range from \$394,980 AUD for Federal Circuit Court Judges to \$468,020 AUD for Federal Court and Family Court Judges. As these salaries are in Australian dollars, currency conversion is necessary before comparing them to Canadian salaries. [37]
30. Using a nominal exchange rate of {\$1.00 AUD = \$0.9247 CAD}, the salary of Australian Federal Circuit Court Judges converts to \$365,238 CAD, and the salary of Australian Family and Federal Court Judges converts to \$432,778 CAD.
31. Costs of living are lower in Canada than in Australia. Because the above estimates do not account for these cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada.
32. Purchasing power parity exchange rates are adjustments that account not only for the rate of currency exchange but also for cost-of-living differences.
33. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 AUD = \$0.8197 CAD}, the salary of Australian Federal Circuit Court Judges is worth **\$323,772 CAD**, and the salary of Australian Family and Federal Court Judges is worth **\$383,644 CAD**. The salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800) falls within this range.

⁸ Nominal exchange rates in this section represent average values indicated by the Bank of Canada for 2020. [34] Purchasing Power Exchange rates are from OECD Data Reports for the year 2020. [35]

New Zealand


34. In New Zealand, the Remuneration Authority of New Zealand sets the salaries of federally appointed judges. [38] Salaries for federal judges as of October 1, 2020 range from \$471,100 NZD for Judges of the High Court to \$493,500 NZD for Judges of the Court of Appeal. [39]
35. Using a nominal exchange rate of {\$1.00 NZD = \$0.8712 CAD}, the salary of Judges of the High Court converts to \$410,422 CAD, and the salary of Judges of the Court of Appeal converts to \$429,937 CAD.
36. Because the above estimates do not account for cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada, where costs of living are lower. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 NZD = \$0.8211 CAD}, the salary of Judges of the High Court is worth **\$386,824 CAD**, and the salary of Judges of the Court of Appeal is worth **\$405,217 CAD**. These adjusted salaries exceed the salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800).

United Kingdom

37. In the United Kingdom, judges are appointed by the prime minister with the selection of candidates for judicial office determined by an independent Judicial Appointments Commission. The salaries of judges in the United Kingdom are determined through recommendation of the Senior Salaries Review Body. [40]
38. As of April 1, 2020, salaries were £219,396 for Group 3 Judges (which include Inner House Judges of the Court of Session for Scotland, Justices of Appeal, and Justices of Appeal for Northern Ireland), and £192,679 for Group 4 Judges (which include Puisne Judges of the High Court, Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster, Puisne Judge of the High Court for Northern Ireland, and Outer House Judges of the Court of Session for Scotland). [41, 42]
39. Using a nominal exchange rate of {£1.00 = \$1.7199 CAD}, the salary of Group 3 Judges converts to \$377,339 CAD, and the salary of Group 4 Judges converts to \$331,389 CAD.
40. As the above estimates do not account for cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada, where costs of living are lower. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate {£1.00 = \$1.6727 CAD}, the salary of Group 3 Judges is worth **\$366,982 CAD**, and the salary of Group 4 Judges is worth **\$322,292 CAD**. The salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800) falls within this range.

United States

41. Federal judges in the United States are nominated by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. [43] For 2020, salaries were \$216,400 USD for District Judges and \$229,500 USD for Circuit Judges. [44]
42. Using a nominal exchange rate of {\$1.00 USD = \$1.3415 CAD}, the salary of District Judges converts to \$290,301 CAD, and the salary of Circuit Judges converts to \$307,874 CAD.
43. As the above estimates do not account for cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada, where costs of living are lower. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 USD = \$1.1981 CAD}, the salary of District Judges is worth **\$259,266 CAD**, and the salary of Circuit Judges is worth **\$274,961 CAD**. These adjusted salaries are much lower than the salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800).
44. The Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court for 2020 is \$277,700 USD. Using a purchasing parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 USD = \$1.1981 CAD}, this would be worth **\$332,709 CAD**. The salary of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada (\$435,600 CDN) exceeds this level by about 31%.



Mark Szekely, Partner
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APPENDIX B – QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE



**COLUMBIA PACIFIC
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MARK E. SZEKELY

EDUCATION:

Bachelor of Science (Economics), University of Victoria (1993)
Master of Arts (Economics), University of Western Ontario (1994)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

Board of Directors, Association of Professional Economists of BC
Member, National Association of Forensic Economics

SPECIALIZATION AREAS:

Labour economics, natural resources and the environment, socio-economic analysis and major project assessment.

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

1998-Present: Economist/Partner, Columbia Pacific Consulting Ltd.

Economic assessments relating to litigation matters involving personal injury and fatality. More than 1,500 assignments completed including earnings projections by education level and occupation, cost of future care valuations, pension loss calculations; financial support projections; statistical household services projections, and gross-up estimates for income taxes and investment management fees. Also completed socio-economic impact studies for various major investment projects. Partner since June 2018.

Qualified as an expert witness in the British Columbia Supreme Court.

1996-1998: Economic Consultant, Vancouver

Preparation of study outlines, drafts and final reports for government and private sector clients. Projects include labour markets, forestry modeling, and community development.

1995: Research Analyst, BC Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum

Contract position involving data analysis and stakeholder consultations for the BC Greenhouse Gas Action Plan.

1994-1996: Research Analyst, G.E. Bridges & Associates

Socio-economic analysis and financial modeling for projects dealing with natural resources and the environment.

1993-1994: Research Assistant, University of Western Ontario

Research Assistant to Dr. Jonas Fisher. Studies effects of monetary shocks to US and Canadian economies.

SALARIES - APRIL 1, 2019

Revision rate 2.60%

| | | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| | New (current) | | Previous | |
| | Annual salary | monthly salary | Annual salary | monthly salary |

Supreme Court of Canada

| | | | | |
|---------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Chief Justice | \$424,200.00 | \$35,350.00 | \$413,500.00 | \$34,458.33 |
| Justice | \$392,700.00 | \$32,725.00 | \$382,800.00 | \$31,900.00 |

Federal Court & Tax Court

| | | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Chief Justice | \$361,700.00 | \$30,141.66 | \$352,600.00 | \$29,383.33 |
| Allowance | \$2,000.00 | \$166.67 | \$2,000.00 | \$166.67 |
| Associate Chief Justice | \$361,700.00 | \$30,141.66 | \$352,600.00 | \$29,383.33 |
| Allowance | \$2,000.00 | \$166.67 | \$2,000.00 | \$166.67 |
| Justice | \$329,900.00 | \$27,491.66 | \$321,600.00 | \$26,800.00 |
| Allowance | \$2,000.00 | \$166.67 | \$2,000.00 | \$166.67 |
| Prothonotaries | \$263,900.00 | \$21,991.66 | \$257,200.00 | \$21,433.33 |

| | |
|-----|------------------------|
| P/J | |
| 80% | \$263,900 |
| 80% | \$263,900 rounded down |
| | \$0 |

Superior, Supreme, Q.B

| | | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Chief Justice | \$361,700.00 | \$30,141.66 | \$352,600.00 | \$29,383.33 |
| Associate Chief Justice | \$361,700.00 | \$30,141.66 | \$352,600.00 | \$29,383.33 |
| Justice | \$329,900.00 | \$27,491.66 | \$321,600.00 | \$26,800.00 |

Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Labrador

| | | | | |
|---------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Chief Justice | \$361,700.00 | \$30,141.66 | \$352,600.00 | \$29,383.33 |
| Allowance | \$12,000.00 | \$1,000.00 | \$12,000.00 | \$1,000.00 |
| Justice | \$329,900.00 | \$27,491.66 | \$321,600.00 | \$26,800.00 |
| Allowance | \$12,000.00 | \$1,000.00 | \$12,000.00 | \$1,000.00 |

**Anonymized Data Re: Appointment, Supernumerary Status and Retirement
for Retirements from 1933 to 30Sep20**

(All dates have been anonymized in order to protect the identities of the individuals involved)

| ID | First Appointment | Eligible to Retire | Eligible to Elect | Elected | Retirement | Retirement Reason | Age at Retirement |
|-----------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 11-Apr-1983 | 26-Feb-1999 | 9-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-2000 | 5-Nov-2003 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.1 |
| 2 | 8-Sep-2012 | 18-Sep-2027 | 18-Sep-2027 | | | | |
| 3 | 11-Mar-1999 | 11-Mar-2014 | 11-Mar-2014 | | 23-Jul-2009 | Early Retirement | 63.3 |
| 4 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 5 | 6-Jun-2015 | 1-Dec-2030 | 1-Dec-2030 | | | | |
| 6 | 7-Mar-1993 | 15-Jul-2008 | 15-Jul-2008 | 15-Jul-2008 | 9-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | 68.4 |
| 7 | 9-Nov-1973 | 9-Nov-1988 | 9-Nov-1988 | 10-Apr-1989 | 30-Dec-1995 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 8 | 30-Jan-2010 | 29-Jun-2023 | 30-Jan-2020 | 30-Jan-2020 | | | |
| 9 | 3-Nov-1995 | 3-Nov-2010 | 3-Nov-2010 | 3-Nov-2010 | 1-Jan-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 10 | 23-Dec-2006 | 23-Dec-2021 | 23-Dec-2021 | | 1-Jan-2017 | Early Retirement | 64.0 |
| 11 | 18-Jan-2003 | 18-Jan-2018 | 18-Jan-2018 | 18-Jan-2018 | | | |
| 12 | 29-Sep-2018 | 27-Sep-2036 | 27-Sep-2036 | | | | |
| 13 | 18-Dec-1948 | 23-Jul-1967 | 23-Jul-1967 | | 3-Feb-1976 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.5 |
| 14 | 24-Sep-2016 | 15-Oct-2031 | 15-Oct-2031 | | | | |
| 15 | 25-Dec-1971 | 27-Dec-1987 | 27-Dec-1987 | 9-Feb-1988 | 10-Apr-1993 | ELECTIVE | 70.3 |
| 16 | 21-Mar-2015 | 24-Jun-2033 | 24-Jun-2033 | | | | |
| 17 | 16-Jun-1974 | 16-Jun-1989 | 14-Apr-1986 | 23-Oct-1987 | 14-Apr-1991 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 18 | 11-Jun-2011 | 11-Jun-2026 | 22-Sep-2025 | | | | |
| 19 | 4-May-1986 | 4-May-2001 | 4-May-2001 | 4-May-2001 | 11-Jul-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 20 | 21-Feb-1976 | 21-Feb-1991 | 21-Feb-1991 | 21-Feb-1991 | 10-Mar-1997 | ELECTIVE | 74.3 |
| 21 | 2-Nov-1975 | 6-Apr-1992 | 6-Apr-1992 | 6-Apr-1992 | 7-Apr-2002 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 22 | 24-Jul-2019 | 24-Jul-2034 | 2-Dec-2032 | | | | |
| 23 | 31-May-1969 | 30-May-1984 | 29-Nov-1981 | | 10-Apr-1986 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.4 |
| 24 | 9-Nov-1983 | 24-Aug-2006 | 24-Aug-2006 | | 23-Jun-1984 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 42.8 |
| 25 | 29-Jan-2000 | 19-Jun-2016 | 19-Jun-2016 | 14-Dec-2016 | | | |
| 26 | 22-Dec-1965 | 22-Dec-1980 | 22-Dec-1980 | 22-Dec-1980 | 29-Jul-1987 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 27 | 6-Jan-2019 | 6-Jan-2034 | 6-Jan-2034 | | | | |
| 28 | 4-Jan-1996 | 17-Apr-2012 | 17-Apr-2012 | 17-Apr-2012 | 10-Apr-2015 | ELECTIVE | 66.7 |
| 29 | 17-Jul-2007 | 21-Jan-2018 | 17-Jul-2017 | 17-Jul-2017 | 21-Jan-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 30 | 19-Jul-2014 | 19-Jul-2029 | 17-Jan-2029 | | | | |
| 31 | 24-Oct-1981 | 4-Jul-1992 | 4-Jul-1992 | 4-Jul-1992 | 4-Jul-1997 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 32 | 31-Mar-1979 | 16-Dec-1998 | 16-Dec-1998 | 16-Dec-1998 | 11-Apr-2001 | ELECTIVE | 67.3 |
| 33 | 28-Aug-2020 | 27-Apr-2039 | 27-Apr-2039 | | | | |
| 34 | 29-Apr-1972 | 29-Jun-1988 | 29-Jun-1988 | | 24-Dec-1986 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.5 |
| 35 | 8-Mar-1991 | 28-May-2005 | 8-Mar-2001 | 8-Mar-2001 | 28-May-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 36 | 29-Mar-1970 | 29-Mar-1985 | 29-Mar-1985 | | 29-Mar-1975 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 57.8 |
| 37 | 12-Jan-1986 | 12-Jan-2001 | 12-Jan-2001 | 12-Jan-2001 | 29-Nov-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 38 | 12-Feb-2000 | 12-Feb-2015 | 9-Jan-2013 | | 5-Jan-2008 | DISABILITY | 65.0 |
| 39 | 17-Dec-1988 | 16-Nov-2007 | 16-Nov-2007 | 28-Nov-2007 | 11-Jul-2012 | ELECTIVE | 65.7 |
| 40 | 14-Oct-1953 | 9-Jan-1970 | 9-Jan-1970 | | 30-Oct-1975 | ELECTIVE | 70.8 |
| 41 | 21-Mar-2018 | 28-Mar-2035 | 28-Mar-2035 | | | | |
| 42 | 29-Aug-2019 | 29-Aug-2034 | 29-Aug-2034 | | | | |
| 43 | 12-Jun-1952 | 2-May-1960 | 12-Jun-1962 | | 3-May-1965 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 44 | 18-Jul-1975 | 14-Feb-1992 | 14-Feb-1992 | 14-Feb-1992 | 14-Feb-2002 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 45 | 31-Aug-1972 | 9-May-1996 | 9-May-1996 | 9-May-1996 | 10-May-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 46 | 22-Feb-1969 | 29-Dec-1986 | 29-Dec-1986 | 11-Apr-1989 | 11-Apr-1995 | ELECTIVE | 73.3 |
| 47 | 21-Jan-1984 | 21-Jan-1999 | 21-Jan-1999 | 21-Jan-1999 | 3-Jul-2004 | DEATH (RPC) | 71.9 |
| 48 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 26-Sep-2023 | | 11-Apr-2019 | Early Retirement | 63.4 |
| 49 | 31-Mar-1985 | 17-Jun-2000 | 3-Sep-2000 | 3-Sep-2000 | 1-Apr-2009 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 50 | 11-Apr-1946 | 11-Apr-1961 | 3-Jun-1957 | | 10-Dec-1961 | ELECTIVE | 74.5 |
| 51 | 9-Feb-1995 | 28-Jan-2011 | 28-Jan-2011 | 28-Jan-2011 | 25-Mar-2018 | ELECTIVE | 71.2 |
| 52 | 9-Feb-1995 | 9-Feb-2010 | 29-Jun-2006 | 10-Jul-2006 | 15-Aug-2007 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.1 |
| 53 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Oct-2004 | | | 9-Dec-2013 | ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 54 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 27-Sep-2030 | | | | |
| 55 | 28-Sep-2000 | 26-Dec-2017 | 26-Dec-2017 | 26-Dec-2017 | | | |
| 56 | 11-Dec-1988 | 13-Jul-2004 | 13-Feb-2005 | 13-Feb-2005 | 25-Dec-2006 | ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 57 | 14-Sep-2001 | 14-May-2019 | 14-May-2019 | 14-May-2019 | | | |
| 58 | 11-Jun-2008 | 11-Jun-2023 | 17-Jul-2019 | 17-Jul-2019 | | | |
| 59 | 27-Mar-2014 | 18-Feb-2028 | 26-Mar-2024 | | | | |
| 60 | 22-Nov-1935 | 22-Nov-1950 | 22-Nov-1950 | | 2-Jan-1953 | DISABILITY | 70.6 |
| 61 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 27-Mar-2029 | | | | |
| 62 | 4-Jan-1969 | 4-Jan-1984 | 21-Mar-1979 | 12-Apr-1979 | 20-Mar-1984 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 63 | 1-Jul-1984 | 22-Nov-2004 | 24-Mar-2007 | 14-Apr-2008 | 15-Apr-2018 | COMPULSORY | 73.0 |
| 64 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 8-Jan-2026 | | | | |
| 65 | 26-Jan-1967 | 4-Jun-1984 | 4-Jun-1984 | 4-Jun-1984 | 12-Jun-1988 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.0 |
| 66 | 21-May-1999 | 21-May-2014 | 19-Dec-2011 | 19-Dec-2011 | 19-Dec-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 67 | 1-Jul-1972 | 16-Aug-1988 | 16-Aug-1988 | 16-Aug-1988 | 24-Apr-1989 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.7 |
| 68 | 26-Apr-2015 | 20-Nov-2031 | 20-Nov-2031 | | | | |
| 69 | 26-May-1973 | 25-May-1988 | 7-Feb-1987 | 8-Feb-1987 | 7-Feb-1992 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 70 | 3-Feb-2007 | 3-Feb-2022 | 26-Jan-2020 | 26-Jan-2020 | | | |
| 71 | 29-Mar-1987 | 29-Mar-2002 | 29-Mar-2002 | 29-Mar-2002 | 10-Dec-2002 | ELECTIVE | 66.5 |
| 72 | 19-Oct-1991 | 19-Oct-2006 | 19-Oct-2006 | 9-Nov-2006 | 23-Aug-2014 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 73 | 12-Jun-2020 | 9-Feb-2036 | 9-Feb-2036 | | | | |
| 74 | 27-Apr-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 5-Sep-2003 | 5-Sep-2003 | 13-Jul-2005 | ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 75 | 5-Aug-1978 | 4-Nov-1995 | 4-Nov-1995 | 8-Nov-1995 | 4-Nov-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 76 | 8-Nov-1992 | 11-May-2014 | 11-May-2014 | 11-Apr-2019 | | | |
| 77 | 7-Nov-2008 | 1-Apr-2024 | 1-Apr-2024 | | | | |
| 78 | 9-Nov-1973 | 9-Nov-1988 | 9-Nov-1988 | 10-Nov-1988 | 1-Jun-1996 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 79 | 21-May-1993 | 9-Aug-2009 | 9-Aug-2009 | 9-Sep-2014 | 27-Oct-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 80 | 26-Sep-2003 | 26-Sep-2018 | 15-Jun-2018 | | 9-Dec-2014 Early Retirement | 66.5 |
| 81 | 16-Jun-1943 | 16-Jun-1958 | 16-Jun-1958 | | 16-Jun-1963 DISABILITY | 71.0 |
| 82 | 23-Aug-1980 | 23-Aug-1995 | 23-Aug-1995 | | 8-Jun-1982 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 56.4 |
| 83 | 11-Jun-2011 | 11-Jun-2026 | 3-Sep-2024 | | | |
| 84 | 4-May-1956 | 19-Jul-1970 | 19-Jul-1970 | | 22-May-1973 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 72.8 |
| 85 | 1-Aug-1968 | 25-Aug-1989 | 25-Aug-1989 | 25-Aug-1989 | 25-Aug-1999 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 86 | 27-Jul-1945 | 27-Jul-1960 | 27-Jul-1960 | | 29-Nov-1962 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.8 |
| 87 | 9-May-1970 | 24-Jul-1996 | 24-Jul-1996 | | 15-Feb-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 43.6 |
| 88 | 30-Sep-1978 | 11-May-1997 | 11-May-1997 | 11-May-1997 | 11-May-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 89 | 19-May-1973 | 5-Oct-1993 | 5-Oct-1993 | 5-Oct-1993 | 5-Oct-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 90 | 23-Nov-1956 | 8-Jul-1976 | 8-Jul-1976 | 8-Jul-1976 | 8-Jul-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 91 | 8-Sep-1994 | 19-Feb-2013 | 19-Feb-2013 | 19-Feb-2013 | 1-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE | 67.6 |
| 92 | 5-Jan-2002 | 5-Jan-2017 | 5-Jan-2017 | 8-Jan-2017 | | |
| 93 | 30-Mar-1975 | 11-Apr-1993 | 11-Apr-1993 | 16-Apr-1993 | 29-Nov-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.6 |
| 94 | 1-Feb-1996 | 5-May-2015 | 5-May-2015 | | 8-Aug-2015 ELECTIVE | 61.0 |
| 95 | 22-Jun-2005 | 22-Jun-2020 | 5-Mar-2020 | | 12-Jul-2018 Early Retirement | 68.4 |
| 96 | 29-Dec-1994 | 29-Dec-2009 | 9-Nov-2005 | 9-Nov-2005 | 27-Dec-2007 DISABILITY | 72.1 |
| 97 | 7-Aug-2009 | 1-Jul-2022 | 7-Aug-2019 | 9-Aug-2019 | | |
| 98 | 11-Dec-2020 | 13-Jul-2039 | 13-Jul-2039 | | | |
| 99 | 25-Jan-2019 | 25-Jan-2034 | 25-Jan-2034 | | | |
| 100 | 23-Sep-1964 | 27-Sep-1985 | 27-Sep-1985 | 8-Jan-1987 | 27-Sep-1995 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 101 | 21-May-2010 | 21-May-2025 | 21-Jun-2024 | | | |
| 102 | 27-Apr-1958 | 27-Apr-1973 | 27-Apr-1973 | | 14-Mar-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 59.8 |
| 103 | 21-Mar-2003 | 7-Apr-2021 | 7-Apr-2021 | | 13-Jul-2019 Early Retirement | 60.2 |
| 104 | 26-Feb-1998 | 21-Mar-2014 | 21-Mar-2014 | 21-Mar-2014 | | |
| 105 | 8-Mar-2008 | 9-Mar-2023 | 9-Mar-2023 | | | |
| 106 | 27-Oct-1988 | 27-Oct-2003 | 14-Aug-2003 | | 27-Nov-2002 DISABILITY | 69.3 |
| 107 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | | |
| 108 | 26-Dec-2004 | 26-Dec-2019 | 26-Dec-2019 | | 25-Nov-2017 DISABILITY | 66.9 |
| 109 | 14-May-2011 | 16-Aug-2025 | 14-May-2021 | | | |
| 110 | 9-Jul-1983 | 24-Apr-2005 | 24-Apr-2005 | | 9-Oct-2019 ELECTIVE | 72.7 |
| 111 | 11-Jun-2008 | 11-Jun-2023 | 11-Jun-2023 | | | |
| 112 | 3-Nov-1988 | 31-May-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 9-Jun-2007 | 8-Nov-2010 ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 113 | 7-Feb-1947 | 7-Feb-1962 | 7-Feb-1962 | | 23-Oct-1966 ELECTIVE | 74.0 |
| 114 | 22-Mar-2008 | 23-Mar-2023 | 23-Mar-2023 | | | |
| 115 | 20-Jul-1978 | 20-Jul-1993 | 20-Jul-1993 | 20-Jul-1993 | 10-Apr-2000 ELECTIVE | 72.1 |
| 116 | 23-Oct-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 11-Jan-2000 | 11-Jan-2000 | 21-Sep-2009 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.7 |
| 117 | 6-Jun-1981 | 5-Jun-1996 | 5-Jun-1996 | | 9-Oct-1998 ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 118 | 29-Jan-1970 | 14-Jan-1994 | 14-Jan-1994 | 14-Jan-1994 | 10-Dec-1994 ELECTIVE | 65.9 |
| 119 | 25-Dec-2003 | 27-Mar-2021 | 27-Mar-2021 | | | |
| 120 | 11-Aug-2017 | 16-Jul-2033 | 16-Jul-2033 | | | |
| 121 | 19-May-1985 | 18-May-2000 | 18-Aug-1996 | 18-Aug-1996 | 18-Aug-2001 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 122 | 6-Mar-1980 | 7-Mar-1995 | 15-Jun-1994 | | 8-Oct-1991 DISABILITY | 67.3 |
| 123 | 28-Apr-2005 | 27-Apr-2020 | 27-Apr-2020 | 27-Apr-2020 | | |
| 124 | 9-Sep-1964 | 1-Dec-1977 | 1-Dec-1977 | 9-Aug-1982 | 1-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 125 | 27-Jun-2010 | 30-Mar-2026 | 30-Mar-2026 | | | |
| 126 | 21-Jan-1999 | 29-Apr-2014 | 29-Apr-2014 | | 23-Jul-2014 ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 127 | 18-Apr-1999 | 18-Apr-2014 | 18-Apr-2014 | 18-Apr-2014 | | |
| 128 | 28-Aug-1971 | 28-Aug-1986 | 28-Aug-1986 | | 13-May-1978 DISABILITY | 59.2 |
| 129 | 29-Sep-1984 | 1-Apr-1996 | 1-Apr-1996 | 1-Apr-1996 | 2-Apr-2001 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 130 | 9-Jun-1961 | 3-Dec-1979 | 3-Dec-1979 | | 3-Dec-1989 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 131 | 8-Oct-2015 | 8-Oct-2030 | 8-Oct-2030 | | | |
| 132 | 21-Jan-1964 | 21-Jan-1979 | 21-Jan-1979 | 9-Jan-1986 | 21-Sep-1988 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 133 | 2-Oct-2011 | 13-Feb-2020 | | | 13-Feb-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 134 | 25-Jan-1951 | 25-Jan-1966 | 20-Oct-1964 | | 29-May-1952 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 57.6 |
| 135 | 9-Sep-1999 | 23-Mar-2012 | 9-Sep-2009 | | 7-Dec-2001 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.7 |
| 136 | 22-Aug-2009 | 12-Feb-2018 | | | 12-Feb-2018 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 137 | 12-Jul-2018 | 12-Jul-2033 | 12-Jul-2033 | | | |
| 138 | 3-Feb-2007 | 28-Sep-2018 | 3-Feb-2017 | | 9-Sep-2017 Early Retirement | 73.9 |
| 139 | 11-Apr-1953 | 17-Oct-1977 | 17-Oct-1977 | 10-Apr-1980 | 17-Oct-1987 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 140 | 14-Nov-2010 | 24-Nov-2031 | 24-Nov-2031 | | | |
| 141 | 7-Mar-1993 | 21-Mar-2013 | 21-Mar-2013 | 11-Apr-2019 | | |
| 142 | 19-May-1973 | 14-Dec-1986 | 19-May-1983 | | 10-Apr-1979 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 67.3 |
| 143 | 17-Dec-1988 | 17-Dec-2003 | 17-Dec-2003 | 17-Dec-2003 | 9-Oct-2008 ELECTIVE | 71.4 |
| 144 | 24-Oct-2002 | 21-Dec-2012 | 24-Oct-2012 | | 21-Dec-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 145 | 5-May-1973 | 15-Feb-1992 | 15-Feb-1992 | 15-Feb-1992 | 15-Feb-2002 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 146 | 8-May-1966 | 8-May-1981 | 8-May-1981 | 8-May-1981 | 10-Apr-1986 ELECTIVE | 74.1 |
| 147 | 9-Jan-1960 | 9-Jan-1975 | 8-Nov-1971 | 28-Oct-1975 | 8-Nov-1976 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 148 | 13-Sep-2002 | 21-Feb-2020 | 21-Feb-2020 | 21-Feb-2020 | | |
| 149 | 29-Mar-1961 | 28-Mar-1976 | 7-Apr-1971 | | 6-Apr-1976 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 150 | 9-Jul-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 7-Oct-2000 | 10-Dec-2001 | 7-Oct-2010 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 151 | 7-Dec-2005 | 10-Apr-2021 | 10-Apr-2021 | | | |
| 152 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 27-Sep-2030 | | | |
| 153 | 15-Feb-2019 | 15-Feb-2034 | 31-May-2032 | | | |
| 154 | 12-Jan-1990 | 19-Jul-2005 | 23-Jan-2006 | 23-Jan-2006 | 9-Aug-2006 ELECTIVE | 65.5 |
| 155 | 17-Oct-1984 | 13-Jan-2000 | 8-Apr-2000 | 29-May-2005 | 11-Jul-2009 ELECTIVE | 74.3 |
| 156 | 2-Oct-1992 | 2-Oct-2007 | | | 9-Dec-2015 ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 157 | 30-May-2008 | 23-Mar-2025 | 23-Mar-2025 | | | |
| 158 | 27-Jan-2017 | 25-Feb-2034 | 25-Feb-2034 | | | |
| 159 | 27-Jan-2017 | 30-Jul-2032 | 30-Jul-2032 | | | |
| 160 | 5-Sep-2015 | 5-Sep-2030 | 5-Sep-2030 | | | |
| 161 | 8-Jul-1999 | 27-Jul-2015 | 27-Jul-2015 | 27-Jul-2015 | | |
| 162 | 8-Feb-1964 | 9-Jan-1990 | 9-Jan-1990 | 20-Feb-1992 | 9-Jan-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 163 | 21-Sep-2014 | 21-Sep-2029 | 23-Oct-2024 | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 164 | 3-Aug-2013 | 3-Aug-2028 | 3-Aug-2028 | | | | |
| 165 | 1-Apr-1992 | 12-Apr-2011 | 12-Apr-2011 | 12-Apr-2011 | 9-Dec-2014 | ELECTIVE | 64.6 |
| 166 | 12-Apr-1985 | 11-Apr-2000 | 16-Feb-2000 | 16-Feb-2000 | 16-Feb-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 167 | 2-May-2009 | 9-Oct-2027 | 9-Oct-2027 | | | | |
| 168 | 22-Oct-2017 | 22-Oct-2032 | 22-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 169 | 30-Jun-1991 | 19-Nov-2004 | 30-Jun-2001 | 30-Jun-2001 | 19-Nov-2004 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 170 | 26-Mar-1983 | 19-Nov-2001 | 15-Jul-2005 | 15-Jul-2005 | 10-Apr-2013 | ELECTIVE | 72.7 |
| 171 | 21-Mar-1996 | 2-Apr-2013 | 2-Apr-2013 | 13-Jun-2014 | 5-Dec-2015 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.6 |
| 172 | 19-Oct-1991 | 12-Aug-2010 | 12-Aug-2010 | 18-Aug-2010 | 18-Aug-2020 | COMPULSORY | 71.2 |
| 173 | 24-Oct-1976 | 24-Oct-1991 | 24-Oct-1991 | | 1-Nov-1978 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 53.2 |
| 174 | 8-Mar-2008 | 9-Mar-2023 | 9-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| 175 | 25-Sep-1976 | 25-Sep-1991 | 15-Apr-1987 | 16-Apr-1987 | 14-Apr-1992 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 176 | 13-Mar-1986 | 13-Mar-2001 | 13-Mar-2001 | 13-Mar-2001 | 9-Jan-2007 | ELECTIVE | 74.6 |
| 177 | 18-Feb-1977 | 18-Feb-1992 | 18-Feb-1992 | 18-Feb-1992 | 15-Oct-1998 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 178 | 4-Aug-1966 | 4-Aug-1981 | 21-Jun-1977 | 21-Jun-1977 | 10-Apr-1982 | ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 179 | 9-Jul-1977 | 13-Dec-1996 | 13-Dec-1996 | 13-Dec-1996 | 13-Dec-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 180 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 1-May-2024 | | | | |
| 181 | 24-Sep-2016 | 24-Sep-2031 | 24-Sep-2031 | | | | |
| 182 | 29-Mar-1997 | 28-Mar-2012 | 28-Mar-2012 | 28-Mar-2012 | 2-Sep-2019 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 183 | 9-Feb-2019 | 21-Mar-2035 | 21-Mar-2035 | | | | |
| 184 | 9-May-2007 | 9-May-2022 | 9-May-2022 | | | | |
| 185 | 30-Mar-1974 | 30-Mar-1989 | 18-Jun-1986 | | 7-Nov-1981 | DISABILITY | 65.4 |
| 186 | 9-May-2020 | 10-May-2035 | 10-May-2035 | | | | |
| 187 | 31-Dec-1983 | 13-Jun-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | | 23-Aug-2010 | ELECTIVE | 63.7 |
| 188 | 8-Jan-2021 | 12-Aug-2040 | 12-Aug-2040 | | | | |
| 189 | 10-Jul-1993 | 10-Jul-2008 | 18-Jul-2005 | 18-Jul-2005 | 18-Jul-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 190 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2035 | 28-Aug-2035 | | | | |
| 191 | 1-Oct-1998 | 1-Oct-2013 | 1-Oct-2013 | | 1-Oct-2013 | ELECTIVE | 68.2 |
| 192 | 31-Jul-1994 | 31-Jul-2009 | 31-Jul-2009 | 31-Jul-2009 | 11-Nov-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 193 | 26-Aug-1973 | 30-Jun-1992 | 30-Jun-1992 | 30-Jun-1992 | 13-Sep-2000 | ELECTIVE | 73.2 |
| 194 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 5-Jan-2030 | | | | |
| 195 | 8-Sep-2012 | 20-Sep-2027 | 20-Sep-2027 | | | | |
| 196 | 12-Jan-2013 | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | | |
| 197 | 26-Jun-1997 | 10-Mar-2014 | 10-Mar-2014 | 10-Mar-2014 | | | |
| 198 | 13-Jul-1985 | 13-Jul-2000 | 12-Jan-2000 | 12-Jan-2000 | 10-Apr-2004 | ELECTIVE | 74.2 |
| 199 | 21-Jun-1974 | 1-Mar-1993 | 1-Mar-1993 | 1-Mar-1993 | 12-Jan-1999 | ELECTIVE | 70.9 |
| 200 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2030 | 22-Jul-2030 | | | | |
| 201 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 7-Nov-2023 | | | | |
| 202 | 18-Feb-1972 | 11-Jun-1996 | 11-Jun-1996 | | 11-Jun-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 203 | 9-Aug-1934 | 2-Dec-1964 | 2-Dec-1964 | | 2-Dec-1964 | ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 204 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 24-Sep-2031 | | | | |
| 205 | 30-Aug-1975 | 15-May-1994 | | | 17-May-1987 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 58.0 |
| 206 | 2-Jul-2005 | 2-Jul-2020 | 2-Jul-2020 | | 11-Mar-2019 | Early Retirement | 67.3 |
| 207 | 10-Jul-1993 | 10-Jul-2008 | 4-Sep-2005 | 9-Sep-2005 | 9-Dec-2008 | ELECTIVE | 73.3 |
| 208 | 21-Dec-1950 | 9-Jan-1967 | 9-Jan-1967 | 17-Dec-1975 | 9-Jan-1977 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 209 | 18-Jul-2019 | 18-Jul-2034 | 1-Sep-2029 | | | | |
| 210 | 11-Apr-1974 | 11-Apr-1989 | | | 9-Jan-1978 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 60.6 |
| 211 | 9-May-1997 | 31-Mar-2013 | 31-Mar-2013 | 31-Mar-2013 | 8-Jan-2014 | ELECTIVE | 64.9 |
| 212 | 29-May-1971 | 13-Sep-1997 | 13-Sep-1997 | 13-Sep-1997 | 13-Sep-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 213 | 7-Nov-2008 | 27-May-2023 | 7-Nov-2018 | 7-Nov-2018 | | | |
| 214 | 24-Dec-1989 | 24-Dec-2004 | 12-Oct-2003 | 25-May-2008 | 12-Oct-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 215 | 1-Apr-1992 | 25-Jan-2011 | 25-Jan-2011 | | | | |
| 216 | 9-Sep-1938 | 9-Sep-1953 | 9-Sep-1953 | | 19-Feb-1963 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 217 | 16-Aug-1942 | 16-Aug-1957 | 16-Aug-1957 | | 8-Feb-1964 | ELECTIVE | 72.1 |
| 218 | 8-Sep-2012 | 8-Sep-2027 | 15-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| 219 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 27-Sep-2030 | | | | |
| 220 | 21-May-1999 | 21-May-2014 | 28-Feb-2014 | 28-Feb-2014 | 28-Feb-2019 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 221 | 24-Jun-1978 | 26-Feb-1999 | 19-Sep-2001 | | 9-Jan-2005 | ELECTIVE | 68.3 |
| 222 | 12-Feb-1998 | 31-Aug-2013 | 31-Aug-2013 | 8-Jan-2014 | | | |
| 223 | 18-Aug-1946 | 25-Nov-1966 | 25-Nov-1966 | | 25-Nov-1976 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 224 | 7-Feb-2002 | 7-Feb-2017 | 7-Feb-2017 | 7-Feb-2017 | | | |
| 225 | 21-Jun-1969 | 25-Dec-1987 | 25-Dec-1987 | 25-Dec-1987 | 25-Dec-1997 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 226 | 9-Nov-1978 | 9-Nov-1993 | 9-Nov-1993 | 30-Nov-1996 | 19-Jan-1999 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 227 | 10-May-2014 | 1-Dec-2031 | 1-Dec-2031 | | | | |
| 228 | 5-Nov-1981 | 5-Nov-1996 | 5-Nov-1996 | 5-Nov-1996 | 29-Dec-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 229 | 31-Jul-1943 | 15-Oct-1960 | 15-Oct-1960 | | 15-Oct-1970 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 230 | 9-May-2007 | 12-Mar-2023 | 12-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| 231 | 19-Jun-1985 | 25-Jan-1996 | 25-Jan-1996 | 25-Jan-1996 | 9-Jun-2000 | ELECTIVE | 74.4 |
| 232 | 1-Oct-1998 | 1-Oct-2013 | 1-Oct-2013 | | 16-Dec-2012 | Early Retirement | 66.7 |
| 233 | 24-Sep-1961 | 9-Jul-1978 | 9-Jul-1978 | 10-Jul-1978 | 9-Dec-1983 | ELECTIVE | 70.4 |
| 234 | 5-Jan-2002 | 16-Oct-2019 | 16-Oct-2019 | | 9-Dec-2017 | Early Retirement | 60.4 |
| 235 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 6-Oct-2029 | | | | |
| 236 | 26-Aug-1973 | 26-Aug-1988 | 23-Sep-1986 | 24-Sep-1986 | 27-Apr-1991 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.6 |
| 237 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | | |
| 238 | 18-Oct-1980 | 7-Dec-1991 | 7-Dec-1991 | 7-Dec-1991 | 9-Dec-1994 | ELECTIVE | 73.0 |
| 239 | 7-Mar-1981 | 15-Jun-2003 | 24-Mar-2007 | 10-Dec-2007 | 10-Dec-2017 | COMPULSORY | 72.2 |
| 240 | 12-Jul-2020 | 12-Jul-2035 | 7-Oct-2033 | | | | |
| 241 | 27-Mar-1988 | 15-Oct-2007 | 2-May-2012 | | 14-Feb-2005 | DEATH (RPC) | 57.8 |
| 242 | 1-Jul-1950 | 1-Jul-1965 | 1-Jul-1965 | | 17-Aug-1961 | DISABILITY | 65.0 |
| 243 | 31-Oct-1981 | 31-Oct-1996 | 11-Feb-1992 | 11-Feb-1992 | 11-Feb-1997 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 244 | 30-May-1996 | 31-May-2011 | 31-May-2011 | 31-May-2011 | 21-Feb-2019 | ELECTIVE | 74.0 |
| 245 | 19-Oct-1963 | 13-Jun-1978 | 19-Oct-1973 | 19-Oct-1975 | 13-Jun-1978 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 246 | 10-Dec-1975 | 10-Dec-1990 | 10-Dec-1990 | 10-Dec-1990 | 19-Jan-1998 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 247 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 11-Apr-2010 | ELECTIVE | 70.3 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 248 | 1-Feb-1997 | 13-May-2013 | 13-May-2013 | | 9-Jan-2010 DISABILITY | 60.4 |
| 249 | 11-Aug-2018 | 11-Aug-2033 | 11-Aug-2033 | | | |
| 250 | 7-Mar-1984 | 8-Mar-1999 | 25-Dec-1997 | 25-Dec-1997 | 11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | 71.3 |
| 251 | 31-Dec-1983 | 31-Dec-1998 | 31-Dec-1998 | | 7-Sep-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.4 |
| 252 | 21-Jul-1990 | 21-Jul-2005 | 21-Jul-2005 | 21-Jul-2005 | 17-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 253 | 2-Apr-1998 | 24-Jul-2016 | 24-Jul-2016 | 9-Oct-2016 | | |
| 254 | 30-Jul-2005 | 2-Nov-2020 | 2-Nov-2020 | 2-Nov-2020 | | |
| 255 | 26-Jun-1997 | 17-Aug-2014 | 17-Aug-2014 | 10-Apr-2016 | | |
| 256 | 20-Jun-1992 | 20-Aug-2007 | 20-Aug-2007 | 18-Oct-2007 | 8-Nov-2015 ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 257 | 5-Oct-2002 | 5-Oct-2017 | 5-Oct-2017 | 5-Oct-2017 | | |
| 258 | 8-Apr-1948 | 2-Jan-1958 | 9-Apr-1958 | | 7-Oct-1953 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.8 |
| 259 | 3-Nov-1988 | 15-May-2008 | 15-May-2008 | 11-Apr-2017 | | |
| 260 | 7-May-1994 | 2-May-2012 | 2-May-2012 | | 9-Mar-2009 Early Retirement | 58.9 |
| 261 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 7-Dec-2033 | | | |
| 262 | 17-Mar-1965 | 3-Jun-1986 | 3-Jun-1986 | 3-Jun-1986 | 3-Jun-1994 ELECTIVE | 73.0 |
| 263 | 24-Jul-1957 | 13-Jun-1973 | 13-Jun-1973 | | 10-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE | 65.8 |
| 264 | 2-Mar-2006 | 2-Mar-2021 | 2-Mar-2021 | | | |
| 265 | 27-Mar-2014 | 11-Mar-2031 | 11-Mar-2031 | | | |
| 266 | 27-Oct-1988 | 20-Sep-2006 | 20-Sep-2006 | | 9-Jun-1998 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 56.7 |
| 267 | 11-Oct-1980 | 30-Oct-1994 | 11-Oct-1990 | | 3-Jan-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.2 |
| 268 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | |
| 269 | 18-Jan-1972 | 19-Aug-1981 | | | 19-Aug-1981 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 270 | 24-Apr-1966 | 24-Apr-1981 | 24-Apr-1981 | 25-Apr-1981 | 24-Oct-1982 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.9 |
| 271 | 5-Aug-2007 | 3-Feb-2024 | 3-Feb-2024 | | | |
| 272 | 9-Jan-2014 | 23-Nov-2031 | 23-Nov-2031 | | | |
| 273 | 30-Nov-1985 | 13-Mar-2003 | 23-Jun-2005 | | 16-Jul-2003 ELECTIVE | 63.1 |
| 274 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 27-Sep-2024 | | | |
| 275 | 8-Jul-1999 | 8-Jul-2014 | 8-Jul-2014 | | 18-Aug-2005 DISABILITY | 56.7 |
| 276 | 29-Mar-2018 | 29-Mar-2033 | 29-Mar-2033 | | | |
| 277 | 19-Aug-2017 | 19-Aug-2032 | 19-Aug-2032 | | | |
| 278 | 9-Jun-2012 | 24-Jun-2029 | 24-Jun-2029 | | | |
| 279 | 19-Jan-1992 | 28-Nov-2008 | 8-Oct-2010 | | 24-Jul-1997 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 51.8 |
| 280 | 23-Jan-1959 | 23-Jan-1974 | 8-Nov-1971 | 9-May-1973 | 8-Nov-1976 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 281 | 6-May-1972 | 16-Mar-1989 | 16-Mar-1989 | 9-Sep-1990 | 16-Mar-1999 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 282 | 21-Mar-2003 | 21-Mar-2018 | 21-Mar-2018 | 21-Mar-2018 | 10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 283 | 2-Nov-1969 | 2-Nov-1984 | 21-Nov-1983 | 21-Nov-1983 | 21-Nov-1988 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 284 | 14-Jun-2014 | 14-Jun-2029 | 14-Jun-2029 | | | |
| 285 | 5-Sep-1985 | 16-Jul-2000 | 16-Jul-2000 | | 16-Jul-2000 ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 286 | 10-Jun-1965 | 17-Oct-1970 | 10-Jun-1975 | | 17-Oct-1975 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 287 | 5-Jul-1962 | 5-Jul-1977 | 5-Jul-1977 | | 3-Nov-1984 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 288 | 16-May-2015 | 8-Feb-2031 | 8-Feb-2031 | | | |
| 289 | 8-Mar-1975 | 6-Feb-1997 | 6-Feb-1997 | 29-Sep-2004 | 6-Feb-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 290 | 15-Feb-1968 | 21-Dec-1991 | 21-Dec-1991 | 21-Dec-1991 | 8-Jan-1995 ELECTIVE | 68.0 |
| 291 | 23-Mar-1985 | 10-Jul-1995 | 23-Mar-1995 | 23-Mar-1995 | 10-Jul-1995 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 292 | 5-Jan-2002 | 3-May-2018 | 3-May-2018 | | | |
| 293 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | | 16-Jun-2005 DISABILITY | 59.1 |
| 294 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 8-Mar-2012 | 8-Mar-2012 | 9-Mar-2017 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 295 | 23-Jun-1965 | 23-Jun-1980 | 20-Jun-1980 | 20-Jun-1980 | 9-Dec-1982 ELECTIVE | 72.5 |
| 296 | 21-Aug-1992 | 21-Aug-2007 | 21-Aug-2007 | 21-Aug-2007 | 10-Apr-2015 ELECTIVE | 74.6 |
| 297 | 5-Oct-2002 | 5-Oct-2017 | 13-May-2017 | | 8-Jan-2016 Early Retirement | 68.7 |
| 298 | 19-Sep-1981 | 19-Sep-1996 | 19-Sep-1996 | | 4-Nov-1990 DISABILITY | 63.6 |
| 299 | 26-May-1996 | 5-Dec-2013 | 5-Dec-2013 | 10-Dec-2014 | | |
| 300 | 15-Oct-2015 | 16-Sep-2032 | 16-Sep-2032 | | | |
| 301 | 27-Feb-2005 | 17-May-2021 | 17-May-2021 | | | |
| 302 | 19-Jan-1992 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | 9-Jan-2010 ELECTIVE | 69.8 |
| 303 | 9-Jan-2014 | 9-Jan-2029 | 9-Jan-2029 | | | |
| 304 | 14-Sep-2018 | 14-Sep-2033 | 3-Oct-2029 | | | |
| 305 | 9-Feb-1967 | 9-Feb-1982 | 9-Feb-1982 | | 4-Apr-1982 ELECTIVE | 65.3 |
| 306 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-May-2003 | 14-May-2003 | 13-May-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 307 | 24-Sep-2016 | 26-Apr-2036 | 26-Apr-2036 | | | |
| 308 | 30-Nov-1985 | 1-Jan-2001 | 2-Feb-2001 | 11-Apr-2001 | 10-Dec-2002 ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 309 | 23-Nov-1995 | 13-May-2014 | 13-May-2014 | 13-May-2014 | 9-Oct-2019 ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 310 | 10-Jul-1993 | 6-Mar-2011 | 6-Mar-2011 | | 10-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE | 65.1 |
| 311 | 4-Jul-1979 | 4-Jul-1994 | 4-Jul-1994 | | 30-Sep-1989 DISABILITY | 61.0 |
| 312 | 24-Jul-2019 | 24-Jul-2034 | 24-Jul-2034 | | | |
| 313 | 11-Jan-1996 | 27-Jan-2012 | 27-Jan-2012 | 13-Feb-2013 | 23-Sep-2015 DEATH (RPC) | 67.6 |
| 314 | 7-Dec-2018 | 10-Mar-2034 | 10-Mar-2034 | | | |
| 315 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 14-Jun-2023 | | | |
| 316 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 27-Sep-2024 | | | |
| 317 | 7-Oct-1984 | 12-Dec-2001 | 16-Feb-2004 | | 9-Feb-2002 Early Retirement | 63.0 |
| 318 | 18-Apr-1998 | 17-Apr-2008 | | | 29-Jan-2012 ELECTIVE | 72.5 |
| 319 | 10-Mar-1979 | 11-Mar-1999 | 11-Mar-1999 | | 24-Mar-1995 DISABILITY | 61.0 |
| 320 | 4-Jan-1969 | 2-Apr-1990 | 2-Apr-1990 | 2-Apr-1990 | 1-Apr-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 321 | 4-Nov-2000 | 1-Mar-2013 | 4-Nov-2010 | 11-Apr-2011 | 1-Mar-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 322 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 8-Dec-2018 | 8-Dec-2018 | | |
| 323 | 12-Jun-2020 | 12-Jun-2035 | 12-Jun-2035 | | | |
| 324 | 1-Oct-1998 | 20-Apr-2015 | 20-Apr-2015 | | 20-Mar-2013 Early Retirement | 61.4 |
| 325 | 10-Dec-1976 | 10-Dec-1991 | 10-Dec-1991 | 10-Dec-1991 | 8-Feb-1994 ELECTIVE | 71.6 |
| 326 | 27-Mar-1982 | 11-Sep-1996 | 26-Mar-1992 | 10-Dec-1992 | 11-Sep-1996 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 327 | 8-Jun-1961 | 5-Apr-1968 | 8-Jun-1971 | | 6-Apr-1973 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 328 | 9-Jun-1962 | 30-Aug-1977 | 30-Aug-1977 | | 25-Jan-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 53.4 |
| 329 | 23-Nov-2017 | 12-Apr-2033 | 12-Apr-2033 | | | |
| 330 | 21-Aug-1992 | 23-Mar-2009 | 23-Mar-2009 | 23-Mar-2009 | 10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | 67.5 |
| 331 | 19-Jan-1992 | 1-Nov-2012 | 1-Nov-2012 | 11-Apr-2019 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|--|--|------|
| 332 | 25-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2022 | 25-Mar-2022 | | | | | | |
| 333 | 6-Apr-1952 | 10-Dec-1974 | 10-Dec-1974 | 16-Oct-1976 | 7-Apr-1982 | ELECTIVE | | | 72.3 |
| 334 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 1-May-2024 | | | | | | |
| 335 | 20-Aug-1959 | 20-Aug-1974 | 20-Aug-1974 | | 18-Mar-1980 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 336 | 27-Mar-1968 | 12-Sep-1990 | 12-Sep-1990 | 12-Sep-1990 | 24-Jul-1991 | ELECTIVE | | | 65.9 |
| 337 | 21-Jul-1990 | 21-Jul-2005 | 21-Jul-2005 | | 22-Apr-2002 | Early Retirement | | | 62.7 |
| 338 | 29-Jan-1954 | 18-Dec-1970 | 18-Dec-1970 | | 13-Nov-1972 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 66.9 |
| 339 | 21-Mar-2010 | 21-Mar-2025 | 21-Mar-2025 | | | | | | |
| 340 | 26-Nov-1965 | 6-Mar-1981 | 6-Mar-1981 | 11-Mar-1981 | 6-Mar-1991 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 341 | 21-Jan-1982 | 22-Mar-2000 | 21-May-2003 | 21-May-2003 | 11-May-2013 | ELECTIVE | | | 75.0 |
| 342 | 30-Mar-1974 | 30-Mar-1989 | 30-Mar-1989 | 24-Apr-1992 | 2-May-1996 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 343 | 29-Sep-1984 | 29-Sep-1999 | 29-Sep-1999 | 29-Sep-1999 | 15-Aug-2007 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 74.9 |
| 344 | 2-Jan-1982 | 26-Feb-1999 | 19-Nov-1999 | 19-Nov-1999 | 19-Nov-2009 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 345 | 30-Nov-1985 | 30-Nov-2000 | 30-Nov-2000 | 9-Jan-2007 | 15-Feb-2008 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 346 | 27-Feb-2004 | 27-Feb-2019 | 16-Sep-2017 | 24-Sep-2017 | | | | | |
| 347 | 15-Jan-1998 | 15-Jan-2013 | 15-Jan-2013 | 15-Jan-2013 | 9-Dec-2018 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.4 |
| 348 | 14-Aug-1992 | 18-Oct-2012 | 18-Oct-2012 | 18-Oct-2012 | | | | | |
| 349 | 12-May-1951 | 18-Jul-1971 | 18-Jul-1971 | | 18-Jul-1981 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 350 | 8-May-1966 | 24-Jul-1982 | 24-Jul-1982 | 23-Jun-1983 | 24-Jul-1992 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 351 | 7-May-1977 | 6-May-1992 | 6-May-1992 | 6-May-1992 | 9-Mar-1996 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.7 |
| 352 | 7-Oct-1984 | 7-Oct-1999 | 7-Oct-1999 | | 22-Apr-1998 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 66.9 |
| 353 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 6-Jun-2019 | 6-Jun-2019 | | | | | |
| 354 | 18-Jan-1957 | 3-Jun-1975 | 3-Jun-1975 | | 16-Sep-1967 | OTHER | | | 57.3 |
| 355 | 26-Mar-2003 | 9-Oct-2021 | 9-Oct-2021 | | 9-Aug-2020 | Early Retirement | | | 60.3 |
| 356 | 12-May-1993 | 11-May-2008 | 19-Dec-2003 | 19-Dec-2003 | 19-Dec-2008 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 357 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 18-Apr-2011 | 20-Apr-2011 | 11-May-2013 | DISABILITY | | | 72.1 |
| 358 | 22-Sep-2018 | 22-Sep-2033 | 19-Oct-2032 | | | | | | |
| 359 | 9-Jun-1995 | 8-Jan-2008 | | | 9-Oct-2008 | ELECTIVE | | | 61.1 |
| 360 | 24-Sep-2016 | 12-Dec-2031 | 12-Dec-2031 | | | | | | |
| 361 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2029 | 30-Nov-2027 | | | | | | |
| 362 | 2-Dec-1964 | 21-Feb-1980 | 21-Feb-1980 | 21-Feb-1980 | 10-Apr-1984 | DISABILITY | | | 69.1 |
| 363 | 28-Apr-2018 | 30-Sep-2034 | 30-Sep-2034 | | | | | | |
| 364 | 6-Mar-1966 | 6-Mar-1981 | 23-Nov-1976 | 23-Nov-1976 | 23-Nov-1981 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 365 | 27-May-1990 | 25-Sep-2008 | 25-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2008 | 8-Sep-2015 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.6 |
| 366 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 29-Apr-2021 | | | | | | |
| 367 | 10-Dec-1975 | 10-Dec-1990 | | | 10-Mar-1989 | DISABILITY | | | 64.0 |
| 368 | 14-Jun-1969 | 7-Jan-1986 | 7-Jan-1986 | 7-Jan-1986 | 8-Jan-1993 | ELECTIVE | | | 72.0 |
| 369 | 21-Oct-1972 | 30-Mar-1995 | 30-Mar-1995 | | 7-Apr-1995 | ELECTIVE | | | 65.0 |
| 370 | 21-Mar-2010 | 3-Apr-2024 | 20-Mar-2020 | 15-Apr-2020 | | | | | |
| 371 | 19-Jul-2014 | 19-Jul-2029 | 19-Jul-2029 | | | | | | |
| 372 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | 10-Apr-2008 | 31-Aug-2013 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 373 | 27-Jun-1940 | 8-Jun-1957 | 8-Jun-1957 | | 11-Apr-1966 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.8 |
| 374 | 15-Feb-1958 | 15-Feb-1973 | 15-Feb-1973 | | 15-Feb-1973 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.0 |
| 375 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | | | | | | |
| 376 | 21-Jan-1978 | 21-Jan-1993 | 21-Jan-1993 | 17-Jul-1993 | 25-Jul-1997 | ELECTIVE | | | 71.8 |
| 377 | 9-Feb-1995 | 4-Feb-2012 | 4-Feb-2012 | 4-Feb-2012 | 11-Jul-2013 | ELECTIVE | | | 64.4 |
| 378 | 26-Oct-1983 | 4-May-1993 | 26-Oct-1993 | | 9-Dec-1990 | DISABILITY | | | 67.6 |
| 379 | 17-Aug-1995 | 17-Aug-2010 | 17-Aug-2010 | 17-Aug-2010 | 17-Jul-2019 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 380 | 14-Sep-2013 | 14-Sep-2028 | 28-Jul-2027 | | | | | | |
| 381 | 26-Jun-1982 | 26-Jun-1997 | 6-Oct-1995 | | 4-Dec-1993 | DISABILITY | | | 68.2 |
| 382 | 27-Sep-2015 | 13-Jul-2031 | 13-Jul-2031 | | | | | | |
| 383 | 5-May-2002 | 18-Nov-2018 | 18-Nov-2018 | 10-Dec-2018 | | | | | |
| 384 | 24-Sep-1993 | 18-Sep-2010 | 11-Sep-2012 | | 22-Apr-1999 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 51.6 |
| 385 | 19-May-1956 | 20-Mar-1970 | 20-Mar-1970 | | 27-Jun-1969 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 69.3 |
| 386 | 21-Sep-1961 | 21-Jun-1969 | 21-Sep-1971 | | 21-Jun-1974 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 387 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 25-May-2021 | | 21-Jul-2019 | DISABILITY | | | 68.2 |
| 388 | 5-Aug-2007 | 5-Oct-2027 | 5-Oct-2027 | | | | | | |
| 389 | 5-Sep-2015 | 5-Sep-2030 | 5-Sep-2030 | | | | | | |
| 390 | 8-Jul-2007 | 8-Jul-2022 | 8-Jul-2022 | | | | | | |
| 391 | 8-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2014 | 10-Apr-2019 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.9 |
| 392 | 14-May-2011 | 27-Apr-2025 | 14-May-2021 | | | | | | |
| 393 | 5-Sep-2015 | 4-Feb-2025 | | | | | | | |
| 394 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 29-Jul-2033 | | | | | | |
| 395 | 21-Sep-1967 | 24-Jul-1978 | 21-Sep-1977 | | 12-May-1969 | DISABILITY | | | 65.8 |
| 396 | 19-Jun-1985 | 19-Jun-2000 | 19-Jun-2000 | | 24-Jan-2007 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 397 | 1-Jul-1978 | 1-Jul-1993 | 1-Jul-1993 | | 1-Jun-1991 | DISABILITY | | | 64.4 |
| 398 | 18-Aug-1956 | 18-Aug-1971 | 1-Nov-1967 | | 1-Nov-1972 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 399 | 6-Jun-1981 | 9-Jul-1989 | 6-Jun-1991 | | 24-Jul-1986 | DISABILITY | | | 67.0 |
| 400 | 18-Jan-1964 | 18-Dec-1985 | 18-Dec-1985 | 19-Dec-1985 | 18-Dec-1995 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 401 | 9-May-2019 | 15-Dec-2036 | 15-Dec-2036 | | | | | | |
| 402 | 9-Feb-2011 | 9-Feb-2026 | 31-Dec-2024 | | | | | | |
| 403 | 23-Oct-1975 | 23-Oct-1990 | 23-Oct-1990 | 9-Aug-1991 | 6-Nov-1993 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 69.2 |
| 404 | 30-Nov-1985 | 20-Apr-1999 | 30-Nov-1995 | 30-Nov-1995 | 20-Apr-1999 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 405 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 3-Apr-2004 | | 12-Jan-2002 | Early Retirement | | | 67.8 |
| 406 | 28-Apr-1965 | 11-Jan-1987 | 11-Jan-1987 | | 24-Jul-1989 | ELECTIVE | | | 67.5 |
| 407 | 5-Jun-2005 | 4-Jun-2020 | 11-Oct-2015 | 11-Oct-2015 | 11-Oct-2020 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 408 | 6-Mar-1980 | 7-Mar-1995 | 7-Mar-1995 | 7-Mar-1995 | 24-Dec-1997 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.7 |
| 409 | 11-Oct-1975 | 17-Aug-1991 | 17-Aug-1991 | 17-Aug-1991 | 16-May-1999 | ELECTIVE | | | 72.7 |
| 410 | 26-Jan-1964 | 29-Jun-1978 | 26-Jan-1974 | | 29-Jun-1978 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 411 | 9-Feb-2006 | 9-Feb-2021 | 13-Mar-2017 | 10-Apr-2017 | | | | | |
| 412 | 7-Dec-2005 | 7-Dec-2020 | 7-Dec-2020 | 9-Dec-2020 | | | | | |
| 413 | 16-May-2015 | 18-Jul-2029 | 16-May-2025 | | | | | | |
| 414 | 31-Mar-1984 | 1-Apr-1999 | 1-Apr-1999 | 1-Apr-1999 | 10-Dec-2002 | ELECTIVE | | | 70.3 |
| 415 | 9-Jun-2001 | 26-Aug-2016 | 26-Aug-2016 | | | | | | |

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|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 416 | 20-Oct-1976 | 15-Dec-1986 | 20-Oct-1986 | | 24-Dec-1981 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 70.0 |
| 417 | 16-Feb-1997 | 24-Aug-2015 | 24-Aug-2015 | 24-Aug-2015 | | |
| 418 | 27-Aug-2003 | 23-Sep-2020 | 23-Sep-2020 | 23-Sep-2020 | | |
| 419 | 9-Jan-2010 | 16-Aug-2021 | 9-Jan-2020 | | 9-Jan-2020 Early Retirement | 73.4 |
| 420 | 27-Sep-1958 | 6-Mar-1977 | 17-Jun-1975 | | 9-Feb-1969 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 56.9 |
| 421 | 22-Nov-1959 | 20-Mar-1982 | 20-Mar-1982 | | 14-Mar-1964 DISABILITY | 47.0 |
| 422 | 14-May-2011 | 25-Nov-2025 | 14-May-2021 | | | |
| 423 | 8-Nov-2001 | 8-Nov-2016 | 8-Nov-2016 | | 8-Feb-2014 Early Retirement | 65.5 |
| 424 | 5-May-1966 | 5-May-1981 | 5-May-1981 | | 19-Mar-1991 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 425 | 6-Feb-1986 | 6-Feb-2001 | 6-Feb-2001 | 7-Feb-2001 | 7-May-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 426 | 2-Jan-1982 | 26-Feb-1999 | 18-Mar-2001 | | 10-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | 63.1 |
| 427 | 29-May-1971 | 13-Oct-1981 | 29-May-1981 | | 13-Oct-1981 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 428 | 19-Dec-1991 | 15-Apr-2007 | 15-Apr-2007 | 11-Apr-2011 | 10-Aug-2017 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 429 | 21-Oct-1987 | 29-Jul-1998 | 21-Oct-1997 | | 9-Oct-1997 DISABILITY | 74.2 |
| 430 | 7-Jan-1978 | 15-Dec-1995 | 15-Dec-1995 | 15-Dec-1995 | 17-Mar-1999 ELECTIVE | 68.3 |
| 431 | 11-Apr-1979 | 16-Oct-1995 | 16-Oct-1995 | 16-Oct-1995 | 14-Dec-2003 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.2 |
| 432 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | | 9-Apr-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.7 |
| 433 | 30-May-2008 | 1-Dec-2023 | 1-Dec-2023 | | | |
| 434 | 16-Feb-1963 | 16-Feb-1978 | 4-Jul-1977 | 6-Jul-1977 | 4-Jul-1982 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 435 | 5-Aug-1948 | 5-Aug-1963 | 5-Aug-1963 | | 2-Jan-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.7 |
| 436 | 28-Apr-1965 | 7-Oct-1984 | 7-Oct-1984 | | 4-Dec-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.2 |
| 437 | 7-Dec-2018 | 16-Mar-2036 | 16-Mar-2036 | | | |
| 438 | 5-Jul-2001 | 5-Jul-2016 | 5-Jul-2016 | | | |
| 439 | 17-Apr-1947 | 31-Dec-1965 | 31-Dec-1965 | | 31-Dec-1975 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 440 | 7-Oct-1984 | 25-Mar-2000 | 10-Sep-2000 | 10-Sep-2000 | 9-Apr-2008 ELECTIVE | 72.6 |
| 441 | 5-Jul-2001 | 17-Jul-2017 | 17-Jul-2017 | 17-Jul-2017 | | |
| 442 | 27-Mar-2014 | 12-Jun-2030 | 12-Jun-2030 | | | |
| 443 | 12-Jul-2018 | 18-Mar-2035 | 18-Mar-2035 | | | |
| 444 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 27-Sep-2030 | | | |
| 445 | 2-Oct-1992 | 13-Mar-2009 | 13-Mar-2009 | | 16-Dec-2009 ELECTIVE | 64.3 |
| 446 | 19-Jan-1992 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | | 12-Sep-1998 DISABILITY | 58.2 |
| 447 | 12-Sep-1986 | 12-Sep-2001 | 7-Sep-1999 | | 9-Apr-1992 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 62.6 |
| 448 | 17-Jun-1961 | 17-Jun-1976 | 11-Dec-1972 | 11-Dec-1972 | 11-Dec-1977 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 449 | 9-Feb-2019 | 9-Feb-2034 | 9-Feb-2034 | | | |
| 450 | 12-Jun-2020 | 8-Oct-2038 | 8-Oct-2038 | | | |
| 451 | 19-Apr-1996 | 15-Feb-2012 | 15-Feb-2012 | 13-Dec-2012 | | |
| 452 | 29-Mar-1970 | 29-Mar-1985 | 29-Mar-1985 | 30-Mar-1985 | 20-Jul-1990 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 453 | 7-Jan-1954 | 9-Feb-1967 | 9-Feb-1967 | | 20-Nov-1960 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.8 |
| 454 | 7-Jan-2012 | 7-Jan-2027 | 7-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 455 | 1-Apr-1978 | 1-Apr-1993 | 1-Apr-1993 | 2-Apr-1993 | 9-Oct-1998 ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 456 | 19-Oct-1991 | 30-May-2007 | 30-May-2007 | 30-May-2007 | 12-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | 70.3 |
| 457 | 21-Sep-1967 | 18-Oct-1985 | 18-Oct-1985 | | 19-Feb-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.3 |
| 458 | 5-Feb-1977 | 5-Feb-1992 | 5-Feb-1992 | 5-Feb-1992 | 9-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE | 70.2 |
| 459 | 6-Aug-1995 | 6-Aug-2010 | 29-Nov-2008 | | 26-Sep-2001 DISABILITY | 62.8 |
| 460 | 30-Sep-2017 | 30-Sep-2032 | 30-Sep-2032 | | | |
| 461 | 14-Nov-2010 | 23-May-2026 | 23-May-2026 | | | |
| 462 | 1-Apr-1996 | 16-Apr-2011 | 16-Apr-2011 | 16-Apr-2011 | 8-Nov-2018 ELECTIVE | 72.5 |
| 463 | 13-Nov-1982 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 11-Apr-2003 ELECTIVE | 72.3 |
| 464 | 9-Jan-1967 | 20-Jun-1983 | 20-Jun-1983 | 20-Jun-1983 | 20-Jun-1993 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 465 | 14-Jan-1984 | 11-Oct-2001 | 9-Jul-2004 | 9-Jul-2004 | 9-Jul-2014 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 466 | 8-Jul-2007 | 8-Jul-2022 | 23-May-2021 | | | |
| 467 | 30-Sep-2014 | 30-Sep-2029 | 13-Jul-2028 | | | |
| 468 | 10-Aug-2019 | 10-Aug-2034 | 10-Aug-2034 | | | |
| 469 | 21-Mar-2009 | 20-Mar-2024 | 28-Dec-2022 | | | |
| 470 | 8-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2014 | 16-Dec-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 471 | 30-Jan-2005 | 30-Jan-2020 | 23-Jan-2020 | 23-Jan-2020 | | |
| 472 | 13-Nov-1982 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 2-Nov-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 473 | 23-Jul-2005 | 23-Jul-2020 | 28-Nov-2017 | 28-Nov-2017 | 9-Sep-2020 ELECTIVE | 72.8 |
| 474 | 30-Jun-1967 | 7-Jul-1990 | 7-Jul-1990 | | 25-Aug-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.1 |
| 475 | 9-Jun-1961 | 28-May-1981 | 28-May-1981 | 9-Aug-1981 | 28-May-1991 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 476 | 17-Jul-1971 | 29-Jun-1993 | 29-Jun-1993 | 8-Jan-1994 | 29-Jun-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 477 | 7-Mar-1970 | 17-Mar-1994 | 17-Mar-1994 | 17-Mar-1994 | 10-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE | 67.7 |
| 478 | 15-Oct-1983 | 16-Jan-2000 | 18-Apr-2001 | 18-Apr-2001 | 10-Dec-2007 ELECTIVE | 71.6 |
| 479 | 23-Nov-1951 | 30-Apr-1967 | 30-Apr-1967 | | 5-Feb-1970 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.8 |
| 480 | 17-Dec-1995 | 19-Jun-2014 | 19-Jun-2014 | | 10-Apr-2011 Early Retirement | 58.3 |
| 481 | 21-Jul-1990 | 18-Aug-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 8-Aug-2013 ELECTIVE | 70.9 |
| 482 | 14-Aug-1992 | 23-Aug-2004 | 14-Aug-2002 | | 23-Aug-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 483 | 10-Jun-1978 | 30-Apr-1990 | 30-Apr-1990 | 10-Nov-1991 | 30-Apr-1995 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 484 | 12-Feb-1983 | 29-Mar-2000 | 14-May-2002 | 14-May-2002 | 13-May-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 485 | 25-Dec-2003 | 25-Dec-2018 | 25-Dec-2018 | 25-Dec-2018 | | |
| 486 | 7-Jan-1989 | 25-Feb-2005 | 14-Apr-2006 | 14-Apr-2006 | 23-Feb-2009 ELECTIVE | 67.9 |
| 487 | 18-Aug-2007 | 18-Aug-2022 | 13-May-2020 | 13-May-2020 | | |
| 488 | 21-Jul-1990 | 27-May-2009 | | | | |
| 489 | 7-Dec-2001 | 7-Dec-2016 | 17-Aug-2014 | 17-Aug-2014 | 8-Feb-2018 ELECTIVE | 73.5 |
| 490 | 12-Feb-2004 | 12-Feb-2019 | 29-Jun-2018 | 29-Jun-2018 | | |
| 491 | 3-Feb-2018 | 26-Jan-2030 | 3-Feb-2028 | | | |
| 492 | 31-Jul-1983 | 31-Jul-1998 | 21-Dec-1996 | | 9-Jan-1989 DISABILITY | 62.1 |
| 493 | 16-Sep-1999 | 16-Sep-2014 | 16-Sep-2014 | | 28-May-2009 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.0 |
| 494 | 8-Jul-2007 | 9-Sep-2019 | 8-Jul-2017 | | 9-Sep-2017 Early Retirement | 73.0 |
| 495 | 15-Mar-1984 | 4-May-1998 | 16-Mar-1994 | 10-Apr-1994 | 4-May-1998 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 496 | 6-Apr-1996 | 7-Sep-2015 | 7-Sep-2015 | 9-Sep-2015 | | |
| 497 | 4-Dec-1966 | 7-Aug-1989 | 7-Aug-1989 | 4-Dec-1989 | 29-Mar-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.6 |
| 498 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-2002 | 21-Apr-2000 | 21-Apr-2000 | 9-Feb-2003 ELECTIVE | 72.8 |
| 499 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 27-Mar-2029 | | | |

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|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 500 | 22-Sep-1965 | 13-Apr-1979 | 13-Apr-1979 | 13-Apr-1979 | 8-Oct-1983 | ELECTIVE | 74.5 |
| 501 | 9-Aug-1978 | 19-May-1996 | 19-May-1996 | 19-May-1996 | 20-May-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 502 | 29-Aug-2019 | 29-Aug-2034 | 29-Aug-2034 | | | | |
| 503 | 31-Jan-1988 | 1-Dec-1996 | | | 12-Nov-1988 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.9 |
| 504 | 10-Dec-1970 | 10-Dec-1985 | 1-Sep-1984 | | 25-Mar-1982 | DISABILITY | 67.6 |
| 505 | 29-Mar-1987 | 4-Sep-2001 | 4-Sep-2001 | | 12-Aug-2000 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.9 |
| 506 | 6-Mar-2010 | 6-Mar-2025 | 20-Nov-2021 | | | | |
| 507 | 12-Jul-2018 | 18-Oct-2034 | 18-Oct-2034 | | | | |
| 508 | 26-Oct-1983 | 18-Dec-1996 | 26-Oct-1993 | | 24-Jun-1989 | DISABILITY | 67.5 |
| 509 | 4-Jan-2004 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | | | |
| 510 | 30-Jan-2010 | 30-Jan-2025 | 30-Jan-2025 | | | | |
| 511 | 9-Oct-2017 | 9-Oct-2032 | 9-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 512 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 20-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 513 | 6-Nov-2009 | 6-Nov-2024 | 24-May-2022 | | | | |
| 514 | 30-Mar-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 16-Jun-2000 | 9-Jan-2010 | 16-Jun-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 515 | 29-Sep-2012 | 12-Aug-2031 | 12-Aug-2031 | | | | |
| 516 | 10-Aug-1989 | 27-Aug-2007 | 27-Aug-2007 | 8-Jan-2020 | 12-Sep-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 517 | 7-Jun-1969 | 4-Feb-1995 | 4-Feb-1995 | 9-Feb-1995 | 4-Feb-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 518 | 5-Sep-1998 | 5-Sep-2013 | 29-Aug-2012 | 29-Aug-2012 | 9-Dec-2015 | ELECTIVE | 73.3 |
| 519 | 3-Jul-2019 | 25-Aug-2030 | 3-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 520 | 12-Feb-2004 | 12-Feb-2019 | 12-Feb-2019 | 12-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 521 | 24-Jan-2002 | 14-Feb-2018 | 14-Feb-2018 | 14-Feb-2018 | | | |
| 522 | 27-May-1999 | 27-May-2014 | 27-May-2014 | 27-May-2014 | | | |
| 523 | 7-Mar-1993 | 15-Sep-2011 | 15-Sep-2011 | 15-Sep-2011 | 10-Mar-2018 | ELECTIVE | 68.0 |
| 524 | 21-Jan-1982 | 12-Dec-2002 | 2-Nov-2008 | | 12-Dec-2002 | ELECTIVE | 59.1 |
| 525 | 26-Sep-2010 | 15-Jul-2022 | 26-Sep-2020 | 26-Sep-2020 | | | |
| 526 | 7-Jun-1961 | 21-May-1974 | 21-May-1974 | | 6-Jun-1971 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.0 |
| 527 | 15-Feb-2002 | 15-Feb-2017 | 15-Feb-2017 | 15-Feb-2017 | 10-Dec-2020 | ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 528 | 13-Nov-1982 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 10-Apr-2006 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 529 | 10-Jun-1978 | 2-Sep-1996 | 2-Sep-1996 | | 11-Jan-1992 | DISABILITY | 60.4 |
| 530 | 27-Sep-2009 | 11-Mar-2027 | 11-Mar-2027 | | | | |
| 531 | 29-Sep-2018 | 29-Sep-2033 | 29-Sep-2033 | | | | |
| 532 | 27-Sep-2015 | 14-Apr-2032 | 14-Apr-2032 | | | | |
| 533 | 30-Mar-1975 | 2-Feb-1991 | | | 9-Sep-1999 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 534 | 14-Sep-2013 | 8-Jun-2031 | 8-Jun-2031 | | | | |
| 535 | 9-May-1997 | 25-Jul-2014 | 25-Jul-2014 | 10-Oct-2016 | | | |
| 536 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 21-Feb-2015 | | | |
| 537 | 12-Aug-1977 | 2-Oct-1993 | 2-Oct-1993 | 20-Feb-1994 | 8-Jan-1997 | ELECTIVE | 68.3 |
| 538 | 17-Jul-1991 | 7-Dec-2009 | 7-Dec-2009 | | | | |
| 539 | 28-Jan-1999 | 28-Jan-2014 | 28-Jan-2014 | 28-Jan-2014 | 9-Apr-2020 | ELECTIVE | 72.0 |
| 540 | 5-Jan-1995 | 5-Jan-2010 | 5-Jan-2010 | 5-Jan-2010 | 13-Jun-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 541 | 8-Oct-1989 | 4-Nov-2007 | 4-Nov-2007 | 4-Nov-2007 | 11-Apr-2011 | ELECTIVE | 65.4 |
| 542 | 5-Sep-1981 | 5-Sep-1996 | 5-Sep-1996 | 8-Sep-1996 | 4-Nov-2004 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 543 | 6-Jun-2015 | 6-Jun-2030 | 5-Feb-2028 | | | | |
| 544 | 24-Oct-1976 | 4-Apr-1997 | 4-Apr-1997 | 11-Apr-1997 | 2-Jun-1998 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.2 |
| 545 | 27-Sep-2009 | 17-May-2027 | 17-May-2027 | | | | |
| 546 | 23-Dec-2006 | 23-Dec-2021 | 23-Dec-2021 | | | | |
| 547 | 11-Apr-1951 | 11-Apr-1966 | 11-Apr-1966 | | 9-Aug-1972 | ELECTIVE | 74.6 |
| 548 | 4-Feb-1988 | 4-Feb-2003 | 15-Nov-2002 | 15-Nov-2002 | 15-Nov-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 549 | 7-Mar-1981 | 26-Feb-1999 | 6-Apr-1999 | 6-Apr-1999 | 15-Dec-2001 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.7 |
| 550 | 5-Jun-2005 | 5-Feb-2022 | 5-Feb-2022 | | | | |
| 551 | 13-Oct-1985 | 21-Sep-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 30-Aug-2010 | 30-Aug-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 552 | 28-Jul-1988 | 10-Feb-2005 | 25-Aug-2006 | 25-Aug-2006 | 25-Aug-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 553 | 22-Sep-1956 | 22-May-1978 | 22-May-1978 | 8-Oct-1978 | 21-May-1988 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 554 | 3-Aug-1995 | 17-Apr-2007 | 3-Aug-2005 | 3-Aug-2005 | 17-Apr-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 555 | 9-Jan-1967 | 31-Jan-1977 | 31-Jan-1977 | 31-Jan-1977 | 31-Jan-1982 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 556 | 28-Oct-2015 | 28-Oct-2030 | 28-Oct-2030 | | | | |
| 557 | 5-Aug-1978 | 5-Aug-1993 | 5-Aug-1993 | 5-Aug-1993 | 9-Sep-1998 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 558 | 28-Jan-2012 | 28-Jan-2027 | 28-Jan-2027 | | | | |
| 559 | 11-Jan-1975 | 11-Jan-1990 | 23-Jun-1985 | | 10-May-1981 | DISABILITY | 65.9 |
| 560 | 27-Sep-1998 | 27-Sep-2013 | 5-Dec-2010 | 5-Dec-2010 | 8-Jan-2014 | ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 561 | 26-Oct-1983 | 25-Feb-2001 | 28-Jun-2003 | 28-Jun-2003 | 28-Jun-2013 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 562 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 11-Jun-2001 | 11-Jun-2001 | 12-Jan-2005 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 563 | 20-Feb-1959 | 1-May-1967 | 20-Feb-1969 | | 30-Apr-1972 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 564 | 24-Oct-1981 | 24-Oct-1996 | 24-Oct-1996 | 24-Oct-1996 | 9-Feb-2000 | ELECTIVE | 72.1 |
| 565 | 22-Oct-1972 | 27-Dec-1987 | 27-Dec-1987 | | 23-Oct-1986 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.8 |
| 566 | 27-May-1967 | 27-May-1982 | 9-Jan-1981 | | 5-Feb-1977 | DISABILITY | 66.1 |
| 567 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 29-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 568 | 9-Aug-2001 | 9-Aug-2016 | 15-Oct-2015 | 15-Oct-2015 | 15-Oct-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 569 | 24-Mar-2002 | 27-Jan-2019 | 27-Jan-2019 | | 20-Dec-2015 | DISABILITY | 60.0 |
| 570 | 27-Feb-2005 | 24-Jun-2020 | 24-Jun-2020 | | | | |
| 571 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 23-May-2023 | | | | |
| 572 | 6-Jan-2019 | 1-Nov-2035 | 1-Nov-2035 | | | | |
| 573 | 10-Dec-1972 | 18-Dec-1996 | 18-Dec-1996 | | 18-Dec-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 574 | 10-Jul-1993 | 10-Jul-2008 | 31-Dec-2006 | 1-Jan-2007 | 31-Dec-2011 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 575 | 24-Sep-1993 | 4-Dec-2013 | 4-Dec-2013 | 12-Feb-2014 | 8-Aug-2018 | ELECTIVE | 64.5 |
| 576 | 5-Jul-1975 | 6-Sep-1992 | 6-Sep-1992 | 6-Sep-1992 | 9-Aug-2002 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 577 | 21-Sep-1961 | 23-Feb-1982 | 23-Feb-1982 | | 23-Feb-1982 | ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 578 | 24-Nov-1960 | 27-Apr-1983 | 27-Apr-1983 | | 8-Apr-1979 | OTHER | 60.9 |
| 579 | 21-Oct-1987 | 21-Oct-2002 | 21-Oct-2002 | 21-Oct-2002 | 29-Feb-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 580 | 31-May-1979 | 9-Feb-1996 | 9-Feb-1996 | 23-May-2001 | 9-Feb-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 581 | 25-Aug-1983 | 29-Jan-2000 | 3-Jul-2001 | 11-Apr-2002 | 3-Jul-2011 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 582 | 18-Apr-1999 | 18-Apr-2014 | 18-Apr-2014 | 18-Apr-2014 | 9-Dec-2019 | ELECTIVE | 74.1 |
| 583 | 7-Mar-1993 | 6-Mar-2008 | 6-Mar-2008 | | 9-Aug-2006 | Early Retirement | 65.9 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 584 | 19-Oct-1991 | 9-Nov-2007 | 9-Nov-2007 | 9-Nov-2007 | 9-Feb-2013 ELECTIVE | 69.2 |
| 585 | 30-Apr-1977 | 15-Dec-1989 | 15-Dec-1989 | | 2-Oct-1986 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.8 |
| 586 | 7-Mar-1993 | 24-Dec-2006 | 7-Mar-2003 | 7-Mar-2003 | 24-Dec-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 587 | 19-Mar-2005 | 24-Jan-2022 | 24-Jan-2022 | | | |
| 588 | 17-Oct-1970 | 24-Feb-1988 | 24-Feb-1988 | | 1-Sep-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.5 |
| 589 | 17-Dec-1988 | 19-Sep-1996 | | | 19-Sep-1996 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 590 | 7-Jan-2012 | 7-Jan-2027 | 14-Jan-2025 | | | |
| 591 | 10-Dec-1954 | 7-Nov-1970 | 7-Nov-1970 | 11-Apr-1974 | 24-Dec-1977 ELECTIVE | 72.1 |
| 592 | 29-Jun-1995 | 3-Dec-2014 | 3-Dec-2014 | 3-Dec-2014 | | |
| 593 | 28-Jan-2018 | 26-May-2034 | 26-May-2034 | | | |
| 594 | 14-Mar-2002 | 14-Mar-2017 | 14-Mar-2017 | 14-Mar-2017 | | |
| 595 | 17-Aug-2014 | 17-Aug-2029 | 4-Feb-2029 | | | |
| 596 | 10-Aug-2019 | 10-Aug-2034 | 10-Aug-2034 | | | |
| 597 | 13-Jul-1985 | 13-Jul-2000 | 13-Jul-2000 | 13-Jul-2000 | 11-Sep-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 598 | 28-Jan-2018 | 28-Jan-2033 | 28-Jan-2033 | | | |
| 599 | 28-Aug-2009 | 28-Aug-2024 | 30-Apr-2020 | | | |
| 600 | 15-Feb-2002 | 1-Feb-2018 | 1-Feb-2018 | 22-Aug-2018 | | |
| 601 | 23-Dec-2006 | 11-Jul-2020 | 23-Dec-2016 | 23-Dec-2016 | 11-Jul-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 602 | 3-Feb-2007 | 3-Feb-2022 | 14-Dec-2019 | | 7-Apr-2010 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 60.3 |
| 603 | 2-Oct-1992 | 2-Oct-2007 | 2-Oct-2007 | 2-Oct-2007 | 11-Apr-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 604 | 13-Oct-1965 | 13-Oct-1980 | 13-Oct-1980 | 25-Feb-1984 | 10-Mar-1985 ELECTIVE | 69.7 |
| 605 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Oct-2004 | 27-Feb-2001 | 27-Feb-2001 | 27-Feb-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 606 | 23-Feb-2000 | 30-Dec-2017 | 30-Dec-2017 | | | |
| 607 | 16-Mar-2019 | 16-Mar-2034 | 21-Feb-2030 | | | |
| 608 | 18-Jul-2019 | 2-Apr-2031 | 18-Jul-2029 | | | |
| 609 | 21-Mar-2015 | 31-May-2030 | 31-May-2030 | | | |
| 610 | 18-Sep-1993 | 2-Nov-2011 | 2-Nov-2011 | 2-Nov-2011 | | |
| 611 | 9-Jan-1956 | 2-Jul-1967 | 2-Jul-1967 | | 9-Jan-1971 ELECTIVE | 73.5 |
| 612 | 6-Mar-1976 | 28-May-1994 | 28-May-1994 | 27-Mar-1998 | 3-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 613 | 8-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2014 | 10-Mar-2016 ELECTIVE | 70.5 |
| 614 | 14-Apr-1976 | 15-Apr-1991 | 15-Apr-1991 | 15-Apr-1991 | 9-Sep-1998 ELECTIVE | 72.6 |
| 615 | 17-Mar-2000 | 18-Mar-2015 | 18-Mar-2015 | 18-Mar-2015 | 8-Sep-2016 ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 616 | 20-Apr-2001 | 27-May-2016 | 27-May-2016 | 27-May-2016 | 8-Aug-2019 ELECTIVE | 68.1 |
| 617 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 27-Mar-2029 | | | |
| 618 | 17-Feb-2018 | 19-Apr-2034 | 19-Apr-2034 | | | |
| 619 | 7-Jan-2012 | 7-Jan-2027 | 7-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 620 | 22-May-1982 | 25-Mar-1999 | 26-Jan-2001 | | 9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE | 64.0 |
| 621 | 7-May-1994 | 7-May-2009 | 7-May-2009 | 8-May-2009 | 11-May-2013 ELECTIVE | 72.4 |
| 622 | 17-Apr-1950 | 17-Jun-1969 | | | 8-Apr-1979 ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 623 | 26-Feb-1983 | 11-Sep-2002 | 24-Mar-2007 | 23-Aug-2009 | 27-Mar-2017 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 624 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 27-Sep-2030 | | | |
| 625 | 30-Sep-2020 | 30-Sep-2035 | 30-Nov-2034 | | | |
| 626 | 2-Jul-2017 | 2-Jul-2032 | 2-Jul-2032 | | | |
| 627 | 3-Sep-1928 | 8-Feb-1945 | 8-Feb-1945 | | 11-Aug-1933 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 53.5 |
| 628 | 18-Feb-1972 | 18-Feb-1987 | 18-Feb-1987 | 18-Feb-1987 | 14-Jun-1993 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 629 | 13-Jul-1995 | 13-Jul-2010 | 6-Jun-2007 | | 6-Mar-2003 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.7 |
| 630 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 7-Dec-2033 | | | |
| 631 | 29-Mar-2018 | 17-May-2035 | 17-May-2035 | | | |
| 632 | 5-Feb-2011 | 5-Feb-2026 | 30-Aug-2025 | | | |
| 633 | 10-Jul-1993 | 30-Jul-2008 | 19-Aug-2008 | | 24-Jan-2002 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 58.4 |
| 634 | 9-Nov-1995 | 14-Nov-2015 | 14-Nov-2015 | 19-Jul-2017 | | |
| 635 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 26-Apr-2021 | | | |
| 636 | 28-Aug-1959 | 28-Aug-1974 | 28-Aug-1974 | | 20-Apr-1976 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.6 |
| 637 | 6-Jun-2018 | 6-Jun-2033 | 16-Sep-2030 | | | |
| 638 | 28-Apr-1950 | 28-Apr-1965 | 28-Apr-1965 | | 6-Mar-1972 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 639 | 23-Mar-1963 | 1-Feb-1986 | 1-Feb-1986 | 1-Feb-1986 | 11-Apr-1990 ELECTIVE | 69.2 |
| 640 | 2-Mar-2007 | 28-Jan-2023 | 28-Jan-2023 | | | |
| 641 | 31-Mar-1979 | 31-Mar-1994 | 31-Mar-1994 | 31-Mar-1994 | 8-Feb-1997 ELECTIVE | 68.0 |
| 642 | 8-Dec-1978 | 8-Dec-1993 | 27-Jul-1993 | 27-Jul-1993 | 8-Aug-1994 ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 643 | 15-Feb-2014 | 15-Feb-2029 | 20-Jun-2028 | | | |
| 644 | 7-Jul-1990 | 9-Oct-2011 | | | 15-Nov-2012 ELECTIVE | 59.8 |
| 645 | 26-Feb-1998 | 25-May-2015 | 25-May-2015 | 28-Feb-2016 | | |
| 646 | 24-Oct-1981 | 18-May-2000 | 10-Dec-2003 | 10-Apr-2004 | 22-Sep-2007 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.8 |
| 647 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 17-Aug-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 648 | 28-Dec-1963 | 14-Mar-1979 | 14-Mar-1979 | | 18-Jan-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.8 |
| 649 | 8-Mar-1991 | 17-Aug-2010 | 17-Aug-2010 | 22-Mar-2015 | 10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE | 70.9 |
| 650 | 15-Mar-1991 | 15-Mar-2006 | 8-Apr-2001 | 8-Apr-2001 | 8-Apr-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 651 | 19-Mar-2005 | 18-Mar-2020 | 18-Mar-2020 | 18-Mar-2020 | | |
| 652 | 8-Jul-2007 | 5-Feb-2019 | 8-Jul-2017 | 8-Jul-2017 | 5-Feb-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 653 | 9-Oct-1970 | 27-Jan-1990 | 27-Jan-1990 | 27-Jan-1990 | 9-Aug-1994 ELECTIVE | 69.5 |
| 654 | 13-Nov-1982 | 13-Nov-1992 | 13-Nov-1992 | 10-Dec-1992 | 12-May-1994 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 655 | 22-Sep-2018 | 22-Sep-2033 | 25-Jan-2029 | | | |
| 656 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 14-Dec-2027 | | | |
| 657 | 11-Oct-1959 | 2-Mar-1980 | 2-Mar-1980 | 9-Oct-1981 | 11-Oct-1988 ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 658 | 3-Aug-1995 | 3-Aug-2010 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 659 | 20-Jul-1978 | 20-Jul-1993 | 20-Jul-1993 | 20-Jul-1993 | 10-Nov-2001 ELECTIVE | 74.1 |
| 660 | 20-Jun-1968 | 26-Mar-1993 | 26-Mar-1993 | 26-Mar-1993 | 29-May-1995 ELECTIVE | 67.2 |
| 661 | 31-Mar-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 29-Jan-2003 | | 11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | 61.2 |
| 662 | 26-Jan-1961 | 26-Jan-1976 | 19-Jan-1972 | | 19-Jan-1977 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 663 | 15-Mar-1975 | 15-Mar-1990 | 22-Jan-1989 | | 26-Mar-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.2 |
| 664 | 8-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-2014 | 22-Oct-2009 | 22-Oct-2009 | 22-Oct-2014 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 665 | 12-May-1958 | 26-Oct-1967 | | | 26-Oct-1967 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 666 | 4-Jan-2004 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | | |
| 667 | 12-Feb-1998 | 12-Feb-2013 | 14-Jun-2011 | 14-Jun-2011 | 10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | 71.8 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 668 | 11-Dec-1988 | 11-Dec-2003 | 16-Aug-2003 | 16-Aug-2003 | 10-Dec-2004 ELECTIVE | 71.3 |
| 669 | 11-Mar-1999 | 11-Mar-2014 | 9-Jun-2013 | 9-Jun-2013 | 9-Jun-2018 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 670 | 19-Jun-1985 | 14-Aug-1996 | 19-Jun-1995 | 19-Jun-1995 | 14-Aug-1996 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 671 | 26-Feb-1998 | 26-Feb-2013 | 26-Dec-2012 | 8-Nov-2014 | 26-Dec-2017 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 672 | 3-Nov-1984 | 29-Jul-1997 | 29-Jul-1997 | 29-Jul-1997 | 10-Dec-2000 ELECTIVE | 73.4 |
| 673 | 19-Oct-1991 | 27-Dec-2010 | 27-Dec-2010 | 11-Apr-2019 | | |
| 674 | 2-May-1996 | 16-May-2013 | 16-May-2013 | 16-May-2013 | | |
| 675 | 20-Jun-1992 | 15-Aug-2009 | | | | |
| 676 | 5-Feb-2004 | 4-Jul-2021 | 4-Jul-2021 | | | |
| 677 | 2-Apr-1977 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Nov-1991 | 2-Nov-1991 | 8-Jun-1992 ELECTIVE | 70.6 |
| 678 | 9-Mar-2019 | 9-Mar-2034 | 6-Mar-2034 | | | |
| 679 | 6-Mar-2010 | 6-Mar-2025 | 6-Mar-2025 | | | |
| 680 | 28-Jan-1945 | 19-Feb-1964 | 19-Feb-1964 | | 10-Jun-1965 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.3 |
| 681 | 1-Jul-1999 | 23-Jul-2014 | 23-Jul-2014 | 23-Jul-2014 | 9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | 66.7 |
| 682 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 27-Feb-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 683 | 21-Jun-2011 | 3-Sep-2022 | 21-Jun-2021 | | | |
| 684 | 19-Jul-2014 | 16-Oct-2030 | 16-Oct-2030 | | | |
| 685 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 21-Jun-2027 | | | |
| 686 | 8-May-1966 | 6-Jul-1985 | 6-Jul-1985 | | 10-May-1981 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.8 |
| 687 | 6-Mar-1980 | 25-Jul-1995 | 25-Jul-1995 | 25-Jul-1995 | 25-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 688 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 7-Dec-2033 | | | |
| 689 | 28-Dec-1961 | 28-Dec-1976 | 28-Dec-1976 | 12-Apr-1978 | 8-Apr-1982 ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 690 | 1-Jun-2018 | 14-Mar-2036 | 14-Mar-2036 | | | |
| 691 | 8-Jul-1961 | 13-Nov-1976 | 13-Nov-1976 | 7-Feb-1977 | 13-Nov-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 692 | 4-Jun-1961 | 3-Feb-1974 | 3-Feb-1974 | | 10-Dec-1976 ELECTIVE | 72.9 |
| 693 | 6-Jun-1970 | 5-Mar-1996 | 5-Mar-1996 | | 9-Mar-1996 ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 694 | 14-Jan-1984 | 18-Jun-2004 | 21-Nov-2009 | | 9-Feb-2002 DISABILITY | 57.2 |
| 695 | 11-Feb-1988 | 26-Jan-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 11-Apr-2017 COMPULSORY | 73.3 |
| 696 | 13-Oct-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 1-Mar-2003 | 1-Mar-2003 | 1-Mar-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 697 | 31-Mar-1979 | 31-Mar-1994 | 31-Mar-1994 | 31-Mar-1994 | 8-Oct-2002 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 698 | 9-Aug-1978 | 9-Aug-1993 | 21-Dec-1991 | 21-Dec-1991 | 9-Aug-1993 ELECTIVE | 71.6 |
| 699 | 10-May-1993 | 9-May-2008 | 6-Jan-2004 | | 15-Aug-2000 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.6 |
| 700 | 21-Jul-2017 | 21-May-2024 | | | | |
| 701 | 27-Mar-1988 | 16-Sep-2008 | | | 9-Oct-2004 Early Retirement | 57.4 |
| 702 | 25-Jun-1998 | 28-Nov-2015 | 28-Nov-2015 | 10-Dec-2017 | | |
| 703 | 28-Nov-1965 | 8-May-1979 | 28-Nov-1975 | 29-Nov-1975 | 10-Apr-1979 DISABILITY | 74.9 |
| 704 | 27-Jun-2010 | 27-Jun-2025 | 28-Jan-2022 | | | |
| 705 | 13-Jul-1985 | 11-Feb-2002 | 12-Sep-2003 | 12-Sep-2003 | 12-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 706 | 3-Aug-1995 | 25-Sep-2012 | 25-Sep-2012 | 9-Dec-2014 | | |
| 707 | 3-Feb-2018 | 3-Feb-2033 | 3-Feb-2033 | | | |
| 708 | 19-Jul-2017 | 8-Oct-2032 | 8-Oct-2032 | | | |
| 709 | 17-Jan-2015 | 17-Jan-2030 | 17-Jan-2030 | | | |
| 710 | 17-Oct-1970 | 17-Oct-1985 | 17-Oct-1985 | 17-Oct-1985 | 9-Feb-1989 ELECTIVE | 72.2 |
| 711 | 9-Oct-1999 | 9-Oct-2014 | 9-Oct-2014 | 9-Oct-2014 | 8-Oct-2016 ELECTIVE | 67.8 |
| 712 | 27-Aug-2005 | 24-Apr-2021 | 24-Apr-2021 | | 29-Aug-2015 Early Retirement | 58.7 |
| 713 | 7-Jun-2000 | 29-Feb-2016 | 29-Feb-2016 | | | |
| 714 | 22-May-1994 | 26-Aug-2011 | 26-Aug-2011 | 26-Aug-2011 | | |
| 715 | 17-Jan-2015 | 30-Sep-2031 | 30-Sep-2031 | | | |
| 716 | 23-Mar-2013 | 2-Jul-2032 | 2-Jul-2032 | | | |
| 717 | 7-May-1994 | 17-Jun-2011 | 17-Jun-2011 | | 11-Jul-2011 ELECTIVE | 63.0 |
| 718 | 9-Jul-1983 | 9-Jul-1998 | 9-Jul-1998 | 10-Jul-1998 | 9-Aug-2000 ELECTIVE | 68.5 |
| 719 | 6-Feb-1982 | 6-Feb-1997 | 25-Oct-1995 | 25-Oct-1995 | 25-Oct-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 720 | 16-Jun-1951 | 9-Aug-1967 | 9-Aug-1967 | | 6-Nov-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.2 |
| 721 | 12-Apr-1992 | 13-Apr-2007 | 11-Nov-2005 | | 9-Feb-2003 Early Retirement | 67.2 |
| 722 | 10-Dec-1987 | 17-Sep-2009 | 17-Sep-2009 | 9-Oct-2009 | 9-Oct-2019 COMPULSORY | 68.3 |
| 723 | 30-Sep-2019 | 30-Sep-2034 | 30-Sep-2034 | | | |
| 724 | 27-Mar-1982 | 27-Mar-1997 | 27-Mar-1997 | 27-Mar-1997 | 9-Aug-1997 ELECTIVE | 69.0 |
| 725 | 9-Mar-1995 | 30-Dec-2010 | 30-Dec-2010 | 22-Oct-2011 | | |
| 726 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 15-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 727 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | |
| 728 | 1-Apr-1978 | 16-Mar-1997 | 16-Mar-1997 | 16-Mar-1997 | 10-Dec-2004 ELECTIVE | 72.7 |
| 729 | 10-Dec-1972 | 30-Sep-1988 | 30-Sep-1988 | 15-Dec-1988 | 30-Sep-1998 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 730 | 9-Mar-1995 | 6-Mar-2011 | 6-Mar-2011 | 22-May-2011 | 10-Apr-2019 ELECTIVE | 72.1 |
| 731 | 4-Mar-1999 | 2-Jul-2015 | 2-Jul-2015 | 8-Oct-2016 | | |
| 732 | 13-Feb-1965 | 13-Feb-1980 | 1-Dec-1977 | 10-Dec-1977 | 1-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 733 | 19-Jul-2014 | 17-Jun-2030 | 17-Jun-2030 | | | |
| 734 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 1-Jan-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 735 | 10-Nov-1973 | 22-Oct-1997 | 22-Oct-1997 | 11-Nov-1998 | 22-Oct-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 736 | 15-Aug-2004 | 18-Oct-2021 | 18-Oct-2021 | | | |
| 737 | 20-Jun-2020 | 29-Nov-2035 | 29-Nov-2035 | | | |
| 738 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | |
| 739 | 27-May-1990 | 18-Aug-2005 | 8-Nov-2005 | 8-Nov-2005 | 9-Feb-2007 ELECTIVE | 66.3 |
| 740 | 7-Aug-1982 | 7-Aug-1997 | 7-Aug-1997 | | 26-Dec-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.4 |
| 741 | 12-Jan-2013 | 20-Aug-2029 | 20-Aug-2029 | | | |
| 742 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | |
| 743 | 10-Nov-1973 | 26-Feb-1999 | 23-May-2001 | 23-May-2001 | 3-Feb-2008 DEATH (RPC) | 71.7 |
| 744 | 15-Mar-1984 | 16-Mar-1999 | 17-Oct-1997 | 17-Oct-1997 | 17-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 745 | 20-Sep-1986 | 6-Jun-2008 | 6-Jun-2008 | 6-Jun-2008 | 7-Jun-2018 COMPULSORY | 68.3 |
| 746 | 9-Jun-1979 | 9-Jun-1994 | 9-Jun-1994 | | 9-Oct-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 57.9 |
| 747 | 30-Sep-2019 | 30-Sep-2034 | 30-Sep-2034 | | | |
| 748 | 24-Oct-1976 | 24-Oct-1991 | 6-Oct-1989 | | 15-Apr-1980 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.5 |
| 749 | 27-Jan-2017 | 16-Mar-2030 | 27-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 750 | 22-Mar-2008 | 14-Feb-2024 | 14-Feb-2024 | | | |
| 751 | 13-Dec-1981 | 23-Apr-2000 | 2-Sep-2003 | 8-Oct-2003 | 10-Apr-2012 ELECTIVE | 73.6 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 752 | 21-Feb-1970 | 21-Feb-1985 | 21-Feb-1985 | 21-Feb-1985 | 18-Dec-1990 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 753 | 8-Oct-1961 | 8-Nov-1977 | 8-Nov-1977 | 9-Nov-1977 | 8-Nov-1987 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 754 | 6-Dec-1963 | 6-Dec-1978 | 6-Dec-1978 | 6-Dec-1978 | 10-Dec-1981 | ELECTIVE | 70.2 |
| 755 | 28-Jul-1973 | 28-Jul-1988 | 28-Jul-1988 | 10-Apr-1989 | 25-Mar-1991 | ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 756 | 14-Dec-1951 | 28-Oct-1967 | | | 28-Oct-1977 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 757 | 28-Aug-1964 | 28-Aug-1979 | 5-Aug-1978 | | 5-Aug-1983 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 758 | 8-Jul-1999 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2015 | 7-May-2018 | ELECTIVE | 66.4 |
| 759 | 17-Jan-2015 | 9-Nov-2030 | 9-Nov-2030 | | | | |
| 760 | 16-Mar-2019 | 16-Mar-2034 | 22-Nov-2030 | | | | |
| 761 | 2-Oct-2011 | 2-Oct-2026 | 23-Sep-2024 | | | | |
| 762 | 27-Jan-1962 | 28-May-1979 | 28-May-1979 | 28-May-1979 | 8-Feb-1988 | ELECTIVE | 73.7 |
| 763 | 6-Sep-1975 | 6-Sep-1990 | 19-Sep-1989 | 20-Sep-1989 | 19-Sep-1994 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 764 | 17-Jul-1952 | 17-Jul-1967 | 29-Jun-1967 | | 9-Mar-1958 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.7 |
| 765 | 27-May-1967 | 10-Jan-1974 | 27-May-1977 | | 22-Mar-1969 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.2 |
| 766 | 18-Dec-2009 | 23-Mar-2025 | 23-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 767 | 29-Jun-2001 | 29-Jun-2016 | 29-Jun-2016 | 10-Jul-2016 | | | |
| 768 | 29-Dec-1979 | 29-Dec-1994 | 29-Dec-1994 | 30-Dec-1994 | 2-Oct-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 769 | 19-Jan-1986 | 2-Aug-2004 | 24-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2010 | ELECTIVE | 67.2 |
| 770 | 23-Jul-2005 | 23-Jul-2020 | 23-Jul-2020 | 23-Jul-2020 | | | |
| 771 | 9-Oct-1978 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Jul-2000 | 22-Jul-2000 | 9-Nov-2006 | ELECTIVE | 71.3 |
| 772 | 9-Jan-2003 | 9-Jan-2018 | 9-Jan-2018 | | | | |
| 773 | 7-Dec-2018 | 20-Mar-2031 | 7-Dec-2028 | | | | |
| 774 | 21-Mar-2015 | 9-May-2030 | 9-May-2030 | | | | |
| 775 | 1-Sep-1988 | 1-Sep-2003 | | | 4-Mar-1998 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.7 |
| 776 | 17-Dec-1988 | 9-Dec-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 25-Apr-2007 | 9-Nov-2011 | ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 777 | 15-Feb-2003 | 15-Feb-2018 | 15-Feb-2018 | 16-Feb-2018 | | | |
| 778 | 14-Mar-1985 | 13-Mar-2000 | 12-Feb-1998 | 7-Oct-2001 | 12-Feb-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 779 | 9-Jun-2012 | 9-Jun-2027 | 12-Jan-2024 | | | | |
| 780 | 9-Feb-1986 | 20-Feb-2008 | 20-Feb-2008 | 10-Dec-2009 | 10-Dec-2019 | COMPULSORY | 69.8 |
| 781 | 12-Jan-2013 | 20-Oct-2028 | 20-Oct-2028 | | | | |
| 782 | 5-Feb-2004 | 5-Feb-2019 | 11-Aug-2016 | 12-Oct-2016 | | | |
| 783 | 1-Apr-1992 | 25-Jan-2010 | 20-Nov-2012 | | 29-Nov-2002 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 55.0 |
| 784 | 27-Feb-1948 | 27-Feb-1963 | 27-Feb-1963 | | 7-Apr-1954 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 58.7 |
| 785 | 7-May-1994 | 25-Jan-2007 | 6-May-2004 | | 10-Mar-2001 | DISABILITY | 69.1 |
| 786 | 8-Sep-2012 | 11-Feb-2023 | 8-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 787 | 9-Jun-1955 | 9-Jun-1970 | 9-Jun-1970 | 31-Mar-1973 | 7-Apr-1976 | ELECTIVE | 73.9 |
| 788 | 21-May-2010 | 21-May-2025 | 21-May-2025 | | | | |
| 789 | 7-Jan-2018 | 7-Jan-2033 | 7-Jan-2033 | | | | |
| 790 | 10-Aug-1974 | 10-Aug-1989 | 10-Aug-1989 | 9-Jan-1991 | 10-Jul-1993 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 791 | 9-Feb-1969 | 17-Dec-1981 | 9-Feb-1979 | 9-Feb-1979 | 17-Dec-1981 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 792 | 23-Feb-2006 | 23-Feb-2021 | 23-Feb-2021 | | | | |
| 793 | 25-Jun-1998 | 25-Jun-2013 | 25-Jun-2013 | 9-Jul-2013 | | | |
| 794 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | | |
| 795 | 12-Aug-1999 | 12-Aug-2014 | 12-Aug-2014 | | 13-Feb-2013 | Early Retirement | 66.7 |
| 796 | 29-Mar-1997 | 28-Mar-2012 | 28-Mar-2012 | 11-May-2014 | 8-Aug-2014 | ELECTIVE | 71.5 |
| 797 | 8-Sep-2002 | 8-Sep-2017 | 19-Nov-2013 | | 10-Sep-2013 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.8 |
| 798 | 9-Jan-1958 | 9-Jan-1973 | | | 9-Jun-1973 | ELECTIVE | 74.3 |
| 799 | 18-May-2013 | 9-May-2025 | 18-May-2023 | | 23-Oct-2020 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.5 |
| 800 | 2-Oct-1993 | 27-Mar-2012 | 19-Sep-2020 | 11-Apr-2017 | | | |
| 801 | 20-Aug-1966 | 20-Aug-1981 | 15-Dec-1980 | 15-Dec-1980 | 15-Dec-1985 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 802 | 1-Jan-1931 | 1-Jan-1946 | 1-Jan-1946 | | 9-Feb-1956 | Appointed for Life | 77.4 |
| 803 | 11-Apr-1979 | 11-Apr-1994 | 11-Apr-1994 | | 28-Aug-2001 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 804 | 22-Aug-2009 | 18-Aug-2027 | 18-Aug-2027 | | | | |
| 805 | 2-Feb-1974 | 2-Feb-1989 | 2-Feb-1989 | | 7-Aug-1987 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.8 |
| 806 | 17-Aug-1995 | 12-Feb-2015 | 12-Feb-2015 | | 12-Feb-2015 | ELECTIVE | 60.5 |
| 807 | 17-Dec-1988 | 17-Dec-2003 | 31-Jul-2002 | | 29-Sep-2001 | DISABILITY | 69.2 |
| 808 | 26-Sep-2003 | 26-Sep-2018 | 26-Sep-2018 | 26-Sep-2018 | 10-May-2020 | ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 809 | 22-Aug-2004 | 27-Oct-2019 | 27-Oct-2019 | 27-Oct-2019 | | | |
| 810 | 25-Sep-1993 | 18-Jun-2012 | 18-Jun-2012 | 11-Apr-2015 | 10-Dec-2018 | ELECTIVE | 67.8 |
| 811 | 16-Jun-1973 | 16-Jun-1988 | 15-Mar-1987 | 11-Apr-1987 | 9-Feb-1992 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 812 | 1-Jun-1989 | 13-Jan-2008 | 26-Aug-2011 | | 16-Feb-2000 | DISABILITY | 53.5 |
| 813 | 18-Jul-2019 | 2-May-2038 | 2-May-2038 | | | | |
| 814 | 26-Sep-2008 | 8-Mar-2025 | 8-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 815 | 4-May-1975 | 19-Dec-1992 | 19-Dec-1992 | 3-Mar-1994 | 19-Dec-2002 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 816 | 30-Dec-1967 | 30-Dec-1982 | 20-Aug-1981 | 20-Aug-1981 | 22-Jul-1986 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 817 | 2-Mar-2006 | 26-Apr-2022 | 26-Apr-2022 | | | | |
| 818 | 27-Jan-2017 | 11-Dec-2031 | 27-Jan-2027 | | | | |
| 819 | 15-Feb-2014 | 7-Jul-2029 | 7-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 820 | 21-Jan-1978 | 21-Jan-1993 | 29-Jul-1988 | 29-Jul-1988 | 29-Jul-1993 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 821 | 19-Jul-2014 | 19-Jul-2029 | 8-Oct-2026 | | | | |
| 822 | 5-Sep-1976 | 13-Jun-1995 | 13-Jun-1995 | | 13-Jun-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 823 | 15-Mar-1986 | 15-Mar-2001 | 22-Apr-2000 | | 10-Jun-1987 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 57.1 |
| 824 | 14-Mar-1964 | 15-Mar-1979 | 9-Feb-1977 | 9-Feb-1977 | 9-Feb-1982 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 825 | 12-May-1993 | 11-May-2008 | 30-Mar-2004 | 30-Mar-2004 | 31-Mar-2009 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 826 | 29-Sep-2012 | 29-Sep-2027 | 22-Jul-2027 | | | | |
| 827 | 10-Dec-2015 | 19-Jun-2031 | 19-Jun-2031 | | | | |
| 828 | 5-Sep-1985 | 1-Nov-1993 | | | 1-Nov-1993 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 829 | 13-May-1962 | 13-May-1977 | 3-Oct-1975 | 13-May-1979 | 3-Oct-1980 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 830 | 5-Jun-1982 | 5-Jun-1997 | 5-Jun-1997 | 5-Jun-1997 | 28-Mar-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 831 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | 17-Dec-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 832 | 25-May-1985 | 12-Feb-1996 | 25-May-1995 | 25-May-1995 | 24-Nov-1995 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.8 |
| 833 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | | | | |
| 834 | 28-Apr-2018 | 28-Apr-2033 | 23-Jul-2032 | | | | |
| 835 | 11-Jul-1998 | 11-Jul-2013 | 11-Jul-2013 | 11-Jul-2013 | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|--|------|
| 836 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 27-Sep-2030 | | | | | |
| 837 | 9-Jan-1956 | 7-Aug-1977 | 7-Aug-1977 | 27-Mar-1983 | 7-Aug-1987 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 838 | 13-Oct-1994 | 13-Oct-2009 | 23-Oct-2004 | 23-Oct-2004 | 23-Oct-2009 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 839 | 21-Mar-2010 | 21-Mar-2025 | 21-Mar-2025 | | | | | |
| 840 | 25-Jun-1998 | 25-Jun-2013 | 6-Oct-2009 | 6-Oct-2009 | 24-Sep-2014 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 75.0 |
| 841 | 19-Jan-1992 | 2-Oct-2008 | 2-Oct-2008 | 8-Aug-2009 | 8-Aug-2019 | COMPULSORY | | 74.1 |
| 842 | 7-Mar-1996 | 10-Nov-2013 | 10-Nov-2013 | 10-Nov-2013 | | | | |
| 843 | 26-Oct-1983 | 19-Sep-1999 | 12-Aug-2000 | 12-Aug-2000 | 9-Aug-2009 | ELECTIVE | | 74.0 |
| 844 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 8-Jan-2026 | | | | | |
| 845 | 1-Oct-1993 | 7-May-2010 | 7-May-2010 | 7-May-2010 | 9-Feb-2017 | ELECTIVE | | 70.2 |
| 846 | 12-Aug-1999 | 12-Aug-2014 | 12-Aug-2014 | 12-Aug-2014 | 15-May-2020 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 847 | 31-Mar-1984 | 15-Apr-2000 | 30-Apr-2001 | 30-Apr-2001 | 30-Apr-2011 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 848 | 9-Jan-2014 | 15-Nov-2027 | 9-Jan-2024 | | | | | |
| 849 | 28-Aug-1976 | 24-Nov-1992 | 24-Nov-1992 | 11-Apr-1993 | 24-Nov-2002 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 850 | 6-Apr-2003 | 24-Aug-2019 | | | | | | |
| 851 | 20-Mar-1954 | 20-Mar-1969 | 20-Mar-1969 | 9-Dec-1973 | 26-Jan-1976 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 852 | 10-Dec-1972 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-1987 | 17-Jul-1991 | 1-May-1995 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 853 | 24-Jul-1960 | 30-Nov-1976 | 30-Nov-1976 | | 20-Jul-1969 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 57.6 |
| 854 | 8-Mar-1992 | 14-Jun-2008 | 14-Jun-2008 | 14-Jun-2008 | 14-Jun-2018 | COMPULSORY | | 73.7 |
| 855 | 31-Oct-1981 | 31-Oct-1996 | 31-Oct-1996 | | 11-Mar-1999 | ELECTIVE | | 68.2 |
| 856 | 8-Oct-1989 | 3-Nov-2004 | 29-Nov-2004 | | 1-Dec-2004 | ELECTIVE | | 65.0 |
| 857 | 13-Aug-1983 | 4-Mar-2001 | 24-Sep-2003 | | 24-Sep-2013 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 858 | 30-Mar-1975 | 21-Jan-1991 | 21-Jan-1991 | 21-Jan-1991 | 9-Sep-1999 | ELECTIVE | | 73.6 |
| 859 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 17-Oct-2021 | | | | | |
| 860 | 2-Oct-2011 | 2-Oct-2026 | 2-Oct-2026 | | | | | |
| 861 | 25-Sep-1993 | 25-Sep-2008 | 25-Sep-2008 | 25-Sep-2008 | 22-Jul-2012 | ELECTIVE | | 69.1 |
| 862 | 6-Jun-2015 | 6-Jun-2030 | 16-May-2030 | | | | | |
| 863 | 12-Jan-2013 | 12-Jan-2028 | 2-Jun-2023 | | | | | |
| 864 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | 23-Aug-2007 | 10-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | | 74.6 |
| 865 | 9-Feb-2019 | 9-Feb-2034 | 7-Aug-2030 | | | | | |
| 866 | 15-Feb-2014 | 13-Sep-2031 | 13-Sep-2031 | | | | | |
| 867 | 14-Sep-2013 | 14-Sep-2028 | 18-Aug-2027 | | | | | |
| 868 | 9-May-1998 | 17-Jan-2014 | 17-Jan-2014 | 9-Oct-2014 | | | | |
| 869 | 11-Apr-1987 | 25-May-2008 | 25-May-2008 | 25-May-2008 | 24-Dec-2013 | ELECTIVE | | 64.5 |
| 870 | 4-Mar-1967 | 23-Apr-1988 | 23-Apr-1988 | | 12-May-1984 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 61.1 |
| 871 | 1-Feb-1963 | 20-Sep-1992 | 20-Sep-1992 | | 29-Jan-1981 | OTHER | | 53.4 |
| 872 | 17-Aug-1995 | 17-Aug-2010 | 8-May-2008 | | 10-Dec-2011 | ELECTIVE | | 73.6 |
| 873 | 22-Dec-1991 | 22-Dec-2006 | 22-Dec-2006 | 22-Dec-2006 | 22-Apr-2016 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 874 | 26-Oct-1983 | 30-Aug-2005 | 30-Aug-2005 | | 10-Apr-1999 | OTHER | | 58.6 |
| 875 | 12-Jun-2020 | 23-Dec-2035 | 23-Dec-2035 | | | | | |
| 876 | 31-Oct-1981 | 31-Oct-1996 | 31-Oct-1996 | | 11-May-1994 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 63.7 |
| 877 | 2-Mar-2006 | 2-Mar-2021 | 2-Mar-2021 | | | | | |
| 878 | 22-Apr-1943 | 22-Apr-1958 | 22-Apr-1958 | | 15-Aug-1964 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 879 | 17-Jun-1999 | 17-Jun-2014 | 17-Jun-2014 | 17-Jun-2014 | 10-Apr-2018 | ELECTIVE | | 69.2 |
| 880 | 7-Jun-2000 | 1-Nov-2017 | 1-Nov-2017 | 10-Dec-2017 | | | | |
| 881 | 24-Sep-2016 | 24-Sep-2031 | 6-Sep-2031 | | | | | |
| 882 | 23-Jan-1956 | 8-Jun-1973 | 8-Jun-1973 | 3-Oct-1975 | 9-Apr-1983 | ELECTIVE | | 74.8 |
| 883 | 26-Sep-2010 | 26-Sep-2025 | 26-Sep-2025 | | 9-May-2015 | DISABILITY | | 54.8 |
| 884 | 18-Jan-1969 | 18-Jan-1984 | 27-Nov-1981 | 27-Nov-1981 | 25-Mar-1984 | ELECTIVE | | 72.3 |
| 885 | 25-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2022 | 25-Mar-2022 | | | | | |
| 886 | 31-May-1969 | 20-Mar-1990 | 20-Mar-1990 | | 20-Jan-1983 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 57.8 |
| 887 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 13-Jul-2021 | | | | | |
| 888 | 17-Nov-1982 | 17-Nov-1997 | 17-Nov-1997 | | 26-Dec-1985 | DISABILITY | | 55.0 |
| 889 | 5-Sep-2015 | 8-Mar-2034 | 8-Mar-2034 | | | | | |
| 890 | 11-Aug-1988 | 12-May-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2017 | COMPULSORY | | 73.1 |
| 891 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2030 | 28-Sep-2030 | | | | | |
| 892 | 18-Jul-2019 | 6-Aug-2034 | 6-Aug-2034 | | | | | |
| 893 | 7-May-1994 | 23-Sep-2010 | 23-Sep-2010 | 8-Oct-2012 | 18-Jan-2019 | ELECTIVE | | 71.9 |
| 894 | 28-Sep-2000 | 6-Apr-2018 | 6-Apr-2018 | 10-Apr-2018 | | | | |
| 895 | 7-Jan-2018 | 7-Jan-2033 | 29-Sep-2031 | | | | | |
| 896 | 19-Jun-1974 | 19-Jun-1989 | 19-Jun-1989 | | 16-Sep-1978 | DISABILITY | | 56.3 |
| 897 | 14-Nov-2010 | 24-Apr-2028 | 24-Apr-2028 | | | | | |
| 898 | 22-Mar-2008 | 23-Mar-2023 | 27-Feb-2020 | 27-Feb-2020 | | | | |
| 899 | 8-Jan-2011 | 12-Mar-2026 | 12-Mar-2026 | | | | | |
| 900 | 22-Oct-2017 | 26-Sep-2033 | 26-Sep-2033 | | | | | |
| 901 | 1-Jan-1988 | 1-Jan-2003 | 1-Jan-2003 | 1-Jan-2003 | 2-Mar-2009 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 902 | 27-Jan-1962 | 27-Jan-1977 | 19-Jun-1973 | 1-Feb-1976 | 12-Mar-1977 | DISABILITY | | 73.7 |
| 903 | 22-Mar-2008 | 23-Mar-2023 | 7-Nov-2018 | | | | | |
| 904 | 12-Jan-1990 | 31-Jul-2007 | 31-Jul-2007 | 31-Jul-2007 | 31-Jul-2017 | COMPULSORY | | 72.5 |
| 905 | 24-Mar-2002 | 22-Aug-2019 | 22-Aug-2019 | | 10-Dec-2017 | Early Retirement | | 60.9 |
| 906 | 25-Jan-2001 | 12-Jul-2012 | 25-Jan-2011 | 25-Jan-2011 | 12-Jul-2012 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 907 | 8-Mar-2009 | 7-Mar-2024 | 30-Dec-2021 | | | | | |
| 908 | 12-Aug-1999 | 12-Aug-2014 | 12-Aug-2014 | 12-Aug-2014 | | | | |
| 909 | 1-Apr-1972 | 1-Oct-1985 | 1-Oct-1985 | 23-Oct-1987 | 1-Oct-1990 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 910 | 2-Mar-2006 | 2-Mar-2021 | 23-Apr-2017 | 9-Dec-2017 | | | | |
| 911 | 18-Aug-2007 | 2-Oct-2025 | 2-Oct-2025 | | | | | |
| 912 | 2-Mar-2007 | 22-Mar-2022 | 22-Mar-2022 | | | | | |
| 913 | 16-Nov-2002 | 16-Nov-2017 | 16-Nov-2017 | 10-Dec-2017 | | | | |
| 914 | 7-Oct-2009 | 22-Jan-2026 | 22-Jan-2026 | | | | | |
| 915 | 9-Sep-1978 | 9-Sep-1993 | 21-Dec-1991 | 21-Dec-1991 | 9-Apr-1996 | ELECTIVE | | 74.3 |
| 916 | 24-Oct-2002 | 24-Oct-2017 | 24-Oct-2017 | | 22-Feb-2010 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 58.0 |
| 917 | 10-Dec-1949 | 10-Dec-1964 | 10-Dec-1964 | 23-Aug-1972 | 11-Nov-1973 | COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 918 | 1-Apr-1972 | 25-Feb-1984 | 25-Feb-1984 | | 25-Feb-1984 | Compulsory(County Court) | | 70.0 |
| 919 | 9-Jul-1983 | 8-Aug-2002 | 6-Sep-2006 | 10-Apr-2008 | 10-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | | 70.6 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 920 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 9-Feb-2020 ELECTIVE | | 70.1 |
| 921 | 15-Aug-2004 | 15-Aug-2019 | 15-Aug-2019 | 15-Aug-2019 | | | |
| 922 | 11-Mar-1999 | 11-Mar-2014 | 3-Oct-2012 | 8-Oct-2012 | 3-Oct-2017 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 923 | 1-Nov-1975 | 25-Sep-1994 | 25-Sep-1994 | 25-Sep-1994 | 13-Apr-2000 ELECTIVE | | 70.5 |
| 924 | 14-Sep-2013 | 14-Sep-2028 | 21-Jan-2026 | | | | |
| 925 | 20-Jun-2018 | 17-Nov-2035 | 17-Nov-2035 | | | | |
| 926 | 18-Jul-2003 | 18-Jul-2018 | 18-Jul-2018 | 18-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 927 | 7-Dec-2018 | 22-Nov-2034 | 22-Nov-2034 | | | | |
| 928 | 24-Jun-1978 | 24-Jun-1993 | 24-Jun-1993 | 24-Jun-1993 | 9-Feb-1997 ELECTIVE | | 68.9 |
| 929 | 3-Jul-2019 | 3-Jul-2034 | 3-Jul-2034 | | | | |
| 930 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 11-Feb-2026 | | | | |
| 931 | 9-Jan-2014 | 5-Jun-2029 | 5-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 932 | 8-Oct-1989 | 7-Sep-2008 | 7-Sep-2008 | | 9-Sep-2008 ELECTIVE | | 61.1 |
| 933 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 19-Feb-2006 | 19-Feb-2006 | 9-Feb-2008 ELECTIVE | | 72.0 |
| 934 | 5-Feb-1948 | 28-Jun-1962 | 28-Jun-1962 | | 3-Jan-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 73.5 |
| 935 | 20-Oct-1973 | 4-Jun-1989 | 4-Jun-1989 | 18-Dec-1991 | 4-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 936 | 20-Jul-1978 | 20-Jul-1993 | 20-Jul-1993 | 20-Jul-1993 | 10-Aug-2002 ELECTIVE | | 75.0 |
| 937 | 26-Aug-2017 | 26-Aug-2032 | 26-Aug-2032 | | | | |
| 938 | 14-Aug-1992 | 10-Jul-2009 | 10-Jul-2009 | 10-Jul-2009 | 10-Jul-2019 COMPULSORY | | 73.1 |
| 939 | 21-Dec-1974 | 20-Dec-1990 | 20-Dec-1990 | 11-Apr-1995 | 10-Mar-1997 ELECTIVE | | 71.2 |
| 940 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 4-Nov-2025 | | | | |
| 941 | 28-Feb-1980 | 12-Dec-2000 | 12-Dec-2000 | | 23-Mar-1997 OTHER | | 61.3 |
| 942 | 15-Nov-1996 | 15-Nov-2011 | 15-Nov-2011 | 9-Jan-2012 | 31-Aug-2012 ELECTIVE | | 68.5 |
| 943 | 12-May-1973 | 5-Jul-1992 | | | 18-Feb-1989 DISABILITY | | 61.6 |
| 944 | 11-Aug-1988 | 11-Aug-2003 | 11-Aug-2003 | 10-Apr-2004 | 19-Mar-2010 ELECTIVE | | 73.9 |
| 945 | 1-Apr-1950 | 30-Jan-1965 | 30-Jan-1965 | | 30-Jan-1970 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 946 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Oct-2004 | 15-May-2004 | | 10-Oct-2001 Early Retirement | | 67.4 |
| 947 | 28-Sep-1996 | 28-Sep-2011 | 28-Sep-2011 | 28-Sep-2011 | 9-Sep-2020 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 948 | 27-Jul-2002 | 27-Jul-2017 | 23-May-2016 | 9-Jun-2016 | 9-Dec-2018 ELECTIVE | | 72.5 |
| 949 | 5-Jun-2005 | 23-Feb-2023 | 23-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| 950 | 3-Mar-1963 | 3-Mar-1978 | 3-Mar-1978 | 3-Mar-1978 | 13-Nov-1983 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 951 | 24-Mar-2012 | 19-Mar-2029 | 19-Mar-2029 | | | | |
| 952 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Dec-2017 | 13-Dec-2017 | | | |
| 953 | 23-Jul-2005 | 8-Nov-2014 | | | 8-Nov-2014 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 954 | 15-Dec-1979 | 15-Dec-1994 | 16-Oct-1994 | 16-Oct-1994 | 10-Mar-1997 ELECTIVE | | 72.4 |
| 955 | 29-Sep-2018 | 29-Sep-2033 | 17-Mar-2030 | | | | |
| 956 | 18-Sep-1993 | 10-Oct-2011 | 10-Oct-2011 | 18-Sep-2012 | | | |
| 957 | 10-Sep-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 10-Sep-2000 | 10-Sep-2000 | 10-Dec-2007 ELECTIVE | | 72.2 |
| 958 | 30-May-2008 | 26-Mar-2025 | 26-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 959 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-2002 | 2-Jan-1998 | 2-Jan-1998 | 2-Jan-2003 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 960 | 10-Jan-2010 | 10-Jan-2025 | 12-May-2021 | | | | |
| 961 | 23-May-1970 | 8-Jan-1986 | 8-Jan-1986 | 8-Jan-1986 | 8-Jan-1996 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 962 | 30-Jun-1965 | 30-Jun-1980 | 30-Jun-1980 | 10-Dec-1980 | 15-Jan-1986 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 963 | 5-Sep-1993 | 30-Jul-2013 | 30-Jul-2013 | 31-Jul-2013 | 9-Dec-2016 ELECTIVE | | 63.5 |
| 964 | 28-Sep-2000 | 4-Jan-2018 | 4-Jan-2018 | 4-Jan-2018 | | | |
| 965 | 1-Nov-1975 | 1-Nov-1990 | 20-Sep-1988 | | 6-May-1976 RESIGNATION (RPC) | | 57.6 |
| 966 | 17-Jul-1976 | 17-Jul-1991 | 15-Mar-1989 | 15-Mar-1989 | 15-Mar-1994 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 967 | 12-Jul-1969 | 12-Jul-1984 | 23-May-1982 | 23-May-1982 | 23-May-1987 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 968 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 1-May-2024 | | | | |
| 969 | 13-Oct-1990 | 4-May-2008 | 4-May-2008 | 4-May-2008 | 10-Apr-2018 ELECTIVE | | 72.4 |
| 970 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Mar-2022 | 3-Aug-2020 | 8-Oct-2020 | | | |
| 971 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 25-Nov-2032 | | | | |
| 972 | 30-Nov-1985 | 21-Feb-1999 | 30-Nov-1995 | 30-Nov-1995 | 22-Mar-1998 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 74.1 |
| 973 | 22-Jul-1972 | 22-Jul-1987 | 22-Jul-1987 | 8-Jan-1989 | 8-Mar-1996 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 974 | 24-Feb-1965 | 30-Mar-1981 | 30-Mar-1981 | 30-Mar-1981 | 9-Feb-1982 ELECTIVE | | 65.9 |
| 975 | 8-Nov-1992 | 20-Sep-2009 | 20-Sep-2009 | 8-Sep-2012 | | | |
| 976 | 5-Sep-2015 | 5-Sep-2030 | 5-Sep-2030 | | | | |
| 977 | 18-Jul-1981 | 15-Feb-2012 | | | 25-Mar-2018 ELECTIVE | | 74.3 |
| 978 | 3-Feb-2007 | 3-Feb-2022 | 6-Jun-2018 | 6-Jun-2018 | | | |
| 979 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 29-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 980 | 30-Mar-1968 | 21-Aug-1981 | 21-Aug-1981 | 9-Sep-1981 | 21-Aug-1986 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 981 | 19-Jul-2014 | 8-May-2030 | 8-May-2030 | | | | |
| 982 | 13-Oct-2015 | 13-Oct-2030 | 13-Oct-2030 | | | | |
| 983 | 25-Aug-2019 | 25-Feb-2038 | 25-Feb-2038 | | | | |
| 984 | 2-Mar-1974 | 10-Apr-1992 | 10-Apr-1992 | | 10-Sep-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 64.4 |
| 985 | 31-May-1979 | 31-May-1994 | 31-May-1994 | | 31-May-1994 ELECTIVE | | 69.1 |
| 986 | 16-Sep-2017 | 16-Sep-2032 | 16-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 987 | 16-Feb-1980 | 16-Feb-1995 | 16-Feb-1995 | | 28-Sep-1991 DISABILITY | | 63.2 |
| 988 | 27-Apr-1957 | 24-Dec-1975 | 24-Dec-1975 | | 11-Apr-1973 DISABILITY | | 62.3 |
| 989 | 25-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2022 | 11-Nov-2020 | 11-Nov-2020 | | | |
| 990 | 22-Dec-1973 | 22-May-1994 | 22-May-1994 | 22-May-1994 | 21-May-2004 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 991 | 7-Jul-1965 | 7-Jul-1980 | 18-Jul-1979 | 9-Dec-1979 | 18-Jul-1984 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 992 | 9-Feb-1967 | 9-Feb-1982 | 9-Feb-1982 | 11-Apr-1982 | 13-Nov-1990 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 993 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 10-Apr-2015 | | | |
| 994 | 20-Nov-2000 | 20-Nov-2015 | 9-Dec-2011 | 10-Dec-2011 | 20-Nov-2013 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 71.9 |
| 995 | 8-Oct-1976 | 8-Oct-1991 | 8-Oct-1991 | 8-Oct-1991 | 8-Nov-1994 ELECTIVE | | 72.7 |
| 996 | 17-Oct-1981 | 17-Oct-1996 | 17-Oct-1996 | | 17-Oct-1996 ELECTIVE | | 69.9 |
| 997 | 5-Aug-1978 | 5-Aug-1993 | 5-Aug-1993 | | 16-Dec-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 59.0 |
| 998 | 25-Dec-1991 | 20-Aug-2012 | 20-Aug-2012 | 31-Jul-2016 | | | |
| 999 | 25-Jan-1975 | 25-Jan-1990 | 25-Jan-1990 | | 9-Feb-1983 DISABILITY | | 60.4 |
| 1000 | 24-Jan-1981 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Mar-1999 | 22-Mar-1999 | 10-Mar-2008 ELECTIVE | | 74.0 |
| 1001 | 1-Aug-2010 | 28-Oct-2028 | 28-Oct-2028 | | | | |
| 1002 | 6-Nov-2009 | 11-Jul-2025 | 11-Jul-2025 | | | | |
| 1003 | 29-Jun-2001 | 29-Jun-2016 | 29-Jun-2016 | 11-Apr-2018 | | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 1004 | 30-Jan-2010 | 10-Dec-2029 | 10-Dec-2029 | | | | |
| 1005 | 12-Jan-2014 | 12-Jan-2029 | 12-Jan-2029 | | | | |
| 1006 | 9-Jun-2001 | 30-Dec-2016 | 30-Dec-2016 | 26-Sep-2017 | | | |
| 1007 | 27-Apr-1974 | 21-Jan-1990 | 21-Jan-1990 | 21-Jan-1990 | 8-Feb-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 67.0 |
| 1008 | 19-Feb-1944 | 16-Nov-1967 | 16-Nov-1967 | | 30-Jan-1948 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 45.2 |
| 1009 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 9-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| 1010 | 22-Mar-2003 | 22-Mar-2018 | 22-Mar-2018 | 22-Mar-2018 | | | |
| 1011 | 27-Jan-2017 | 26-Oct-2032 | 26-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 1012 | 18-Jul-1970 | 18-Jul-1985 | 18-Jul-1985 | 19-Jul-1985 | 22-Mar-1995 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1013 | 3-Nov-1989 | 20-Nov-2000 | 3-Nov-1999 | | 20-Nov-2000 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1014 | 5-May-1973 | 4-May-1988 | 4-May-1988 | 4-May-1988 | 6-Dec-1993 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1015 | 23-Feb-1962 | 12-Mar-1973 | 12-Mar-1973 | 10-Dec-1976 | 12-Mar-1978 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1016 | 15-Dec-1988 | 15-Dec-2003 | 15-Dec-2003 | 15-Feb-2006 | 17-Feb-2012 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1017 | 19-Jun-1982 | 18-Mar-2004 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | | 70.3 |
| 1018 | 1-Nov-2003 | 1-Nov-2018 | 8-Aug-2018 | | 6-Nov-2011 DISABILITY | | 63.2 |
| 1019 | 4-Jan-1964 | 4-Jan-1979 | 4-Jan-1979 | 11-Jun-1984 | 5-Mar-1987 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1020 | 9-Oct-2020 | 9-Oct-2035 | 20-May-2034 | | | | |
| 1021 | 8-Jun-1977 | 13-Oct-1997 | 13-Oct-1997 | 13-Oct-1997 | 9-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE | | 70.0 |
| 1022 | 26-Oct-1983 | 31-Jul-2001 | 4-May-2004 | 4-May-2004 | 9-Apr-2014 ELECTIVE | | 74.9 |
| 1023 | 7-Jan-2012 | 7-Jan-2027 | 3-Aug-2025 | | | | |
| 1024 | 23-Nov-1951 | 12-Mar-1970 | 12-Mar-1970 | 5-Nov-1975 | 11-Mar-1980 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1025 | 21-May-1998 | 10-Jun-2017 | 10-Jun-2017 | 10-Jun-2017 | 12-Nov-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 63.4 |
| 1026 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 3-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 1027 | 16-Feb-1974 | 16-Feb-1989 | 16-Feb-1989 | 16-Feb-1989 | 28-Apr-1998 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1028 | 22-Oct-2017 | 22-Oct-2032 | 22-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 1029 | 7-Aug-2009 | 11-Jul-2027 | 11-Jul-2027 | | | | |
| 1030 | 27-Oct-1968 | 27-Oct-1983 | 27-Oct-1983 | 8-Oct-1984 | 22-Feb-1993 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1031 | 23-Mar-2013 | 22-Mar-2028 | 22-Mar-2028 | | | | |
| 1032 | 27-Jun-1968 | 8-Nov-1990 | 8-Nov-1990 | | 9-Sep-1980 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 54.8 |
| 1033 | 12-Jan-2013 | 21-Apr-2030 | 21-Apr-2030 | | | | |
| 1034 | 9-Feb-1963 | 26-Aug-1989 | 26-Aug-1989 | 26-Aug-1989 | 26-Aug-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1035 | 21-Aug-2005 | 19-Feb-2015 | | | 19-Feb-2015 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1036 | 16-May-2015 | 11-Dec-2031 | 11-Dec-2031 | | | | |
| 1037 | 22-Jul-1999 | 27-May-2016 | 27-May-2016 | 10-Aug-2016 | | | |
| 1038 | 6-Mar-1980 | 7-Mar-1995 | 19-Feb-1993 | 19-Feb-1993 | 19-Feb-1998 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1039 | 24-Dec-1989 | 6-Jun-2011 | 6-Jun-2011 | 6-Jun-2011 | 8-Jan-2018 ELECTIVE | | 65.1 |
| 1040 | 30-May-1996 | 15-Jan-2014 | 2-Sep-2016 | | 24-Jul-2006 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 54.9 |
| 1041 | 14-Jun-2014 | 19-Dec-2027 | 14-Jun-2024 | | | | |
| 1042 | 8-Jun-1995 | 13-Aug-2012 | 13-Aug-2012 | 10-Dec-2018 | | | |
| 1043 | 23-Mar-1941 | 22-Mar-1956 | 22-Mar-1956 | | 6-Jan-1964 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1044 | 2-Jul-1993 | 1-Aug-2011 | 1-Aug-2011 | 1-Aug-2011 | | | |
| 1045 | 3-Jan-2004 | 26-Feb-2021 | 26-Feb-2021 | | | | |
| 1046 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 30-Nov-2021 | | | | |
| 1047 | 28-Dec-1963 | 28-Dec-1978 | 28-Dec-1978 | | 28-Mar-1976 Early Retirement | | 66.7 |
| 1048 | 20-Aug-1966 | 5-Sep-1976 | 20-Aug-1976 | | 5-Sep-1976 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1049 | 26-Sep-2003 | 26-Sep-2018 | 26-Sep-2018 | | 9-Aug-2014 DISABILITY | | 61.9 |
| 1050 | 11-May-1972 | 12-May-1987 | 12-May-1987 | | 6-Oct-1982 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 61.2 |
| 1051 | 27-Dec-1936 | 2-Jan-1962 | 2-Jan-1962 | | 2-Jan-1972 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1052 | 13-Nov-1982 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 13-Nov-1997 | 23-Aug-2007 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1053 | 30-Jul-1955 | 21-Dec-1969 | 30-Jul-1965 | | 21-Dec-1969 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1054 | 27-Jul-2002 | 20-Jan-2018 | 20-Jan-2018 | 15-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 1055 | 18-Sep-1993 | 27-Aug-2015 | 27-Aug-2015 | | | | |
| 1056 | 9-Aug-1979 | 27-Jan-1995 | 27-Jan-1995 | | 25-May-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 63.3 |
| 1057 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 18-May-1998 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1058 | 30-Aug-2010 | 30-Aug-2025 | 6-Feb-2025 | | | | |
| 1059 | 25-Dec-1965 | 25-Dec-1980 | 25-Dec-1980 | 19-Jul-1982 | 26-May-1990 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1060 | 24-Jul-1997 | 12-Jun-2013 | 12-Jun-2013 | | 24-Nov-2010 Early Retirement | | 61.6 |
| 1061 | 21-Aug-2020 | 21-Aug-2035 | 26-Jul-2034 | | | | |
| 1062 | 27-May-1999 | 27-May-2014 | 27-May-2014 | 27-May-2014 | 8-Aug-2016 ELECTIVE | | 70.8 |
| 1063 | 15-Mar-1984 | 16-Mar-1999 | 6-Jun-1995 | 6-Jun-1995 | 11-Jul-1999 ELECTIVE | | 74.1 |
| 1064 | 2-Dec-1983 | 29-Oct-1992 | | | 29-Oct-1992 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1065 | 28-Sep-2000 | 15-Jul-2017 | 15-Jul-2017 | 15-Jul-2017 | | | |
| 1066 | 11-Dec-1988 | 11-Dec-2003 | 1-Nov-2002 | | 9-Jul-1997 DISABILITY | | 64.7 |
| 1067 | 31-Jan-1981 | 31-Jan-1996 | 31-Jan-1996 | 31-Jan-1996 | 24-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE | | 72.2 |
| 1068 | 9-Jun-1991 | 9-Jun-2006 | 9-Jun-2006 | 9-Jun-2006 | 9-Sep-2012 ELECTIVE | | 71.4 |
| 1069 | 7-Nov-2009 | 17-Jan-2025 | 17-Jan-2025 | | | | |
| 1070 | 9-Feb-1995 | 3-May-2016 | 3-May-2016 | 9-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 1071 | 8-Aug-2015 | 11-Jun-2030 | 8-Aug-2025 | | | | |
| 1072 | 22-Oct-2017 | 7-May-2035 | 7-May-2035 | | | | |
| 1073 | 16-Oct-1971 | 26-Feb-1999 | 20-Feb-2001 | | 11-Apr-2003 ELECTIVE | | 67.1 |
| 1074 | 10-Dec-1987 | 7-May-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 29-Mar-2007 | 8-Jan-2017 ELECTIVE | | 74.3 |
| 1075 | 14-Mar-1985 | 11-Apr-1999 | 14-Mar-1995 | | 11-Apr-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1076 | 9-Jun-1972 | 15-Sep-1988 | 15-Sep-1988 | 15-Sep-1988 | 9-Dec-1988 ELECTIVE | | 65.2 |
| 1077 | 8-Nov-1990 | 8-Nov-2005 | 27-Aug-2003 | 27-Aug-2003 | 27-Aug-2008 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1078 | 4-Jul-2015 | 4-Jul-2030 | 4-Jul-2030 | | | | |
| 1079 | 2-May-2009 | 21-Nov-2021 | 2-May-2019 | 2-May-2019 | | | |
| 1080 | 22-Mar-2019 | 22-Mar-2034 | 22-Mar-2034 | | | | |
| 1081 | 1-Oct-1998 | 4-Jan-2014 | 4-Jan-2014 | | 1-Oct-2014 ELECTIVE | | 65.5 |
| 1082 | 6-Mar-2005 | 5-Mar-2020 | 22-Mar-2017 | 22-Mar-2017 | | | |
| 1083 | 22-Mar-2008 | 23-Mar-2023 | 30-Aug-2021 | | | | |
| 1084 | 5-Feb-2004 | 14-Jun-2020 | 14-Jun-2020 | | 6-Feb-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 62.3 |
| 1085 | 23-Nov-2017 | 23-Nov-2032 | 25-Sep-2029 | | | | |
| 1086 | 12-Sep-1963 | 12-Sep-1978 | 9-Apr-1976 | | 9-Jan-1974 DISABILITY | | 67.8 |
| 1087 | 15-Feb-2002 | 27-May-2020 | 27-May-2020 | | | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 1088 | 19-Jun-1982 | 26-Feb-1999 | 10-Jul-1999 | | 10-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | 64.8 |
| 1089 | 8-Feb-1964 | 15-Apr-1975 | 15-Apr-1975 | 10-Jul-1978 | 24-Mar-1980 ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 1090 | 21-Mar-2015 | 13-Nov-2032 | 13-Nov-2032 | | | |
| 1091 | 10-Jul-1947 | 30-Jan-1966 | | | 2-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE | 73.2 |
| 1092 | 16-Feb-1974 | 16-Feb-1989 | 16-Feb-1989 | 16-Feb-1989 | 10-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE | 68.3 |
| 1093 | 9-Jun-1991 | 9-Jun-2006 | 15-Aug-2002 | 15-Aug-2002 | 16-Jul-2006 ELECTIVE | 73.9 |
| 1094 | 9-Jan-1967 | 17-Jul-1989 | 17-Jul-1989 | | 28-Mar-1989 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.7 |
| 1095 | 23-Mar-2013 | 22-Mar-2028 | 22-Mar-2028 | | | |
| 1096 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Sep-2034 | 10-Sep-2034 | | | |
| 1097 | 20-Jul-2008 | 20-Jul-2023 | 20-Jul-2023 | | | |
| 1098 | 10-Dec-1964 | 10-Dec-1979 | 10-Dec-1979 | 9-Feb-1980 | 15-Jan-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.1 |
| 1099 | 30-Dec-1967 | 4-Jun-1982 | 30-Dec-1977 | | 13-Aug-1977 DISABILITY | 70.2 |
| 1100 | 9-Nov-1974 | 9-Nov-1989 | 9-Nov-1989 | 9-Nov-1989 | 10-Feb-1991 ELECTIVE | 67.4 |
| 1101 | 5-Oct-2006 | 24-Feb-2026 | 24-Feb-2026 | | | |
| 1102 | 8-Oct-1983 | 20-Oct-1998 | 20-Oct-1998 | 23-Oct-1998 | 20-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1103 | 18-Jan-2003 | 18-Jan-2018 | 18-Jan-2018 | | 12-Oct-2017 DISABILITY | 69.6 |
| 1104 | 13-Oct-1985 | 13-Oct-2000 | 17-Aug-1998 | 17-Aug-1998 | 11-Mar-2001 ELECTIVE | 72.6 |
| 1105 | 9-Jun-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 21-Sep-2000 | | 11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | 63.6 |
| 1106 | 23-Mar-1985 | 22-Mar-2000 | 22-Mar-2000 | | 12-Mar-1986 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 51.1 |
| 1107 | 27-Jul-2002 | 24-Feb-2020 | 24-Feb-2020 | 12-Apr-2020 | | |
| 1108 | 27-Jan-2017 | 31-Jul-2030 | 27-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 1109 | 22-Aug-2009 | 8-Oct-2025 | 8-Oct-2025 | | | |
| 1110 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 29-May-2028 | | | |
| 1111 | 21-Dec-1950 | 23-Dec-1970 | 23-Dec-1970 | | 23-Dec-1980 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1112 | 23-Oct-1975 | 17-Dec-1995 | 17-Dec-1995 | 8-Jan-1996 | 9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE | 69.1 |
| 1113 | 7-Jan-1989 | 25-Mar-2010 | | | 8-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE | 60.5 |
| 1114 | 30-Aug-1973 | 30-Aug-1988 | 30-Aug-1988 | 30-Aug-1988 | 3-Nov-1995 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1115 | 7-Feb-2002 | 17-Sep-2020 | 17-Sep-2020 | | | |
| 1116 | 9-Feb-2019 | 30-Apr-2034 | 30-Apr-2034 | | | |
| 1117 | 11-Mar-1955 | 11-Mar-1970 | 11-Mar-1970 | 1-Sep-1978 | 1-Mar-1979 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1118 | 12-Jul-1969 | 12-Jul-1984 | 1-Jul-1981 | 10-Mar-1984 | 1-Jul-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1119 | 6-Mar-2005 | 5-Mar-2020 | 5-Mar-2020 | 5-Mar-2020 | | |
| 1120 | 11-Aug-2018 | 16-Oct-2035 | 16-Oct-2035 | | | |
| 1121 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 27-Mar-2029 | | | |
| 1122 | 30-Jun-1988 | 30-Jun-2003 | 7-Oct-2001 | 7-Oct-2001 | 7-Oct-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1123 | 16-Mar-2019 | 16-Mar-2034 | 16-Mar-2034 | | | |
| 1124 | 1-Jan-1988 | 31-Jul-2007 | 31-Jul-2007 | 26-Feb-2012 | 18-Jan-2019 ELECTIVE | 71.9 |
| 1125 | 26-Mar-1954 | 26-Mar-1971 | 26-Mar-1971 | | 10-Apr-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 58.0 |
| 1126 | 22-Sep-1966 | 22-Sep-1981 | 22-Sep-1981 | | 19-Jun-1988 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 72.8 |
| 1127 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 27-Sep-2024 | | | |
| 1128 | 9-Sep-2007 | 9-Sep-2022 | 7-May-2022 | | 9-Dec-2018 Early Retirement | 66.6 |
| 1129 | 9-Feb-2006 | 9-Feb-2021 | 16-Feb-2018 | 16-Feb-2018 | | |
| 1130 | 8-Feb-1969 | 8-Feb-1984 | 6-Sep-1979 | 9-Sep-1979 | 6-Sep-1984 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1131 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 17-Dec-2026 | | | |
| 1132 | 2-Mar-2007 | 4-Dec-2025 | 4-Dec-2025 | | | |
| 1133 | 22-Aug-2010 | 30-Apr-2029 | 30-Apr-2029 | | | |
| 1134 | 5-Sep-1981 | 5-Sep-1996 | 5-Sep-1996 | 10-Apr-1997 | 1-Dec-2001 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1135 | 24-Sep-2016 | 24-Sep-2031 | 17-Oct-2026 | | | |
| 1136 | 22-Jul-1999 | 27-Jul-2015 | 27-Jul-2015 | | | |
| 1137 | 2-Jan-1953 | 3-Sep-1968 | 3-Sep-1968 | | 9-Jan-1967 DISABILITY | 63.4 |
| 1138 | 21-May-1993 | 18-Jul-2007 | 21-May-2003 | | 10-Dec-2003 DISABILITY | 71.4 |
| 1139 | 16-Sep-1999 | 16-Dec-2016 | 16-Dec-2016 | 9-Dec-2017 | | |
| 1140 | 31-Dec-1977 | 29-Feb-2000 | 29-Feb-2000 | | 10-Dec-1988 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 53.8 |
| 1141 | 27-Jan-1965 | 11-Sep-1978 | 11-Sep-1978 | 8-Oct-1978 | 11-Sep-1983 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1142 | 10-Jun-2007 | 26-Sep-2025 | 26-Sep-2025 | | | |
| 1143 | 17-Oct-1984 | 15-Aug-2002 | 11-Jun-2005 | | 9-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE | 62.3 |
| 1144 | 22-Mar-2008 | 18-Apr-2023 | 18-Apr-2023 | | | |
| 1145 | 24-Oct-1981 | 18-Jan-1999 | 18-Jan-1999 | 18-Jan-1999 | 18-Jan-2009 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1146 | 14-Nov-2010 | 14-Nov-2025 | 14-Nov-2025 | | | |
| 1147 | 14-Sep-2013 | 9-Dec-2028 | 9-Dec-2028 | | | |
| 1148 | 17-Jul-1976 | 12-Apr-1993 | 12-Apr-1993 | 12-Apr-1993 | 12-Apr-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1149 | 2-Jun-1957 | 4-Jan-1978 | 4-Jan-1978 | 18-May-1983 | 4-Jan-1988 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1150 | 8-Oct-1989 | 20-Jun-2007 | 20-Jun-2007 | 10-Apr-2008 | 11-Apr-2018 COMPULSORY | 73.1 |
| 1151 | 19-Jun-1985 | 19-Jun-2000 | 19-Jun-2000 | 19-Jun-2000 | 9-Jan-2006 ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 1152 | 23-Jul-2005 | 23-Jul-2020 | 23-Jul-2020 | 23-Jul-2020 | | |
| 1153 | 1-May-1999 | 6-Mar-2015 | 6-Mar-2015 | | 8-Jan-2015 Early Retirement | 64.0 |
| 1154 | 21-Mar-1970 | 29-Mar-1993 | 29-Mar-1993 | | 25-May-1991 DISABILITY | 62.2 |
| 1155 | 1-Nov-1975 | 26-Aug-1998 | 26-Aug-1998 | 1-Nov-2000 | 26-Aug-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1156 | 5-Aug-2007 | 24-Jan-2027 | 24-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 1157 | 26-Jun-1982 | 27-Feb-2002 | 30-Oct-2006 | 30-Oct-2006 | 30-Oct-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1158 | 16-Nov-1977 | 26-Jul-1995 | 26-Jul-1995 | 26-Jul-1995 | 8-Aug-1997 ELECTIVE | 67.0 |
| 1159 | 23-Dec-2017 | 23-Dec-2032 | 19-Apr-2032 | | | |
| 1160 | 25-Feb-1987 | 25-Feb-2002 | 25-Feb-2002 | 10-Mar-2002 | 6-Dec-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1161 | 10-Sep-2004 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Dec-2019 | | |
| 1162 | 3-Jun-1986 | 3-Jun-2001 | 19-Jul-2000 | 19-Jul-2000 | 19-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1163 | 12-Feb-1983 | 2-Dec-2000 | 21-Sep-2003 | 22-Mar-2005 | 21-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1164 | 2-Jan-1982 | 3-Oct-1999 | 3-Oct-1999 | | 18-Feb-1982 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 47.4 |
| 1165 | 30-Sep-2019 | 30-Sep-2034 | 30-Sep-2034 | | | |
| 1166 | 14-Jun-2014 | 14-Jun-2029 | 14-Jun-2029 | | | |
| 1167 | 9-Jan-1964 | 9-Jan-1979 | 9-Jan-1979 | | 15-Feb-1976 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.5 |
| 1168 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 26-Sep-2023 | | | |
| 1169 | 17-Jan-2015 | 25-Mar-2032 | 25-Mar-2032 | | | |
| 1170 | 7-Oct-1998 | 8-Nov-2013 | 8-Nov-2013 | 8-Nov-2013 | | |
| 1171 | 11-Apr-1976 | 12-Apr-1991 | | | 14-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE | 67.3 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 1172 | 9-May-2019 | 9-May-2034 | 25-Oct-2030 | | | | |
| 1173 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | | | |
| 1174 | 24-Mar-2012 | 25-Mar-2027 | 25-Mar-2027 | | | | |
| 1175 | 9-Sep-2020 | 9-Sep-2035 | 21-Feb-2033 | | | | |
| 1176 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 1-Jan-2011 | 1-Jan-2011 | 11-Apr-2011 | Early Retirement | 70.3 |
| 1177 | 12-Jan-2019 | 7-Mar-2029 | 12-Jan-2029 | | | | |
| 1178 | 20-Dec-1947 | 20-Dec-1962 | 20-Dec-1962 | | 13-Feb-1965 | ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 1179 | 1-Mar-2019 | 1-Mar-2034 | 13-Apr-2029 | | | | |
| 1180 | 12-Jun-2020 | 27-Sep-2028 | | | | | |
| 1181 | 5-Oct-2019 | 5-Oct-2034 | 19-Mar-2032 | | | | |
| 1182 | 27-Sep-2009 | 15-Mar-2027 | 15-Mar-2027 | | | | |
| 1183 | 23-Mar-2013 | 26-May-2026 | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| 1184 | 20-Jul-2008 | 20-Jul-2023 | 24-Apr-2021 | | | | |
| 1185 | 27-Jun-1963 | 27-Jun-1978 | 27-Jun-1978 | 9-Jan-1980 | 1-Jun-1985 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1186 | 9-Nov-1973 | 9-Nov-1988 | 9-Nov-1988 | 9-Nov-1988 | 27-Oct-1998 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1187 | 23-May-1970 | 16-Apr-1999 | 16-Apr-1999 | | 11-Jul-1997 | DISABILITY | 63.2 |
| 1188 | 2-Jan-2005 | 2-Jan-2020 | 2-Jan-2020 | 2-Jan-2020 | | | |
| 1189 | 25-Dec-2003 | 6-Jun-2022 | 6-Jun-2022 | | | | |
| 1190 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 26-Sep-2023 | | | | |
| 1191 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Mar-2022 | 2-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 1192 | 5-Sep-2015 | 5-Sep-2030 | 2-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 1193 | 8-Apr-1954 | 29-Feb-1972 | 29-Feb-1972 | 13-Apr-1974 | 1-Mar-1982 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1194 | 27-Sep-2015 | 13-Aug-2031 | 13-Aug-2031 | | | | |
| 1195 | 2-Jan-1958 | 24-Dec-1960 | | | 24-Dec-1965 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1196 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 21-Mar-2030 | | | | |
| 1197 | 25-Jun-1998 | 25-Jun-2013 | 8-Jul-2012 | 8-Jul-2012 | 24-Jan-2016 | ELECTIVE | 73.5 |
| 1198 | 25-Mar-1972 | 10-Dec-1997 | 10-Dec-1997 | 10-Dec-1997 | 9-Aug-2003 | ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 1199 | 16-Nov-1977 | 16-Nov-1992 | 12-May-1989 | 9-Jun-1989 | 9-Dec-1992 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 1200 | 26-Apr-1981 | 25-Apr-1996 | 25-Apr-1996 | 25-Apr-1996 | 10-Apr-2000 | ELECTIVE | 70.1 |
| 1201 | 11-Aug-2017 | 13-Jul-2035 | 13-Jul-2035 | | | | |
| 1202 | 3-Feb-1979 | 12-Oct-1998 | 12-Oct-1998 | 18-Nov-1998 | 12-Dec-2003 | ELECTIVE | 70.2 |
| 1203 | 10-Dec-2001 | 10-Dec-2016 | 10-Dec-2016 | 10-Dec-2016 | | | |
| 1204 | 7-May-1983 | 7-May-1998 | 28-Jan-1995 | | 31-Oct-1985 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.8 |
| 1205 | 16-Nov-1977 | 16-Nov-1992 | 16-Nov-1992 | 16-Nov-1992 | 14-Dec-1994 | ELECTIVE | 68.7 |
| 1206 | 11-Mar-1955 | 9-May-1964 | 11-Mar-1965 | | 21-Nov-1964 | DISABILITY | 70.5 |
| 1207 | 13-Jan-1974 | 12-Jul-1993 | 12-Jul-1993 | | 10-Sep-1984 | DEATH (RPC) | 56.2 |
| 1208 | 17-Jun-1999 | 17-Jun-2014 | 17-Jun-2014 | | | | |
| 1209 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 5-Jan-2027 | | | | |
| 1210 | 11-Jan-1996 | 21-May-2014 | 21-May-2014 | 9-Aug-2014 | | | |
| 1211 | 1-Nov-1975 | 20-Aug-1993 | 20-Aug-1993 | 26-May-1999 | 20-Aug-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1212 | 9-Feb-2019 | 9-Feb-2034 | 18-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 1213 | 28-Jan-2012 | 28-Jan-2027 | 24-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| 1214 | 1-Oct-1983 | 5-Nov-1996 | 1-Oct-1993 | 1-Oct-1993 | 5-Nov-1995 | DISABILITY | 74.0 |
| 1215 | 13-Nov-1982 | 11-Apr-1999 | 7-Sep-2000 | 7-Sep-2000 | 7-Sep-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1216 | 18-May-2013 | 9-Dec-2025 | | | | | |
| 1217 | 3-Jan-1942 | 4-Feb-1960 | 4-Feb-1960 | | 3-Apr-1964 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.2 |
| 1218 | 13-Aug-2005 | 13-Aug-2020 | 13-Aug-2020 | | | | |
| 1219 | 12-Jul-2020 | 3-Nov-2037 | 3-Nov-2037 | | | | |
| 1220 | 17-Aug-2014 | 7-Aug-2029 | 17-Aug-2024 | | | | |
| 1221 | 3-Aug-2013 | 3-Aug-2028 | 29-Mar-2028 | | | | |
| 1222 | 12-Apr-1975 | 12-Aug-1992 | 12-Aug-1992 | 12-Aug-1992 | 10-Dec-1999 | ELECTIVE | 72.3 |
| 1223 | 27-Jan-2017 | 17-Feb-2031 | 27-Jan-2027 | | | | |
| 1224 | 18-Oct-1980 | 26-Feb-1999 | 4-Apr-1999 | 4-Apr-1999 | 13-Jul-2005 | ELECTIVE | 71.3 |
| 1225 | 23-Nov-2017 | 23-Nov-2032 | 23-Nov-2032 | | | | |
| 1226 | 7-May-1994 | 19-Oct-2013 | 19-Oct-2013 | 19-Oct-2013 | | | |
| 1227 | 18-Dec-2009 | 5-Oct-2027 | 5-Oct-2027 | | | | |
| 1228 | 20-Dec-1975 | 20-Dec-1990 | 20-Dec-1990 | 16-Feb-1992 | 14-Feb-1996 | ELECTIVE | 70.4 |
| 1229 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 9-Aug-2008 | ELECTIVE | 69.8 |
| 1230 | 4-Jan-2004 | 19-May-2023 | 19-May-2023 | | | | |
| 1231 | 11-Jun-2011 | 11-Jun-2026 | 11-Jun-2026 | | | | |
| 1232 | 3-Mar-1963 | 12-Jan-1982 | 12-Jan-1982 | | 8-Jan-1977 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.0 |
| 1233 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | | 9-Oct-2003 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.1 |
| 1234 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2035 | 28-Aug-2035 | | | | |
| 1235 | 23-Dec-2006 | 20-Mar-2016 | | | 20-Mar-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1236 | 26-May-1985 | 9-Oct-2000 | 22-Feb-2001 | 22-Feb-2001 | 10-Apr-2009 | ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 1237 | 11-Mar-1999 | 11-Mar-2014 | 26-Feb-2014 | 26-Feb-2014 | 10-Dec-2018 | ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 1238 | 16-May-2015 | 17-May-2024 | | | | | |
| 1239 | 8-Jul-2007 | 8-Jul-2022 | 16-Feb-2018 | 11-Mar-2018 | | | |
| 1240 | 28-Jan-2018 | 23-Nov-2027 | | | | | |
| 1241 | 29-Sep-2017 | 10-Apr-2027 | | | | | |
| 1242 | 12-May-1993 | 26-Aug-2008 | 26-Aug-2008 | 26-Aug-2008 | 14-Feb-2017 | ELECTIVE | 73.2 |
| 1243 | 25-Mar-1972 | 15-Dec-1987 | 15-Dec-1987 | 15-Dec-1987 | 15-Dec-1997 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1244 | 21-Nov-2009 | 21-Nov-2024 | 21-Nov-2024 | | | | |
| 1245 | 1-Nov-2003 | 1-Nov-2018 | 18-Aug-2017 | 18-Aug-2017 | 9-Oct-2020 | ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 1246 | 19-Jul-2014 | 13-Mar-2032 | | | | | |
| 1247 | 12-Feb-1998 | 12-Feb-2013 | 12-Feb-2013 | 12-Feb-2013 | 9-Feb-2019 | ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 1248 | 7-May-1977 | 14-Jun-1993 | 14-Jun-1993 | 14-Jun-1993 | 14-Jun-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1249 | 24-Sep-2016 | 16-Sep-2031 | 24-Sep-2026 | | | | |
| 1250 | 29-Apr-1972 | 15-Mar-1991 | 15-Mar-1991 | | 15-Mar-2001 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1251 | 12-Jan-2019 | 17-Dec-2036 | 17-Dec-2036 | | | | |
| 1252 | 17-Jul-1976 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Jan-2001 | | 10-Apr-2000 | ELECTIVE | 64.2 |
| 1253 | 9-Jun-1979 | 9-Jun-1994 | 9-Jun-1994 | 9-Jun-1994 | 6-Feb-1996 | ELECTIVE | 67.6 |
| 1254 | 8-Oct-1989 | 20-Dec-2004 | 3-Mar-2005 | 3-Mar-2005 | 9-Aug-2008 | ELECTIVE | 68.4 |
| 1255 | 8-Nov-2001 | 8-Nov-2016 | 8-Nov-2016 | | 22-Sep-2012 | Early Retirement | 63.7 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 1256 | 26-Sep-2008 | 27-Oct-2022 | 26-Sep-2018 | | | 11-Jun-2011 DISABILITY | 63.6 |
| 1257 | 16-Sep-2017 | 16-Sep-2032 | 31-May-2030 | | | | |
| 1258 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | | | 9-Jan-2013 ELECTIVE | 71.9 |
| 1259 | 5-May-1940 | 6-May-1955 | 6-May-1955 | | | 30-Oct-1958 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.7 |
| 1260 | 2-Apr-2007 | 14-May-2026 | 14-May-2026 | | | | |
| 1261 | 29-Apr-1964 | 3-Dec-1988 | 3-Dec-1988 | 30-Apr-1994 | | 14-May-1998 ELECTIVE | 74.4 |
| 1262 | 3-Feb-2007 | 3-Feb-2022 | 3-Feb-2022 | | | | |
| 1263 | 26-Oct-1983 | 14-Apr-2002 | 1-Oct-2005 | 1-Oct-2005 | | 1-Oct-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1264 | 29-Dec-1994 | 18-Mar-2010 | 18-Mar-2010 | 9-Aug-2010 | | 10-Apr-2017 ELECTIVE | 71.8 |
| 1265 | 13-Jan-2001 | 11-Nov-2017 | 11-Nov-2017 | | | 5-Oct-2014 DEATH (RPC) | 60.1 |
| 1266 | 13-Dec-1992 | 13-Dec-2007 | 13-Dec-2007 | 13-Dec-2007 | | 13-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE | 74.4 |
| 1267 | 19-Jul-1985 | 19-Jul-2000 | 9-Aug-1998 | 9-Aug-1998 | | 1-Mar-2002 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.6 |
| 1268 | 22-Aug-2009 | 22-Aug-2024 | 5-Mar-2020 | 10-Mar-2020 | | | |
| 1269 | 13-Aug-1959 | 27-Sep-1975 | | | | 8-Feb-1985 ELECTIVE | 74.4 |
| 1270 | 18-Jan-2003 | 17-Jul-2027 | | | | 13-Jun-2020 Early Retirement | 60.1 |
| 1271 | 27-May-1990 | 27-May-2005 | 5-Feb-2003 | 5-Feb-2003 | | 5-Feb-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1272 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 17-Feb-1999 | | 17-Dec-2001 ELECTIVE | 71.1 |
| 1273 | 9-Jul-1977 | 11-Sep-1997 | 11-Sep-1997 | 11-Sep-1997 | | 9-Jan-2002 Early Retirement | 69.3 |
| 1274 | 23-Feb-2002 | 23-Feb-2017 | 23-Feb-2017 | 23-Feb-2017 | | 9-Dec-2017 ELECTIVE | 66.8 |
| 1275 | 9-Mar-2018 | 7-Nov-2034 | 7-Nov-2034 | | | | |
| 1276 | 25-Feb-1988 | 25-Feb-2003 | 18-Dec-2000 | 18-Dec-2000 | | 18-Dec-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1277 | 5-May-2002 | 5-May-2017 | 5-May-2017 | | | 5-Oct-2012 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.9 |
| 1278 | 24-Sep-2016 | 15-May-2036 | 15-May-2036 | | | | |
| 1279 | 10-May-2008 | 6-Nov-2025 | 6-Nov-2025 | | | | |
| 1280 | 6-Jun-2015 | 6-Jun-2030 | 6-Jun-2030 | | | | |
| 1281 | 25-Jul-1986 | 27-Sep-2003 | 28-Nov-2005 | 28-Nov-2005 | | 28-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1282 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | | 10-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE | 71.6 |
| 1283 | 9-Jun-2012 | 9-Jun-2027 | 9-Jun-2027 | | | | |
| 1284 | 9-Oct-1963 | 9-Oct-1978 | 9-Oct-1978 | | | 23-Feb-1976 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.3 |
| 1285 | 30-May-1996 | 31-May-2011 | 14-Apr-2007 | 14-Apr-2007 | | 13-Apr-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1286 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 1-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 1287 | 15-Jun-1989 | 25-Aug-2009 | 25-Aug-2009 | 10-Dec-2009 | | 9-Feb-2018 ELECTIVE | 68.3 |
| 1288 | 3-Nov-1995 | 3-Nov-2010 | 25-Dec-2006 | 25-Dec-2006 | | 25-Dec-2011 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1289 | 30-Apr-1967 | 23-Jun-1983 | | | | 26-May-1989 ELECTIVE | 70.9 |
| 1290 | 20-Jul-2008 | 1-Jun-2025 | 1-Jun-2025 | | | | |
| 1291 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | | 22-May-2014 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1292 | 28-Mar-1996 | 25-Nov-2014 | 25-Nov-2014 | | | | |
| 1293 | 1-Oct-2005 | 18-Dec-2027 | | | | | |
| 1294 | 10-Jul-1961 | 3-Jul-1977 | 3-Jul-1977 | 9-Oct-1977 | | 5-Apr-1978 ELECTIVE | 65.8 |
| 1295 | 25-Jan-1964 | 6-Feb-1984 | 6-Feb-1984 | 6-Feb-1984 | | 6-Feb-1994 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1296 | 25-Sep-1987 | 10-Jan-2008 | 10-Jan-2008 | 9-Sep-2008 | | 9-Sep-2018 COMPULSORY | 70.4 |
| 1297 | 1-Oct-2005 | 22-Nov-2023 | 22-Nov-2023 | | | | |
| 1298 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 22-Jan-2005 | 22-Jan-2005 | | 11-Apr-2009 ELECTIVE | 74.2 |
| 1299 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 8-Jan-2026 | | | | |
| 1300 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | | 5-Mar-2013 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1301 | 7-May-1994 | 7-May-2009 | 7-Apr-2007 | 7-Apr-2007 | | 6-Apr-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1302 | 10-Apr-2012 | 11-Apr-2027 | 10-Jan-2024 | | | | |
| 1303 | 22-Mar-1975 | 22-Mar-1990 | 7-Mar-1989 | 7-Mar-1989 | | 26-Dec-1990 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.8 |
| 1304 | 12-Feb-1954 | 13-Jun-1977 | 13-Jun-1977 | | | 20-Mar-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.8 |
| 1305 | 7-Mar-1971 | 12-Sep-1982 | 7-Mar-1981 | | | 18-Jun-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.8 |
| 1306 | 16-Feb-1997 | 2-Oct-2014 | 2-Oct-2014 | 2-Oct-2014 | | | |
| 1307 | 7-Jan-2012 | 7-Jan-2027 | 19-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| 1308 | 27-Dec-1975 | 27-Dec-1990 | 27-Dec-1990 | | | 9-Sep-1989 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.2 |
| 1309 | 18-May-2013 | 5-Apr-2029 | 5-Apr-2029 | | | | |
| 1310 | 20-Jan-1963 | 1-Aug-1984 | 1-Aug-1984 | 1-Aug-1984 | | 20-Jan-1993 ELECTIVE | 73.5 |
| 1311 | 1-Jun-1989 | 26-Oct-2003 | 1-Jun-1999 | 10-Dec-1999 | | 26-Oct-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1312 | 8-Mar-1992 | 27-Aug-2000 | | | | 27-Aug-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1313 | 21-Oct-1972 | 24-Jul-1988 | 24-Jul-1988 | 24-Jul-1988 | | 27-Jul-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.0 |
| 1314 | 23-Jul-2005 | 23-Jul-2020 | 23-Jul-2020 | | | 9-Sep-2017 Early Retirement | 63.7 |
| 1315 | 21-Aug-2005 | 16-Mar-2022 | 16-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 1316 | 29-Sep-1984 | 15-Jun-1999 | 15-Jun-1999 | 15-Jun-1999 | | 15-Jun-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1317 | 4-Jul-2015 | 5-Apr-2031 | 5-Apr-2031 | | | | |
| 1318 | 5-May-2002 | 13-Apr-2018 | 13-Apr-2018 | 9-Sep-2020 | | | |
| 1319 | 18-Apr-1999 | 25-Sep-2015 | 25-Sep-2015 | 11-Mar-2018 | | | |
| 1320 | 16-Oct-1986 | 16-Oct-2001 | 16-Oct-2001 | 16-Oct-2001 | | 19-Mar-2010 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1321 | 9-Jan-1965 | 23-Dec-1978 | 23-Dec-1978 | | | 14-Jul-1973 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.6 |
| 1322 | 11-Dec-1971 | 19-Oct-1995 | 19-Oct-1995 | 19-Oct-1995 | | 21-Apr-1999 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.5 |
| 1323 | 7-Jan-1989 | 7-Jan-2004 | 2-Apr-2000 | 9-Oct-2001 | | 9-Jan-2005 ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 1324 | 31-Mar-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 15-Feb-2002 | 8-Jun-2002 | | 9-Feb-2007 ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 1325 | 31-Mar-1984 | 1-Apr-1999 | 1-Apr-1999 | 1-Apr-1999 | | 10-May-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1326 | 18-Aug-1985 | 11-Nov-2000 | 4-Feb-2001 | | | 14-Aug-1999 DISABILITY | 63.5 |
| 1327 | 11-Dec-1988 | 11-Dec-2003 | 28-Jun-1999 | 9-Sep-2000 | | 28-Jun-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1328 | 2-Oct-2011 | 25-Oct-2026 | 25-Oct-2026 | | | | |
| 1329 | 11-May-1958 | 23-Dec-1977 | 23-Dec-1977 | 23-Dec-1977 | | 25-Jun-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.5 |
| 1330 | 27-Jan-1962 | 17-Nov-1972 | 17-Nov-1972 | | | 16-Apr-1965 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.4 |
| 1331 | 3-Feb-2018 | 14-Sep-2034 | 14-Sep-2034 | | | | |
| 1332 | 15-May-2020 | 16-May-2035 | 16-May-2035 | | | | |
| 1333 | 5-Oct-2019 | 5-Oct-2034 | 5-Oct-2034 | | | | |
| 1334 | 13-Oct-1990 | 13-Oct-2005 | 25-Jun-2002 | 25-Jun-2002 | | 25-Jun-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1335 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2035 | 28-Aug-2035 | | | | |
| 1336 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 10-Jun-2022 | | | | |
| 1337 | 9-Feb-1995 | 9-Feb-2010 | 9-Feb-2010 | 10-Apr-2012 | | 11-Jan-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1338 | 7-Dec-2018 | 19-Oct-2028 | | | | | |
| 1339 | 13-Oct-1978 | 13-Oct-1993 | 13-Oct-1993 | | | 29-Oct-1988 DISABILITY | 63.0 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|--|--|------|
| 1340 | 8-Jan-2021 | 23-Jan-2036 | 23-Jan-2036 | | | | | | |
| 1341 | 19-Jan-1992 | 13-Nov-2010 | 13-Nov-2010 | 13-Nov-2010 | 8-Nov-2017 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.2 |
| 1342 | 18-Dec-2009 | 18-Dec-2024 | 23-Oct-2024 | | | | | | |
| 1343 | 22-Nov-1935 | 19-Oct-1953 | 19-Oct-1953 | | 5-Mar-1958 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.4 |
| 1344 | 29-Mar-1981 | 28-Mar-1996 | 26-Jul-1993 | | 25-Oct-1987 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 64.2 |
| 1345 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 3-Nov-1995 | 3-Nov-1995 | 11-Mar-1999 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.4 |
| 1346 | 18-Aug-2007 | 18-Aug-2022 | 6-Jul-2022 | | | | | | |
| 1347 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 16-Jan-1995 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.0 |
| 1348 | 8-Aug-2015 | 11-Nov-2032 | 11-Nov-2032 | | | | | | |
| 1349 | 15-May-1963 | 7-Apr-1977 | 7-Apr-1977 | 11-Apr-1977 | 7-Apr-1982 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1350 | 29-Dec-1979 | 29-Dec-1994 | 29-Dec-1994 | | 4-Apr-1984 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 56.0 |
| 1351 | 11-Jul-1998 | 11-Jul-2013 | 11-Jul-2013 | 11-Jul-2013 | 9-Apr-2020 | ELECTIVE | | | 75.0 |
| 1352 | 28-Jan-1999 | 28-Jan-2014 | 28-Jan-2014 | 28-Jan-2014 | | | | | |
| 1353 | 12-Jul-2020 | 14-Oct-2035 | 14-Oct-2035 | | | | | | |
| 1354 | 8-Mar-1969 | 23-Jun-1984 | 23-Jun-1984 | | 25-Jul-1975 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 56.1 |
| 1355 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 17-Mar-2027 | | | | | | |
| 1356 | 13-Jul-1995 | 13-Jul-2010 | 13-Jul-2010 | | 17-Feb-1997 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 51.8 |
| 1357 | 26-Oct-1983 | 31-Jul-2006 | 31-Jul-2006 | | 11-May-1996 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 54.8 |
| 1358 | 6-Aug-2020 | 6-Aug-2035 | 6-Aug-2035 | | | | | | |
| 1359 | 8-Nov-1951 | 25-Nov-1965 | 8-Nov-1961 | | 27-Jun-1965 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 74.6 |
| 1360 | 9-May-1938 | 20-Apr-1955 | 20-Apr-1955 | | 18-Dec-1963 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 73.7 |
| 1361 | 3-Feb-1983 | 3-Feb-1993 | 3-Feb-1993 | 10-Apr-1993 | 20-Oct-1995 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1362 | 11-Dec-2020 | 26-Sep-2040 | 26-Sep-2040 | | | | | | |
| 1363 | 22-Mar-2019 | 22-Mar-2034 | 10-Apr-2031 | | | | | | |
| 1364 | 13-May-2005 | 10-Nov-2024 | 10-Nov-2024 | | | | | | |
| 1365 | 10-Mar-1965 | 19-Dec-1981 | 19-Dec-1981 | | 23-Jul-1973 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 56.6 |
| 1366 | 3-Apr-1974 | 3-Apr-1989 | 11-Dec-1988 | 11-Dec-1988 | 11-Apr-1991 | ELECTIVE | | | 72.3 |
| 1367 | 26-Jun-1997 | 26-Jun-2012 | 26-Jun-2012 | 10-Jul-2012 | | | | | |
| 1368 | 18-Sep-1993 | 11-Feb-2012 | 11-Feb-2012 | 12-Jul-2015 | | | | | |
| 1369 | 4-May-1986 | 20-Oct-2002 | 6-Apr-2004 | 6-Apr-2004 | 18-Jul-2012 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.3 |
| 1370 | 5-Sep-1993 | 3-Mar-2015 | 27-Aug-2026 | 15-Dec-2016 | | | | | |
| 1371 | 21-May-1998 | 21-May-2013 | 21-May-2013 | 21-May-2013 | 6-Oct-2017 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.1 |
| 1372 | 21-Sep-1961 | 21-Sep-1976 | 21-Sep-1976 | 9-Oct-1981 | 16-Sep-1984 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1373 | 9-Jun-1961 | 29-Nov-1981 | 29-Nov-1981 | 9-Dec-1981 | 7-Jul-1983 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 66.6 |
| 1374 | 8-Dec-1978 | 29-Oct-1998 | 29-Oct-1998 | | 9-Feb-2002 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.3 |
| 1375 | 3-Apr-1970 | 3-Apr-1985 | 3-Apr-1985 | | 10-Apr-1983 | DISABILITY | | | 65.0 |
| 1376 | 7-Dec-2005 | 2-Jun-2023 | 2-Jun-2023 | | | | | | |
| 1377 | 28-Feb-1962 | 18-Jun-1964 | | | 18-Jun-1969 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 75.0 |
| 1378 | 23-May-1952 | 20-Aug-1970 | 20-Aug-1970 | | 20-Aug-1980 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1379 | 23-Oct-1998 | 27-Jul-2015 | 27-Jul-2015 | 29-Jul-2015 | | | | | |
| 1380 | 10-Mar-1984 | 29-Sep-2000 | 20-Apr-2002 | 20-Apr-2002 | 10-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | | | 75.0 |
| 1381 | 23-May-1981 | 7-Feb-2000 | 23-Oct-2003 | 23-Oct-2003 | 10-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.5 |
| 1382 | 13-Sep-1969 | 5-Apr-1987 | 5-Apr-1987 | 11-Apr-1987 | 5-Apr-1997 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1383 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 17-Dec-2029 | | | | | | |
| 1384 | 9-Nov-1995 | 9-Nov-2010 | 9-Nov-2010 | | 2-Feb-2006 | DISABILITY | | | 61.9 |
| 1385 | 14-Apr-1965 | 9-Apr-1976 | 14-Apr-1975 | | 3-Apr-1969 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 68.0 |
| 1386 | 15-Sep-1988 | 15-Sep-2003 | 15-Sep-2003 | 15-Sep-2003 | 10-Apr-2004 | ELECTIVE | | | 67.2 |
| 1387 | 2-Apr-1977 | 8-Mar-2003 | 8-Mar-2003 | | 10-Dec-1996 | DISABILITY | | | 58.8 |
| 1388 | 16-May-1996 | 17-May-2011 | 19-Mar-2010 | 19-Mar-2010 | 17-May-2011 | ELECTIVE | | | 71.2 |
| 1389 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 23-Oct-2016 | ELECTIVE | | | 70.0 |
| 1390 | 15-Feb-2014 | 15-Feb-2029 | 15-Feb-2029 | | | | | | |
| 1391 | 9-Sep-1953 | 16-Aug-1971 | 16-Aug-1971 | 9-Sep-1976 | 8-Apr-1977 | ELECTIVE | | | 70.6 |
| 1392 | 17-Oct-1959 | 23-Dec-1968 | | | 23-Dec-1968 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1393 | 20-Jul-1978 | 16-Feb-1994 | 16-Feb-1994 | 16-Feb-1994 | 16-Feb-2004 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1394 | 19-Jun-1985 | 7-May-2000 | 7-May-2000 | 7-May-2000 | 10-Nov-2001 | ELECTIVE | | | 71.5 |
| 1395 | 9-Oct-1977 | 6-Jul-1997 | 6-Jul-1997 | 6-Jul-1997 | 6-Jul-2007 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1396 | 17-Aug-1995 | 11-Mar-2010 | 17-Aug-2005 | 17-Aug-2005 | 11-Mar-2010 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1397 | 29-Jan-2000 | 29-Jan-2015 | 5-Jun-2014 | 5-Jun-2014 | 8-Feb-2019 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.7 |
| 1398 | 17-Jun-2014 | 30-Apr-2031 | 30-Apr-2031 | | | | | | |
| 1399 | 9-Feb-2019 | 9-Feb-2034 | 9-Feb-2034 | | | | | | |
| 1400 | 22-Apr-2000 | 23-Apr-2015 | 23-Apr-2015 | | 23-Apr-2015 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.8 |
| 1401 | 25-Feb-1953 | 22-Jun-1974 | 22-Jun-1974 | 25-Oct-1975 | 8-Apr-1979 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.8 |
| 1402 | 29-Jan-1954 | 29-Jan-1969 | 29-Jan-1969 | | 16-May-1961 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 59.8 |
| 1403 | 1-Oct-1998 | 5-Feb-2012 | 1-Oct-2008 | 1-Oct-2008 | 5-Feb-2012 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1404 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 31-Oct-2029 | | | | | | |
| 1405 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 21-Mar-2030 | | | | | | |
| 1406 | 9-May-1970 | 21-Jun-1992 | 21-Jun-1992 | 21-Jun-1992 | 21-Jun-2002 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1407 | 13-Nov-1982 | 30-Oct-1992 | 13-Nov-1992 | | 7-Sep-1986 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 63.9 |
| 1408 | 8-Mar-1969 | 31-Aug-1992 | 31-Aug-1992 | 31-Aug-1992 | 31-Aug-2002 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1409 | 9-Jan-2014 | 9-Jan-2029 | 21-Jul-2027 | | | | | | |
| 1410 | 11-Dec-1988 | 23-Mar-2005 | 2-Jul-2006 | 2-Jul-2006 | 2-Jul-2016 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1411 | 12-Jan-2019 | 12-Jan-2034 | 12-Jan-2034 | | | | | | |
| 1412 | 1-Sep-1963 | 28-Jun-1971 | | | 28-Jun-1971 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 75.0 |
| 1413 | 2-Jan-2005 | 25-Nov-2020 | 25-Nov-2020 | | | | | | |
| 1414 | 1-Apr-1992 | 6-Jul-2010 | 6-Jul-2010 | 6-Jul-2010 | 10-Dec-2018 | ELECTIVE | | | 70.2 |
| 1415 | 14-Oct-1965 | 14-Oct-1980 | 14-Oct-1980 | 9-Jul-1985 | 9-Dec-1988 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.3 |
| 1416 | 8-May-1966 | 8-May-1981 | 8-May-1981 | 9-Oct-1981 | 7-Aug-1989 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1417 | 23-Nov-1973 | 23-Nov-1988 | 3-Nov-1986 | | 9-Oct-1985 | DISABILITY | | | 68.9 |
| 1418 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 27-Jan-2032 | | | | | | |
| 1419 | 10-May-2014 | 1-Jun-2028 | 9-May-2024 | | 9-Dec-2019 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 66.5 |
| 1420 | 15-Feb-1964 | 15-Feb-1979 | 15-Feb-1979 | 15-Feb-1979 | 5-Oct-1987 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1421 | 6-Sep-1945 | 10-Dec-1965 | 10-Dec-1965 | 9-Sep-1974 | 10-Dec-1975 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1422 | 17-Aug-1996 | 29-Nov-2013 | 29-Nov-2013 | 9-Oct-2015 | 9-Dec-2015 | ELECTIVE | | | 64.7 |
| 1423 | 11-Dec-1980 | 26-Feb-1999 | 21-May-2000 | 21-May-2000 | 14-Dec-2009 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.6 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 1424 | 30-May-1976 | 12-Sep-1998 | 12-Sep-1998 | 9-Feb-1999 | 24-Jul-2002 | ELECTIVE | 68.9 |
| 1425 | 14-Apr-1976 | 26-Feb-1999 | 9-Dec-2005 | 10-Dec-2005 | 9-Aug-2012 | ELECTIVE | 71.7 |
| 1426 | 31-Aug-2018 | 31-Aug-2033 | 29-Jul-2033 | | | | |
| 1427 | 10-Feb-2013 | 26-Dec-2030 | 26-Dec-2030 | | | | |
| 1428 | 13-Sep-2002 | 5-Nov-2018 | 5-Nov-2018 | 5-Nov-2018 | | | |
| 1429 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 24-Jul-2028 | | | | |
| 1430 | 10-May-2008 | 11-May-2023 | 16-Jul-2020 | | 15-Aug-2018 | Early Retirement | 68.1 |
| 1431 | 21-Aug-1982 | 21-Aug-1997 | 21-Aug-1997 | | 22-Feb-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1432 | 3-Apr-1991 | 14-Apr-2007 | 14-Apr-2007 | 25-Apr-2007 | 11-Jul-2014 | ELECTIVE | 71.2 |
| 1433 | 11-Apr-1987 | 27-Apr-2004 | 13-May-2006 | 9-Jun-2006 | 12-May-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1434 | 26-Oct-1983 | 15-Sep-2003 | 24-Mar-2007 | 18-Apr-2007 | 20-Apr-2015 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.7 |
| 1435 | 19-Jul-2014 | 31-Aug-2032 | 31-Aug-2032 | | | | |
| 1436 | 5-Nov-1981 | 30-May-1996 | 30-May-1996 | 30-May-1996 | 11-Apr-1999 | ELECTIVE | 72.9 |
| 1437 | 14-May-2011 | 8-Jul-2027 | 8-Jul-2027 | | | | |
| 1438 | 11-Dec-1988 | 9-Nov-2001 | 11-Dec-1998 | 11-Dec-1998 | 9-Nov-2001 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1439 | 9-Aug-1960 | 19-Jan-1986 | 19-Jan-1986 | | 11-Mar-1977 | DISABILITY | 56.1 |
| 1440 | 25-Sep-1987 | 8-Feb-2004 | 22-Jun-2005 | 22-Jun-2005 | 26-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | 71.8 |
| 1441 | 8-Mar-1969 | 6-Apr-1988 | 6-Apr-1988 | | 24-Jun-1985 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.2 |
| 1442 | 28-Jun-2003 | 28-Jun-2018 | 28-Jun-2018 | 10-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 1443 | 28-Sep-1996 | 28-Jul-2012 | 28-Jul-2012 | 8-Oct-2012 | | | |
| 1444 | 24-Jan-1981 | 13-Dec-2000 | 31-Oct-2005 | 31-Oct-2005 | 9-Feb-2007 | ELECTIVE | 66.3 |
| 1445 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 20-Jan-2006 | 20-Jan-2006 | 20-Jan-2011 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1446 | 10-May-2014 | 11-Feb-2031 | 11-Feb-2031 | | | | |
| 1447 | 9-Jun-1991 | 10-Jan-2009 | 10-Jan-2009 | 10-Jan-2009 | 8-Aug-2015 | ELECTIVE | 69.0 |
| 1448 | 29-Mar-1970 | 16-Oct-1998 | | | 16-Apr-2000 | ELECTIVE | 66.5 |
| 1449 | 19-Jan-1992 | 16-Apr-2008 | 16-Apr-2008 | 16-Apr-2008 | 26-Sep-2016 | ELECTIVE | 72.2 |
| 1450 | 16-Sep-2001 | 24-Oct-2017 | 24-Oct-2017 | 11-Apr-2018 | | | |
| 1451 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 8-Sep-2002 | | 8-Sep-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1452 | 2-Jul-1993 | 2-Jul-2008 | 10-May-2005 | 10-May-2005 | 9-Dec-2008 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 1453 | 8-Dec-1978 | 4-Aug-1999 | 31-Mar-2005 | 31-Mar-2005 | 8-Dec-2009 | ELECTIVE | 69.7 |
| 1454 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 8-Nov-2021 | | 30-Jan-2019 | DISABILITY | 67.2 |
| 1455 | 2-Jan-1970 | 29-Jul-1991 | 29-Jul-1991 | 29-Jul-1991 | 29-Jul-2001 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1456 | 13-Aug-2005 | 13-Aug-2020 | 30-Nov-2019 | 13-Aug-2020 | | | |
| 1457 | 29-Mar-1987 | 23-Oct-2003 | 18-May-2005 | | 19-Jun-2000 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.1 |
| 1458 | 4-Jul-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 7-Aug-2000 | 7-Aug-2000 | 7-Aug-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1459 | 29-Mar-2018 | 29-Mar-2033 | 9-May-2032 | | | | |
| 1460 | 17-Aug-2000 | 25-Sep-2015 | 25-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2015 | | | |
| 1461 | 1-Nov-1975 | 4-Jun-1992 | 4-Jun-1992 | 11-Mar-1993 | 26-Mar-1993 | DEATH (RPC) | 65.8 |
| 1462 | 3-Sep-1998 | 21-Mar-2014 | 21-Mar-2014 | | 8-Oct-2009 | Early Retirement | 60.0 |
| 1463 | 10-Aug-1944 | 10-Aug-1959 | 10-Aug-1959 | | 13-Feb-1968 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1464 | 10-Feb-1965 | 10-Feb-1980 | 10-Feb-1980 | 10-Feb-1980 | 10-Mar-1982 | ELECTIVE | 71.8 |
| 1465 | 20-Aug-1962 | 13-Apr-1977 | 20-Aug-1972 | 6-Jun-1976 | 13-Apr-1977 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1466 | 13-Jan-1963 | 7-Sep-1987 | 7-Sep-1987 | 7-Sep-1987 | 7-Sep-1997 | ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 1467 | 14-Sep-2001 | 13-Sep-2018 | 13-Sep-2018 | 13-Sep-2018 | | | |
| 1468 | 5-Aug-2007 | 27-Nov-2019 | 5-Aug-2017 | 27-Nov-2017 | 27-Nov-2019 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1469 | 20-Jun-2020 | 22-Apr-2038 | 22-Apr-2038 | | | | |
| 1470 | 27-Oct-1988 | 24-Jun-2004 | 19-Feb-2005 | 19-Feb-2005 | 10-Apr-2014 | ELECTIVE | 74.1 |
| 1471 | 9-Jun-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Jun-2001 | 10-Dec-2005 | 10-Apr-2006 | ELECTIVE | 69.8 |
| 1472 | 19-Jul-2014 | 19-Jul-2029 | 19-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 1473 | 19-Jan-1992 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | 18-Oct-2012 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1474 | 6-Sep-1945 | 14-May-1961 | 14-May-1961 | | 14-May-1971 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1475 | 13-Jul-1985 | 25-May-1999 | 25-May-1999 | | 10-Feb-1997 | DISABILITY | 67.7 |
| 1476 | 13-Feb-2004 | 20-Mar-2016 | 13-Feb-2014 | 13-Feb-2014 | 20-Mar-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1477 | 17-Apr-1947 | 19-Sep-1969 | 19-Sep-1969 | 1-Feb-1979 | 19-Sep-1979 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1478 | 7-May-1994 | 20-Nov-2011 | 20-Nov-2011 | | 8-Nov-1994 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 48.0 |
| 1479 | 24-Sep-1993 | 24-Sep-2008 | 24-Sep-2008 | | 1-May-1999 | DISABILITY | 57.0 |
| 1480 | 14-May-2011 | 14-May-2026 | 20-Jul-2022 | | 2-Dec-2018 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.4 |
| 1481 | 9-Sep-2007 | 7-May-2024 | 7-May-2024 | | | | |
| 1482 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 12-Jan-1988 | 12-Jan-1988 | 12-Jan-1993 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1483 | 23-Feb-2002 | 23-Feb-2017 | 23-Feb-2017 | 23-Feb-2017 | | | |
| 1484 | 27-May-1999 | 27-May-2014 | 27-May-2014 | 27-May-2014 | | | |
| 1485 | 27-Jul-1957 | 14-Jun-1985 | 14-Jun-1985 | | 12-May-1990 | ELECTIVE | 69.9 |
| 1486 | 28-May-1977 | 14-Feb-1997 | 14-Feb-1997 | 11-Apr-1997 | 14-Feb-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1487 | 27-Aug-2005 | 19-Sep-2022 | 19-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 1488 | 5-Sep-2015 | 1-Apr-2033 | 1-Apr-2033 | | | | |
| 1489 | 5-Jun-1996 | 6-Jun-2011 | 6-Jun-2011 | 6-Jun-2011 | 10-Apr-2015 | ELECTIVE | 73.4 |
| 1490 | 29-Mar-1981 | 23-Apr-1996 | 23-Apr-1996 | | 23-Apr-1996 | ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 1491 | 13-Jul-2001 | 13-Jul-2016 | 13-Jul-2016 | 13-Jul-2016 | 25-Sep-2016 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.7 |
| 1492 | 21-Aug-2020 | 21-Aug-2035 | 21-Aug-2035 | | | | |
| 1493 | 8-Dec-1978 | 10-Jan-1998 | 10-Jan-1998 | 10-Jan-1998 | 10-Jan-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1494 | 4-Aug-2007 | 23-Sep-2023 | 23-Sep-2023 | | | | |
| 1495 | 30-Aug-1945 | 21-Jul-1961 | 21-Jul-1961 | | 21-Jul-1971 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1496 | 18-Aug-1965 | 18-Aug-1980 | 28-Dec-1978 | 28-Dec-1978 | 8-Jan-1982 | ELECTIVE | 73.0 |
| 1497 | 16-May-2015 | 6-Mar-2033 | 6-Mar-2033 | | | | |
| 1498 | 15-Feb-1969 | 9-Jul-1980 | 15-Feb-1979 | | 9-Dec-1969 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.4 |
| 1499 | 10-May-2014 | 10-May-2029 | 10-May-2029 | | | | |
| 1500 | 12-Jul-2020 | 12-Jul-2035 | 12-Jul-2035 | | | | |
| 1501 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 28-May-2023 | | | | |
| 1502 | 24-Oct-2002 | 24-Oct-2017 | 24-Oct-2017 | 24-Oct-2017 | 15-Jul-2020 | ELECTIVE | 71.6 |
| 1503 | 5-Feb-2004 | 5-Feb-2019 | 5-Feb-2019 | 5-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 1504 | 14-Sep-2013 | 14-Sep-2028 | 14-Sep-2028 | | | | |
| 1505 | 7-Feb-1980 | 22-Nov-1985 | 7-Feb-1990 | | 22-Nov-1985 | ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 1506 | 4-May-1986 | 12-Jun-2004 | 24-Mar-2007 | 1-Apr-2007 | 26-Jul-2007 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.0 |
| 1507 | 22-Nov-1959 | 22-Nov-1974 | 22-Nov-1974 | | 5-Sep-1966 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 1508 | 11-Mar-1999 | 11-Mar-2014 | 11-Mar-2014 | 11-Mar-2014 | 12-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 1509 | 25-Mar-1943 | 20-Feb-1959 | | | 25-Apr-1958 DISABILITY | 64.2 |
| 1510 | 6-Mar-2005 | 5-Mar-2020 | 31-Jul-2018 | | 14-Feb-2010 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.5 |
| 1511 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 22-Jun-2019 | | | |
| 1512 | 22-Dec-1962 | 22-Dec-1977 | 22-Dec-1977 | 9-Jan-1979 | 26-Feb-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1513 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 6-Jun-2003 | 6-Jun-2003 | 5-Jun-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1514 | 29-Jan-2000 | 4-Mar-2018 | 4-Mar-2018 | 4-Mar-2018 | | |
| 1515 | 4-Jul-1979 | 27-Sep-1999 | 21-Dec-2004 | | 9-Oct-1999 ELECTIVE | 59.8 |
| 1516 | 12-Jan-1986 | 2-Apr-2003 | 20-Jun-2005 | 20-Jun-2005 | 20-Jun-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1517 | 28-Jul-1945 | 4-Nov-1962 | 4-Nov-1962 | | 3-May-1946 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 48.5 |
| 1518 | 30-Dec-1967 | 18-May-1980 | | | 18-May-1980 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1519 | 2-Oct-2011 | 9-Aug-2027 | 9-Aug-2027 | | | |
| 1520 | 9-Oct-1964 | 9-Oct-1979 | 9-Oct-1979 | 9-Sep-1984 | 8-Oct-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1521 | 5-Jun-2004 | 6-Jun-2019 | 6-Jun-2019 | 6-Jun-2019 | | |
| 1522 | 10-Apr-1996 | 11-Apr-2011 | 11-Apr-2011 | 11-Apr-2011 | 12-Feb-2014 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.9 |
| 1523 | 10-Dec-1972 | 18-Mar-1991 | 18-Mar-1991 | 18-Mar-1991 | 7-Aug-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.4 |
| 1524 | 9-Sep-1964 | 9-Dec-1986 | 9-Dec-1986 | 8-Jun-1989 | 10-Jul-1994 ELECTIVE | 72.6 |
| 1525 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2007 ELECTIVE | 72.0 |
| 1526 | 28-Aug-2009 | 28-Aug-2024 | 26-Dec-2019 | | 21-Aug-2014 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.7 |
| 1527 | 10-Apr-1972 | 22-Nov-1991 | 22-Nov-1991 | | 23-Jun-1993 ELECTIVE | 66.6 |
| 1528 | 19-Jun-1985 | 30-Oct-1999 | 30-Oct-1999 | 8-Feb-2000 | 30-Oct-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1529 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 29-Dec-2014 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1530 | 4-Nov-2000 | 26-Dec-2015 | 26-Dec-2015 | 10-Apr-2016 | | |
| 1531 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 27-Jan-2032 | | | |
| 1532 | 19-Mar-2005 | 18-Mar-2020 | 23-Jan-2018 | 23-Jan-2018 | | |
| 1533 | 27-Mar-1988 | 26-Nov-2002 | 28-Mar-1998 | | 11-Aug-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.7 |
| 1534 | 8-Nov-1992 | 13-Feb-2009 | 13-Feb-2009 | | 16-Feb-2009 ELECTIVE | 63.7 |
| 1535 | 24-Sep-1949 | 24-Jan-1963 | 24-Jan-1963 | | 9-Jan-1962 DISABILITY | 69.0 |
| 1536 | 8-Jul-1999 | 30-Apr-2015 | 30-Apr-2015 | 30-Apr-2015 | 8-Nov-2018 ELECTIVE | 67.7 |
| 1537 | 26-Jul-1962 | 19-Dec-1984 | 19-Dec-1984 | | 2-Apr-1977 DISABILITY | 57.3 |
| 1538 | 7-Feb-1947 | 2-Apr-1964 | 2-Apr-1964 | | 10-Dec-1972 ELECTIVE | 73.7 |
| 1539 | 23-Feb-2006 | 23-Feb-2021 | 29-May-2018 | 8-Jun-2018 | | |
| 1540 | 10-Sep-2015 | 10-Sep-2030 | 10-Sep-2030 | | | |
| 1541 | 4-Sep-1976 | 13-Sep-1989 | 13-Sep-1989 | | 21-Jun-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.8 |
| 1542 | 23-Feb-1996 | 23-Feb-2011 | 17-Apr-2010 | 17-Apr-2010 | 17-Apr-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1543 | 11-Aug-1965 | 20-Mar-1980 | 20-Mar-1980 | 9-Apr-1980 | 21-Mar-1985 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1544 | 21-Dec-1950 | 21-Dec-1965 | 21-Dec-1965 | | 11-Jan-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.1 |
| 1545 | 7-Dec-2018 | 2-Aug-2034 | 2-Aug-2034 | | | |
| 1546 | 10-Dec-1973 | 11-Nov-1995 | 11-Nov-1995 | 11-Nov-1995 | 11-Nov-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1547 | 15-Jun-2019 | 11-Dec-2036 | 11-Dec-2036 | | | |
| 1548 | 5-Jul-1969 | 5-Jun-1986 | 5-Jun-1986 | | 12-Jan-1986 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.6 |
| 1549 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 8-Oct-2016 ELECTIVE | 67.3 |
| 1550 | 10-Feb-2013 | 10-Feb-2028 | 10-Feb-2028 | | | |
| 1551 | 15-Jun-2019 | 14-Apr-2036 | 14-Apr-2036 | | | |
| 1552 | 30-Sep-2007 | 8-Sep-2024 | 8-Sep-2024 | | 31-Jul-2010 DISABILITY | 49.0 |
| 1553 | 22-Mar-2019 | 22-Mar-2034 | 22-Mar-2034 | | | |
| 1554 | 9-Nov-1963 | 9-Nov-1978 | 9-Nov-1978 | 9-Dec-1978 | 3-Apr-1984 DEATH (RPC) | 73.1 |
| 1555 | 30-Nov-1985 | 30-Nov-2000 | 30-Nov-2000 | 9-Jul-2001 | 26-Jan-2009 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1556 | 25-Mar-2007 | 28-Jul-2024 | 28-Jul-2024 | | | |
| 1557 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 14-Jun-2029 | | | |
| 1558 | 1-Nov-2003 | 19-Aug-2019 | 19-Aug-2019 | 19-Aug-2019 | | |
| 1559 | 21-Oct-1987 | 13-Jun-2004 | 4-Feb-2006 | 4-Feb-2006 | 19-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE | 71.9 |
| 1560 | 21-Jul-1990 | 11-Mar-2010 | 11-Mar-2010 | 30-Oct-2014 | | |
| 1561 | 22-Aug-2009 | 2-May-2026 | 2-May-2026 | | | |
| 1562 | 5-Mar-1983 | 1-Aug-1996 | 1-Aug-1996 | 2-Aug-1996 | 1-Aug-2001 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1563 | 15-May-2020 | 16-May-2035 | 16-May-2035 | | | |
| 1564 | 9-Oct-1971 | 30-May-1998 | 30-May-1998 | 18-Sep-1998 | 29-May-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1565 | 28-Jan-1949 | 6-Mar-1967 | 6-Mar-1967 | | 12-Jan-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.9 |
| 1566 | 30-Nov-1985 | 1-Jan-2005 | 1-Jan-2005 | | 3-Feb-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1567 | 12-Mar-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 12-Mar-1999 | 12-Mar-1999 | 9-Aug-1999 ELECTIVE | 65.4 |
| 1568 | 5-Dec-1952 | 5-Dec-1967 | 5-Dec-1967 | | 9-Feb-1973 ELECTIVE | 72.7 |
| 1569 | 13-Feb-2004 | 5-Jul-2018 | 13-Feb-2014 | 13-Feb-2014 | 9-Dec-2015 Early Retirement | 72.4 |
| 1570 | 9-Mar-1995 | 1-Aug-2011 | 1-Aug-2011 | 1-Aug-2011 | 14-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | 68.3 |
| 1571 | 27-Sep-2015 | 26-Nov-2027 | 27-Sep-2025 | | 18-Jun-2017 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 64.6 |
| 1572 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2005 | 11-Apr-2005 | 25-Mar-2008 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.8 |
| 1573 | 1-Jun-2018 | 1-Jun-2033 | 11-Oct-2032 | | | |
| 1574 | 18-Dec-2009 | 30-Apr-2024 | 18-Dec-2019 | 18-Dec-2019 | | |
| 1575 | 8-Jul-2007 | 30-Sep-2022 | 30-Sep-2022 | | | |
| 1576 | 7-Jun-1969 | 1-Apr-1991 | 1-Apr-1991 | | 23-Jan-1990 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.8 |
| 1577 | 6-Nov-2009 | 6-Nov-2024 | 27-Dec-2021 | | | |
| 1578 | 1-Nov-2003 | 1-Nov-2018 | 1-Nov-2018 | 9-Nov-2018 | 28-Apr-2020 ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 1579 | 11-Jun-2011 | 11-Jun-2026 | 11-Jun-2026 | | | |
| 1580 | 14-Aug-1992 | 3-Nov-2009 | 3-Nov-2009 | 3-Nov-2009 | 3-Nov-2019 COMPULSORY | 72.8 |
| 1581 | 27-Sep-2015 | 16-Nov-2028 | 27-Sep-2025 | | | |
| 1582 | 24-Mar-2012 | 25-Mar-2027 | 25-Mar-2027 | | | |
| 1583 | 29-Dec-2018 | 26-Aug-2028 | | | | |
| 1584 | 8-Feb-1969 | 8-Feb-1984 | 8-Feb-1984 | 9-Feb-1984 | 13-Jul-1985 DEATH (RPC) | 70.8 |
| 1585 | 9-Aug-2001 | 9-Aug-2016 | 27-Apr-2015 | 27-Apr-2015 | 26-Apr-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1586 | 1-Mar-2019 | 1-Mar-2034 | 1-Mar-2034 | | | |
| 1587 | 30-Sep-2019 | 30-Sep-2034 | 29-Dec-2032 | | | |
| 1588 | 24-Sep-2016 | 29-Jun-2031 | 24-Sep-2026 | | | |
| 1589 | 24-Dec-1989 | 24-Dec-2007 | 24-Dec-2007 | 24-Dec-2007 | 8-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE | 67.0 |
| 1590 | 26-Oct-1983 | 4-Dec-2001 | 13-Jan-2005 | 13-Jan-2005 | 13-Jan-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1591 | 9-Nov-1964 | 4-Apr-1981 | 4-Apr-1981 | | 1-Aug-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 59.3 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 1592 | 5-Aug-1972 | 10-Aug-1991 | 10-Aug-1991 | 10-Aug-1991 | 10-Aug-2001 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1593 | 15-Feb-1987 | 28-Feb-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | | 25-Jul-2007 | ELECTIVE | 60.4 |
| 1594 | 21-Jul-2017 | 25-Oct-2032 | 25-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 1595 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 26-Jan-2026 | | | | |
| 1596 | 13-Jul-1985 | 13-Jul-2000 | 13-Jan-1998 | | 5-May-1993 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.3 |
| 1597 | 25-Feb-1984 | 6-May-2001 | 16-Jul-2003 | 16-Jul-2003 | 16-Jul-2013 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1598 | 10-Aug-1989 | 10-Aug-2004 | 10-Aug-2004 | 10-Aug-2004 | 11-Apr-2009 | ELECTIVE | 70.4 |
| 1599 | 1-Apr-1978 | 24-May-2005 | 24-May-2005 | | 9-Sep-1990 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 50.3 |
| 1600 | 12-Jun-2020 | 12-Jul-2035 | 12-Jul-2035 | | | | |
| 1601 | 28-Apr-1973 | 27-Apr-1988 | 27-Apr-1988 | | 25-May-1996 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 1602 | 15-Feb-2002 | 15-Feb-2017 | 15-Feb-2017 | | 16-Mar-2016 | Early Retirement | 68.9 |
| 1603 | 11-Mar-1982 | 11-Mar-1997 | 11-Mar-1997 | 11-Mar-1997 | 9-Feb-2003 | ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 1604 | 4-Jul-1979 | 4-Jan-2001 | 8-Jul-2007 | | 15-Jul-2001 | ELECTIVE | 59.0 |
| 1605 | 18-Feb-1972 | 2-Feb-1990 | 2-Feb-1990 | 18-Feb-1990 | 2-Feb-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1606 | 4-Jan-1964 | 24-Jul-1980 | 24-Jul-1980 | 3-Aug-1980 | 8-Oct-1984 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.2 |
| 1607 | 21-Mar-2015 | 14-Dec-2024 | | | 9-Aug-2016 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 66.7 |
| 1608 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 1609 | 30-Dec-1967 | 30-Dec-1982 | 30-Dec-1982 | 31-Dec-1982 | 25-Aug-1990 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.9 |
| 1610 | 12-Apr-1984 | 25-Feb-2002 | 25-Feb-2002 | | 9-Mar-1996 | DISABILITY | 59.0 |
| 1611 | 19-Dec-1991 | 19-Jun-2012 | 19-Jun-2012 | 25-Mar-2019 | | | |
| 1612 | 13-May-1978 | 13-Aug-1995 | 13-Aug-1995 | | 9-Oct-1983 | DISABILITY | 53.2 |
| 1613 | 3-Jul-2019 | 3-Jul-2034 | 3-Jul-2034 | | | | |
| 1614 | 1-Oct-1998 | 1-Oct-2013 | 1-Oct-2013 | 1-Oct-2013 | | | |
| 1615 | 26-Aug-2017 | 5-Jan-2034 | 5-Jan-2034 | | | | |
| 1616 | 27-Mar-2014 | 8-Aug-2023 | | | | | |
| 1617 | 26-Jan-1964 | 26-Jan-1979 | 26-Jan-1979 | | 17-Dec-1988 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1618 | 9-Jan-2014 | 9-Jan-2029 | 9-Jan-2029 | | | | |
| 1619 | 28-May-1985 | 6-Apr-2000 | 28-May-1995 | 8-Jun-1995 | 6-Apr-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1620 | 26-Sep-2008 | 8-Nov-2023 | 8-Nov-2023 | | | | |
| 1621 | 30-Jun-1965 | 23-Sep-1986 | 23-Sep-1986 | 18-Dec-1986 | 24-Sep-1989 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.0 |
| 1622 | 5-Mar-1983 | 5-Mar-1998 | 5-Mar-1998 | 11-Apr-1998 | 11-Apr-2005 | ELECTIVE | 73.5 |
| 1623 | 27-Jul-1984 | 27-Jul-1999 | 27-Jul-1999 | | 9-Aug-1999 | ELECTIVE | 67.5 |
| 1624 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Sep-2034 | 10-Sep-2034 | | | | |
| 1625 | 18-Jul-2019 | 30-Nov-2030 | 18-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 1626 | 29-Mar-1987 | 29-Mar-2002 | 15-Jun-1998 | 15-Jun-1998 | 15-Jun-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1627 | 5-Jul-2001 | 5-Jul-2016 | 5-Jul-2016 | | 10-Apr-2014 | Early Retirement | 65.6 |
| 1628 | 26-Jan-1961 | 26-Jan-1976 | 26-Jan-1976 | 9-Nov-1979 | 21-Apr-1984 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1629 | 25-Aug-1973 | 25-Aug-1988 | 25-Aug-1988 | 13-Apr-1991 | 10-Apr-1994 | ELECTIVE | 71.2 |
| 1630 | 23-Dec-2006 | 23-Dec-2021 | 27-Jan-2019 | 9-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 1631 | 13-Aug-1993 | 20-Jan-2009 | 20-Jan-2009 | | 28-Jun-2019 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1632 | 20-Aug-1995 | 17-Jul-2014 | 17-Jul-2014 | 10-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 1633 | 3-Aug-1995 | 28-Jan-2013 | 28-Jan-2013 | 28-Jan-2013 | | | |
| 1634 | 21-Mar-2003 | 5-Aug-2019 | 5-Aug-2019 | 5-Aug-2019 | | | |
| 1635 | 22-Dec-1991 | 23-Feb-2011 | 23-Feb-2011 | | 9-Oct-2011 | ELECTIVE | 61.5 |
| 1636 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 1637 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | 13-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 1638 | 9-May-1970 | 22-Apr-1983 | 22-Apr-1983 | 22-Apr-1983 | 21-Apr-1988 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1639 | 31-May-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 4-Sep-1999 | 9-Oct-2000 | 9-Feb-2007 | ELECTIVE | 72.4 |
| 1640 | 5-Jan-1995 | 5-Jan-2010 | 5-Jan-2010 | 5-Jan-2010 | 7-Mar-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1641 | 19-Nov-2010 | 19-Nov-2025 | 19-Nov-2025 | | | | |
| 1642 | 9-Jun-1961 | 9-Jun-1976 | 6-Oct-1971 | 17-Nov-1973 | 9-Jun-1976 | ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 1643 | 5-Oct-2006 | 5-Oct-2021 | 5-Oct-2021 | | | | |
| 1644 | 9-Jun-1961 | 7-Aug-1974 | 9-Jun-1971 | 20-Oct-1972 | 7-Aug-1974 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1645 | 5-Sep-1993 | 5-Sep-2008 | 5-Sep-2008 | 9-Oct-2008 | 7-Apr-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1646 | 1-Jul-1984 | 31-Oct-1999 | 29-Feb-2000 | 29-Feb-2000 | 1-Mar-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1647 | 7-Jan-1989 | 7-Jan-2004 | 26-Aug-2002 | 26-Aug-2002 | 10-Dec-2005 | ELECTIVE | 73.3 |
| 1648 | 18-Feb-2000 | 31-Jul-2017 | 31-Jul-2017 | 31-Jul-2017 | | | |
| 1649 | 29-Mar-1981 | 10-Jun-2000 | 23-Aug-2004 | 11-Apr-2007 | 23-Aug-2014 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1650 | 23-Nov-1973 | 17-Oct-1995 | 17-Oct-1995 | 17-Oct-1995 | 9-Aug-2004 | ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 1651 | 10-Apr-2000 | 1-Feb-2017 | 1-Feb-2017 | 27-Mar-2017 | | | |
| 1652 | 17-Jan-2015 | 14-Feb-2032 | 14-Feb-2032 | | | | |
| 1653 | 8-Oct-1998 | 8-Oct-2013 | 8-Oct-2013 | 8-Oct-2013 | | | |
| 1654 | 10-Sep-2019 | 27-Jul-2036 | 27-Jul-2036 | | | | |
| 1655 | 15-Nov-1996 | 12-Nov-2012 | 12-Nov-2012 | 9-Dec-2012 | | | |
| 1656 | 7-May-1994 | 7-May-2009 | 20-Aug-2004 | 20-Aug-2004 | 20-Aug-2009 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1657 | 2-Jul-2017 | 5-Feb-2034 | 5-Feb-2034 | | | | |
| 1658 | 9-Sep-2005 | 25-Dec-2016 | 9-Sep-2015 | 10-Dec-2015 | 25-Dec-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1659 | 12-Jun-2020 | 19-Mar-2036 | 19-Mar-2036 | | | | |
| 1660 | 15-Jun-2013 | 15-Jun-2028 | 24-Oct-2024 | | | | |
| 1661 | 13-Jan-1974 | 17-Aug-1998 | 17-Aug-1998 | 17-Aug-1998 | 17-Aug-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1662 | 25-Feb-1961 | 14-Dec-1986 | 14-Dec-1986 | 14-Dec-1986 | 25-Feb-1995 | ELECTIVE | 73.2 |
| 1663 | 21-Mar-1996 | 6-Sep-2010 | 22-Mar-2006 | 22-Mar-2006 | 6-Sep-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1664 | 10-Sep-2019 | 12-Feb-2035 | 12-Feb-2035 | | | | |
| 1665 | 16-Jul-2017 | 21-Jun-2030 | 16-Jul-2027 | | | | |
| 1666 | 10-May-2014 | 10-May-2029 | 10-May-2029 | | | | |
| 1667 | 16-Jul-1960 | 17-Jan-1979 | 17-Jan-1979 | 10-Dec-1979 | 17-Jan-1989 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1668 | 8-Nov-1975 | 15-Aug-1999 | | | 13-Sep-1992 | DISABILITY | 58.1 |
| 1669 | 26-Mar-1955 | 26-Mar-1970 | 11-Apr-1969 | 29-Apr-1972 | 30-Mar-1974 | ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 1670 | 29-Nov-1963 | 29-Nov-1978 | 1-Jun-1977 | 1-Jun-1977 | 10-Dec-1978 | ELECTIVE | 71.5 |
| 1671 | 21-Mar-2003 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2020 | | 10-Apr-2017 | Early Retirement | 59.2 |
| 1672 | 6-Mar-1976 | 7-Mar-1991 | 7-Mar-1991 | 7-Mar-1991 | 30-Oct-1999 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1673 | 2-Jan-1971 | 7-Aug-1990 | 7-Aug-1990 | 9-Aug-1990 | 7-Aug-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1674 | 1-Jun-1989 | 14-Sep-2008 | 14-Sep-2008 | 14-Sep-2008 | 8-Aug-2014 | ELECTIVE | 66.6 |
| 1675 | 30-May-2008 | 22-Jun-2024 | 22-Jun-2024 | | | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 1676 | 17-Jul-1997 | 7-Feb-2011 | 17-Jul-2007 | 17-Jul-2007 | 7-Feb-2011 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1677 | 28-Sep-1996 | 28-Sep-2011 | 28-Sep-2011 | 28-Sep-2011 | 8-Nov-2017 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 1678 | 26-Sep-2008 | 11-Mar-2026 | 11-Mar-2026 | | | | |
| 1679 | 3-Aug-1995 | 3-Aug-2010 | 3-Aug-2010 | 3-Aug-2010 | 9-Feb-2018 | ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 1680 | 14-Sep-2000 | 19-Jul-2018 | 19-Jul-2018 | 10-Apr-2020 | | | |
| 1681 | 19-Oct-1991 | 19-Oct-2006 | 19-Oct-2006 | 19-Oct-2006 | 11-Jul-2011 | ELECTIVE | 72.5 |
| 1682 | 14-Jul-2012 | 13-Nov-2025 | 14-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| 1683 | 13-May-1978 | 26-Feb-1999 | 15-Jan-2000 | 16-Apr-2000 | 15-Jan-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1684 | 21-Sep-2014 | 21-Sep-2029 | 21-Sep-2029 | | 11-Oct-2014 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 50.9 |
| 1685 | 23-Mar-1985 | 22-Mar-2000 | 6-Apr-1996 | 6-Apr-1996 | 16-Feb-1998 | DEATH (RPC) | 71.9 |
| 1686 | 22-Oct-2017 | 18-Apr-2032 | 22-Oct-2027 | | | | |
| 1687 | 28-Mar-1996 | 12-Aug-2013 | 12-Aug-2013 | 12-Aug-2013 | 9-Feb-2019 | ELECTIVE | 68.1 |
| 1688 | 11-Aug-2018 | 26-Dec-2028 | 11-Aug-2028 | | | | |
| 1689 | 16-Dec-1962 | 16-Dec-1977 | 16-Dec-1977 | 5-Jan-1978 | 14-Dec-1979 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.4 |
| 1690 | 21-Mar-2009 | 20-Mar-2024 | 26-Oct-2020 | 26-Oct-2020 | | | |
| 1691 | 15-Feb-2019 | 5-Jan-2027 | | | | | |
| 1692 | 22-Mar-2008 | 25-Nov-2025 | 25-Nov-2025 | | | | |
| 1693 | 26-Sep-1981 | 30-Oct-2002 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Apr-2008 | 10-Dec-2008 | ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 1694 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Mar-2022 | 27-Feb-2020 | 27-Feb-2020 | | | |
| 1695 | 27-Mar-1982 | 12-Apr-1992 | 12-Apr-1992 | 12-Apr-1992 | 13-Apr-1997 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1696 | 8-Jan-2021 | 8-Jan-2036 | 8-Jan-2036 | | | | |
| 1697 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 26-Apr-2018 | 26-Apr-2018 | | | |
| 1698 | 27-Jan-1962 | 27-Jan-1982 | 27-Jan-1982 | 27-Jan-1982 | 27-Jan-1992 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1699 | 22-Aug-1962 | 5-May-1977 | 5-May-1977 | 5-May-1977 | 8-Jan-1978 | ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 1700 | 13-Dec-1981 | 3-Oct-2001 | 23-Jul-2006 | 23-Jul-2006 | 23-Jul-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1701 | 25-Sep-1987 | 5-Oct-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 18-Apr-2007 | 18-Apr-2017 | COMPULSORY | 73.5 |
| 1702 | 18-May-1995 | 18-May-2010 | 18-May-2010 | | 27-Apr-2005 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.3 |
| 1703 | 9-Jan-1978 | 9-Jan-1993 | | | 8-Oct-1979 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 54.3 |
| 1704 | 1-Jun-2018 | 17-Mar-2034 | 17-Mar-2034 | | | | |
| 1705 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 29-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 1706 | 26-Sep-2003 | 24-May-2021 | 24-May-2021 | | | | |
| 1707 | 29-Aug-2019 | 7-May-2035 | 7-May-2035 | | | | |
| 1708 | 4-Jan-2004 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | | 10-Apr-2014 | Early Retirement | 61.5 |
| 1709 | 26-Aug-2010 | 26-Aug-2025 | 26-Aug-2025 | | 21-Aug-2016 | DISABILITY | 59.2 |
| 1710 | 23-Aug-2018 | 14-Dec-2036 | 14-Dec-2036 | | | | |
| 1711 | 10-Feb-2013 | 10-Feb-2028 | 9-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| 1712 | 22-Sep-2017 | 22-Sep-2032 | 22-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 1713 | 25-Apr-1958 | 25-Apr-1973 | | | 21-May-1982 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1714 | 22-Mar-1934 | 5-Jan-1945 | 5-Jan-1945 | | 28-Mar-1945 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.2 |
| 1715 | 30-Dec-1951 | 18-Mar-1975 | 18-Mar-1975 | 18-Mar-1975 | 25-Oct-1975 | ELECTIVE | 65.6 |
| 1716 | 29-Mar-2018 | 29-Mar-2033 | 31-Aug-2031 | | | | |
| 1717 | 24-Jan-1981 | 15-Jan-1999 | 15-Jan-1999 | 15-Jan-1999 | 15-Jan-2009 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1718 | 7-Oct-1984 | 26-May-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Jan-2008 | 9-Jan-2015 | ELECTIVE | 67.0 |
| 1719 | 2-Jan-2005 | 22-Jul-2022 | 22-Jul-2022 | | | | |
| 1720 | 31-Aug-2018 | 31-Aug-2033 | 31-Aug-2033 | | | | |
| 1721 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 8-Apr-2022 | | | | |
| 1722 | 16-Nov-1977 | 20-Oct-1997 | 20-Oct-1997 | | 24-Mar-1990 | DISABILITY | 57.4 |
| 1723 | 26-Oct-1983 | 7-Jul-2002 | 17-Mar-2006 | 20-Mar-2015 | 16-Mar-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1724 | 8-May-1982 | 28-Dec-1997 | 28-Dec-1997 | 10-Apr-1998 | 28-Dec-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1725 | 2-Apr-1977 | 21-Sep-1992 | 21-Sep-1992 | 11-Mar-1993 | 21-Sep-2002 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1726 | 29-Sep-1991 | 29-Sep-2006 | 23-May-2002 | 10-Dec-2002 | 9-Feb-2007 | ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 1727 | 4-Jul-1979 | 4-Jul-1994 | 4-Jul-1994 | 4-Jul-1994 | 25-Dec-2002 | ELECTIVE | 74.3 |
| 1728 | 14-Mar-1964 | 30-Jan-1990 | 30-Jan-1990 | 14-Dec-1990 | 19-Jan-1999 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.0 |
| 1729 | 3-Feb-2007 | 3-Feb-2022 | 4-May-2017 | 10-May-2017 | | | |
| 1730 | 19-Jul-2014 | 22-Oct-2032 | 22-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 1731 | 8-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-2014 | 12-Sep-2010 | 12-Sep-2010 | 22-Sep-2015 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1732 | 23-Apr-1958 | 29-Apr-1971 | 29-Apr-1971 | | 17-Mar-1966 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.9 |
| 1733 | 22-Sep-2017 | 1-Jan-2035 | 1-Jan-2035 | | | | |
| 1734 | 22-Aug-2009 | 22-Aug-2024 | 22-Aug-2024 | | | | |
| 1735 | 18-Oct-1980 | 18-Oct-1995 | 18-Oct-1995 | 18-Oct-1995 | 9-Sep-2000 | ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 1736 | 9-May-2007 | 15-Dec-2023 | 15-Dec-2023 | | | | |
| 1737 | 20-Jan-1963 | 17-Jul-1969 | 20-Jan-1973 | | 10-Aug-1968 | DISABILITY | 69.1 |
| 1738 | 14-Jan-1990 | 12-May-2010 | 12-May-2010 | | 12-May-2010 | ELECTIVE | 59.7 |
| 1739 | 28-Apr-1973 | 7-Jan-1988 | | | 31-Jul-1988 | ELECTIVE | 68.5 |
| 1740 | 28-Sep-1996 | 24-Dec-2014 | 24-Dec-2014 | | 10-Dec-1997 | DISABILITY | 48.0 |
| 1741 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2035 | 28-Aug-2035 | | | | |
| 1742 | 14-Sep-2018 | 14-Sep-2033 | 14-Sep-2033 | | | | |
| 1743 | 21-Jul-1990 | 21-Jul-2005 | 21-Jul-2005 | | 13-Feb-1994 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 53.8 |
| 1744 | 7-Dec-1956 | 13-Aug-1978 | 13-Aug-1978 | | 13-Aug-1988 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1745 | 18-Jul-2019 | 18-Jul-2034 | 18-Jul-2034 | | | | |
| 1746 | 15-Sep-1988 | 6-Jul-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Jul-2012 | ELECTIVE | 70.2 |
| 1747 | 5-Oct-2019 | 5-Nov-2036 | 5-Nov-2036 | | | | |
| 1748 | 9-Aug-2003 | 1-Jun-2021 | 1-Jun-2021 | | 8-Jun-2020 | DISABILITY | 61.2 |
| 1749 | 11-Apr-1995 | 11-Apr-2010 | 3-Jul-2008 | | 11-Apr-2003 | DISABILITY | 64.8 |
| 1750 | 12-Feb-1998 | 5-Oct-2016 | 5-Oct-2016 | | | | |
| 1751 | 19-Jul-2014 | 16-Aug-2029 | 16-Aug-2029 | | | | |
| 1752 | 7-Feb-1947 | 6-Dec-1967 | 6-Dec-1967 | | 8-Sep-1976 | ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 1753 | 29-Sep-1991 | 18-Jan-2005 | 29-Sep-2001 | 29-Sep-2001 | 18-Jan-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1754 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 31-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| 1755 | 10-Apr-2000 | 11-Apr-2015 | 7-Jan-2014 | 7-Jan-2014 | 7-Jan-2019 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 1756 | 22-Sep-2017 | 22-Sep-2032 | 22-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 1757 | 19-Sep-1998 | 19-Sep-2013 | 28-Sep-2011 | | 10-Apr-2013 | Early Retirement | 71.5 |
| 1758 | 7-Mar-1993 | 7-Aug-2011 | 7-Aug-2011 | | 15-Dec-2011 | ELECTIVE | 61.9 |
| 1759 | 16-Feb-1974 | 16-Feb-1989 | 16-Feb-1989 | 23-Feb-1992 | 24-Sep-1995 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 72.4 |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 1760 | 8-Jan-2011 | 8-Jan-2026 | 8-Jan-2026 | | | | |
| 1761 | 26-Jul-1962 | 30-Jul-1983 | 30-Jul-1983 | | 27-Jun-1985 DEATH (RPC) | | 66.9 |
| 1762 | 19-Jun-1982 | 26-Feb-1999 | 16-Jan-2000 | 16-Jan-2000 | 9-Apr-2007 ELECTIVE | | 72.2 |
| 1763 | 21-Aug-1982 | 20-Jun-2000 | 20-Apr-2003 | 11-Apr-2007 | 20-Apr-2013 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1764 | 26-Oct-1983 | 8-Nov-1998 | 8-Nov-1998 | 12-Jul-2000 | 14-Jul-2004 ELECTIVE | | 70.7 |
| 1765 | 20-Apr-1977 | 19-Apr-1992 | 14-Dec-1991 | 14-Dec-1991 | 25-May-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 71.4 |
| 1766 | 12-May-1965 | 11-May-1980 | 11-May-1980 | 11-May-1980 | 11-Mar-1986 ELECTIVE | | 74.8 |
| 1767 | 21-Jul-2017 | 21-Jul-2032 | 16-Nov-2030 | | | | |
| 1768 | 27-Jun-2010 | 27-Jun-2025 | 12-Feb-2025 | | | | |
| 1769 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 7-Dec-2033 | | | | |
| 1770 | 28-Dec-1967 | 18-Dec-1990 | 18-Dec-1990 | 18-Dec-1990 | 18-Dec-2000 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1771 | 12-Jan-1986 | 23-Feb-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 10-Dec-2014 ELECTIVE | | 70.7 |
| 1772 | 7-May-1972 | 3-Nov-1998 | 3-Nov-1998 | 3-Nov-1998 | 3-Nov-2008 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1773 | 28-May-1980 | 12-Jun-1998 | 12-Jun-1998 | | 12-Jun-1998 ELECTIVE | | 65.0 |
| 1774 | 2-Oct-2011 | 2-Oct-2026 | 23-Sep-2026 | | | | |
| 1775 | 13-Oct-1990 | 30-Jan-2006 | 19-May-2006 | 19-May-2006 | 18-May-2016 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1776 | 21-Jul-2017 | 21-Jul-2032 | 21-Jul-2032 | | | | |
| 1777 | 27-Feb-2004 | 8-Mar-2020 | 8-Mar-2020 | | | | |
| 1778 | 3-Aug-1940 | 30-Jun-1957 | 30-Jun-1957 | | 30-Jun-1967 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1779 | 9-May-1970 | 28-May-1991 | 28-May-1991 | | 20-May-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 58.0 |
| 1780 | 1-Jan-1998 | 1-Jan-2013 | 1-Jan-2013 | 1-Jan-2013 | 28-Jul-2020 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1781 | 11-Apr-1959 | 25-Apr-1972 | 25-Apr-1972 | | 10-Dec-1975 ELECTIVE | | 73.6 |
| 1782 | 5-Dec-1997 | 10-Apr-2015 | | | 10-Dec-2016 ELECTIVE | | 64.3 |
| 1783 | 13-Oct-1985 | 13-Oct-2000 | 13-Oct-2000 | 13-Oct-2000 | 9-Mar-2008 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1784 | 15-Nov-1996 | 15-Nov-2011 | 28-Aug-2007 | 28-Aug-2007 | 9-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE | | 74.3 |
| 1785 | 2-Oct-1992 | 6-Dec-2010 | 6-Dec-2010 | | | | |
| 1786 | 30-May-1959 | 30-May-1974 | 12-Dec-1969 | | 21-Sep-1967 DISABILITY | | 67.8 |
| 1787 | 7-Mar-1996 | 23-Aug-2018 | 23-Aug-2018 | | 23-Aug-2018 Early Retirement | | 57.5 |
| 1788 | 29-Mar-2018 | 18-Apr-2033 | 18-Apr-2033 | | | | |
| 1789 | 10-Feb-1976 | 10-Feb-1991 | 24-Apr-1988 | 24-Apr-1988 | 10-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE | | 73.0 |
| 1790 | 27-Mar-2020 | 19-Jul-2036 | 19-Jul-2036 | | | | |
| 1791 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | | 11-Jun-2008 RESIGNATION (RPC) | | 54.1 |
| 1792 | 25-Sep-1993 | 22-Jul-2012 | 22-Jul-2012 | 18-May-2014 | | | |
| 1793 | 8-Jul-1972 | 8-Jul-1987 | 8-Jul-1987 | 10-Jul-1987 | 25-Aug-1994 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1794 | 6-Jun-2002 | 3-Mar-2019 | 3-Mar-2019 | | 3-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE | | 63.3 |
| 1795 | 13-Jan-1963 | 13-Jan-1978 | 13-Jan-1978 | 29-Sep-1979 | 26-Oct-1983 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1796 | 18-Jul-1981 | 28-Mar-2000 | 6-Dec-2003 | | 17-Jul-2005 ELECTIVE | | 66.6 |
| 1797 | 13-Aug-2005 | 13-Aug-2020 | 10-Apr-2019 | 11-Apr-2019 | | | |
| 1798 | 13-Jul-1967 | 28-Aug-1982 | 28-Aug-1982 | | 19-Oct-1967 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 50.1 |
| 1799 | 28-Jan-2012 | 28-Jan-2027 | 2-Jul-2025 | | | | |
| 1800 | 22-Dec-1956 | 3-Dec-1972 | 3-Dec-1972 | | 3-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1801 | 19-Jan-1992 | 25-Feb-2010 | 25-Feb-2010 | | 12-May-2009 Early Retirement | | 61.1 |
| 1802 | 22-Oct-2017 | 31-Jul-2031 | 22-Oct-2027 | | | | |
| 1803 | 23-Sep-1964 | 30-Jan-1985 | 30-Jan-1985 | 10-Jul-1988 | 30-Jan-1995 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1804 | 25-Mar-1972 | 9-Mar-1996 | 9-Mar-1996 | 9-Mar-1996 | 24-Dec-1998 ELECTIVE | | 67.8 |
| 1805 | 15-May-1974 | 15-May-1989 | 15-May-1989 | 8-Jan-1990 | 31-Dec-1994 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1806 | 23-Jun-1965 | 29-Feb-1984 | 29-Feb-1984 | 10-Mar-1984 | 1-Mar-1994 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1807 | 24-Dec-1995 | 18-Jan-2011 | 18-Jan-2011 | 9-Feb-2011 | | | |
| 1808 | 9-Aug-1962 | 28-Jun-1966 | | | 28-Jun-1971 RESIGNATION (RPC) | | 75.0 |
| 1809 | 26-Sep-2010 | 4-Apr-2027 | 4-Apr-2027 | | | | |
| 1810 | 11-Oct-2005 | 1-Jun-2021 | 1-Jun-2021 | | 16-Mar-2017 Early Retirement | | 60.2 |
| 1811 | 7-Nov-2008 | 17-Jul-2023 | 7-Nov-2018 | 9-Nov-2018 | 26-Aug-2020 DISABILITY | | 72.1 |
| 1812 | 28-Sep-2000 | 17-Sep-2017 | 17-Sep-2017 | | 13-Aug-2016 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 61.9 |
| 1813 | 9-May-1997 | 9-Dec-2012 | 9-Dec-2012 | 10-Dec-2012 | | | |
| 1814 | 21-Mar-2003 | 9-Jun-2020 | 9-Jun-2020 | 9-Jun-2020 | | | |
| 1815 | 15-Aug-1996 | 5-Apr-2011 | 15-Aug-2006 | 15-Aug-2006 | 5-Apr-2011 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1816 | 7-Jul-1990 | 7-Jul-2005 | 7-Jul-2005 | 10-Jul-2005 | 11-Nov-2014 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1817 | 27-Sep-2015 | 29-Jul-2032 | 29-Jul-2032 | | | | |
| 1818 | 8-Oct-1989 | 27-Oct-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 10-Dec-2009 | 15-Nov-2018 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1819 | 9-Jun-2001 | 9-Jun-2016 | 9-Jun-2016 | 9-Jun-2016 | | | |
| 1820 | 25-Jan-1975 | 10-Sep-1989 | 25-Jan-1985 | 26-Jan-1985 | 10-Sep-1989 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1821 | 1-Apr-1979 | 2-Jan-1993 | 1-Apr-1989 | 9-Jan-1990 | 2-Jan-1993 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1822 | 29-Dec-1977 | 29-Dec-1992 | 29-Dec-1992 | 29-Dec-1992 | 28-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1823 | 2-Feb-1974 | 19-Oct-1995 | 19-Oct-1995 | 19-Oct-1995 | 11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | | 68.5 |
| 1824 | 25-May-1973 | 24-May-1988 | 25-Aug-1983 | 9-Sep-1983 | 25-Aug-1988 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1825 | 26-Sep-1981 | 8-May-2002 | 24-Mar-2007 | 18-Dec-2007 | 18-Dec-2017 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1826 | 24-Sep-2016 | 24-Jul-2034 | 24-Jul-2034 | | | | |
| 1827 | 8-Nov-1992 | 8-Nov-2007 | 8-Nov-2007 | 8-Nov-2007 | 31-Mar-2012 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 72.2 |
| 1828 | 15-Feb-2002 | 9-May-2020 | 9-May-2020 | 9-May-2020 | | | |
| 1829 | 21-Aug-2020 | 5-Apr-2038 | 5-Apr-2038 | | | | |
| 1830 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 1-May-2024 | | | | |
| 1831 | 23-Mar-2013 | 1-Jul-2029 | 1-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 1832 | 14-Jul-1965 | 24-May-1982 | 24-May-1982 | | 14-Oct-1983 ELECTIVE | | 66.4 |
| 1833 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 27-Mar-2029 | | | | |
| 1834 | 22-Mar-2003 | 6-Sep-2019 | 6-Sep-2019 | 6-Sep-2019 | | | |
| 1835 | 9-Feb-1995 | 9-Feb-2010 | 4-Sep-2006 | 4-Sep-2006 | 24-Jan-2008 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 71.4 |
| 1836 | 5-Aug-1978 | 5-Aug-1993 | 5-Aug-1993 | 5-Aug-1993 | 17-Jun-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 68.3 |
| 1837 | 15-Mar-1984 | 21-May-2000 | 26-Jul-2001 | | 10-Dec-2002 ELECTIVE | | 66.4 |
| 1838 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 6-Apr-2003 | 6-Apr-2003 | 5-Apr-2008 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1839 | 14-May-1983 | 24-May-2001 | 2-Jun-2004 | 7-Jul-2004 | 28-Feb-2010 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 70.7 |
| 1840 | 2-Mar-2006 | 2-Mar-2021 | 2-Mar-2021 | | | | |
| 1841 | 26-Feb-1978 | 26-Feb-1999 | 10-Mar-2000 | 10-Mar-2000 | 11-Mar-2010 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1842 | 29-Sep-1966 | 13-Apr-1991 | 13-Apr-1991 | 13-Apr-1991 | 13-Apr-2001 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1843 | 12-May-1993 | 11-May-2008 | 11-May-2008 | 8-Oct-2013 | 2-Aug-2015 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|--|------|
| 1844 | 14-Sep-2013 | 14-Sep-2028 | 28-Feb-2027 | | | | | |
| 1845 | 12-Mar-1977 | 11-Mar-1992 | 11-Mar-1992 | | | 7-May-1989 DISABILITY | | 65.2 |
| 1846 | 24-Dec-1999 | 24-Dec-2014 | 24-Dec-2014 | | | 5-Aug-2007 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 61.9 |
| 1847 | 16-Feb-1997 | 16-Feb-2012 | 16-Feb-2012 | 16-Feb-2012 | | 30-Sep-2020 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1848 | 8-Oct-2015 | 22-Dec-2032 | 22-Dec-2032 | | | | | |
| 1849 | 3-Dec-1937 | 31-Oct-1956 | 31-Oct-1956 | | | 10-Jul-1965 DISABILITY | | 73.7 |
| 1850 | 1-Oct-1998 | 20-Jul-2014 | 20-Jul-2014 | 20-Jul-2014 | | | | |
| 1851 | 9-Sep-1983 | 9-Sep-1998 | 9-Sep-1998 | | | 24-Dec-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 61.1 |
| 1852 | 9-Jun-1956 | 13-Aug-1970 | | | | 16-Oct-1957 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 62.2 |
| 1853 | 9-May-2020 | 10-May-2035 | 10-May-2035 | | | | | |
| 1854 | 1-Feb-1963 | 10-Jul-1978 | 10-Jul-1978 | 12-Jul-1978 | | 5-Dec-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 71.4 |
| 1855 | 9-Jan-1956 | 9-Jan-1971 | 9-Jan-1971 | | | 12-Dec-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 61.4 |
| 1856 | 15-Dec-1979 | 10-Feb-1996 | 10-Feb-1996 | 10-Feb-1996 | | 9-Aug-2004 ELECTIVE | | 73.5 |
| 1857 | 16-Nov-1970 | 29-Apr-1990 | 29-Apr-1990 | | | 14-Feb-1981 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 55.8 |
| 1858 | 28-Sep-2015 | 17-Mar-2033 | 17-Mar-2033 | | | | | |
| 1859 | 27-Jan-2017 | 28-Oct-2036 | 28-Oct-2036 | | | | | |
| 1860 | 10-Feb-2013 | 10-Feb-2028 | 23-Jul-2025 | | | | | |
| 1861 | 1-Nov-1975 | 3-Feb-1992 | 3-Feb-1992 | 3-Feb-1992 | 3-Feb-2002 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1862 | 27-Jun-2002 | 25-Nov-2017 | 25-Nov-2017 | 25-Nov-2017 | | | | |
| 1863 | 28-Aug-1976 | 18-Aug-1993 | 18-Aug-1993 | 18-Aug-1993 | 18-Aug-2003 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1864 | 15-Mar-1986 | 18-Sep-2008 | 18-Sep-2008 | 18-Sep-2008 | 8-Sep-2012 ELECTIVE | | | 61.5 |
| 1865 | 6-Sep-1945 | 10-Jun-1965 | 10-Jun-1965 | | | 10-Dec-1972 ELECTIVE | | 72.5 |
| 1866 | 11-Dec-2020 | 7-Sep-2036 | 7-Sep-2036 | | | | | |
| 1867 | 8-Oct-1989 | 29-Nov-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | | | 72.2 |
| 1868 | 18-Apr-1963 | 1-Feb-1985 | 1-Feb-1985 | 1-Feb-1985 | 8-Sep-1994 ELECTIVE | | | 74.6 |
| 1869 | 8-Mar-1947 | 21-Apr-1967 | 21-Apr-1967 | | 9-Nov-1972 ELECTIVE | | | 70.6 |
| 1870 | 3-Aug-1995 | 3-Aug-2010 | 3-Aug-2010 | | 6-Oct-2003 RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 58.6 |
| 1871 | 9-Feb-1995 | 28-Oct-2015 | 28-Oct-2015 | 28-Oct-2015 | | | | |
| 1872 | 5-Dec-1997 | 30-Apr-2017 | 30-Apr-2017 | 12-May-2017 | | | | |
| 1873 | 8-Nov-1995 | 8-Nov-2010 | 8-Nov-2010 | 8-Nov-2010 | 10-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1874 | 2-Apr-1998 | 7-Apr-2015 | 7-Apr-2015 | 11-Apr-2018 | | | | |
| 1875 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 29-Sep-2032 | | | | | |
| 1876 | 5-Feb-2004 | 15-Jul-2017 | 5-Feb-2014 | 9-Feb-2014 | 15-Nov-2016 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 74.3 |
| 1877 | 26-Nov-1959 | 26-Nov-1974 | 26-Nov-1974 | 19-Jan-1975 | 6-Apr-1980 ELECTIVE | | | 74.1 |
| 1878 | 24-Sep-1993 | 24-Sep-2008 | 24-Sep-2008 | | 20-Mar-2014 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1879 | 26-Aug-2010 | 26-Aug-2025 | 26-Aug-2025 | | | | | |
| 1880 | 5-Feb-1948 | 4-Dec-1959 | 4-Dec-1959 | | 25-Nov-1950 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 61.0 |
| 1881 | 31-Jul-1994 | 9-Feb-2013 | 9-Feb-2013 | 9-Feb-2013 | 1-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE | | | 67.5 |
| 1882 | 6-Jun-2015 | 28-Feb-2027 | 6-Jun-2025 | | | | | |
| 1883 | 9-Nov-1973 | 9-Nov-1988 | 8-Sep-1987 | 22-Oct-1987 | 8-Sep-1992 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1884 | 22-May-1982 | 27-Nov-1997 | 27-Nov-1997 | 9-Jun-1999 | 27-Nov-2007 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1885 | 2-Dec-1979 | 16-Oct-1993 | 2-Dec-1989 | 2-Dec-1989 | 16-Oct-1993 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1886 | 26-Jan-1974 | 2-Feb-1989 | 2-Feb-1989 | 2-Feb-1989 | 9-Sep-1994 ELECTIVE | | | 70.6 |
| 1887 | 14-Sep-2013 | 11-Feb-2029 | 11-Feb-2029 | | | | | |
| 1888 | 4-Jan-1969 | 28-Mar-1986 | 28-Mar-1986 | 28-Mar-1986 | 27-Mar-1996 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1889 | 28-Jul-1951 | 28-Jul-1966 | 28-Jul-1966 | | 23-Feb-1957 DISABILITY | | | 59.5 |
| 1890 | 9-Sep-1999 | 9-Sep-2014 | 19-Mar-2012 | 10-Apr-2012 | 20-Mar-2017 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1891 | 14-Jan-1999 | 17-Jun-2015 | 17-Jun-2015 | 12-Jul-2015 | 10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE | | | 69.1 |
| 1892 | 15-Oct-1983 | 4-May-2003 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 8-Nov-2012 ELECTIVE | | | 70.0 |
| 1893 | 25-Jan-1975 | 29-May-1991 | 29-May-1991 | 10-Jul-1991 | 29-May-2001 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1894 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 31-Mar-2018 | | 11-Mar-2018 Early Retirement | | | 69.9 |
| 1895 | 12-Jun-1952 | 2-Feb-1968 | 2-Feb-1968 | 9-Mar-1973 | 2-Feb-1978 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1896 | 17-Nov-1982 | 17-Nov-1997 | 16-Dec-1992 | 16-Dec-1992 | 16-Dec-1996 DISABILITY | | | 74.0 |
| 1897 | 10-Dec-2009 | 10-Dec-2024 | 11-Jan-2023 | | | | | |
| 1898 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Mar-2022 | 2-Mar-2022 | | | | | |
| 1899 | 14-May-1994 | 12-Nov-2013 | 12-Nov-2013 | 12-Nov-2013 | | | | |
| 1900 | 10-Jun-1978 | 10-Jun-1993 | 10-Jun-1993 | | 14-Sep-1991 DISABILITY | | | 67.1 |
| 1901 | 20-Jul-2003 | 26-Jun-2021 | 26-Jun-2021 | | 9-Aug-2019 Early Retirement | | | 60.2 |
| 1902 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 10-Sep-2004 | 10-Sep-2004 | 10-Sep-2009 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 1903 | 10-Dec-1972 | 18-Dec-1990 | 18-Dec-1990 | | 18-Dec-1990 ELECTIVE | | | 65.0 |
| 1904 | 16-May-2015 | 15-Sep-2033 | 15-Sep-2033 | | | | | |
| 1905 | 14-Nov-2010 | 14-Nov-2025 | 14-Nov-2025 | | | | | |
| 1906 | 2-Oct-1992 | 31-Mar-2012 | 31-Mar-2012 | 10-Apr-2012 | | | | |
| 1907 | 7-Nov-2008 | 14-Jun-2025 | 14-Jun-2025 | | | | | |
| 1908 | 15-Jul-1965 | 15-Jan-1972 | | | 25-Oct-1968 DISABILITY | | | 71.8 |
| 1909 | 10-Jul-1999 | 4-May-2016 | 4-May-2016 | 4-May-2016 | | | | |
| 1910 | 14-Nov-2010 | 14-Nov-2025 | 14-Nov-2025 | | | | | |
| 1911 | 24-Sep-2016 | 24-Sep-2031 | 25-Apr-2030 | | | | | |
| 1912 | 9-Feb-1995 | 8-Jun-2011 | 8-Jun-2011 | 8-Jun-2011 | 28-Jul-2016 ELECTIVE | | | 68.8 |
| 1913 | 3-Feb-2007 | 3-Feb-2022 | 9-Dec-2021 | | 13-Apr-2017 Early Retirement | | | 65.3 |
| 1914 | 28-Sep-2000 | 14-Apr-2018 | 14-Apr-2018 | 30-Jan-2019 | | | | |
| 1915 | 9-Jan-1953 | 9-Jan-1968 | 9-Jan-1968 | | 9-Nov-1973 ELECTIVE | | | 71.7 |
| 1916 | 10-Jun-1978 | 10-Sep-1996 | 10-Sep-1996 | 10-Sep-1996 | 9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE | | | 68.4 |
| 1917 | 23-May-1970 | 5-Mar-1989 | 5-Mar-1989 | 5-Mar-1989 | 9-Apr-1996 ELECTIVE | | | 72.1 |
| 1918 | 22-Dec-1991 | 22-Dec-2006 | 22-Dec-2006 | 22-Dec-2006 | 13-Jul-2012 ELECTIVE | | | 72.2 |
| 1919 | 16-Nov-1977 | 3-Sep-1992 | 3-Sep-1992 | 3-Sep-1992 | 9-Mar-1996 ELECTIVE | | | 73.5 |
| 1920 | 4-Dec-1966 | 16-May-1982 | 16-May-1982 | | 21-Nov-1980 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 63.5 |
| 1921 | 25-Feb-1987 | 17-Apr-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 8-Oct-2012 ELECTIVE | | | 67.3 |
| 1922 | 16-Jul-1960 | 21-May-1971 | 15-Oct-1970 | | 8-Feb-1964 DISABILITY | | | 67.7 |
| 1923 | 16-Feb-1997 | 5-Feb-2017 | 5-Feb-2017 | 10-Dec-2017 | | | | |
| 1924 | 9-Mar-2019 | 9-Mar-2034 | 5-Aug-2031 | | | | | |
| 1925 | 10-Mar-2012 | 30-May-2033 | 30-May-2033 | | | | | |
| 1926 | 31-Jul-1968 | 31-Jul-1983 | 31-Jul-1983 | 31-Jul-1983 | 19-Jun-1986 ELECTIVE | | | 72.0 |
| 1927 | 18-Feb-1972 | 18-Feb-1987 | 18-Feb-1987 | 23-Feb-1987 | 19-Aug-1995 COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 1928 | 9-Oct-1963 | 9-Oct-1978 | 9-Oct-1978 | | | 17-Dec-1967 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 57.8 |
| 1929 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 1-May-2024 | | | 31-Oct-2019 Early Retirement | 63.2 |
| 1930 | 9-Jan-1965 | 17-Jun-1980 | 17-Jun-1980 | | | 7-Sep-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.2 |
| 1931 | 8-Oct-1989 | 2-Mar-2017 | 2-Mar-2017 | | | 20-Dec-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 45.8 |
| 1932 | 11-Mar-1972 | 5-Jun-1987 | 5-Jun-1987 | | | 19-Mar-1973 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 50.8 |
| 1933 | 22-Mar-2008 | 23-Mar-2023 | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| 1934 | 28-Jan-2012 | 7-Aug-2028 | 7-Aug-2028 | | | | |
| 1935 | 15-Dec-1979 | 15-Dec-1994 | 15-Dec-1994 | 15-Dec-1994 | 4-Oct-2001 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1936 | 12-Jan-2013 | 15-Apr-2028 | 15-Apr-2028 | | | | |
| 1937 | 21-Mar-2009 | 20-Mar-2024 | 22-Jul-2019 | | | | |
| 1938 | 3-Oct-1971 | 21-Jun-1981 | 3-Oct-1981 | 10-Dec-1981 | 21-Jun-1986 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1939 | 6-Mar-1980 | 7-Mar-1995 | 18-Mar-1994 | 18-Mar-1994 | 18-Mar-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1940 | 26-Jul-1970 | 26-Jul-1985 | 1-Sep-1981 | 9-Sep-1981 | 8-Feb-1986 ELECTIVE | | 74.4 |
| 1941 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 4-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1942 | 27-Jan-1962 | 3-Jan-1979 | 3-Jan-1979 | 3-Jan-1979 | 9-Aug-1983 ELECTIVE | | 69.6 |
| 1943 | 10-Jul-2004 | 5-Feb-2020 | 5-Feb-2020 | 14-Apr-2020 | | | |
| 1944 | 19-Jan-2003 | 10-Nov-2019 | 10-Nov-2019 | | | | |
| 1945 | 9-May-2007 | 9-May-2022 | 16-Jul-2018 | 18-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 1946 | 4-Sep-1982 | 10-Dec-1989 | | | 10-Dec-1989 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1947 | 9-May-1998 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | | | |
| 1948 | 25-Feb-1967 | 25-Feb-1982 | 25-Feb-1982 | | 22-Nov-1970 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 57.0 |
| 1949 | 24-Oct-1981 | 30-Jan-1999 | 30-Jan-1999 | | 30-Jan-1999 ELECTIVE | | 65.0 |
| 1950 | 28-Apr-1946 | 10-Sep-1965 | 10-Sep-1965 | | 10-Sep-1975 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1951 | 3-Feb-2007 | 31-Mar-2022 | 31-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 1952 | 6-Feb-2011 | 6-Feb-2026 | 6-Feb-2026 | | | | |
| 1953 | 29-Sep-1991 | 29-Sep-2006 | 22-Oct-2003 | | 22-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1954 | 7-Mar-1993 | 1-Aug-2010 | 1-Aug-2010 | 1-Aug-2010 | 1-Aug-2020 COMPULSORY | | 72.6 |
| 1955 | 16-Sep-1999 | 2-Oct-2015 | 2-Oct-2015 | 17-Oct-2016 | | | |
| 1956 | 17-Aug-1995 | 17-Aug-2010 | 17-Aug-2010 | 17-Aug-2010 | 11-Jul-2014 ELECTIVE | | 73.5 |
| 1957 | 14-Jan-1945 | 28-Jan-1963 | 28-Jan-1963 | | 16-Feb-1961 DISABILITY | | 63.1 |
| 1958 | 5-Aug-1988 | 5-Aug-2003 | 20-Oct-2001 | 20-Oct-2001 | 10-Aug-2003 ELECTIVE | | 71.8 |
| 1959 | 10-Jul-1993 | 10-Jul-2008 | 10-Jul-2008 | 9-Aug-2008 | 23-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1960 | 31-Dec-1983 | 22-Apr-1999 | 11-Aug-1999 | 11-Aug-1999 | 12-May-2005 ELECTIVE | | 70.8 |
| 1961 | 28-Aug-2020 | 4-Nov-2036 | 4-Nov-2036 | | | | |
| 1962 | 9-Oct-1976 | 15-Mar-1996 | 15-Mar-1996 | 15-Mar-1996 | 9-Oct-1999 ELECTIVE | | 68.6 |
| 1963 | 21-May-2010 | 21-May-2025 | 21-May-2025 | | | | |
| 1964 | 22-Jun-1990 | 22-Jun-2005 | 22-Jun-2005 | 22-Jun-2005 | 10-Dec-2008 ELECTIVE | | 71.7 |
| 1965 | 16-Dec-1962 | 1-Feb-1979 | 1-Feb-1979 | 11-Apr-1979 | 1-Feb-1989 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1966 | 14-Jun-1984 | 3-Feb-2000 | 23-Sep-2000 | 23-Sep-2000 | 15-Apr-2004 ELECTIVE | | 68.6 |
| 1967 | 16-Mar-2000 | 17-Mar-2015 | 17-Mar-2015 | | 17-Mar-2015 ELECTIVE | | 69.3 |
| 1968 | 11-Oct-1975 | 14-Sep-1993 | 14-Sep-1993 | 14-Sep-1993 | 3-Dec-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 66.2 |
| 1969 | 7-Dec-2018 | 3-Sep-2034 | 3-Sep-2034 | | | | |
| 1970 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Oct-2004 | 24-Jun-2002 | 24-Jun-2002 | 24-Jun-2007 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1971 | 2-Mar-2007 | 29-Sep-2022 | 29-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 1972 | 22-Mar-2008 | 23-Mar-2023 | 23-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| 1973 | 10-Dec-1942 | 18-Mar-1967 | 18-Mar-1967 | | 18-Mar-1977 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1974 | 12-Jan-2013 | 13-Sep-2028 | 13-Sep-2028 | | | | |
| 1975 | 10-Jun-1978 | 26-Feb-1999 | 16-Aug-2002 | 16-Aug-2002 | 7-Jan-2006 ELECTIVE | | 68.4 |
| 1976 | 20-Jun-2004 | 26-Apr-2020 | 26-Apr-2020 | 26-Apr-2020 | | | |
| 1977 | 19-Aug-2017 | 19-Aug-2032 | 15-Jun-2032 | | | | |
| 1978 | 11-Apr-1954 | 18-Dec-1974 | 18-Dec-1974 | | 9-Jan-1970 DISABILITY | | 60.1 |
| 1979 | 1-Oct-1993 | 8-Nov-2009 | 8-Nov-2009 | | 9-Nov-2009 ELECTIVE | | 63.9 |
| 1980 | 24-Dec-1980 | 26-Feb-1999 | 13-Apr-1999 | 13-Apr-1999 | 13-Apr-2009 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1981 | 3-Mar-1963 | 4-Dec-1970 | 3-Mar-1973 | | 4-Dec-1975 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1982 | 6-Jun-2018 | 6-Jun-2033 | 6-Jun-2033 | | | | |
| 1983 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | | | | |
| 1984 | 9-Jan-2014 | 9-Jan-2029 | 9-Jan-2029 | | | | |
| 1985 | 25-Aug-1946 | 13-Jan-1975 | 13-Jan-1975 | 11-Mar-1977 | 8-Oct-1983 ELECTIVE | | 73.7 |
| 1986 | 25-Feb-1987 | 25-Feb-2002 | 25-Feb-2002 | | 9-Aug-2003 ELECTIVE | | 67.7 |
| 1987 | 2-Dec-1964 | 16-Jan-1986 | 16-Jan-1986 | 10-Apr-1986 | 16-Jan-1996 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1988 | 29-Aug-1994 | 29-Aug-2009 | 29-Aug-2009 | 9-Oct-2009 | 4-Aug-2018 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1989 | 13-Nov-1982 | 10-Jun-1999 | 5-Jan-2001 | 5-Jan-2001 | 5-Jan-2007 ELECTIVE | | 71.0 |
| 1990 | 2-Mar-2006 | 2-Mar-2021 | 2-Mar-2021 | | | | |
| 1991 | 7-Mar-1993 | 22-Aug-2011 | 22-Aug-2011 | 10-Apr-2012 | 26-May-2019 ELECTIVE | | 69.3 |
| 1992 | 28-Dec-1980 | 28-Dec-1995 | 4-Jun-1995 | 4-Jun-1995 | 3-Jun-2000 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 1993 | 8-Jan-1983 | 8-Jan-1998 | 8-Jan-1998 | | 13-Jan-1998 ELECTIVE | | 66.7 |
| 1994 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | | | |
| 1995 | 14-Oct-2015 | 19-Apr-2028 | 14-Oct-2025 | | 8-Aug-2018 RESIGNATION (RPC) | | 65.3 |
| 1996 | 25-Dec-1997 | 3-Sep-2014 | 3-Sep-2014 | 3-Sep-2014 | | | |
| 1997 | 7-Aug-1955 | 2-Dec-1961 | 7-Aug-1965 | | 27-Mar-1957 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 65.3 |
| 1998 | 16-Feb-1997 | 28-Apr-2013 | 28-Apr-2013 | | 29-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | | 63.8 |
| 1999 | 9-Feb-1995 | 5-Jan-2011 | 5-Jan-2011 | 5-Jan-2011 | 23-Feb-2020 ELECTIVE | | 73.2 |
| 2000 | 9-Mar-1995 | 3-Nov-2013 | 3-Nov-2013 | 3-Nov-2013 | | | |
| 2001 | 15-Feb-1968 | 19-Sep-1973 | 15-Feb-1978 | | 18-Jul-1974 DISABILITY | | 70.8 |
| 2002 | 7-Nov-2008 | 31-Oct-2026 | 31-Oct-2026 | | | | |
| 2003 | 23-Feb-2002 | 1-Sep-2017 | 1-Sep-2017 | 11-Apr-2018 | | | |
| 2004 | 3-Feb-2007 | 4-Apr-2026 | 4-Apr-2026 | | | | |
| 2005 | 7-Jan-1978 | 7-Jan-1993 | 7-Jan-1993 | | 3-May-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 65.4 |
| 2006 | 12-Jan-2019 | 12-Jan-2034 | 12-Jan-2034 | | | | |
| 2007 | 15-Feb-2019 | 12-Sep-2035 | 12-Sep-2035 | | | | |
| 2008 | 30-May-2008 | 31-Jan-2025 | 31-Jan-2025 | | | | |
| 2009 | 14-May-1994 | 30-Mar-2013 | 30-Mar-2013 | 15-Dec-2016 | | | |
| 2010 | 9-Jan-1965 | 23-Dec-1981 | 23-Dec-1981 | 27-Apr-1983 | 23-Dec-1991 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2011 | 17-Oct-1959 | 17-Oct-1974 | 17-Oct-1974 | 10-Dec-1976 | 11-Jun-1981 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 2012 | 26-Apr-1961 | 12-Jun-1971 | 26-Apr-1971 | | 23-Dec-1965 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.5 |
| 2013 | 13-Oct-1990 | 13-Oct-2005 | 13-Feb-2005 | 11-Mar-2007 | 13-Feb-2010 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2014 | 15-Jan-1959 | 15-Jan-1974 | 25-Nov-1969 | | 17-Jun-1961 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.6 |
| 2015 | 29-Apr-1949 | 16-Dec-1972 | 16-Dec-1972 | 12-Oct-1975 | 16-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2016 | 5-Oct-2019 | 2-Mar-2039 | 2-Mar-2039 | | | |
| 2017 | 9-May-2019 | 30-Jan-2036 | 30-Jan-2036 | | | |
| 2018 | 9-Oct-1981 | 25-Apr-1998 | 25-Apr-1998 | 11-Apr-2000 | 12-Feb-2006 ELECTIVE | 72.8 |
| 2019 | 18-Mar-1972 | 19-Mar-1987 | 19-Mar-1987 | 11-Apr-1987 | 9-Jan-1992 ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 2020 | 17-Sep-1966 | 23-Aug-1979 | 17-Sep-1976 | 8-Oct-1976 | 23-Aug-1979 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2021 | 21-Aug-2014 | 21-Aug-2029 | 13-Mar-2028 | | | |
| 2022 | 27-Mar-1988 | 1-Aug-2000 | 28-Mar-1998 | 28-Mar-1998 | 1-Aug-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2023 | 19-Sep-1998 | 9-Mar-2014 | 9-Mar-2014 | 10-Dec-2016 | | |
| 2024 | 4-Oct-1998 | 4-Oct-2013 | 12-Nov-2012 | 12-Nov-2012 | 10-Apr-2014 ELECTIVE | 71.4 |
| 2025 | 15-Aug-2004 | 15-Aug-2019 | 6-Apr-2015 | | 10-Apr-2015 Early Retirement | 70.0 |
| 2026 | 1-Jun-1989 | 1-Sep-2005 | 1-Dec-2006 | 1-Dec-2006 | 1-Dec-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2027 | 7-Jan-2012 | 7-Jan-2027 | 7-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 2028 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 21-Mar-2030 | | | |
| 2029 | 20-Feb-1959 | 11-Aug-1971 | 11-Aug-1971 | | 21-Jul-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.9 |
| 2030 | 31-May-1979 | 3-Jun-1997 | 3-Jun-1997 | | 3-Jun-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2031 | 10-Mar-1956 | 22-May-1968 | 22-May-1968 | | 11-Mar-1973 ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 2032 | 1-Jun-2018 | 1-Jun-2033 | 1-Jun-2033 | | | |
| 2033 | 12-May-1962 | 20-May-1979 | 20-May-1979 | 22-Aug-1980 | 20-May-1989 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2034 | 29-Sep-2012 | 29-Sep-2027 | 13-Apr-2025 | | | |
| 2035 | 9-Nov-1973 | 17-Oct-2000 | 17-Oct-2000 | | 28-Jan-1982 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 46.3 |
| 2036 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | 1-Oct-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2037 | 25-Dec-1955 | 25-Dec-1970 | 25-Dec-1970 | 10-Mar-1976 | 18-Jan-1980 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2038 | 29-Nov-1963 | 29-Nov-1978 | 21-Sep-1977 | | 19-Mar-1974 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.5 |
| 2039 | 25-Feb-1984 | 29-Oct-2000 | 3-Jul-2002 | | 30-Oct-2000 ELECTIVE | 63.3 |
| 2040 | 20-Sep-1953 | 2-Jul-1963 | 20-Sep-1963 | | 16-Jan-1962 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.5 |
| 2041 | 21-Mar-1959 | 21-Mar-1974 | 21-Mar-1974 | 24-Dec-1976 | 5-Jan-1979 ELECTIVE | 70.7 |
| 2042 | 29-Mar-2018 | 8-Oct-2034 | 8-Oct-2034 | | | |
| 2043 | 30-Jun-1965 | 12-Apr-1982 | 12-Apr-1982 | | 15-Aug-1986 DEATH (RPC) | 69.3 |
| 2044 | 6-Jun-2015 | 5-Nov-2032 | 5-Nov-2032 | | | |
| 2045 | 30-May-1996 | 31-May-2011 | 22-Oct-2007 | 22-Oct-2007 | 22-Oct-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2046 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 21-May-2023 | | | |
| 2047 | 11-Aug-2017 | 6-Nov-2032 | 6-Nov-2032 | | | |
| 2048 | 15-Feb-1958 | 15-Feb-1973 | 15-Feb-1973 | | 10-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE | 69.7 |
| 2049 | 5-Jul-2001 | 5-Jul-2016 | 1-Sep-2013 | 1-Sep-2013 | 1-Sep-2018 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2050 | 2-Jul-2017 | 2-Jul-2032 | 2-Jul-2032 | | | |
| 2051 | 15-Aug-2007 | 15-Aug-2022 | 27-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 2052 | 17-Oct-1975 | 12-Jul-1997 | 12-Jul-1997 | 12-Jul-1997 | 12-Jul-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2053 | 27-Jan-2017 | 18-Aug-2034 | 18-Aug-2034 | | | |
| 2054 | 2-Jul-2017 | 2-Jul-2032 | 2-Jul-2032 | | | |
| 2055 | 18-Jan-2003 | 18-Jan-2018 | 18-Jan-2018 | 18-Jan-2018 | | |
| 2056 | 17-Jul-1952 | 25-Jul-1973 | 25-Jul-1973 | | 25-Jul-1983 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2057 | 5-Feb-2011 | 5-Feb-2026 | 5-Feb-2026 | | | |
| 2058 | 22-Aug-2004 | 8-Aug-2021 | 8-Aug-2021 | | | |
| 2059 | 5-Sep-1985 | 1-Oct-2012 | 1-Oct-2012 | | 16-Apr-1991 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 43.5 |
| 2060 | 29-Sep-2012 | 3-Feb-2028 | 3-Feb-2028 | | | |
| 2061 | 5-Nov-1955 | 28-Feb-1965 | | | 28-Feb-1965 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2062 | 9-Mar-1995 | 19-Dec-2010 | 19-Dec-2010 | 19-Dec-2010 | 10-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE | 67.2 |
| 2063 | 19-Oct-1991 | 4-Mar-2008 | 4-Mar-2008 | 4-Mar-2008 | 29-Aug-2012 ELECTIVE | 68.1 |
| 2064 | 21-Mar-2015 | 28-Apr-2031 | 28-Apr-2031 | | | |
| 2065 | 2-Sep-1999 | 2-Sep-2014 | 2-Sep-2014 | 2-Sep-2014 | 10-Dec-2018 ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 2066 | 16-Feb-1974 | 6-Sep-1991 | 6-Sep-1991 | 6-Sep-1991 | 9-Apr-1996 ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 2067 | 11-Dec-1988 | 15-Mar-2009 | 15-Mar-2009 | | | |
| 2068 | 7-Mar-1996 | 8-Mar-2011 | 8-Mar-2011 | 8-Mar-2011 | 15-Jul-2013 ELECTIVE | 70.1 |
| 2069 | 29-Mar-1981 | 28-Mar-1996 | 15-Jul-1995 | 23-Jul-1995 | 15-Jul-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2070 | 9-Sep-2020 | 9-Sep-2035 | 23-Oct-2034 | | | |
| 2071 | 24-Mar-1965 | 27-Jun-1980 | 27-Jun-1980 | 27-Jun-1980 | 27-Jun-1990 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2072 | 18-May-2013 | 17-May-2028 | 17-May-2028 | | | |
| 2073 | 17-Dec-1986 | 26-Oct-2007 | 26-Oct-2007 | 2-Sep-2013 | | |
| 2074 | 13-May-1978 | 13-May-1993 | 13-May-1993 | 13-May-1993 | 9-Aug-2000 ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 2075 | 18-Feb-2000 | 25-Jun-2016 | 25-Jun-2016 | 25-Jun-2016 | | |
| 2076 | 19-Nov-1967 | 14-Aug-1978 | 14-Aug-1978 | | 4-May-1977 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.7 |
| 2077 | 23-Dec-2006 | 23-Oct-2024 | 23-Oct-2024 | | | |
| 2078 | 8-Oct-1976 | 8-Oct-1991 | 8-Oct-1991 | | 10-Feb-1986 DEATH (RPC) | 59.9 |
| 2079 | 8-Mar-1992 | 9-Mar-2007 | 28-Sep-2002 | 28-Sep-2002 | 23-Sep-2007 ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 2080 | 27-Jun-1996 | 27-Jun-2011 | 27-Jun-2011 | 27-Jun-2011 | 16-Oct-2018 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2081 | 12-Jan-1990 | 28-Jul-2010 | 28-Jul-2010 | 13-Oct-2010 | 13-Oct-2020 COMPULSORY | 69.7 |
| 2082 | 30-Jun-1991 | 25-Jan-2011 | 25-Jan-2011 | 24-Jul-2014 | | |
| 2083 | 8-Sep-2002 | 9-Oct-2017 | 9-Oct-2017 | 9-Oct-2017 | | |
| 2084 | 25-Jan-1951 | 2-Dec-1966 | 2-Dec-1966 | | 10-Sep-1956 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 54.8 |
| 2085 | 9-Jun-1962 | 14-Jul-1979 | 14-Jul-1979 | 14-Jul-1979 | 14-Jul-1989 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2086 | 15-Aug-1970 | 15-Aug-1985 | 15-Aug-1985 | 15-Aug-1985 | 11-Feb-1992 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2087 | 1-Mar-2019 | 1-Mar-2034 | 26-May-2031 | | | |
| 2088 | 6-Jan-2019 | 10-May-2036 | 10-May-2036 | | | |
| 2089 | 15-Dec-1979 | 15-Dec-1994 | 29-Nov-1993 | 29-Nov-1993 | 29-Nov-1998 ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 2090 | 11-Mar-1957 | 9-Jul-1982 | 9-Jul-1982 | | 1-Dec-1978 DISABILITY | 61.4 |
| 2091 | 12-Jan-1986 | 9-Oct-2001 | 5-Jul-2002 | 5-Jul-2002 | 5-Jul-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2092 | 14-Aug-1992 | 30-May-2009 | 30-May-2009 | 9-Jun-2009 | 23-Nov-2015 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.7 |
| 2093 | 21-Mar-2003 | 21-Mar-2018 | 21-Mar-2018 | | 8-Jan-2017 Early Retirement | 66.9 |
| 2094 | 25-Mar-2015 | 15-Nov-2032 | 15-Nov-2032 | | | |
| 2095 | 3-Jul-1987 | 3-Jul-2002 | 3-Jul-2002 | 3-Jul-2002 | 10-Jan-2009 ELECTIVE | 72.9 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|--|--|------|
| 2096 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 12-Mar-2029 | | | | | | |
| 2097 | 7-Oct-1984 | 27-Oct-1994 | 27-Oct-1994 | 27-Oct-1994 | 11-Apr-1999 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.5 |
| 2098 | 27-Apr-1974 | 17-Aug-1996 | 17-Aug-1996 | 17-Aug-1996 | 17-Aug-2006 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2099 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2030 | 21-Mar-2030 | | | | | | |
| 2100 | 15-Feb-2014 | 15-Feb-2029 | 31-May-2027 | | | | | | |
| 2101 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Oct-2020 | 2-Mar-2017 | 11-Apr-2017 | 2-Oct-2020 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2102 | 5-Jan-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 7-Aug-1999 | | 24-Dec-2001 | ELECTIVE | | | 67.4 |
| 2103 | 14-Sep-2013 | 5-Mar-2025 | 14-Sep-2023 | | | | | | |
| 2104 | 7-Jun-1969 | 17-Aug-1996 | 17-Aug-1996 | | 17-Aug-1996 | ELECTIVE | | | 65.0 |
| 2105 | 6-Jun-2015 | 6-Jun-2030 | 18-Feb-2027 | | | | | | |
| 2106 | 1-Apr-1978 | 1-Apr-1993 | 1-Apr-1993 | | 10-Apr-1993 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.6 |
| 2107 | 27-Jan-2017 | 7-Jul-2034 | 7-Jul-2034 | | | | | | |
| 2108 | 6-Mar-2005 | 5-Mar-2020 | 5-Mar-2020 | 11-Apr-2020 | | | | | |
| 2109 | 25-Jun-1998 | 4-Mar-2014 | 4-Mar-2014 | 11-Apr-2014 | 4-Jan-2020 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | | 70.1 |
| 2110 | 27-Dec-1967 | 1-Jan-1980 | 27-Dec-1977 | 6-Oct-1978 | 1-Jan-1980 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2111 | 7-Jul-1965 | 7-Jul-1980 | 7-Jul-1980 | 8-Aug-1980 | 8-Feb-1985 | ELECTIVE | | | 73.3 |
| 2112 | 12-May-1993 | 31-Jul-2011 | 31-Jul-2011 | 9-Aug-2011 | 9-Aug-2013 | ELECTIVE | | | 63.8 |
| 2113 | 8-Oct-2013 | 8-Oct-2028 | 4-Feb-2024 | | | | | | |
| 2114 | 31-Aug-2018 | 10-Dec-2033 | 10-Dec-2033 | | | | | | |
| 2115 | 13-Aug-1983 | 26-Feb-1999 | 13-Apr-1999 | 13-Apr-1999 | 13-Apr-2009 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2116 | 2-Mar-2006 | 2-Mar-2021 | 2-Mar-2021 | | | | | | |
| 2117 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 7-Nov-2023 | | | | | | |
| 2118 | 27-Jan-1962 | 21-Oct-1973 | 21-Oct-1973 | | 21-Oct-1978 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2119 | 3-Feb-2018 | 3-Feb-2033 | 3-Feb-2033 | | | | | | |
| 2120 | 11-Aug-2018 | 11-May-2030 | 11-Aug-2028 | | | | | | |
| 2121 | 1-May-1999 | 13-Jan-2013 | 1-May-2009 | 1-May-2009 | 13-Jan-2013 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2122 | 16-May-2015 | 16-May-2030 | 16-May-2030 | | | | | | |
| 2123 | 30-Jun-1991 | 26-Apr-2009 | 26-Apr-2009 | 26-Apr-2009 | 11-Jul-2016 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.4 |
| 2124 | 6-Mar-1980 | 27-Jun-1992 | 7-Mar-1990 | 7-Mar-1990 | 27-Jun-1992 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2125 | 3-Jul-1976 | 3-Jul-1991 | 3-Jul-1991 | 29-Mar-1992 | 1-Sep-1998 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2126 | 4-Jun-1977 | 3-Jun-1992 | 3-Jun-1992 | | 19-Mar-1988 | DISABILITY | | | 63.5 |
| 2127 | 30-May-2008 | 31-May-2023 | 31-May-2023 | | 11-May-2020 | Early Retirement | | | 63.3 |
| 2128 | 31-Mar-1984 | 1-Apr-1999 | 1-Apr-1999 | 1-Apr-1999 | 15-Dec-2006 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2129 | 12-May-1973 | 15-Aug-1989 | 15-Aug-1989 | 15-Aug-1989 | 9-Oct-1991 | ELECTIVE | | | 67.1 |
| 2130 | 17-Jan-1976 | 17-Dec-1995 | 17-Dec-1995 | 17-Dec-1995 | 17-Dec-2005 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2131 | 21-Aug-1992 | 13-Mar-2011 | 13-Mar-2011 | | 9-Dec-2014 | ELECTIVE | | | 65.2 |
| 2132 | 24-Dec-1999 | 24-Mar-2017 | 24-Mar-2017 | 24-Mar-2017 | 9-Oct-2019 | ELECTIVE | | | 65.3 |
| 2133 | 22-Sep-2017 | 22-Sep-2032 | 3-May-2030 | | | | | | |
| 2134 | 10-Sep-2019 | 14-Sep-2034 | 14-Sep-2034 | | | | | | |
| 2135 | 30-Sep-2007 | 30-Sep-2022 | 30-Sep-2022 | | | | | | |
| 2136 | 24-May-1985 | 27-Oct-1997 | 24-May-1995 | 24-May-1995 | 27-Oct-1997 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2137 | 4-Nov-2000 | 13-Aug-2017 | 13-Aug-2017 | 13-Aug-2017 | | | | | |
| 2138 | 19-Mar-1972 | 1-Jul-1998 | 1-Jul-1998 | | 5-Dec-1983 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 50.4 |
| 2139 | 29-Nov-1963 | 29-Nov-1978 | 29-Nov-1978 | 30-Nov-1978 | 3-Jul-1987 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2140 | 2-Nov-1975 | 18-Jul-1998 | 18-Jul-1998 | 18-Jul-1998 | 24-Dec-2002 | ELECTIVE | | | 69.4 |
| 2141 | 26-Dec-1973 | 2-May-1990 | 2-May-1990 | 2-May-1990 | 9-Mar-2000 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.9 |
| 2142 | 5-May-2002 | 25-Apr-2018 | 25-Apr-2018 | 25-Apr-2018 | | | | | |
| 2143 | 10-Aug-1950 | 16-Mar-1977 | 16-Mar-1977 | | 8-Apr-1977 | ELECTIVE | | | 65.1 |
| 2144 | 12-Feb-1998 | 28-Jul-2014 | 28-Jul-2014 | 10-Apr-2017 | | | | | |
| 2145 | 8-Sep-2002 | 28-Jan-2020 | 28-Jan-2020 | | 11-Mar-2019 | Early Retirement | | | 61.7 |
| 2146 | 7-Mar-1993 | 23-May-2008 | 23-May-2008 | 10-Apr-2011 | 9-Aug-2018 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2147 | 9-Aug-2018 | 9-Aug-2033 | 28-Aug-2032 | | | | | | |
| 2148 | 25-Dec-2003 | 25-Dec-2018 | 2-Aug-2014 | 2-Aug-2014 | 2-Aug-2019 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2149 | 10-May-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Feb-2000 | 22-Feb-2000 | 22-Feb-2010 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2150 | 26-Feb-1998 | 26-Feb-2013 | 26-Feb-2013 | 26-Feb-2013 | | | | | |
| 2151 | 10-Dec-1956 | 21-Oct-1966 | | | 21-Oct-1966 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2152 | 8-Aug-2015 | 13-Oct-2033 | 13-Oct-2033 | | | | | | |
| 2153 | 21-Jan-1984 | 10-Dec-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 10-Apr-2015 | ELECTIVE | | | 67.4 |
| 2154 | 9-Nov-1966 | 9-Nov-1981 | 27-Aug-1981 | | 8-Jan-1982 | ELECTIVE | | | 70.4 |
| 2155 | 24-Jun-1978 | 16-Sep-2000 | 16-Sep-2000 | | 10-Mar-1993 | DISABILITY | | | 57.5 |
| 2156 | 22-May-1982 | 8-Dec-1997 | 8-Dec-1997 | | 11-Jan-1992 | DISABILITY | | | 59.1 |
| 2157 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 27-Jan-2032 | | | | | | |
| 2158 | 18-Jul-2019 | 18-Jul-2034 | 1-May-2034 | | | | | | |
| 2159 | 25-Feb-1984 | 11-Mar-1999 | 24-Mar-1999 | 24-Mar-1999 | 24-Mar-2009 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2160 | 29-Jun-2001 | 19-Nov-2016 | 19-Nov-2016 | 19-Nov-2016 | 12-Jul-2020 | ELECTIVE | | | 68.3 |
| 2161 | 28-Sep-1996 | 23-Jan-2014 | 23-Jan-2014 | 10-Mar-2015 | | | | | |
| 2162 | 14-Aug-1992 | 24-Apr-2008 | 24-Apr-2008 | 3-Jan-2009 | 3-Jan-2019 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2163 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Sep-2034 | 10-Sep-2034 | | | | | | |
| 2164 | 20-Jul-2003 | 20-Jul-2018 | 20-Jul-2018 | 20-Jul-2018 | | | | | |
| 2165 | 1-Oct-1998 | 26-Jul-2015 | 26-Jul-2015 | 26-Jul-2015 | | | | | |
| 2166 | 13-Oct-1994 | 13-Oct-2009 | 13-Oct-2009 | 13-Oct-2009 | 11-Apr-2019 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.8 |
| 2167 | 11-Feb-1996 | 26-Aug-2011 | 9-Mar-2012 | | 10-Dec-2002 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | | | 55.8 |
| 2168 | 9-Jun-1991 | 9-Jun-2006 | 25-Sep-2003 | 25-Sep-2003 | 25-Sep-2008 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2169 | 28-Sep-2000 | 2-Dec-2018 | 2-Dec-2018 | | | | | | |
| 2170 | 26-Aug-2017 | 26-Aug-2032 | 26-Aug-2032 | | | | | | |
| 2171 | 5-Sep-1993 | 28-Feb-2009 | 28-Feb-2009 | 28-Feb-2009 | 10-Jun-2016 | DEATH (RPC) | | | 71.8 |
| 2172 | 18-Sep-1993 | 22-Jan-2012 | 22-Jan-2012 | 9-May-2020 | | | | | |
| 2173 | 9-Feb-1995 | 14-Aug-2012 | 14-Aug-2012 | 9-Apr-2016 | | | | | |
| 2174 | 7-Feb-1947 | 2-Oct-1971 | 2-Oct-1971 | | 8-Apr-1977 | ELECTIVE | | | 70.5 |
| 2175 | 13-Aug-1993 | 15-Mar-2012 | 15-Mar-2012 | | 12-Aug-2007 | Early Retirement | | | 56.8 |
| 2176 | 8-Nov-1990 | 22-Nov-2009 | 22-Nov-2009 | 22-Nov-2009 | 9-Jun-2010 | ELECTIVE | | | 61.5 |
| 2177 | 8-Jun-1995 | 26-Oct-2010 | 26-Oct-2010 | 8-Oct-2013 | 7-Jun-2020 | ELECTIVE | | | 74.2 |
| 2178 | 8-May-1982 | 8-May-1997 | 8-May-1997 | 12-May-1997 | 30-Jan-2007 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |
| 2179 | 25-Oct-1980 | 21-Feb-1991 | 21-Feb-1991 | 21-Feb-1991 | 21-Feb-1996 | COMPULSORY | | | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 2180 | 15-Dec-1979 | 1-Jul-1995 | 1-Jul-1995 | 1-Jul-1995 | 20-Apr-2001 ELECTIVE | 70.8 |
| 2181 | 12-Jan-1986 | 12-Jan-2001 | 19-Jun-1998 | 8-Oct-1998 | 19-Jun-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2182 | 9-Jun-2001 | 16-Aug-2017 | 16-Aug-2017 | 16-Aug-2017 | | |
| 2183 | 1-Nov-1975 | 1-Nov-1990 | 1-Nov-1990 | 1-Nov-1990 | 13-Jun-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.1 |
| 2184 | 9-Nov-1995 | 11-Apr-2012 | 11-Apr-2012 | 8-Aug-2013 | | |
| 2185 | 12-Feb-1998 | 12-Feb-2013 | 12-Feb-2013 | | 20-Oct-2000 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 57.0 |
| 2186 | 20-Jul-1974 | 20-Jul-1989 | 20-Jul-1989 | | 9-Nov-1986 DISABILITY | 66.5 |
| 2187 | 1-Mar-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 7-Jan-2001 | 7-Jan-2001 | 11-Apr-2006 ELECTIVE | 70.3 |
| 2188 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 10-Jun-2022 | | | |
| 2189 | 3-Aug-1995 | 5-Aug-2014 | 5-Aug-2014 | 9-Aug-2014 | | |
| 2190 | 1-Nov-2003 | 1-Nov-2018 | 23-Sep-2014 | 23-Sep-2014 | 23-Sep-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2191 | 18-Dec-2009 | 18-Dec-2024 | 10-Jan-2020 | 10-Jan-2020 | | |
| 2192 | 9-Feb-1995 | 5-Oct-2012 | 5-Oct-2012 | 5-Oct-2012 | 15-Mar-2018 ELECTIVE | 67.8 |
| 2193 | 8-Mar-1992 | 25-Mar-2011 | 25-Mar-2011 | 25-Mar-2011 | 9-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE | 63.7 |
| 2194 | 12-Jan-1990 | 23-Apr-2007 | 23-Apr-2007 | 11-Apr-2015 | 31-Jul-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2195 | 26-Aug-2017 | 18-Sep-2029 | 26-Aug-2027 | | | |
| 2196 | 23-Feb-2002 | 10-May-2019 | 10-May-2019 | | | |
| 2197 | 23-Jun-1999 | 23-Jun-2014 | 23-Jun-2014 | | 11-Jul-2015 ELECTIVE | 67.9 |
| 2198 | 7-May-1972 | 8-May-1987 | 8-May-1987 | | 30-Jul-1972 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 52.5 |
| 2199 | 8-Sep-2002 | 24-Apr-2018 | 24-Apr-2018 | 10-Dec-2019 | | |
| 2200 | 4-Jan-1941 | 4-Jan-1956 | 4-Jan-1956 | | 27-Dec-1960 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.9 |
| 2201 | 15-Jul-1982 | 15-Jul-1997 | 15-Jul-1997 | 15-Jul-1997 | 9-Feb-1999 ELECTIVE | 66.8 |
| 2202 | 9-Jun-1961 | 9-Jun-1976 | 9-Jun-1976 | 10-Aug-1977 | 4-Sep-1977 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.6 |
| 2203 | 16-May-2015 | 21-Aug-2031 | 21-Aug-2031 | | | |
| 2204 | 5-May-1950 | 28-Feb-1969 | 28-Feb-1969 | | 28-Feb-1979 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2205 | 8-Mar-2009 | 14-Sep-2025 | 14-Sep-2025 | | | |
| 2206 | 5-Sep-1981 | 5-Sep-1996 | 5-Sep-1996 | | 9-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE | 66.1 |
| 2207 | 16-May-2015 | 22-Dec-2031 | 22-Dec-2031 | | | |
| 2208 | 11-Apr-1976 | 12-Apr-1991 | | 2-Apr-1990 | 9-Dec-1994 ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 2209 | 13-Aug-2005 | 13-Aug-2020 | 8-Jan-2020 | | 12-Oct-2017 DISABILITY | 67.8 |
| 2210 | 19-Jun-1985 | 24-Nov-1997 | 19-Jun-1995 | | 11-Jul-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.6 |
| 2211 | 13-Oct-2000 | 13-Oct-2015 | 13-Oct-2015 | 13-Oct-2015 | 10-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | 66.2 |
| 2212 | 7-May-1994 | 24-Nov-2012 | 24-Nov-2012 | 23-Dec-2012 | | |
| 2213 | 22-Feb-1957 | 22-Feb-1972 | 22-Feb-1972 | 22-Feb-1974 | 21-May-1980 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2214 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 29-Sep-2032 | | | |
| 2215 | 31-Jul-2003 | 7-Nov-2023 | 7-Nov-2023 | | | |
| 2216 | 22-Feb-1975 | 22-Feb-1990 | 28-Nov-1988 | 29-Nov-1988 | 28-Nov-1993 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2217 | 3-Mar-1963 | 3-Mar-1978 | 3-Mar-1978 | | 16-Oct-1979 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.9 |
| 2218 | 9-Mar-2007 | 5-Jan-2026 | 5-Jan-2026 | | | |
| 2219 | 25-Sep-1975 | 17-Mar-1989 | 25-Sep-1985 | 25-Sep-1985 | 17-Mar-1989 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2220 | 6-Mar-2010 | 2-Feb-2026 | 2-Feb-2026 | | | |
| 2221 | 18-Oct-2015 | 9-Feb-2031 | 9-Feb-2031 | | | |
| 2222 | 9-Oct-1998 | 9-Oct-2013 | 9-Oct-2013 | 9-Oct-2013 | | |
| 2223 | 23-Dec-1973 | 23-Dec-1988 | 23-Dec-1988 | | 10-May-1984 DISABILITY | 62.3 |
| 2224 | 11-Jan-1996 | 11-Jul-2014 | 11-Jul-2014 | 13-Jul-2014 | | |
| 2225 | 27-Sep-2009 | 10-Feb-2025 | 10-Feb-2025 | | | |
| 2226 | 13-Mar-1986 | 13-Mar-2001 | 13-Mar-2001 | 11-Apr-2007 | 6-Jan-2011 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2227 | 9-Mar-2019 | 9-Mar-2034 | 18-Feb-2031 | | | |
| 2228 | 4-May-1958 | 4-May-1973 | 4-May-1973 | 30-Nov-1975 | 22-Sep-1979 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2229 | 21-Jun-1969 | 21-Jun-1984 | 24-Oct-1980 | | 31-Dec-1977 DISABILITY | 67.2 |
| 2230 | 2-Nov-1969 | 1-Dec-1991 | 1-Dec-1991 | 1-Dec-1991 | 12-Dec-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 65.0 |
| 2231 | 19-Sep-1970 | 30-Jul-1990 | 30-Jul-1990 | 30-Jul-1990 | 30-Jul-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2232 | 21-Sep-2014 | 7-Aug-2031 | 7-Aug-2031 | | | |
| 2233 | 5-Aug-2007 | 5-Aug-2022 | 5-Aug-2022 | | | |
| 2234 | 30-Dec-1973 | 30-Dec-1988 | 20-Jul-1985 | 9-Sep-1985 | 20-Jul-1990 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2235 | 4-Sep-1982 | 4-Sep-1997 | 4-Sep-1997 | 4-Sep-1997 | 2-Oct-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2236 | 22-Nov-1959 | 31-Oct-1976 | 31-Oct-1976 | 31-Oct-1976 | 31-Oct-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2237 | 21-Mar-2015 | 26-Apr-2030 | 26-Apr-2030 | | | |
| 2238 | 12-Feb-1972 | 14-May-1994 | 14-May-1994 | 14-May-1994 | 13-May-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2239 | 11-Apr-1979 | 12-Apr-1994 | 12-Apr-1994 | 12-Apr-1994 | 8-Apr-2004 ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 2240 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2005 | 17-Jan-2010 ELECTIVE | 70.1 |
| 2241 | 15-Aug-1996 | 15-Aug-2011 | 15-Aug-2011 | 15-Aug-2011 | 24-Sep-2019 ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 2242 | 20-Jul-2018 | 31-Aug-2036 | 31-Aug-2036 | | | |
| 2243 | 5-Sep-2015 | 5-Jul-2031 | 5-Jul-2031 | | | |
| 2244 | 31-Jul-1982 | 16-Oct-1997 | 16-Oct-1997 | 16-Oct-1997 | 16-Oct-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2245 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 15-Oct-2028 | | | |
| 2246 | 1-Feb-1997 | 30-Nov-2012 | 30-Nov-2012 | 10-Dec-2012 | 8-Feb-2019 ELECTIVE | 70.4 |
| 2247 | 6-Nov-2009 | 25-Dec-2029 | | | | |
| 2248 | 9-Nov-1995 | 2-Mar-2012 | 2-Mar-2012 | 2-Mar-2012 | 18-Jan-2016 ELECTIVE | 67.6 |
| 2249 | 12-Aug-1999 | 11-Mar-2015 | 11-Mar-2015 | | 24-Jul-2014 Early Retirement | 63.8 |
| 2250 | 10-Mar-2012 | 11-Mar-2027 | 11-Mar-2027 | | | |
| 2251 | 22-Jan-1972 | 5-Oct-1990 | 5-Oct-1990 | 5-Oct-1990 | 28-Jul-1999 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.8 |
| 2252 | 22-Mar-2003 | 18-Mar-2020 | 18-Mar-2020 | 21-Mar-2020 | | |
| 2253 | 26-Jun-1997 | 12-Aug-2014 | 12-Aug-2014 | 28-Sep-2016 | | |
| 2254 | 14-Nov-2010 | 26-Jan-2027 | 26-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 2255 | 21-Mar-2015 | 21-Mar-2033 | 21-Mar-2033 | | | |
| 2256 | 14-Jul-2012 | 25-Apr-2028 | 25-Apr-2028 | | | |
| 2257 | 8-Feb-1964 | 2-Sep-1981 | | | 8-Oct-1990 ELECTIVE | 74.1 |
| 2258 | 2-Oct-1992 | 7-Feb-2009 | 7-Feb-2009 | 7-Feb-2009 | 9-Aug-2013 ELECTIVE | 68.2 |
| 2259 | 15-Feb-1987 | 15-Feb-2002 | 8-Jul-2000 | 8-Jul-2000 | 8-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2260 | 8-May-1976 | 9-May-1991 | 12-Jan-1987 | 23-Oct-1987 | 12-Jan-1992 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2261 | 9-Jul-1977 | 10-Mar-1999 | 7-Nov-2005 | 10-Jul-2008 | 23-Nov-2014 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.0 |
| 2262 | 8-Apr-1959 | 8-Apr-1974 | 30-Oct-1973 | 27-Nov-1974 | 4-Feb-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.3 |
| 2263 | 24-Jan-2002 | 4-Aug-2019 | 4-Aug-2019 | 12-Sep-2019 | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 2264 | 19-Jan-1974 | 26-Feb-1999 | 3-Nov-1999 | 18-Jun-2000 | 11-Feb-2004 | ELECTIVE | 69.3 |
| 2265 | 1-Oct-2005 | 17-Aug-2020 | 1-Oct-2015 | 1-Oct-2015 | 8-Jan-2020 | Early Retirement | 74.4 |
| 2266 | 11-Apr-1946 | 4-May-1966 | 4-May-1966 | | 7-Apr-1976 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 2267 | 18-May-2013 | 17-May-2028 | 17-May-2028 | | | | |
| 2268 | 21-Mar-2009 | 20-Mar-2024 | 20-Mar-2024 | | | | |
| 2269 | 5-Jun-2005 | 23-Aug-2023 | 23-Aug-2023 | | | | |
| 2270 | 13-Jul-1995 | 27-May-2015 | 27-May-2015 | | 12-May-2019 | ELECTIVE | 64.1 |
| 2271 | 18-Feb-1972 | 18-Feb-1987 | 12-May-1982 | 12-May-1982 | 12-May-1987 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2272 | 16-Feb-1997 | 14-Jul-2015 | 14-Jul-2015 | | 9-Dec-2013 | Early Retirement | 60.0 |
| 2273 | 25-Aug-2019 | 22-Dec-2033 | 25-Aug-2029 | | | | |
| 2274 | 14-Jul-2012 | 14-Jul-2027 | 14-Jul-2027 | | | | |
| 2275 | 21-Jan-1984 | 25-Dec-2003 | 28-Nov-2008 | | 13-Jul-2002 | Early Retirement | 58.6 |
| 2276 | 20-May-1978 | 22-Jun-1987 | 19-May-1988 | | 12-Apr-1988 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.8 |
| 2277 | 14-May-2011 | 14-May-2026 | 14-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 2278 | 20-Jul-2008 | 14-Dec-2026 | 14-Dec-2026 | | | | |
| 2279 | 12-Jul-2018 | 12-Jul-2033 | 12-Jul-2033 | | | | |
| 2280 | 6-Feb-2011 | 4-Mar-2025 | 6-Feb-2021 | | | | |
| 2281 | 10-Dec-1972 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-1987 | 2-Nov-1988 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.3 |
| 2282 | 26-Jan-1974 | 10-Nov-1996 | 10-Nov-1996 | 10-Nov-1996 | 9-Feb-1999 | ELECTIVE | 67.3 |
| 2283 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 30-Apr-2022 | | | | |
| 2284 | 26-Feb-1998 | 16-Oct-2013 | 16-Oct-2013 | 16-Oct-2013 | | | |
| 2285 | 14-Aug-1992 | 27-Feb-2010 | 27-Feb-2010 | | 17-Apr-2009 | DISABILITY | 61.6 |
| 2286 | 18-May-2013 | 17-May-2028 | 19-Jul-2026 | | | | |
| 2287 | 1-Aug-1984 | 1-Aug-1999 | 1-Aug-1999 | 1-Aug-1999 | 23-Feb-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2288 | 30-Jun-1988 | 30-Jun-2003 | 30-Jun-2003 | 10-Jul-2003 | 13-May-2011 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2289 | 9-Jan-2005 | 9-Jan-2020 | 9-Jan-2020 | | | | |
| 2290 | 11-Mar-2014 | 11-Mar-2029 | 29-Nov-2024 | | | | |
| 2291 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Sep-2034 | 10-Sep-2034 | | | | |
| 2292 | 10-Aug-2019 | 28-Jan-2038 | 28-Jan-2038 | | | | |
| 2293 | 14-Jun-2014 | 14-Jun-2029 | 14-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 2294 | 27-Sep-2009 | 14-Dec-2028 | 14-Dec-2028 | | | | |
| 2295 | 22-Jul-1999 | 22-Jul-2014 | 22-Jul-2014 | 31-Jul-2014 | | | |
| 2296 | 9-Mar-1995 | 22-Nov-2015 | 22-Nov-2015 | | | | |
| 2297 | 17-May-2018 | 17-May-2033 | 8-May-2033 | | | | |
| 2298 | 27-Oct-1991 | 9-Oct-1999 | | | 9-Oct-1999 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2299 | 14-Mar-1992 | 15-Mar-2007 | 15-Mar-2007 | 15-Mar-2007 | 11-Sep-2015 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2300 | 9-Apr-2012 | 23-Sep-2022 | 10-Apr-2022 | | | | |
| 2301 | 15-Apr-1966 | 15-Apr-1981 | 15-Apr-1981 | 8-Jan-1982 | 9-Jan-1988 | ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 2302 | 21-Nov-2003 | 21-Nov-2018 | 13-Jul-2015 | | 5-May-2007 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 61.8 |
| 2303 | 16-Jun-2017 | 30-May-2033 | 30-May-2033 | | | | |
| 2304 | 15-Feb-2014 | 24-May-2032 | 24-May-2032 | | | | |
| 2305 | 7-Jun-1969 | 26-Aug-1987 | 26-Aug-1987 | 9-Oct-1992 | 9-Feb-1997 | ELECTIVE | 74.5 |
| 2306 | 18-Oct-1980 | 10-Jul-1998 | 10-Jul-1998 | 10-Jul-1998 | 9-Jun-2008 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 2307 | 9-Sep-2020 | 9-Sep-2035 | 9-Sep-2035 | | | | |
| 2308 | 3-Apr-1991 | 3-Apr-2006 | 3-Apr-2006 | | 10-Jun-2003 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.8 |
| 2309 | 20-Jul-2003 | 20-Jul-2018 | 20-Jul-2018 | | 20-Nov-2011 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.7 |
| 2310 | 4-Jan-2004 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | 8-Jan-2019 | | | |
| 2311 | 25-Aug-2019 | 25-Aug-2034 | 8-Jul-2031 | | | | |
| 2312 | 19-Jan-1992 | 27-Apr-2008 | 27-Apr-2008 | 11-Apr-2011 | 8-Oct-2018 | ELECTIVE | 74.2 |
| 2313 | 13-Oct-1990 | 12-Nov-2010 | 12-Nov-2010 | | 12-Nov-2010 | ELECTIVE | 59.9 |
| 2314 | 1-Apr-1976 | 16-May-1992 | 16-May-1992 | 16-May-1992 | 9-Aug-2000 | ELECTIVE | 73.2 |
| 2315 | 1-Oct-1993 | 1-Oct-2008 | 1-Oct-2008 | 1-Oct-2008 | 1-Oct-2013 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.4 |
| 2316 | 26-Jul-1962 | 26-Jul-1977 | 26-Jul-1977 | | 3-Nov-1967 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.0 |
| 2317 | 27-Sep-2015 | 6-Feb-2034 | 6-Feb-2034 | | | | |
| 2318 | 18-Jan-2003 | 18-Jan-2018 | 18-Jan-2018 | | 20-Jan-2014 | Early Retirement | 65.7 |
| 2319 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 15-Sep-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2320 | 14-Jun-1969 | 14-Jun-1984 | 5-Mar-1981 | | 23-Dec-1974 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.8 |
| 2321 | 14-May-2011 | 23-Dec-2027 | 23-Dec-2027 | | | | |
| 2322 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Oct-2004 | 8-Oct-2004 | 8-Oct-2004 | 27-Sep-2014 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2323 | 9-May-2020 | 10-May-2035 | 10-May-2035 | | | | |
| 2324 | 15-Dec-1986 | 19-May-2005 | 22-Oct-2008 | | 19-May-1999 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 55.6 |
| 2325 | 22-Aug-2009 | 4-Mar-2018 | | | 4-Mar-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2326 | 28-Dec-2007 | 28-Dec-2022 | 28-Dec-2022 | | | | |
| 2327 | 14-Sep-1983 | 31-Jan-1997 | 31-Jan-1997 | | 11-Aug-1999 | DEATH (RPC) | 72.5 |
| 2328 | 27-May-1967 | 27-May-1982 | 27-May-1982 | | 14-Jun-1991 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2329 | 19-Jul-2014 | 19-Jul-2029 | 19-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 2330 | 7-Jan-2018 | 30-May-2025 | | | | | |
| 2331 | 8-Dec-1978 | 26-Feb-1999 | 28-Jun-2001 | 28-Jun-2001 | 11-Apr-2010 | ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 2332 | 4-Jul-1979 | 4-Jul-1994 | 1-Aug-1992 | 3-Aug-1994 | 1-Aug-1997 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2333 | 12-Feb-1972 | 5-Sep-1981 | 12-Feb-1982 | | 5-Sep-1981 | Compulsory(County Court) | 70.0 |
| 2334 | 30-Nov-1985 | 29-Aug-2001 | 27-May-2002 | 6-Jul-2003 | 26-May-2012 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2335 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 13-Jun-2026 | | | | |
| 2336 | 11-Jun-1993 | 27-Jul-2010 | 10-Sep-2012 | | 22-Jul-1999 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 51.9 |
| 2337 | 22-Jul-1960 | 28-Jul-1976 | 28-Jul-1976 | 2-Feb-1977 | 28-Jul-1986 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2338 | 1-Apr-1992 | 18-Jan-2009 | 18-Jan-2009 | 18-Jan-2009 | 8-Aug-2016 | ELECTIVE | 70.8 |
| 2339 | 17-Jul-1971 | 20-Aug-1983 | 20-Aug-1983 | | 10-Jul-1973 | DISABILITY | 59.9 |
| 2340 | 21-Sep-2014 | 15-Apr-2026 | 21-Sep-2024 | | | | |
| 2341 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 18-Aug-2018 | 18-Aug-2018 | | | |
| 2342 | 1-Jun-2018 | 1-Jun-2033 | 12-Jan-2031 | | | | |
| 2343 | 28-Jan-2018 | 28-Jan-2033 | 28-Jan-2033 | | | | |
| 2344 | 21-Mar-2009 | 20-Mar-2024 | 28-Jan-2022 | | | | |
| 2345 | 24-Sep-1993 | 24-Sep-2008 | 24-Sep-2008 | 24-Sep-2008 | 10-Apr-2014 | ELECTIVE | 73.3 |
| 2346 | 7-Dec-2018 | 7-Dec-2033 | 7-Dec-2033 | | | | |
| 2347 | 13-Aug-1993 | 27-Jan-2006 | 13-Aug-2003 | 13-Aug-2003 | 27-Jan-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|--|
| 2348 | 13-Sep-2007 | 13-Sep-2022 | 18-Aug-2019 | 10-May-2020 | | | |
| 2349 | 7-Oct-1998 | 7-Oct-2013 | 6-Sep-2010 | | 28-Sep-2009 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.1 | |
| 2350 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 11-Dec-2004 | 11-Dec-2004 | 11-Dec-2009 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2351 | 26-Aug-2010 | 26-Aug-2025 | 26-Aug-2025 | | | | |
| 2352 | 6-Mar-2010 | 6-Mar-2025 | 6-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 2353 | 19-Jun-1986 | 8-Dec-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 30-May-2007 | 10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | 65.9 | |
| 2354 | 6-Oct-1984 | 23-Jun-2002 | | | 10-Mar-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2355 | 13-Aug-2005 | 19-May-2022 | 19-May-2022 | | | | |
| 2356 | 2-Apr-2007 | 21-Oct-2022 | 21-Oct-2022 | | | | |
| 2357 | 18-Oct-1950 | 25-May-1967 | 25-May-1967 | | 10-Apr-1958 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 55.9 | |
| 2358 | 19-Sep-1951 | 16-Oct-1966 | 16-Oct-1966 | | 20-Dec-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.2 | |
| 2359 | 3-Jul-2019 | 17-Jun-2035 | 17-Jun-2035 | | | | |
| 2360 | 18-Dec-2009 | 18-Dec-2024 | 18-Dec-2024 | | | | |
| 2361 | 13-May-1962 | 19-Nov-1972 | 19-Nov-1972 | | 19-Nov-1977 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2362 | 6-Aug-2020 | 6-Aug-2035 | 5-Jun-2035 | | | | |
| 2363 | 24-Oct-2002 | 23-Feb-2019 | 23-Feb-2019 | 27-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 2364 | 8-Mar-1992 | 9-Mar-2007 | 3-Dec-2003 | 3-Dec-2003 | 3-Dec-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2365 | 6-Aug-1981 | 6-Aug-1996 | 6-Aug-1996 | 6-Aug-1996 | 9-Jan-2004 ELECTIVE | 73.4 | |
| 2366 | 6-Mar-2010 | 6-Mar-2025 | 6-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 2367 | 1-Jul-1972 | 1-Jul-1987 | 1-Jul-1987 | | 9-Jan-1974 DISABILITY | 55.6 | |
| 2368 | 5-Sep-1981 | 16-May-1998 | 16-May-1998 | 16-May-1998 | 15-May-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2369 | 30-Nov-1985 | 30-Nov-2000 | 14-May-2000 | | 15-May-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2370 | 3-Apr-1991 | 18-Nov-2007 | 18-Nov-2007 | 3-Jul-2009 | 3-Jul-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2371 | 22-May-1940 | 9-Mar-1957 | 9-Mar-1957 | | 11-May-1964 ELECTIVE | 72.2 | |
| 2372 | 28-Feb-1996 | 28-Feb-2011 | 28-Feb-2011 | | 18-Apr-2006 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.5 | |
| 2373 | 8-Dec-1962 | 8-Dec-1977 | 8-Dec-1977 | | 27-Aug-1968 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 57.4 | |
| 2374 | 25-Sep-1982 | 25-Sep-1997 | 25-Sep-1997 | 9-Oct-1997 | 12-Sep-2006 DEATH (RPC) | 74.2 | |
| 2375 | 3-Jul-1968 | 3-Jul-1983 | 20-Jul-1981 | 22-Jul-1981 | 20-Jul-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2376 | 21-May-1993 | 20-May-2008 | 30-Sep-2004 | 30-Sep-2004 | 24-Dec-2008 ELECTIVE | 74.2 | |
| 2377 | 8-Nov-1990 | 10-Feb-2010 | 10-Feb-2010 | 10-Feb-2010 | 10-Feb-2020 COMPULSORY | 70.7 | |
| 2378 | 7-Jul-1990 | 12-Mar-2011 | 12-Mar-2011 | | 17-Jul-2009 Early Retirement | 57.7 | |
| 2379 | 29-Jan-2006 | 28-Jun-2023 | 28-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| 2380 | 8-Jan-1986 | 8-Jan-2001 | 21-Jul-1999 | 21-Jul-1999 | 21-Jul-2004 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2381 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 25-Dec-2011 | 25-Dec-2011 | 25-Dec-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2382 | 15-Jan-1959 | 15-Jan-1974 | 24-Apr-1969 | | 8-Sep-1967 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.4 | |
| 2383 | 18-Oct-2007 | 10-Jul-2022 | 18-Oct-2017 | 18-Oct-2017 | | | |
| 2384 | 5-Aug-2007 | 4-Jul-2021 | 5-Aug-2017 | 5-Aug-2017 | | | |
| 2385 | 19-Jan-1974 | 25-May-1996 | 25-May-1996 | 25-May-1996 | 26-May-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2386 | 26-Aug-2010 | 26-Aug-2025 | 5-Oct-2023 | | | | |
| 2387 | 13-May-1978 | 19-Jun-1997 | 19-Jun-1997 | 11-Jul-1997 | 15-Dec-2003 ELECTIVE | 71.5 | |
| 2388 | 27-Feb-2005 | 27-Feb-2020 | 27-Feb-2020 | | | | |
| 2389 | 25-Feb-1999 | 17-Nov-2014 | 17-Nov-2014 | | 23-May-2009 DISABILITY | 58.8 | |
| 2390 | 27-Mar-1988 | 9-Dec-2003 | 21-Aug-2004 | 21-Aug-2004 | 22-Jul-2010 ELECTIVE | 70.9 | |
| 2391 | 10-Apr-1974 | 10-Apr-1989 | 10-Apr-1989 | 10-Apr-1989 | 10-Apr-1993 ELECTIVE | 69.1 | |
| 2392 | 28-Nov-1965 | 21-Jan-1982 | 21-Jan-1982 | | 23-Sep-1973 DISABILITY | 56.7 | |
| 2393 | 25-May-1985 | 7-May-2001 | 19-Apr-2002 | 19-Apr-2002 | 9-Jan-2008 ELECTIVE | 70.7 | |
| 2394 | 14-Jun-1969 | 6-Dec-1989 | 6-Dec-1989 | 6-Dec-1992 | 6-Dec-1999 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2395 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 6-Mar-2024 | | | | |
| 2396 | 12-Jan-2013 | 22-Sep-2031 | 22-Sep-2031 | | | | |
| 2397 | 29-Mar-1997 | 26-Sep-2014 | 26-Sep-2014 | 10-Dec-2015 | 9-Apr-2020 ELECTIVE | 68.0 | |
| 2398 | 3-Apr-1991 | 8-Apr-2010 | 8-Apr-2010 | 10-Apr-2020 | | | |
| 2399 | 31-Jul-1994 | 31-Jul-2009 | 31-Jul-2009 | 31-Jul-2009 | 21-Apr-2018 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2400 | 17-Oct-1981 | 23-Oct-1992 | 23-Oct-1992 | 23-Oct-1992 | 23-Oct-1997 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2401 | 23-Mar-1985 | 27-Aug-1999 | 23-Mar-1995 | 11-Apr-1995 | 27-Aug-1999 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2402 | 9-May-1970 | 7-May-1981 | 8-May-1980 | | 7-May-1981 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2403 | 15-Mar-1984 | 16-Mar-1999 | 16-Mar-1999 | 16-Mar-1999 | 11-Jul-2002 ELECTIVE | 70.5 | |
| 2404 | 7-Dec-2018 | 28-Apr-2033 | 7-Dec-2028 | | | | |
| 2405 | 9-Nov-1995 | 9-Nov-2010 | 9-Nov-2010 | 9-Nov-2010 | 18-Jun-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2406 | 12-Jan-1995 | 1-May-2013 | 1-May-2013 | 1-May-2013 | | | |
| 2407 | 17-Aug-2014 | 25-Mar-2033 | 25-Mar-2033 | | | | |
| 2408 | 3-Aug-1995 | 3-Aug-2010 | 3-Aug-2010 | | 23-Sep-2007 DEATH (RPC) | 66.4 | |
| 2409 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 15-Jun-2034 | | | | |
| 2410 | 14-Aug-1992 | 14-Aug-2007 | 14-Aug-2007 | 15-Aug-2007 | 18-Jun-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2411 | 13-Oct-1994 | 24-Oct-2010 | 24-Oct-2010 | | 8-Nov-2010 ELECTIVE | 64.0 | |
| 2412 | 23-Oct-1975 | 8-Oct-1993 | 8-Oct-1993 | 8-Oct-1993 | 8-Oct-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2413 | 8-Mar-1975 | 8-Mar-1990 | 17-Dec-1989 | | 25-Mar-1980 DEATH (RPC) | 60.3 | |
| 2414 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 8-Apr-2020 | 9-Apr-2020 | | | |
| 2415 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 28-Feb-2003 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.6 | |
| 2416 | 10-Feb-1968 | 22-Nov-1989 | 22-Nov-1989 | | 25-May-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.5 | |
| 2417 | 14-May-2011 | 14-May-2026 | 29-Apr-2022 | | | | |
| 2418 | 22-Nov-1963 | 22-Nov-1978 | 22-Nov-1978 | 23-Nov-1978 | 13-Sep-1986 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2419 | 14-May-2011 | 15-Oct-2031 | 15-Oct-2031 | | | | |
| 2420 | 2-Dec-1964 | 2-Dec-1979 | 2-Dec-1979 | 10-Dec-1979 | 6-Apr-1985 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2421 | 23-Jan-1996 | 23-Dec-2007 | 23-Jan-2006 | | 9-Aug-2000 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 67.6 | |
| 2422 | 29-Mar-1981 | 27-May-2000 | 25-Jul-2004 | 11-Apr-2006 | 25-Jul-2014 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2423 | 26-Feb-1983 | 26-Feb-1993 | 26-Feb-1993 | 26-Feb-1993 | 10-Jul-1996 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2424 | 28-Jul-1973 | 28-Jul-1988 | 28-Jul-1988 | | 15-May-1997 COMPULSORY | 75.0 | |
| 2425 | 14-Sep-2013 | 9-Nov-2026 | 14-Sep-2023 | | 8-Aug-2017 RESIGNATION (RPC) | 65.7 | |
| 2426 | 10-Feb-1961 | 5-Mar-1968 | | | 24-Aug-1967 DISABILITY | 74.5 | |
| 2427 | 10-Dec-1976 | 1-Oct-1997 | 1-Oct-1997 | | 27-Sep-1982 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 50.0 | |
| 2428 | 9-Feb-2006 | 9-Feb-2021 | 18-Feb-2016 | | | | |
| 2429 | 1-Jun-1989 | 7-Apr-2010 | 7-Apr-2010 | 16-Apr-2010 | 21-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | 62.2 | |
| 2430 | 10-Dec-1965 | 10-Dec-1980 | | | 4-Jul-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.5 | |
| 2431 | 14-May-1994 | 14-May-2009 | 14-May-2009 | 14-May-2009 | 9-Dec-2014 ELECTIVE | 71.1 | |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 2432 | 16-May-2019 | 16-Apr-2033 | 16-May-2029 | | | | |
| 2433 | 11-Aug-2018 | 11-Aug-2033 | 11-Aug-2033 | | | | |
| 2434 | 9-Feb-2019 | 24-Mar-2036 | 24-Mar-2036 | | | | |
| 2435 | 21-Jun-2001 | 21-Jun-2016 | 21-Jun-2016 | 21-Jun-2016 | | | |
| 2436 | 5-Feb-2004 | 5-Feb-2019 | 5-Feb-2019 | 5-Feb-2019 | | | |
| 2437 | 18-Dec-2009 | 18-Dec-2024 | 18-Dec-2024 | | | | |
| 2438 | 10-May-2008 | 11-May-2023 | 11-May-2023 | | | | |
| 2439 | 18-Sep-1993 | 18-Sep-2008 | 18-Sep-2008 | 18-Sep-2008 | 2-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2440 | 21-Feb-1976 | 27-Mar-1996 | 27-Mar-1996 | 10-Apr-1996 | 24-Jul-1997 ELECTIVE | | 66.3 |
| 2441 | 25-Feb-1999 | 25-Feb-2014 | 13-Nov-2013 | 13-Nov-2013 | 13-Nov-2018 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2442 | 2-Jan-1997 | 30-Jul-2012 | 30-Jul-2012 | 8-Aug-2012 | 8-Jan-2019 ELECTIVE | | 70.9 |
| 2443 | 30-Jun-1991 | 20-Apr-2007 | 20-Apr-2007 | 9-Oct-2013 | 7-Feb-2018 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2444 | 25-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2022 | 1-Oct-2020 | | | | |
| 2445 | 19-May-1950 | 19-May-1965 | 19-May-1965 | | 9-Oct-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 67.2 |
| 2446 | 6-Nov-2009 | 6-Nov-2024 | 6-Nov-2024 | | | | |
| 2447 | 5-Feb-2004 | 28-Oct-2020 | 28-Oct-2020 | | 20-Jul-2019 Early Retirement | | 62.0 |
| 2448 | 31-Jul-1994 | 31-Jul-2009 | 7-Jan-2006 | 7-Jan-2006 | 7-Jan-2011 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2449 | 18-Dec-1997 | 18-Dec-2012 | 18-Dec-2012 | | 7-Oct-2007 DISABILITY | | 60.2 |
| 2450 | 19-Jan-1992 | 6-Apr-2009 | 6-Apr-2009 | 6-Apr-2009 | 6-Apr-2019 COMPULSORY | | 72.8 |
| 2451 | 22-Oct-2017 | 22-Oct-2032 | 31-May-2028 | | | | |
| 2452 | 5-Jun-2005 | 4-Jun-2020 | 4-Jun-2020 | 4-Jun-2020 | | | |
| 2453 | 17-Mar-1965 | 16-Mar-1980 | 16-Mar-1980 | 19-Mar-1980 | 11-Mar-1982 ELECTIVE | | 71.5 |
| 2454 | 16-Sep-2017 | 8-Mar-2033 | 8-Mar-2033 | | | | |
| 2455 | 11-Oct-1980 | 12-Sep-2000 | 12-Sep-2000 | | 21-Apr-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 55.6 |
| 2456 | 19-Jun-1985 | 5-Feb-2002 | 24-Sep-2003 | 24-Sep-2003 | 10-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE | | 73.2 |
| 2457 | 7-Mar-1940 | 6-Jan-1965 | 6-Jan-1965 | | 4-Sep-1960 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 60.7 |
| 2458 | 10-Mar-2012 | 12-Mar-2032 | 12-Mar-2032 | | | | |
| 2459 | 3-Nov-1995 | 6-Apr-2014 | 6-Apr-2014 | 11-Apr-2014 | 10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE | | 68.3 |
| 2460 | 3-Aug-1995 | 3-Aug-2010 | 3-Aug-2010 | 3-Aug-2010 | 8-Aug-2014 ELECTIVE | | 71.4 |
| 2461 | 27-Jan-2017 | 20-Nov-2033 | 20-Nov-2033 | | | | |
| 2462 | 27-Aug-2005 | 27-Aug-2020 | 18-Jan-2020 | 18-Jan-2020 | | | |
| 2463 | 7-Aug-2009 | 7-Aug-2024 | 7-Aug-2024 | | | | |
| 2464 | 17-Oct-1994 | 29-Sep-2010 | 29-Sep-2010 | 23-Aug-2020 | | | |
| 2465 | 9-Apr-1981 | 8-Apr-1996 | 19-Jul-1991 | 19-Jul-1991 | 19-Jul-1996 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2466 | 7-May-1994 | 3-Aug-2013 | 3-Aug-2013 | 4-Aug-2013 | | | |
| 2467 | 9-May-2020 | 10-May-2035 | 10-May-2035 | | | | |
| 2468 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 2-Apr-2007 | 20-Nov-2016 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2469 | 21-Jul-1990 | 27-Dec-1999 | | | 1-Feb-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 70.1 |
| 2470 | 13-Jun-1968 | 25-Sep-1991 | 25-Sep-1991 | 25-Sep-1991 | 10-Apr-1997 ELECTIVE | | 70.5 |
| 2471 | 15-Jun-2019 | 15-Jun-2034 | 19-Jul-2033 | | | | |
| 2472 | 16-Sep-2017 | 21-Aug-2035 | 21-Aug-2035 | | | | |
| 2473 | 9-Sep-1988 | 9-Sep-2003 | 23-Sep-1999 | 9-Dec-1999 | 23-Sep-2004 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2474 | 16-Dec-1962 | 20-Dec-1970 | 20-Dec-1972 | | 9-Oct-1968 DISABILITY | | 67.8 |
| 2475 | 10-Dec-1975 | 10-Dec-1990 | 10-Dec-1990 | | 16-Jan-1988 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 62.2 |
| 2476 | 15-Aug-1996 | 11-May-2012 | 11-May-2012 | 11-Mar-2018 | | | |
| 2477 | 23-May-1970 | 17-Apr-1982 | 22-May-1980 | 8-Jun-1980 | 17-Apr-1982 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2478 | 25-Jun-1977 | 17-Apr-1995 | 17-Apr-1995 | | 25-Apr-1994 DISABILITY | | 64.0 |
| 2479 | 25-Feb-1999 | 25-Feb-2014 | 12-Apr-2013 | 11-Dec-2013 | 12-Apr-2018 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2480 | 4-Sep-1976 | 23-Dec-1993 | 23-Dec-1993 | 23-Dec-1993 | 23-Dec-2003 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2481 | 8-Jan-2021 | 12-Mar-2037 | 12-Mar-2037 | | | | |
| 2482 | 2-May-2009 | 1-May-2024 | 1-May-2024 | | | | |
| 2483 | 9-Mar-2018 | 9-Mar-2033 | 27-Apr-2031 | | | | |
| 2484 | 17-Aug-2014 | 17-Aug-2029 | 17-Aug-2029 | | | | |
| 2485 | 2-Mar-2007 | 4-Mar-2025 | 4-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 2486 | 25-Feb-1987 | 30-Aug-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 11-Apr-2017 COMPULSORY | | 73.1 |
| 2487 | 26-Sep-2010 | 26-Sep-2025 | 3-Aug-2022 | | | | |
| 2488 | 10-Mar-2012 | 11-Mar-2027 | 11-Mar-2027 | | | | |
| 2489 | 8-Oct-1999 | 19-Jul-2017 | 19-Jul-2017 | 19-Jul-2017 | | | |
| 2490 | 9-Jan-2014 | 9-Jan-2029 | 14-May-2027 | | | | |
| 2491 | 23-Oct-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Mar-2001 | 10-Dec-2002 | 26-May-2004 ELECTIVE | | 68.2 |
| 2492 | 5-Feb-2004 | 5-Feb-2019 | 5-Feb-2019 | | | | |
| 2493 | 21-Mar-2009 | 20-Mar-2024 | 25-Feb-2020 | | 11-May-2019 Early Retirement | | 69.2 |
| 2494 | 19-Sep-1981 | 19-Sep-1996 | | | 8-Jan-1998 ELECTIVE | | 71.5 |
| 2495 | 12-Jan-2013 | 12-Jan-2028 | 5-Mar-2023 | | | | |
| 2496 | 1-Aug-2010 | 1-Aug-2025 | 1-Aug-2025 | | | | |
| 2497 | 12-Jan-1990 | 19-Jun-2005 | 23-Nov-2005 | | 9-Mar-2000 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 59.3 |
| 2498 | 19-Aug-2017 | 7-Jun-2034 | 7-Jun-2034 | | | | |
| 2499 | 23-Feb-2006 | 31-Mar-2022 | 31-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 2500 | 29-Dec-1979 | 20-Dec-1998 | 20-Dec-1998 | 20-Dec-1998 | 11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE | | 65.3 |
| 2501 | 9-Oct-1978 | 30-Nov-1996 | 30-Nov-1996 | 30-Nov-1996 | 11-Mar-2006 ELECTIVE | | 74.3 |
| 2502 | 12-Jun-2020 | 11-Jul-2036 | 11-Jul-2036 | | | | |
| 2503 | 9-Jun-1961 | 11-Apr-1977 | 11-Apr-1977 | 11-Apr-1979 | 8-Aug-1979 ELECTIVE | | 67.3 |
| 2504 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 7-Nov-2023 | | 16-Dec-2018 Early Retirement | | 62.3 |
| 2505 | 14-Aug-1992 | 9-Feb-2010 | 9-Feb-2010 | 11-Mar-2018 | | | |
| 2506 | 29-Sep-1984 | 29-Sep-1999 | 29-Sep-1999 | 29-Sep-1999 | 16-Jul-2007 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2507 | 12-Jan-1974 | 4-Mar-1987 | 12-Jan-1984 | | 31-Oct-1981 DISABILITY | | 69.7 |
| 2508 | 3-Jul-2019 | 2-Apr-2036 | 2-Apr-2036 | | | | |
| 2509 | 8-Feb-1964 | 8-Jul-1983 | 8-Jul-1983 | 8-Jul-1983 | 8-Jul-1993 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2510 | 5-May-1973 | 20-May-1993 | 20-May-1993 | 20-May-1993 | 9-Nov-1998 ELECTIVE | | 70.5 |
| 2511 | 18-Feb-2000 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | 18-Feb-2015 | | | |
| 2512 | 17-Mar-2000 | 24-Oct-2016 | 24-Oct-2016 | 24-Apr-2017 | 31-Oct-2020 ELECTIVE | | 67.4 |
| 2513 | 24-Sep-1986 | 8-Jan-2002 | 23-Apr-2002 | 23-Apr-2002 | 22-Apr-2012 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2514 | 13-Feb-2004 | 13-Feb-2019 | 7-Oct-2017 | 11-Apr-2019 | | | |
| 2515 | 30-Dec-1951 | 30-Dec-1966 | 30-Dec-1966 | | 27-Apr-1973 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 2516 | 12-Jan-1990 | 12-Jan-2005 | 12-Jan-2005 | | | 23-Feb-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 53.2 |
| 2517 | 18-Jul-2003 | 18-Jul-2018 | 18-Jul-2018 | 28-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 2518 | 22-Dec-1973 | 30-Apr-1994 | 30-Apr-1994 | 9-Nov-1994 | 9-Feb-1995 ELECTIVE | | 65.8 |
| 2519 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 3-Jul-2019 | 10-Jul-2019 | | | |
| 2520 | 7-Mar-1981 | 24-Dec-1997 | 24-Dec-1997 | 24-Dec-1997 | 24-Dec-2007 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2521 | 11-Jun-2011 | 2-Jul-2028 | 2-Jul-2028 | | | | |
| 2522 | 14-Jun-1995 | 4-Jun-2012 | 4-Jun-2012 | 4-Jun-2012 | 9-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE | | 64.5 |
| 2523 | 18-Mar-1980 | 19-Mar-1995 | 19-Mar-1995 | | 27-Jan-2001 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2524 | 15-Jun-2019 | 26-Jul-2032 | 15-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 2525 | 8-Feb-1964 | 8-Feb-1979 | 22-Mar-1976 | | 27-Aug-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 65.4 |
| 2526 | 17-Nov-1982 | 21-Nov-1999 | 24-Nov-2001 | 24-Nov-2001 | 24-Nov-2011 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2527 | 5-Sep-1993 | 7-Jul-2011 | 7-Jul-2011 | | | | |
| 2528 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 20-Jul-2014 | 20-Jul-2014 | 28-Mar-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 74.7 |
| 2529 | 8-Dec-1978 | 8-Dec-1993 | 8-Dec-1993 | 8-Dec-1993 | 9-Aug-2000 ELECTIVE | | 72.4 |
| 2530 | 8-Nov-1992 | 3-Jan-2009 | 3-Jan-2009 | 3-Jan-2009 | 9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | | 71.1 |
| 2531 | 19-May-1973 | 16-Dec-1992 | | | 9-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE | | 74.8 |
| 2532 | 23-May-1996 | 5-Aug-2015 | 5-Aug-2015 | | 10-Apr-2015 Early Retirement | | 60.5 |
| 2533 | 23-Sep-1942 | 28-Nov-1967 | 28-Nov-1967 | | 23-Jun-1956 DISABILITY | | 53.6 |
| 2534 | 23-Dec-2006 | 21-Sep-2022 | 21-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 2535 | 5-Jun-2005 | 4-Jun-2020 | 6-Sep-2016 | 8-Oct-2016 | | | |
| 2536 | 6-Jul-1991 | 6-Jul-2006 | 6-Jul-2006 | | 16-Nov-2002 DISABILITY | | 66.1 |
| 2537 | 7-Nov-2008 | 14-Nov-2022 | 7-Nov-2018 | 7-Nov-2018 | | | |
| 2538 | 9-Feb-1967 | 23-Jul-1987 | 23-Jul-1987 | 24-Jul-1987 | 23-Jul-1997 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2539 | 10-Feb-2013 | 15-Jul-2026 | 10-Feb-2023 | | | | |
| 2540 | 1-Jun-2018 | 16-Oct-2035 | 16-Oct-2035 | | | | |
| 2541 | 12-Jan-1986 | 28-Jul-2006 | 28-Jul-2006 | | | | |
| 2542 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Aug-2025 | 2-Aug-2025 | | | | |
| 2543 | 4-Dec-1975 | 10-Feb-1993 | 10-Feb-1993 | 10-Feb-1993 | 8-Feb-1995 ELECTIVE | | 67.0 |
| 2544 | 14-Aug-1992 | 7-Mar-2010 | 7-Mar-2010 | 11-Apr-2010 | 10-Apr-2020 COMPULSORY | | 72.5 |
| 2545 | 18-Jan-2003 | 18-Jan-2018 | 26-Apr-2015 | 26-Apr-2015 | 25-Apr-2020 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2546 | 29-Mar-1981 | 28-Mar-1996 | 21-Sep-1995 | 21-Sep-1995 | 21-Sep-2000 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2547 | 10-Apr-1976 | 11-Apr-1991 | 11-Apr-1991 | 9-Jun-1991 | 13-Dec-1997 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2548 | 26-Sep-1981 | 10-Oct-1998 | 10-Oct-1998 | 12-Oct-1998 | 18-Feb-2006 ELECTIVE | | 72.4 |
| 2549 | 26-May-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 2-Oct-2002 | | 9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE | | 62.4 |
| 2550 | 8-Oct-1971 | 8-Oct-1986 | 8-Oct-1986 | 12-Apr-1993 | 5-Dec-1994 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2551 | 23-Mar-1958 | 4-Oct-1971 | 22-Mar-1968 | | 1-Nov-1963 DISABILITY | | 67.1 |
| 2552 | 26-Dec-1976 | 26-Dec-1991 | 26-Dec-1991 | 26-Dec-1991 | 24-May-1997 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2553 | 1-Nov-1975 | 31-Dec-1993 | 31-Dec-1993 | 31-Dec-1993 | 8-Feb-1996 ELECTIVE | | 67.1 |
| 2554 | 16-Jun-1973 | 16-Jun-1988 | 16-Jun-1988 | 16-Jun-1988 | 9-Apr-1992 ELECTIVE | | 70.3 |
| 2555 | 24-Dec-1989 | 21-Jul-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 9-Aug-2009 | 16-Jul-2014 ELECTIVE | | 71.4 |
| 2556 | 28-May-1955 | 18-Feb-1963 | 28-May-1965 | | 24-Jun-1967 DISABILITY | | 74.3 |
| 2557 | 17-Feb-2018 | 24-Jul-2031 | 17-Feb-2028 | | | | |
| 2558 | 26-Mar-2003 | 26-Mar-2018 | 26-Mar-2018 | 10-Apr-2018 | | | |
| 2559 | 12-Feb-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 2-Oct-1999 | 8-Oct-1999 | 2-Oct-2009 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2560 | 17-Aug-2014 | 17-Aug-2029 | 17-Aug-2029 | | | | |
| 2561 | 2-Feb-1958 | 2-Feb-1973 | 2-Feb-1973 | | 22-Oct-1961 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 54.4 |
| 2562 | 11-Jun-2011 | 11-Jun-2026 | 8-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| 2563 | 9-Nov-1995 | 9-Nov-2010 | 9-Nov-2010 | 9-Nov-2010 | 8-Oct-2017 ELECTIVE | | 73.1 |
| 2564 | 25-Mar-2007 | 8-Feb-2022 | 25-Mar-2017 | 26-Mar-2017 | | | |
| 2565 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Oct-2004 | 19-Nov-2002 | 9-Jul-2004 | 19-Nov-2007 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2566 | 8-Jul-2015 | 8-Jul-2030 | 8-Jul-2030 | | | | |
| 2567 | 30-Jun-1965 | 30-Jun-1980 | 30-Jun-1980 | 29-Sep-1980 | 4-Apr-1990 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2568 | 19-Jun-1968 | 19-Jun-1983 | 8-Jul-1979 | 8-Oct-1979 | 8-Jul-1984 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2569 | 30-Dec-1967 | 30-Dec-1982 | 30-Dec-1982 | 10-Dec-1983 | 6-Jan-1991 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2570 | 10-Apr-1944 | 21-Oct-1966 | 21-Oct-1966 | | 8-Nov-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 65.0 |
| 2571 | 7-Oct-1987 | 6-Nov-2004 | 7-Dec-2006 | 10-Dec-2006 | 12-May-2011 ELECTIVE | | 69.4 |
| 2572 | 25-Mar-1972 | 26-Aug-1999 | 26-Aug-1999 | | 4-Dec-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 59.3 |
| 2573 | 13-Jul-1995 | 13-Jul-2010 | 13-Jul-2010 | 13-Jul-2010 | 8-Jan-2015 ELECTIVE | | 72.3 |
| 2574 | 4-Jun-1998 | 4-Jun-2013 | 4-Jun-2013 | | 9-Oct-2010 Early Retirement | | 63.2 |
| 2575 | 7-Nov-2008 | 7-Nov-2023 | 3-Feb-2022 | | 10-Dec-2020 Early Retirement | | 68.9 |
| 2576 | 8-Jul-1990 | 14-Jan-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 8-Feb-2017 ELECTIVE | | 73.6 |
| 2577 | 16-May-2015 | 11-Aug-2031 | 11-Aug-2031 | | | | |
| 2578 | 28-Sep-2000 | 23-Feb-2018 | 23-Feb-2018 | 23-Feb-2018 | | | |
| 2579 | 10-Jun-2007 | 23-Nov-2022 | 23-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| 2580 | 26-Jun-1963 | 26-Jun-1978 | 26-Jun-1978 | | 9-Feb-1976 DISABILITY | | 65.0 |
| 2581 | 22-Aug-2009 | 6-Jun-2028 | 6-Jun-2028 | | | | |
| 2582 | 15-Aug-2004 | 19-Dec-2021 | 19-Dec-2021 | | | | |
| 2583 | 23-Mar-1958 | 23-Mar-1973 | 18-Dec-1970 | 12-May-1973 | 8-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE | | 73.3 |
| 2584 | 28-Jan-2012 | 20-Jul-2028 | 20-Jul-2028 | | | | |
| 2585 | 10-Jul-1993 | 10-Jul-2008 | 10-Jul-2008 | | 10-Jan-2007 Early Retirement | | 65.1 |
| 2586 | 12-Aug-1999 | 11-Nov-2016 | 11-Nov-2016 | 11-Nov-2016 | | | |
| 2587 | 22-Aug-2009 | 22-Aug-2024 | 20-Jun-2023 | | | | |
| 2588 | 28-May-1977 | 27-May-1992 | 27-May-1992 | 27-May-1992 | 9-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2589 | 6-Jun-2002 | 6-Jun-2017 | 6-Jun-2017 | 6-Jun-2017 | | | |
| 2590 | 28-Apr-2018 | 28-Apr-2033 | 28-Apr-2033 | | | | |
| 2591 | 11-Jun-2011 | 11-Jun-2026 | 11-Jun-2026 | | | | |
| 2592 | 28-Aug-2009 | 28-Aug-2024 | 28-Aug-2024 | | | | |
| 2593 | 9-Nov-1959 | 9-Nov-1974 | 9-Nov-1974 | | 12-Jun-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 65.4 |
| 2594 | 22-Nov-1963 | 19-Jun-1974 | 22-Nov-1973 | | 19-Jun-1974 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2595 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 11-Apr-1998 ELECTIVE | | 72.5 |
| 2596 | 31-Mar-1979 | 7-Nov-1994 | 7-Nov-1994 | 7-Nov-1994 | 7-Nov-2004 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2597 | 27-Jul-1984 | 13-Nov-2009 | 13-Nov-2009 | | 24-Nov-1994 DISABILITY | | 50.0 |
| 2598 | 24-Jun-1967 | 18-Nov-1989 | 18-Nov-1989 | 18-Nov-1989 | 4-Jan-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 69.1 |
| 2599 | 12-Feb-2013 | 22-Jan-2031 | 22-Jan-2031 | | | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 2600 | 23-Dec-2006 | 11-May-2020 | 23-Dec-2016 | | 20-Dec-2015 | DISABILITY | 70.6 |
| 2601 | 10-Jun-1978 | 10-Jun-1993 | 10-Jun-1993 | | 12-May-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2602 | 29-Sep-1991 | 29-Sep-2006 | 29-Sep-2006 | 29-Sep-2006 | 9-Dec-2014 | ELECTIVE | 74.4 |
| 2603 | 5-Oct-2019 | 5-Oct-2034 | 5-Oct-2034 | | | | |
| 2604 | 29-Jun-1995 | 29-Jun-2010 | 29-Jun-2010 | 29-Jun-2010 | 9-Nov-2017 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2605 | 15-Oct-1983 | 15-Oct-1998 | 6-Dec-1997 | 6-Dec-1997 | 6-Dec-2002 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2606 | 30-Sep-1995 | 30-Sep-2010 | 3-Jun-2009 | 3-Jun-2009 | 3-Jun-2014 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2607 | 11-Dec-1988 | 11-Dec-2003 | 23-Nov-2002 | | 13-Jul-1992 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 59.6 |
| 2608 | 6-Sep-2003 | 14-Jan-2020 | 14-Jan-2020 | 14-Jan-2020 | | | |
| 2609 | 16-Jun-1973 | 15-Feb-1998 | 15-Feb-1998 | 15-Feb-1998 | 15-Feb-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2610 | 7-Oct-1984 | 28-Nov-2002 | 18-Jan-2006 | 18-Jan-2006 | 9-Oct-2013 | ELECTIVE | 72.7 |
| 2611 | 5-Sep-1981 | 25-Jun-1987 | 5-Sep-1991 | | 8-Mar-1986 | DISABILITY | 68.7 |
| 2612 | 27-Dec-1980 | 27-Dec-1995 | 27-Dec-1995 | | 26-Sep-1992 | DISABILITY | 64.1 |
| 2613 | 1-Nov-1975 | 12-Jul-1996 | 12-Jul-1996 | | 9-Dec-1996 | ELECTIVE | 65.4 |
| 2614 | 9-Feb-1995 | 1-Feb-2013 | 1-Feb-2013 | 1-Feb-2013 | | | |
| 2615 | 21-Oct-1972 | 10-Jun-1990 | 10-Jun-1990 | 10-Jun-1990 | 11-Aug-1994 | ELECTIVE | 69.2 |
| 2616 | 20-Jul-1974 | 20-Jul-1989 | 20-Jul-1989 | 21-Jul-1989 | 8-Sep-1994 | ELECTIVE | 74.3 |
| 2617 | 22-Jun-1990 | 29-Jul-2007 | 29-Jul-2007 | 29-Jul-2007 | 9-Oct-2009 | ELECTIVE | 65.1 |
| 2618 | 7-May-1994 | 11-Jul-2011 | 11-Jul-2011 | 13-Jul-2011 | 26-Nov-2017 | ELECTIVE | 69.2 |
| 2619 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 5-Feb-2022 | | | | |
| 2620 | 31-Jan-1988 | 19-Mar-2006 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 8-Feb-2016 | ELECTIVE | 71.8 |
| 2621 | 4-Aug-1966 | 4-Aug-1981 | 4-Aug-1981 | 4-Aug-1981 | 19-Feb-1991 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2622 | 26-Sep-2003 | 29-Dec-2018 | 29-Dec-2018 | | 7-May-2018 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.1 |
| 2623 | 24-Sep-2016 | 6-Jan-2029 | 24-Sep-2026 | | | | |
| 2624 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 10-Oct-2018 | 10-Oct-2018 | 8-Jun-2020 | DISABILITY | 71.7 |
| 2625 | 12-Jul-2020 | 12-Jul-2035 | 3-Jun-2034 | | | | |
| 2626 | 24-Jun-1967 | 25-Aug-1983 | 25-Aug-1983 | 25-Aug-1983 | 25-Aug-1993 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2627 | 27-Oct-1988 | 27-Oct-2003 | 27-Oct-2003 | 27-Oct-2003 | 9-Feb-2006 | ELECTIVE | 67.8 |
| 2628 | 13-Oct-1985 | 12-Mar-2002 | 12-Mar-2002 | | 8-May-1995 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 58.2 |
| 2629 | 27-Oct-1976 | 27-Oct-1991 | 27-Oct-1991 | 27-Oct-1991 | 1-Dec-1998 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2630 | 11-Oct-1975 | 11-Oct-1990 | 1-Mar-1988 | 1-Mar-1988 | 10-Dec-1992 | ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 2631 | 18-Jul-2019 | 22-Jul-2030 | 18-Jul-2029 | | | | |
| 2632 | 29-Sep-2018 | 29-Sep-2033 | 29-Sep-2033 | | | | |
| 2633 | 5-May-2002 | 20-Sep-2016 | 4-May-2012 | 4-May-2012 | 20-Sep-2016 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2634 | 11-Apr-1958 | 23-Jul-1965 | 10-Apr-1968 | | 6-Nov-1966 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.3 |
| 2635 | 13-Oct-1994 | 19-Oct-2011 | 19-Oct-2011 | 7-Jan-2012 | 9-Dec-2014 | ELECTIVE | 66.1 |
| 2636 | 26-Sep-2010 | 26-Sep-2025 | 26-Sep-2025 | | | | |
| 2637 | 27-Aug-2005 | 10-Oct-2021 | 10-Oct-2021 | | | | |
| 2638 | 26-Feb-1998 | 3-Jul-2010 | 26-Feb-2008 | 26-Feb-2008 | 3-Jul-2010 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2639 | 25-Mar-2007 | 24-Nov-2022 | 24-Nov-2022 | | | | |
| 2640 | 8-Oct-1999 | 27-Apr-2016 | 27-Apr-2016 | 15-Jul-2018 | | | |
| 2641 | 29-Sep-2018 | 29-Sep-2033 | 10-Jan-2031 | | | | |
| 2642 | 28-Apr-1950 | 3-Jul-1970 | 3-Jul-1970 | | 23-Aug-1973 | ELECTIVE | 68.1 |
| 2643 | 27-Dec-1933 | 16-Nov-1960 | 16-Nov-1960 | | 16-Nov-1970 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2644 | 9-Jun-2001 | 9-Jun-2016 | 9-Jun-2016 | 9-Jun-2016 | 25-Mar-2019 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 70.3 |
| 2645 | 4-Jan-1964 | 4-Jan-1979 | 20-Feb-1976 | 11-Feb-1977 | 20-Feb-1981 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2646 | 19-Oct-1991 | 21-Feb-2003 | | | 4-Apr-2006 | ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 2647 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 27-Sep-2024 | | | | |
| 2648 | 31-May-1969 | 31-Jan-1989 | 31-Jan-1989 | 1-Feb-1989 | 9-Apr-1995 | ELECTIVE | 71.2 |
| 2649 | 9-Aug-2001 | 15-Dec-2019 | 15-Dec-2019 | | | | |
| 2650 | 29-Mar-2018 | 29-Mar-2033 | 29-Mar-2033 | | | | |
| 2651 | 10-Sep-2019 | 10-Sep-2034 | 18-May-2033 | | | | |
| 2652 | 10-Feb-1961 | 4-Apr-1983 | 4-Apr-1983 | 8-Oct-1983 | 4-Apr-1993 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2653 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 25-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 2654 | 21-Mar-2010 | 25-Aug-2025 | 25-Aug-2025 | | | | |
| 2655 | 13-Mar-1986 | 3-Dec-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 25-May-2007 | 9-Sep-2012 | ELECTIVE | 67.0 |
| 2656 | 9-Jan-2014 | 9-Jan-2029 | 9-Jan-2029 | | | | |
| 2657 | 30-Mar-1974 | 20-Sep-1987 | 20-Sep-1987 | | 9-Dec-1989 | ELECTIVE | 72.2 |
| 2658 | 12-Jan-1986 | 12-Jan-2001 | 7-Sep-1996 | 7-Sep-1996 | 23-Sep-1997 | DISABILITY | 71.0 |
| 2659 | 19-Jul-2014 | 23-Feb-2031 | 23-Feb-2031 | | | | |
| 2660 | 12-Jun-1997 | 12-Jun-2012 | 12-Jun-2012 | | 8-Oct-2010 | Early Retirement | 68.1 |
| 2661 | 5-May-2002 | 15-Jun-2013 | 4-May-2012 | 10-Dec-2012 | 15-Jun-2013 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2662 | 27-Apr-1957 | 10-Dec-1965 | 27-Apr-1967 | | 10-Dec-1970 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2663 | 3-Apr-1991 | 10-Jul-2011 | 10-Jul-2011 | 13-May-2013 | | | |
| 2664 | 21-Mar-2015 | 25-Jul-2032 | 25-Jul-2032 | | | | |
| 2665 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 26-Sep-2023 | | 27-Dec-2014 | DISABILITY | 61.1 |
| 2666 | 26-Oct-1963 | 3-Jan-1988 | 3-Jan-1988 | 3-Jan-1988 | 8-Jan-1993 | ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 2667 | 19-Sep-1998 | 14-Oct-2015 | 14-Oct-2015 | 14-Oct-2015 | | | |
| 2668 | 27-Mar-2014 | 19-Feb-2031 | 19-Feb-2031 | | | | |
| 2669 | 4-May-2000 | 5-May-2015 | 5-May-2015 | | 2-Nov-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2670 | 14-May-2011 | 14-May-2026 | 3-Aug-2021 | | | | |
| 2671 | 20-Nov-1976 | 20-Nov-1991 | 20-Nov-1991 | 20-Nov-1991 | 7-Oct-1993 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.6 |
| 2672 | 29-Mar-1981 | 3-Feb-1997 | 3-Feb-1997 | 11-Apr-1997 | 9-Jan-2007 | ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 2673 | 15-Nov-1996 | 6-Mar-2017 | 6-Mar-2017 | 7-Mar-2017 | | | |
| 2674 | 10-Dec-1982 | 10-Dec-1997 | 10-Dec-1997 | 10-Dec-1997 | 27-Feb-2006 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2675 | 9-Nov-1995 | 9-Nov-2010 | 9-Nov-2010 | | 19-Nov-1995 | DEATH (RPC) | 54.1 |
| 2676 | 26-Nov-1959 | 26-Nov-1974 | 25-May-1974 | | 25-May-1979 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2677 | 29-Mar-1981 | 28-Mar-1996 | 26-Nov-1991 | 10-Dec-1991 | 24-Nov-1996 | ELECTIVE | 75.0 |
| 2678 | 30-Sep-1995 | 30-May-2012 | 30-May-2012 | | 11-Apr-2009 | Early Retirement | 60.2 |
| 2679 | 15-May-1963 | 23-Dec-1976 | 23-Dec-1976 | 23-Apr-1981 | 23-Dec-1981 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2680 | 9-Apr-1981 | 12-Nov-1999 | 16-Jun-2003 | | 10-Apr-2000 | ELECTIVE | 61.8 |
| 2681 | 26-Mar-1983 | 26-Mar-1998 | 26-Mar-1998 | 26-Mar-1998 | 17-Nov-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2682 | 14-Jun-2014 | 3-May-2032 | 3-May-2032 | | | | |
| 2683 | 29-Mar-1987 | 29-Mar-2002 | 10-May-1997 | 11-May-1997 | 10-May-2002 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 2684 | 31-Mar-1979 | 26-Feb-1999 | 23-Apr-1999 | 23-Apr-1999 | 23-Apr-2009 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2685 | 23-Mar-1956 | 10-Jan-1975 | 10-Jan-1975 | 10-Jan-1977 | 10-Jan-1985 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2686 | 8-Aug-2015 | 5-Apr-2031 | 5-Apr-2031 | | | |
| 2687 | 27-Sep-2015 | 7-Mar-2035 | 7-Mar-2035 | | | |
| 2688 | 13-May-1993 | 8-Dec-2009 | 8-Dec-2009 | | 13-Feb-2008 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.6 |
| 2689 | 14-Jan-1999 | 14-Jan-2014 | 31-Dec-2013 | 31-Dec-2013 | 10-Mar-2018 ELECTIVE | 74.2 |
| 2690 | 14-May-2011 | 20-Nov-2026 | 20-Nov-2026 | | | |
| 2691 | 21-Jul-1990 | 21-Jul-2005 | 26-Sep-2002 | 9-Sep-2006 | 26-Sep-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2692 | 21-Aug-2005 | 23-Nov-2015 | 21-Aug-2015 | | 24-Mar-2012 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.3 |
| 2693 | 1-Jan-1998 | 10-Jan-2013 | 10-Jan-2013 | 10-Jan-2013 | | |
| 2694 | 12-Feb-1983 | 12-Feb-1998 | 12-Feb-1998 | | 11-May-1998 ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 2695 | 21-Mar-2003 | 4-Aug-2020 | 4-Aug-2020 | 4-Aug-2020 | | |
| 2696 | 26-Jun-1997 | 12-Mar-2013 | 12-Mar-2013 | 12-Apr-2013 | | |
| 2697 | 21-Mar-2015 | 7-Feb-2026 | 21-Mar-2025 | | | |
| 2698 | 9-Jul-1977 | 16-Aug-1998 | 16-Aug-1998 | 16-Aug-1998 | 11-Apr-2007 ELECTIVE | 73.7 |
| 2699 | 30-Sep-2019 | 21-Jan-2036 | 21-Jan-2036 | | | |
| 2700 | 27-Sep-2015 | 27-Sep-2030 | 8-May-2027 | | | |
| 2701 | 30-Mar-1974 | 30-Mar-1989 | 24-Jan-1988 | | 22-Nov-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.8 |
| 2702 | 25-Jun-1998 | 18-Oct-2014 | 18-Oct-2014 | 10-Apr-2016 | | |
| 2703 | 8-Sep-2002 | 20-Dec-2020 | 20-Dec-2020 | | 11-Oct-2018 Early Retirement | 59.5 |
| 2704 | 10-Dec-1976 | 27-Jul-1992 | 27-Jul-1992 | 28-Jul-1992 | 27-Jul-2002 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2705 | 18-Sep-1993 | 1-Jun-2011 | 1-Jun-2011 | 19-Jan-2012 | | |
| 2706 | 26-Aug-2017 | 7-Aug-2036 | 7-Aug-2036 | | | |
| 2707 | 12-Jan-1986 | 12-Jan-2001 | 6-Jul-1998 | 8-Oct-1998 | 6-Jul-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2708 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 10-Jun-2022 | | | |
| 2709 | 14-Sep-2001 | 14-Sep-2016 | 18-Oct-2015 | 18-Oct-2015 | 18-Oct-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2710 | 20-Sep-1986 | 26-Aug-2002 | 1-Aug-2003 | 1-Aug-2003 | 11-May-2013 ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 2711 | 23-Mar-2013 | 22-Mar-2028 | 10-Jan-2025 | | | |
| 2712 | 5-Nov-1955 | 19-Jun-1982 | 19-Jun-1982 | 19-Jun-1982 | 8-Apr-1992 ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 2713 | 11-Apr-1974 | 13-Aug-1991 | 13-Aug-1991 | 13-Aug-1991 | 8-Jun-1992 ELECTIVE | 65.8 |
| 2714 | 1-Nov-1975 | 26-Feb-1999 | 22-Oct-2002 | 22-Oct-2002 | 22-Oct-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2715 | 30-Jun-1991 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 30-Jun-2006 | 26-Oct-2013 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 72.8 |
| 2716 | 15-Aug-1996 | 20-Apr-2014 | 20-Apr-2014 | | | |
| 2717 | 17-Aug-2000 | 17-Aug-2015 | 17-Aug-2015 | 9-Sep-2015 | 8-Sep-2016 ELECTIVE | 70.4 |
| 2718 | 29-Jun-1968 | 12-Dec-1978 | 12-Dec-1978 | | 8-Mar-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.2 |
| 2719 | 14-Sep-2013 | 14-Sep-2028 | 14-Sep-2028 | | | |
| 2720 | 2-Mar-2007 | 26-Oct-2022 | 26-Oct-2022 | | 10-Dec-2020 Early Retirement | 62.5 |
| 2721 | 28-Mar-1996 | 29-Mar-2011 | 29-Mar-2011 | 29-Mar-2011 | 11-Aug-2016 ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 2722 | 4-Jan-2004 | 4-Jan-2019 | 4-Jan-2019 | 8-Feb-2019 | | |
| 2723 | 14-Jul-2012 | 14-Jul-2027 | 6-Feb-2023 | | | |
| 2724 | 10-Mar-2012 | 5-Jan-2029 | 5-Jan-2029 | | | |
| 2725 | 4-May-1986 | 4-May-2001 | 28-Dec-2000 | | 27-Nov-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 64.9 |
| 2726 | 11-Jun-2011 | 2-Aug-2022 | 11-Jun-2021 | | | |
| 2727 | 28-Jul-1965 | 28-Jul-1980 | 12-Oct-1979 | | 20-Nov-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.1 |
| 2728 | 6-Feb-1986 | 6-Feb-2001 | 6-Feb-2001 | | 1-Feb-1992 DISABILITY | 60.6 |
| 2729 | 20-Jan-2008 | 11-Apr-2025 | 11-Apr-2025 | | | |
| 2730 | 5-Jan-2002 | 5-Jan-2017 | 23-Nov-2014 | 26-Nov-2014 | 23-Nov-2019 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2731 | 9-Mar-1996 | 10-Mar-2011 | 20-Feb-2007 | 20-Feb-2007 | 20-Feb-2012 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2732 | 6-Nov-2009 | 28-Dec-2026 | 28-Dec-2026 | | | |
| 2733 | 28-Jan-2012 | 8-Apr-2027 | 8-Apr-2027 | | | |
| 2734 | 25-Mar-2000 | 11-Jun-2015 | 11-Jun-2015 | | 17-Apr-2013 Early Retirement | 62.6 |
| 2735 | 30-Sep-1978 | 31-Dec-1996 | 31-Dec-1996 | 31-Dec-1996 | 9-Jan-2002 ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 2736 | 7-Jun-2003 | 7-Jun-2018 | 7-Jun-2018 | 9-Oct-2018 | | |
| 2737 | 17-Mar-1996 | 18-Mar-2011 | 18-Mar-2011 | 11-Apr-2011 | 5-Dec-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2738 | 13-May-1978 | 21-Jul-1993 | 21-Jul-1993 | 21-Jul-1993 | 21-Jul-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2739 | 18-May-2013 | 17-May-2028 | 17-May-2028 | | | |
| 2740 | 27-Jan-2017 | 17-Aug-2031 | 27-Jan-2027 | | | |
| 2741 | 26-Aug-1973 | 25-Nov-1994 | 25-Nov-1994 | 25-Nov-1994 | 20-Oct-1999 ELECTIVE | 69.9 |
| 2742 | 9-Mar-2018 | 19-Jul-2033 | 19-Jul-2033 | | | |
| 2743 | 14-May-1994 | 14-May-2009 | 14-May-2009 | | 11-Jul-2009 ELECTIVE | 69.5 |
| 2744 | 7-Mar-1996 | 29-Aug-2012 | 29-Aug-2012 | 9-Sep-2012 | | |
| 2745 | 10-Aug-2019 | 30-Oct-2033 | 10-Aug-2029 | | | |
| 2746 | 13-Jan-1973 | 26-Feb-1999 | 25-Jul-2000 | | 25-Jul-2010 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2747 | 9-Jan-2010 | 9-Jan-2025 | 9-Jan-2025 | | | |
| 2748 | 15-Mar-1996 | 11-Nov-2011 | 11-Nov-2011 | 9-Dec-2016 | | |
| 2749 | 21-Aug-1992 | 11-Jun-2012 | 2-Apr-2017 | | 23-Aug-2003 DISABILITY | 51.4 |
| 2750 | 28-Sep-1996 | 2-Jun-2016 | 2-Jun-2016 | 8-Oct-2017 | | |
| 2751 | 8-Dec-1994 | 7-Nov-2009 | 8-Dec-2004 | | 7-Nov-2009 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2752 | 12-May-1993 | 11-May-2008 | 11-May-2008 | 11-May-2008 | 16-Dec-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2753 | 10-Feb-2013 | 10-Feb-2028 | 10-Feb-2028 | | | |
| 2754 | 2-Dec-1949 | 20-Dec-1966 | 20-Dec-1966 | | 8-Nov-1976 ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 2755 | 19-Feb-2013 | 19-Feb-2028 | 30-Dec-2027 | | | |
| 2756 | 15-Jun-1989 | 29-Aug-2008 | 29-Aug-2008 | | | |
| 2757 | 15-Mar-1986 | 23-May-2003 | 30-Jul-2005 | 30-Jul-2005 | 30-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2758 | 21-May-2010 | 21-May-2025 | 22-Sep-2021 | | | |
| 2759 | 13-Nov-1982 | 27-May-1999 | 8-Dec-2000 | | 9-Jun-1999 ELECTIVE | 63.5 |
| 2760 | 24-Jul-1974 | 21-Jun-1993 | 21-Jun-1993 | 21-Jun-1993 | 12-Apr-2002 ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 2761 | 28-Aug-1976 | 7-Oct-1998 | 7-Oct-1998 | 7-Oct-1998 | 7-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2762 | 4-Nov-1983 | 15-May-2002 | 22-Nov-2005 | 22-Nov-2005 | 22-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2763 | 14-Jul-2012 | 14-Jul-2027 | 16-Mar-2025 | | | |
| 2764 | 11-Oct-1975 | 28-Jul-1995 | 28-Jul-1995 | 28-Jul-1995 | 12-May-1999 ELECTIVE | 68.8 |
| 2765 | 12-Jun-1997 | 9-Mar-2013 | 9-Mar-2013 | 9-Mar-2013 | 9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | 67.3 |
| 2766 | 26-Aug-1973 | 26-Aug-1988 | 26-Aug-1988 | | 2-Jan-1988 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 68.8 |
| 2767 | 13-Jul-2001 | 13-Jul-2016 | 13-Jul-2016 | 15-Jul-2016 | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 2768 | 9-Nov-1995 | 27-Jul-2011 | 27-Jul-2011 | 9-Aug-2011 | 9-Nov-2017 ELECTIVE | 70.6 |
| 2769 | 10-Jul-1999 | 21-Sep-2018 | 21-Sep-2018 | | | |
| 2770 | 28-Sep-1996 | 15-Dec-2012 | 15-Dec-2012 | 15-Dec-2012 | | |
| 2771 | 11-May-1932 | 21-Sep-1953 | 21-Sep-1953 | | 21-Sep-1963 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2772 | 27-Mar-2014 | 22-Apr-2030 | 22-Apr-2030 | | | |
| 2773 | 28-Mar-1996 | 29-Mar-2011 | 29-Mar-2011 | 29-Mar-2011 | 9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE | 73.5 |
| 2774 | 5-Oct-2019 | 5-Oct-2034 | 5-Oct-2034 | | | |
| 2775 | 14-Aug-1942 | 7-Jul-1957 | 14-Aug-1952 | | 9-Jun-1961 Appointed for Life | 78.9 |
| 2776 | 12-Jan-1986 | 22-Apr-2001 | 30-Jul-2001 | 30-Jul-2001 | 30-Jul-2011 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2777 | 15-Feb-1968 | 10-Dec-1982 | 10-Dec-1982 | 10-Dec-1982 | 10-Dec-1987 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2778 | 26-Aug-2017 | 26-Aug-2032 | 11-Jul-2030 | | | |
| 2779 | 9-Sep-1972 | 10-Nov-1987 | 9-Aug-1988 | | 10-Aug-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.7 |
| 2780 | 27-Sep-2009 | 27-Sep-2024 | 29-Oct-2023 | | | |
| 2781 | 22-Jan-1956 | 18-Feb-1966 | 22-Jan-1966 | | 18-Feb-1966 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2782 | 13-Mar-1986 | 13-Mar-2001 | 27-Apr-2000 | 10-Dec-2002 | 28-Apr-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2783 | 18-May-2013 | 13-Dec-2029 | 13-Dec-2029 | | | |
| 2784 | 8-May-1958 | 7-Feb-1968 | | | 11-Apr-1967 DISABILITY | 74.2 |
| 2785 | 9-Jun-1991 | 9-Jun-2006 | 10-Feb-2002 | 10-Feb-2002 | 10-Feb-2007 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2786 | 26-Mar-1983 | 29-Oct-2003 | 24-Mar-2007 | 24-Mar-2007 | 9-Aug-2009 ELECTIVE | 65.2 |
| 2787 | 29-Mar-2018 | 29-Mar-2033 | 13-Nov-2029 | | | |
| 2788 | 28-May-1977 | 2-Aug-1995 | 2-Aug-1995 | 10-Dec-1995 | 2-Aug-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2789 | 9-Sep-1957 | 8-Aug-1975 | 8-Aug-1975 | 11-May-1977 | 9-Mar-1984 ELECTIVE | 73.6 |
| 2790 | 28-Apr-1950 | 28-Apr-1965 | 27-May-1961 | | 10-Dec-1965 ELECTIVE | 74.5 |
| 2791 | 14-Aug-1992 | 30-Jan-2009 | 30-Jan-2009 | | 17-Jul-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2792 | 8-Mar-1992 | 4-Jun-2011 | 4-Jun-2011 | 4-Jun-2011 | 10-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE | 62.3 |
| 2793 | 5-May-2002 | 3-Nov-2011 | | | 3-Nov-2011 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2794 | 30-Mar-1963 | 22-Jan-1988 | 22-Jan-1988 | 11-Apr-1991 | 22-Jan-1998 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2795 | 24-Sep-2016 | 24-Sep-2031 | 24-Sep-2031 | | | |
| 2796 | 11-Dec-1988 | 7-Oct-2002 | | | 9-Oct-2004 ELECTIVE | 67.0 |
| 2797 | 10-Jun-2007 | 10-Jun-2022 | 26-Jan-2022 | | | |
| 2798 | 8-Nov-1990 | 26-Dec-2005 | 11-Feb-2006 | 11-Feb-2006 | 22-Mar-2010 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.1 |
| 2799 | 30-Mar-1975 | 30-Mar-1990 | 30-Mar-1990 | | 7-Oct-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 66.0 |
| 2800 | 1-Jan-1988 | 1-Nov-2000 | 1-Jan-1998 | 1-Jan-1998 | 1-Nov-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2801 | 19-Aug-2018 | 19-Aug-2033 | 19-Aug-2033 | | | |
| 2802 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-2002 | 10-Dec-2002 | 10-Dec-2002 | 9-Jan-2010 ELECTIVE | 73.8 |
| 2803 | 7-Oct-1984 | 14-Nov-2006 | 14-Nov-2006 | | 23-Feb-1995 DISABILITY | 53.3 |
| 2804 | 7-Aug-1982 | 2-Nov-2000 | 2-Nov-2000 | | 19-Aug-1993 DISABILITY | 57.8 |
| 2805 | 27-Oct-1973 | 17-Apr-1993 | 17-Apr-1993 | 17-Apr-1994 | 17-Apr-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2806 | 6-Dec-1963 | 6-Dec-1978 | 6-Dec-1978 | 6-Dec-1978 | 29-Apr-1986 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.4 |
| 2807 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 18-Jan-1998 | 18-Jan-1998 | 7-Jan-2000 ELECTIVE | 72.0 |
| 2808 | 4-Aug-2007 | 19-Mar-2024 | 19-Mar-2024 | | | |
| 2809 | 21-May-2010 | 23-Sep-2025 | 23-Sep-2025 | | 20-Dec-2020 Early Retirement | 59.9 |
| 2810 | 11-Dec-1988 | 2-Dec-2007 | 2-Dec-2007 | 9-Apr-2008 | 9-Aug-2012 ELECTIVE | 65.7 |
| 2811 | 31-May-1979 | 31-May-1994 | 31-May-1994 | 31-May-1994 | 11-Apr-1995 ELECTIVE | 67.4 |
| 2812 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Mar-2022 | 25-Feb-2022 | | | |
| 2813 | 26-Oct-1983 | 26-Oct-1998 | 26-Oct-1998 | 10-Dec-1998 | 9-Aug-2004 ELECTIVE | 71.7 |
| 2814 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2035 | 31-Oct-2030 | | | |
| 2815 | 16-Sep-1945 | 17-Apr-1969 | 17-Apr-1969 | 9-Nov-1976 | 8-Apr-1977 ELECTIVE | 73.0 |
| 2816 | 2-Jan-1958 | 27-Aug-1962 | | | 10-Dec-1965 DISABILITY | 73.3 |
| 2817 | 11-Jun-2011 | 14-Oct-2024 | 11-Jun-2021 | | | |
| 2818 | 5-Dec-1997 | 10-May-2014 | 10-May-2014 | 10-Apr-2016 | | |
| 2819 | 9-Jun-1979 | 28-Aug-1995 | 28-Aug-1995 | 28-Aug-1995 | 9-Sep-2001 ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 2820 | 11-Apr-1974 | 31-Aug-1997 | 31-Aug-1997 | | 17-Jul-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.9 |
| 2821 | 3-Nov-1995 | 3-Nov-2010 | 9-Sep-2006 | 9-Sep-2006 | 9-Sep-2011 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2822 | 2-Jul-2017 | 2-Jul-2032 | 21-Sep-2031 | | | |
| 2823 | 18-May-2013 | 8-Apr-2025 | 18-May-2023 | | | |
| 2824 | 19-Jul-2014 | 19-Jul-2029 | 19-Jul-2029 | | | |
| 2825 | 17-Jul-1976 | 17-Jul-1991 | 17-Jul-1991 | 17-Jul-1991 | 15-Feb-1996 ELECTIVE | 73.2 |
| 2826 | 25-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2022 | 3-Jun-2019 | | 9-Jan-2018 Early Retirement | 68.6 |
| 2827 | 6-Jun-2015 | 16-Jul-2032 | 16-Jul-2032 | | | |
| 2828 | 20-Jun-1962 | 1-Jan-1978 | 1-Jan-1978 | | 12-Oct-1975 DISABILITY | 62.8 |
| 2829 | 21-May-1998 | 30-Sep-2014 | 30-Sep-2014 | 9-Oct-2014 | 12-Jul-2020 ELECTIVE | 69.4 |
| 2830 | 4-Feb-1988 | 29-Jun-2004 | 22-Nov-2005 | | 22-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2831 | 25-Feb-1999 | 20-Feb-2015 | 20-Feb-2015 | 20-Feb-2015 | | |
| 2832 | 11-Dec-2020 | 18-Aug-2032 | 11-Dec-2030 | | | |
| 2833 | 9-Dec-1979 | 12-Oct-1996 | 12-Oct-1996 | 12-Oct-1996 | 9-Aug-1997 ELECTIVE | 65.8 |
| 2834 | 3-Sep-1987 | 10-Dec-2007 | 10-Dec-2007 | 10-Apr-2008 | 9-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE | 65.7 |
| 2835 | 10-Jun-2007 | 20-Oct-2023 | 20-Oct-2023 | | | |
| 2836 | 12-Dec-1982 | 12-Dec-1997 | 12-Dec-1997 | 12-Jan-1998 | 30-Jun-2006 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2837 | 12-Jun-2020 | 1-Jul-2037 | 1-Jul-2037 | | | |
| 2838 | 28-Aug-2020 | 28-Aug-2035 | 29-Oct-2033 | | | |
| 2839 | 11-Jun-2008 | 14-Aug-2023 | 14-Aug-2023 | | | |
| 2840 | 10-Apr-1987 | 10-Apr-2002 | 10-Apr-2002 | 11-Apr-2002 | 7-Nov-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2841 | 6-Feb-1971 | 21-Jul-1987 | 21-Jul-1987 | | 8-Sep-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.1 |
| 2842 | 8-Sep-2012 | 8-Sep-2027 | 8-Sep-2027 | | | |
| 2843 | 11-Aug-2017 | 11-Aug-2032 | 11-Aug-2032 | | | |
| 2844 | 6-Nov-2009 | 6-Nov-2024 | 11-Dec-2023 | | | |
| 2845 | 12-Jan-2013 | 12-Jan-2028 | 12-Jan-2028 | | | |
| 2846 | 9-May-2020 | 31-Jul-2037 | 31-Jul-2037 | | | |
| 2847 | 20-Jun-2020 | 20-Jun-2035 | 20-Jun-2035 | | | |
| 2848 | 21-Sep-2014 | 21-Sep-2029 | 15-Aug-2026 | | | |
| 2849 | 21-Mar-1959 | 2-Oct-1969 | 2-Oct-1969 | | 3-Oct-1962 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 63.0 |
| 2850 | 9-Jun-1991 | 18-Sep-2009 | 18-Sep-2009 | 18-Sep-2009 | 8-Sep-2015 ELECTIVE | 67.7 |
| 2851 | 25-Mar-1972 | 15-Jul-1995 | 15-Jul-1995 | 15-Jul-1995 | 15-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|------|
| 2852 | 28-Sep-1996 | 10-Sep-2013 | 10-Sep-2013 | 10-Sep-2013 | 9-Sep-2019 ELECTIVE | 69.0 |
| 2853 | 29-Mar-1987 | 29-Mar-2002 | 29-Mar-2002 | 29-Mar-2002 | 23-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2854 | 6-Jan-2019 | 6-Jan-2034 | 7-Apr-2030 | | | |
| 2855 | 31-Aug-1972 | 31-Aug-1987 | 29-Mar-1987 | 20-Apr-1987 | 28-Mar-1992 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2856 | 17-Oct-1991 | 17-Oct-2006 | 17-Oct-2006 | | 13-Dec-2004 Early Retirement | 63.2 |
| 2857 | 22-Sep-2017 | 22-Sep-2032 | 5-Aug-2031 | | | |
| 2858 | 23-Dec-2006 | 23-Dec-2021 | 16-Oct-2018 | 9-Dec-2018 | | |
| 2859 | 6-Sep-2003 | 10-May-2020 | 10-May-2020 | | 10-May-2020 ELECTIVE | 63.3 |
| 2860 | 24-Mar-2002 | 9-Oct-2020 | 9-Oct-2020 | | | |
| 2861 | 8-Sep-2002 | 23-Apr-2018 | 23-Apr-2018 | | 26-Apr-2015 Early Retirement | 61.4 |
| 2862 | 16-Jun-1965 | 4-May-1983 | 4-May-1983 | | 12-Aug-1978 DISABILITY | 60.3 |
| 2863 | 12-Aug-1964 | 22-Mar-1982 | 22-Mar-1982 | | 24-Mar-1982 ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 2864 | 18-Apr-1999 | 16-Jan-2017 | 16-Jan-2017 | 11-Apr-2017 | | |
| 2865 | 18-May-2013 | 16-Jan-2030 | 16-Jan-2030 | | | |
| 2866 | 8-Oct-1989 | 8-Aug-2008 | 8-Aug-2008 | 8-Aug-2008 | 9-Feb-2010 ELECTIVE | 62.7 |
| 2867 | 12-May-1993 | 18-Jul-2011 | 22-Sep-2014 | | 15-Mar-2002 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 52.5 |
| 2868 | 7-Jan-1989 | 7-Jan-2004 | 11-Jun-2000 | | 9-Feb-2005 ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 2869 | 11-Mar-2015 | 11-Mar-2025 | | | | |
| 2870 | 30-Jan-2005 | 30-Jan-2020 | 30-Jan-2020 | 30-Jan-2020 | | |
| 2871 | 7-Jan-2012 | 24-Nov-2025 | 7-Jan-2022 | | | |
| 2872 | 5-Feb-2004 | 15-Dec-2019 | 15-Dec-2019 | | 8-Jan-2020 ELECTIVE | 64.2 |
| 2873 | 12-Apr-1977 | 11-Feb-1995 | 11-Feb-1995 | | 10-Apr-1995 ELECTIVE | 65.2 |
| 2874 | 21-May-1999 | 16-Aug-2016 | 16-Aug-2016 | 16-Aug-2016 | | |
| 2875 | 28-Sep-2015 | 9-Mar-2032 | 9-Mar-2032 | | | |
| 2876 | 7-Mar-1993 | 6-Mar-2008 | 6-Mar-2008 | 9-Oct-2008 | 4-Jul-2017 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2877 | 25-Jul-1986 | 27-Mar-2003 | 27-Nov-2004 | 27-Nov-2004 | 8-Dec-2010 ELECTIVE | 71.0 |
| 2878 | 27-Dec-1980 | 8-Mar-2002 | 16-May-2008 | | 17-Jul-2002 ELECTIVE | 59.2 |
| 2879 | 29-Dec-1977 | 3-Mar-1997 | 3-Mar-1997 | | 10-Apr-2005 ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 2880 | 10-Mar-2012 | 21-Sep-2026 | 11-Mar-2022 | | | |
| 2881 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 14-May-2029 | | | |
| 2882 | 31-Mar-1984 | 1-Apr-1999 | 8-Sep-1996 | 8-Sep-1996 | 14-Jul-2001 ELECTIVE | 74.8 |
| 2883 | 5-Sep-1993 | 5-Sep-2008 | 5-Sep-2008 | 5-Sep-2008 | 8-Feb-2013 ELECTIVE | 73.4 |
| 2884 | 27-Oct-1988 | 27-Oct-2003 | 10-Aug-2003 | 10-Aug-2003 | 11-Sep-2007 ELECTIVE | 74.1 |
| 2885 | 23-Jun-1968 | 27-May-1991 | 27-May-1991 | | 21-Sep-1988 DISABILITY | 62.3 |
| 2886 | 7-Feb-2002 | 5-Oct-2017 | 5-Oct-2017 | 5-Oct-2017 | | |
| 2887 | 9-Feb-1959 | 29-Mar-1968 | | | 29-Mar-1968 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2888 | 6-Jul-1985 | 3-Jan-1995 | | | 24-May-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.4 |
| 2889 | 1-Jun-2018 | 1-Jun-2033 | | | | |
| 2890 | 12-May-1953 | 1-Nov-1973 | 1-Nov-1973 | | 9-Sep-1961 DISABILITY | 52.9 |
| 2891 | 26-Apr-1975 | 26-Apr-1990 | 15-Jun-1985 | | 15-Jun-1990 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2892 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Jul-2011 | 2-Jul-2011 | 10-Dec-2011 | 10-Apr-2018 ELECTIVE | 67.5 |
| 2893 | 14-Jan-1999 | 14-Jan-2014 | 22-Feb-2011 | 23-Feb-2011 | 22-Feb-2016 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2894 | 26-Aug-2017 | 17-Feb-2036 | 17-Feb-2036 | | | |
| 2895 | 5-Aug-1972 | 5-Aug-1987 | 5-Aug-1987 | | 9-Aug-1988 DISABILITY | 69.2 |
| 2896 | 10-Jun-2007 | 8-Feb-2024 | 8-Feb-2024 | | | |
| 2897 | 16-Aug-1975 | 28-Nov-1990 | 28-Nov-1990 | | 8-Oct-1992 ELECTIVE | 66.9 |
| 2898 | 6-Oct-1985 | 16-Feb-2002 | 28-Jun-2003 | | 9-Jun-2013 ELECTIVE | 74.9 |
| 2899 | 27-Jul-2002 | 30-May-2019 | 30-May-2019 | 30-May-2019 | | |
| 2900 | 12-Jan-2013 | 12-Jan-2028 | 28-May-2025 | | | |
| 2901 | 6-Feb-2011 | 6-Feb-2026 | 6-Feb-2026 | | | |
| 2902 | 7-Jun-2000 | 30-Mar-2016 | 30-Mar-2016 | 10-Apr-2016 | | |
| 2903 | 19-Aug-2017 | 7-Jun-2034 | 7-Jun-2034 | | | |
| 2904 | 1-Oct-1998 | 1-Oct-2013 | 1-Oct-2013 | 1-Oct-2013 | | |
| 2905 | 7-May-1983 | 7-Mar-2000 | 7-Mar-2000 | | 5-Jun-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 61.2 |
| 2906 | 9-Jun-1991 | 2-Sep-2010 | 2-Sep-2010 | | 9-Sep-2009 Early Retirement | 59.8 |
| 2907 | 8-Oct-1999 | 7-Dec-2017 | 7-Dec-2017 | 7-Dec-2017 | | |
| 2908 | 6-Feb-1986 | 6-Feb-2001 | 6-Feb-2001 | | 17-Mar-1990 DISABILITY | 57.8 |
| 2909 | 19-Jan-1992 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | 19-Jan-2007 | 9-Feb-2012 ELECTIVE | 74.7 |
| 2910 | 20-Dec-1947 | 20-Dec-1962 | 20-Dec-1962 | | 9-Aug-1970 ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 2911 | 15-Feb-1987 | 28-Jul-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2009 | 14-Feb-2015 ELECTIVE | 71.1 |
| 2912 | 11-Oct-1980 | 7-Feb-1998 | 7-Feb-1998 | 8-Feb-1998 | 7-Feb-2008 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2913 | 27-Oct-1988 | 27-Oct-2003 | 27-Oct-2003 | 27-Oct-2003 | 28-Jun-2007 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.4 |
| 2914 | 16-Oct-2013 | 27-Mar-2032 | 27-Mar-2032 | | | |
| 2915 | 27-Sep-2015 | 10-Feb-2031 | 10-Feb-2031 | | | |
| 2916 | 8-Mar-1969 | 7-Mar-1984 | 7-Mar-1984 | 7-Mar-1984 | 8-Jun-1990 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2917 | 8-Jul-1999 | 25-Jul-2016 | 25-Jul-2016 | 25-Jul-2016 | | |
| 2918 | 4-May-1974 | 4-May-1989 | 4-May-1989 | | 5-Jan-1979 DISABILITY | 57.1 |
| 2919 | 31-Jan-1981 | 31-Jan-1996 | 22-Feb-1995 | 22-Feb-1995 | 22-Feb-2000 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2920 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | 28-Sep-2015 | | |
| 2921 | 18-Dec-2009 | 3-Sep-2023 | 18-Dec-2019 | 18-Dec-2019 | | |
| 2922 | 10-Mar-2012 | 22-Oct-2027 | 22-Oct-2027 | | | |
| 2923 | 27-Apr-1974 | 26-Feb-1994 | 26-Feb-1994 | | 27-Feb-1994 ELECTIVE | 65.0 |
| 2924 | 29-Jan-2000 | 29-Jan-2015 | 29-Jan-2015 | 29-Jan-2015 | 15-Mar-2020 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2925 | 26-Sep-2010 | 26-Sep-2025 | 26-Sep-2025 | | | |
| 2926 | 12-Jan-2013 | 8-Apr-2030 | 8-Apr-2030 | | | |
| 2927 | 24-Sep-1993 | 24-Sep-2008 | 4-Nov-2004 | 4-Nov-2004 | 4-Nov-2009 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2928 | 10-Jul-1999 | 8-Jan-2017 | 8-Jan-2017 | | 8-Jan-2017 ELECTIVE | 62.5 |
| 2929 | 8-Sep-2002 | 23-Jul-2019 | 23-Jul-2019 | | | |
| 2930 | 8-Jul-1966 | 8-Jul-1981 | 8-Jul-1981 | 8-Jul-1981 | 10-Aug-1989 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2931 | 3-Jul-1987 | 22-Jan-2004 | 12-Aug-2005 | 10-Dec-2005 | 12-Aug-2015 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2932 | 24-Jul-1997 | 24-Jul-2012 | 5-May-2011 | | 9-Feb-2008 Early Retirement | 66.8 |
| 2933 | 22-Oct-2017 | 22-Oct-2032 | 22-Oct-2032 | | | |
| 2934 | 29-Sep-2018 | 1-Jan-2033 | 29-Sep-2028 | | | |
| 2935 | 18-Jul-2019 | 18-Jul-2034 | 18-Jul-2034 | | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|------|
| 2936 | 24-May-1985 | 16-Oct-1999 | 16-Oct-1999 | | | 22-Jun-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 67.7 |
| 2937 | 16-Aug-2008 | 16-Aug-2023 | 31-Mar-2021 | | | 10-Dec-2019 Early Retirement | 68.7 |
| 2938 | 28-Jan-2018 | 12-Oct-2034 | 12-Oct-2034 | | | | |
| 2939 | 9-May-2020 | 11-Sep-2035 | 11-Sep-2035 | | | | |
| 2940 | 22-Mar-2003 | 22-Mar-2018 | 22-Mar-2018 | 22-Mar-2018 | | | |
| 2941 | 16-Nov-1977 | 24-Nov-1998 | 24-Nov-1998 | 24-Nov-1998 | 24-Nov-2008 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2942 | 29-Jun-2001 | 22-Feb-2018 | 22-Feb-2018 | | | | |
| 2943 | 31-Jan-1981 | 31-Jan-1996 | 18-Dec-1995 | | | 8-Feb-1996 ELECTIVE | 70.1 |
| 2944 | 2-Mar-2006 | 27-Dec-2017 | 1-Mar-2016 | | | 27-Dec-2017 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2945 | 2-Jan-2005 | 7-Apr-2021 | | | | | |
| 2946 | 9-Dec-1949 | 1-Nov-1961 | 1-Nov-1961 | | | 9-Dec-1964 ELECTIVE | 73.1 |
| 2947 | 5-Dec-1997 | 20-Jan-2016 | 20-Jan-2016 | 10-Dec-2016 | | | |
| 2948 | 10-Jul-1974 | 1-Jul-1992 | 1-Jul-1992 | 1-Jul-1992 | 9-Jan-1997 ELECTIVE | | 69.5 |
| 2949 | 9-Sep-2020 | 22-Jan-2036 | 22-Jan-2036 | | | | |
| 2950 | 10-May-1975 | 10-May-1990 | 24-Dec-1988 | 28-Dec-1988 | 8-Sep-1993 ELECTIVE | | 74.7 |
| 2951 | 11-Aug-1988 | 11-Aug-2003 | 23-Aug-1999 | 23-Aug-1999 | 23-Aug-2004 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2952 | 9-Sep-1986 | 9-Sep-2001 | 9-Sep-2001 | 9-Sep-2001 | 7-Aug-2010 ELECTIVE | | 74.7 |
| 2953 | 26-Jan-1974 | 24-Nov-1991 | 24-Nov-1991 | 24-Nov-1991 | 24-Nov-2001 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2954 | 6-Feb-1982 | 1-May-2001 | 23-Jul-2005 | 23-Jul-2005 | 23-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2955 | 12-May-1957 | 11-May-1972 | 11-May-1972 | 8-Oct-1977 | 4-Jan-1979 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2956 | 25-Feb-1987 | 25-Feb-2002 | 2-Jan-2002 | 2-Jan-2002 | 12-May-2002 ELECTIVE | | 70.4 |
| 2957 | 8-Dec-1978 | 26-Aug-1996 | 26-Aug-1996 | | | 28-Dec-1995 OTHER | 64.3 |
| 2958 | 30-May-2008 | 17-Apr-2024 | 17-Apr-2024 | | | | |
| 2959 | 30-Mar-1975 | 30-Mar-1990 | 30-Mar-1990 | 30-Mar-1990 | 27-Jun-1995 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2960 | 9-Oct-1954 | 9-Oct-1969 | | | | 2-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE | 74.6 |
| 2961 | 15-Nov-1996 | 2-May-2017 | 2-May-2017 | 10-Dec-2017 | | | |
| 2962 | 13-Aug-1993 | 13-Aug-2008 | 31-May-2008 | 31-May-2008 | 1-Jun-2013 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2963 | 2-Apr-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 23-Oct-2000 | 11-Apr-2002 | 29-Jan-2005 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | | 69.3 |
| 2964 | 30-Sep-2019 | 30-Sep-2034 | 30-Sep-2034 | | | | |
| 2965 | 8-Feb-1964 | 15-Feb-1980 | 15-Feb-1980 | 15-Feb-1980 | 15-Feb-1990 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2966 | 25-Jan-1975 | 9-Nov-1993 | | | | 9-Nov-2003 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2967 | 15-Jun-2019 | 9-Jun-2033 | 15-Jun-2029 | | | | |
| 2968 | 8-Sep-2012 | 23-Oct-2030 | 23-Oct-2030 | | | | |
| 2969 | 13-Sep-2007 | 13-Sep-2022 | 13-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 2970 | 10-Apr-1968 | 26-Jul-1977 | 11-Apr-1978 | 8-Sep-1980 | 25-Jan-1981 DEATH (RPC) | | 73.5 |
| 2971 | 11-Mar-1972 | 12-Mar-1987 | 12-Mar-1987 | 10-Dec-1991 | 21-May-1995 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2972 | 27-Jan-1962 | 25-Dec-1972 | 25-Dec-1972 | | | 25-Dec-1977 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2973 | 14-Mar-2007 | 25-Sep-2024 | 25-Sep-2024 | | | | |
| 2974 | 1-Apr-1992 | 2-Dec-2008 | 2-Dec-2008 | 2-Dec-2008 | 10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE | | 67.7 |
| 2975 | 7-Oct-1984 | 14-Dec-1998 | 7-Oct-1994 | 7-Oct-1994 | 14-Dec-1998 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2976 | 15-Jul-1910 | 30-Jan-1937 | 30-Jan-1937 | | | 7-Aug-1957 Appointed for Life | 85.5 |
| 2977 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 19-Dec-2027 | | | | |
| 2978 | 9-Apr-1975 | 9-Apr-1990 | 14-Jan-1988 | 14-Jan-1988 | 14-Jan-1993 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2979 | 8-Nov-1970 | 11-Dec-1994 | 11-Dec-1994 | 11-Dec-1994 | 23-Nov-1998 ELECTIVE | | 69.0 |
| 2980 | 4-Mar-1999 | 4-Mar-2014 | 4-Mar-2014 | 4-Mar-2014 | | | |
| 2981 | 30-Sep-1978 | 30-Sep-1993 | 30-Sep-1993 | | | 1-Aug-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 56.6 |
| 2982 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 27-Jan-2032 | | | | |
| 2983 | 21-Oct-1987 | 21-Oct-2002 | 26-Dec-2001 | 26-Dec-2001 | 26-Dec-2006 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2984 | 11-Apr-2014 | 11-Aug-2026 | 10-Apr-2024 | | | | |
| 2985 | 30-Sep-2020 | 14-Feb-2036 | 14-Feb-2036 | | | | |
| 2986 | 12-Jun-2020 | 12-Jun-2035 | 12-Jun-2035 | | | | |
| 2987 | 14-Aug-1992 | 23-Oct-2009 | 23-Oct-2009 | 8-Nov-2009 | 9-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE | | 64.9 |
| 2988 | 2-Oct-1992 | 5-Aug-2007 | 2-Oct-2002 | 2-Oct-2002 | 5-Aug-2007 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2989 | 29-Jul-1978 | 5-Aug-1993 | 5-Aug-1993 | | | 14-Jul-1990 DISABILITY | 61.9 |
| 2990 | 12-Jan-1990 | 29-Oct-2007 | 29-Oct-2007 | 14-Aug-2010 | 14-Aug-2020 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2991 | 18-Apr-1959 | 18-Apr-1974 | 15-Mar-1970 | | | 15-Mar-1975 COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 2992 | 10-Aug-1974 | 10-Aug-1989 | 7-Oct-1987 | 9-Oct-1987 | 10-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE | | 73.5 |
| 2993 | 22-Oct-1978 | 8-Oct-1995 | 8-Oct-1995 | 8-Oct-1995 | 8-Oct-2005 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2994 | 11-Jan-1996 | 15-Sep-2012 | 15-Sep-2012 | 15-Sep-2012 | 12-Jul-2017 ELECTIVE | | 68.1 |
| 2995 | 29-Sep-2017 | 29-Sep-2032 | 29-Sep-2032 | | | | |
| 2996 | 29-Mar-1970 | 14-Sep-1991 | 14-Sep-1991 | 15-Sep-1991 | 11-Apr-2001 ELECTIVE | | 74.6 |
| 2997 | 3-Nov-1995 | 3-Nov-2010 | 9-Jun-2009 | 9-Jun-2009 | 11-May-2012 ELECTIVE | | 72.9 |
| 2998 | 26-Feb-1998 | 8-Nov-2010 | 26-Feb-2008 | 21-Mar-2008 | 8-Nov-2010 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 2999 | 30-May-1996 | 21-Jan-2012 | 21-Jan-2012 | 21-Jan-2012 | 10-Apr-2018 ELECTIVE | | 70.6 |
| 3000 | 5-Feb-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 4-Jul-2003 | 8-Oct-2003 | 4-Jul-2013 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3001 | 16-Sep-1999 | 25-Sep-2016 | | | | | |
| 3002 | 9-Oct-1977 | 22-Jan-1993 | 22-Jan-1993 | 22-Jan-1993 | 22-Jan-2003 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3003 | 1-Apr-1972 | 2-Apr-1987 | 2-Apr-1987 | 10-Apr-1987 | 26-Jan-1996 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3004 | 24-Feb-1979 | 24-Feb-1994 | 25-Sep-1993 | 25-Sep-1993 | 9-Jul-1995 ELECTIVE | | 71.8 |
| 3005 | 21-Sep-2014 | 21-Sep-2029 | 18-Aug-2028 | | | | |
| 3006 | 5-Jan-2010 | 5-Jan-2025 | 14-Dec-2023 | | | | |
| 3007 | 6-Jun-2015 | 6-Jun-2030 | 6-Jun-2030 | | | | |
| 3008 | 14-Nov-2010 | 14-Nov-2025 | 14-Nov-2025 | | | | |
| 3009 | 19-May-1982 | 26-Feb-1999 | 1-Oct-1999 | 4-Jul-2003 | 1-Oct-2009 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3010 | 17-Aug-1995 | 23-Dec-2010 | 23-Dec-2010 | | | 11-Mar-2009 Early Retirement | 62.9 |
| 3011 | 10-Feb-2013 | 3-Aug-2031 | 3-Aug-2031 | | | | |
| 3012 | 25-May-1950 | 22-Jan-1968 | 22-Jan-1968 | 25-Mar-1973 | 22-Jan-1978 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3013 | 3-Sep-1998 | 17-Feb-2013 | 3-Sep-2008 | 9-Jun-2009 | 17-Feb-2013 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3014 | 19-May-1973 | 18-May-1988 | 18-May-1988 | 18-May-1988 | 8-Apr-1996 ELECTIVE | | 74.5 |
| 3015 | 12-May-1965 | 16-May-1982 | 16-May-1982 | 16-May-1982 | 15-May-1992 COMPULSORY | | 75.0 |
| 3016 | 10-Jan-1946 | 24-Jan-1953 | 10-Jan-1956 | | | 12-May-1958 Appointed for Life | 75.3 |
| 3017 | 9-Apr-1981 | 11-Aug-1996 | 11-Aug-1996 | | | 8-Mar-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 62.6 |
| 3018 | 11-Dec-2020 | 11-Dec-2035 | 11-Dec-2035 | | | | |
| 3019 | 8-Jul-2007 | 8-Jul-2022 | 8-Jul-2022 | | | | |

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|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 3020 | 28-Sep-2000 | 28-Sep-2015 | 6-Apr-2015 | 9-Sep-2015 | 5-Apr-2020 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3021 | 12-Jun-1947 | 12-Jun-1962 | 31-Oct-1960 | | 17-Mar-1965 | ELECTIVE | 74.4 |
| 3022 | 4-Mar-1978 | 27-Aug-1997 | 27-Aug-1997 | 10-Dec-1997 | 27-Aug-2007 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3023 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 28-Aug-1991 | 9-Mar-1998 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3024 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 2-Aug-2029 | | | | |
| 3025 | 9-Jul-1977 | 26-Feb-1999 | 23-Nov-2002 | 23-Jan-2003 | 23-Nov-2012 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3026 | 17-Jul-1976 | 17-Jul-1991 | 17-Jul-1991 | 17-Jul-1991 | 12-Dec-1996 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3027 | 21-Jun-2001 | 13-Jul-2014 | 21-Jun-2011 | 21-Jun-2011 | 29-Jul-2011 | DISABILITY | 72.0 |
| 3028 | 29-Jan-1960 | 3-Apr-1972 | 29-Jan-1970 | | 3-Apr-1972 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3029 | 9-May-1998 | 14-Apr-2015 | 14-Apr-2015 | 5-Aug-2018 | | | |
| 3030 | 12-Jan-2013 | 10-Oct-2030 | 10-Oct-2030 | | | | |
| 3031 | 10-Feb-1968 | 1-Apr-1986 | 1-Apr-1986 | | 12-Jul-1982 | DISABILITY | 61.3 |
| 3032 | 30-Nov-1985 | 24-Feb-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 9-Oct-2008 | 9-Dec-2013 | ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 3033 | 1-Apr-1978 | 18-Sep-1993 | 18-Sep-1993 | 18-Sep-1993 | 24-Dec-1994 | ELECTIVE | 66.3 |
| 3034 | 2-Mar-1967 | 2-Feb-1986 | 2-Feb-1986 | | 10-Dec-1982 | DISABILITY | 61.9 |
| 3035 | 29-Mar-2018 | | | | | | |
| 3036 | 30-Sep-1959 | 26-Jan-1965 | 30-Sep-1969 | | 26-Jan-1970 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3037 | 22-Dec-1991 | 22-Dec-2006 | 22-Dec-2006 | | 11-Jul-2004 | DISABILITY | 64.4 |
| 3038 | 13-Oct-1990 | 13-Oct-2005 | 13-Oct-2005 | 13-Oct-2005 | 23-Nov-2013 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3039 | 4-Jul-2015 | 4-Jul-2030 | 27-Mar-2027 | | | | |
| 3040 | 30-Mar-2014 | 30-Mar-2029 | 30-Mar-2029 | | | | |
| 3041 | 8-Jul-1999 | 29-Oct-2014 | 29-Oct-2014 | 29-Oct-2014 | 8-Sep-2016 | ELECTIVE | 66.6 |
| 3042 | 28-Aug-1976 | 28-Aug-1991 | 21-Sep-1987 | 21-Sep-1987 | 21-Sep-1992 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3043 | 1-Apr-1966 | 31-Oct-1983 | 31-Oct-1983 | 9-Nov-1983 | 31-Dec-1992 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.2 |
| 3044 | 28-Sep-1996 | 6-Aug-2013 | 6-Aug-2013 | | | | |
| 3045 | 11-Aug-2018 | 11-Aug-2033 | 20-Feb-2033 | | | | |
| 3046 | 24-Jul-1997 | 24-Jul-2012 | 24-Jul-2012 | | 9-Aug-2019 | ELECTIVE | 74.0 |
| 3047 | 8-Nov-1975 | 8-Nov-1990 | 8-Nov-1990 | 9-Nov-1990 | 9-Jul-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3048 | 1-Feb-1963 | 3-Jul-1981 | 3-Jul-1981 | 9-May-1982 | 3-Jul-1991 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3049 | 1-Nov-1975 | 14-Aug-1993 | 14-Aug-1993 | 14-Aug-1993 | 14-Aug-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3050 | 8-Jul-1983 | 22-Feb-2001 | 10-Oct-2003 | 10-Oct-2003 | 10-Oct-2013 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3051 | 10-Jan-1976 | 1-Oct-1992 | 1-Oct-1992 | 1-Oct-1992 | 10-Apr-1995 | ELECTIVE | 67.5 |
| 3052 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2023 | 26-Sep-2023 | | | | |
| 3053 | 14-Sep-2000 | 14-Sep-2015 | 26-May-2012 | 26-May-2012 | 27-May-2017 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3054 | 25-Dec-1987 | 25-Dec-2002 | 10-Aug-2000 | 10-Aug-2000 | 10-Aug-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3055 | 13-Oct-1985 | 26-Sep-2008 | 26-Sep-2008 | | 31-Dec-1998 | DEATH (RPC) | 55.3 |
| 3056 | 11-May-2001 | 10-May-2016 | 10-May-2016 | | 11-Jul-2016 | ELECTIVE | 65.2 |
| 3057 | 13-Oct-1950 | 22-Oct-1967 | 22-Oct-1967 | | 22-Oct-1977 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3058 | 29-Dec-1994 | 29-Dec-2009 | 29-Dec-2009 | 29-Dec-2009 | 20-May-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3059 | 5-Feb-1977 | 3-Sep-1995 | 3-Sep-1995 | 3-Sep-1995 | 3-Sep-2005 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3060 | 10-Dec-1972 | 29-Dec-1993 | 29-Dec-1993 | 29-Dec-1993 | 29-Dec-2003 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3061 | 14-May-2011 | 14-May-2026 | 10-Jun-2024 | | | | |
| 3062 | 31-May-1969 | 20-Jul-1979 | 31-May-1979 | | 20-Jul-1979 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3063 | 4-Jan-1964 | 28-Sep-1979 | 28-Sep-1979 | | 1-Jul-1978 | DISABILITY | 63.8 |
| 3064 | 8-Jul-1999 | 8-Jul-2014 | 8-Jul-2014 | 8-Jul-2014 | 11-Mar-2019 | ELECTIVE | 70.4 |
| 3065 | 29-Mar-1981 | 13-Jul-1999 | 25-Oct-2002 | 25-Oct-2002 | 25-Oct-2012 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3066 | 26-Oct-1983 | 25-Sep-2001 | 26-Aug-2004 | 26-Aug-2004 | 26-Aug-2014 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3067 | 8-Jul-1999 | 14-Jan-2013 | 8-Jul-2009 | 11-Apr-2011 | 14-Jan-2013 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3068 | 9-Feb-1974 | 9-Feb-1989 | 9-Feb-1989 | 9-Feb-1989 | 19-Dec-1991 | DEATH (RPC) | 71.0 |
| 3069 | 29-Sep-1973 | 23-Aug-1996 | 23-Aug-1996 | | 11-Jul-1986 | DISABILITY | 54.9 |
| 3070 | 23-May-1996 | 24-May-2011 | 22-Oct-2009 | 8-Nov-2009 | 22-Oct-2014 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3071 | 22-Aug-2010 | 22-Aug-2025 | 12-Jun-2022 | | | | |
| 3072 | 1-Jul-1984 | 17-Sep-2005 | 24-Mar-2007 | 9-Oct-2013 | 10-Dec-2020 | ELECTIVE | 74.0 |
| 3073 | 19-Apr-1969 | 30-Apr-1981 | 30-Apr-1981 | 30-Apr-1981 | 10-Apr-1985 | ELECTIVE | 73.9 |
| 3074 | 13-Oct-1990 | 20-Jun-2006 | 25-Feb-2007 | | 8-Jan-2007 | ELECTIVE | 64.9 |
| 3075 | 18-Oct-1980 | 27-Feb-2000 | 27-Feb-2000 | | 8-Feb-1998 | DISABILITY | 62.9 |
| 3076 | 8-Mar-2008 | 9-Mar-2023 | 19-Aug-2020 | 19-Aug-2020 | | | |
| 3077 | 16-Jan-1956 | 1-Nov-1968 | 1-Nov-1968 | | 1-Nov-1973 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3078 | 14-Jan-1984 | 16-Jan-2001 | 18-Jan-2003 | 11-Mar-2003 | 13-Feb-2005 | ELECTIVE | 67.1 |
| 3079 | 29-Aug-2019 | 29-Aug-2034 | 1-Dec-2029 | | | | |
| 3080 | 12-Aug-1964 | 12-Aug-1979 | 12-Aug-1979 | | 9-Jan-1980 | ELECTIVE | 67.3 |
| 3081 | 29-Dec-1977 | 29-Dec-1992 | 29-Dec-1992 | 30-Dec-1992 | 10-Dec-1995 | ELECTIVE | 70.0 |
| 3082 | 30-Dec-1967 | 30-Dec-1982 | 27-Sep-1980 | 27-Sep-1980 | 27-Sep-1985 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3083 | 8-Nov-1975 | 8-Nov-1990 | 8-Nov-1990 | | 9-Apr-1992 | ELECTIVE | 68.0 |
| 3084 | 12-Apr-1984 | 7-Jan-1995 | 7-Jan-1995 | 9-Jan-1995 | 7-Jan-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3085 | 10-Apr-1976 | 1-Feb-1993 | 1-Feb-1993 | 1-Feb-1993 | 21-Jan-1999 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 71.0 |
| 3086 | 25-Aug-2019 | 1-Nov-2035 | 1-Nov-2035 | | | | |
| 3087 | 11-Oct-1997 | 14-Sep-2014 | 17-Aug-2016 | | 26-May-2007 | DISABILITY | 55.8 |
| 3088 | 27-Sep-2015 | 2-Oct-2032 | 2-Oct-2032 | | | | |
| 3089 | 8-Mar-1975 | 27-Mar-1990 | 27-Mar-1990 | 11-Apr-1990 | 26-Mar-2000 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3090 | 9-Sep-2007 | 9-Sep-2022 | 9-Sep-2022 | | | | |
| 3091 | 24-Feb-1979 | 30-May-1989 | 30-May-1989 | 30-May-1989 | 30-May-1994 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3092 | 22-Jan-1954 | 23-Feb-1974 | 23-Feb-1974 | 11-May-1976 | 23-Feb-1984 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3093 | 25-Aug-1965 | 25-Aug-1980 | 10-Jun-1979 | | 10-Jun-1984 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3094 | 27-Mar-2014 | 27-Mar-2029 | 25-Dec-2025 | | | | |
| 3095 | 27-Jun-2010 | 14-Jul-2025 | 14-Jul-2025 | | 26-Jul-2010 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 50.0 |
| 3096 | 29-Sep-1938 | 29-Sep-1953 | 29-Sep-1953 | | 18-Nov-1962 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3097 | 18-Sep-1971 | 8-Mar-1992 | 8-Mar-1992 | 8-Mar-1992 | 11-Apr-1999 | ELECTIVE | 72.1 |
| 3098 | 25-Mar-2007 | 25-Mar-2022 | 13-Sep-2018 | | 9-Dec-2013 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 65.2 |
| 3099 | 13-Jan-2001 | 13-Jan-2016 | 13-Jan-2016 | 17-May-2017 | | | |
| 3100 | 29-Dec-1977 | 12-Apr-1996 | 12-Apr-1996 | | 23-Nov-1982 | RESIGNATION (RPC) | 51.6 |
| 3101 | 7-May-1994 | 7-May-2009 | 7-May-2009 | 10-Dec-2016 | 27-Jun-2018 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3102 | 7-Jun-2000 | 23-Aug-2018 | 23-Aug-2018 | 23-Aug-2018 | | | |
| 3103 | 6-Jun-2015 | 6-Jun-2030 | 6-Jun-2030 | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|------|
| 3104 | 23-Mar-1985 | 5-Jul-2004 | 24-Mar-2007 | 19-Jul-2007 | 11-May-2013 | ELECTIVE | 69.6 |
| 3105 | 13-Jul-1995 | 14-Jan-2013 | 14-Jan-2013 | 19-Feb-2013 | | | |
| 3106 | 10-Dec-1987 | 10-Dec-2002 | 10-Dec-2002 | 10-Dec-2002 | 13-Jun-2011 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3107 | 16-Sep-1999 | 16-Sep-2014 | 24-May-2013 | | 9-Aug-2017 | ELECTIVE | 74.2 |
| 3108 | 15-Nov-1996 | 4-Sep-2014 | 4-Sep-2014 | | 10-Dec-2020 | ELECTIVE | 68.5 |
| 3109 | 13-Jun-1953 | 13-Jun-1968 | 13-Jun-1968 | 9-Jan-1973 | 23-Jan-1974 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 74.6 |
| 3110 | 12-Apr-1984 | 31-May-2003 | 24-Mar-2007 | 11-Apr-2007 | 11-Apr-2017 | COMPULSORY | 74.7 |
| 3111 | 8-Jan-2021 | 17-Apr-2038 | 17-Apr-2038 | | | | |
| 3112 | 19-Jan-1992 | 19-Jan-2007 | 7-Apr-2003 | | 28-Sep-2002 | DISABILITY | 69.5 |
| 3113 | 13-Mar-1986 | 13-Mar-2001 | 13-Mar-2001 | | 10-Apr-1997 | DISABILITY | 65.6 |
| 3114 | 27-Jan-2017 | 27-Jan-2032 | 9-Nov-2030 | | | | |
| 3115 | 30-Sep-2017 | 26-Sep-2035 | 26-Sep-2035 | | | | |
| 3116 | 2-Feb-1975 | 28-Dec-1996 | 28-Dec-1996 | 9-Jan-1997 | 11-Apr-1999 | ELECTIVE | 67.3 |
| 3117 | 3-Apr-1959 | 4-Apr-1962 | | | 25-Jun-1964 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 72.2 |
| 3118 | 10-Dec-1955 | 9-Nov-1970 | 10-Dec-1965 | | 1-Nov-1964 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 69.0 |
| 3119 | 24-Sep-1993 | 3-Jun-2010 | 3-Jun-2010 | 3-Jun-2010 | 10-Dec-2017 | ELECTIVE | 70.8 |
| 3120 | 24-Sep-1961 | 24-Sep-1976 | 7-Dec-1972 | | 21-Aug-1976 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 73.7 |
| 3121 | 8-Nov-2001 | 8-Nov-2016 | 8-Nov-2016 | 21-Dec-2016 | 20-Apr-2018 | ELECTIVE | 66.7 |
| 3122 | 10-Aug-2019 | 10-Aug-2034 | 11-Jun-2031 | | | | |
| 3123 | 1-Feb-1963 | 8-Dec-1984 | 8-Dec-1984 | 12-May-1985 | 8-Dec-1994 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3124 | 13-Nov-1982 | 8-Mar-1998 | 8-Mar-1998 | 8-Mar-1998 | 7-Mar-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3125 | 1-Apr-1992 | 30-Apr-2009 | 30-Apr-2009 | 30-Apr-2009 | 10-Apr-2012 | ELECTIVE | 65.9 |
| 3126 | 2-Mar-2007 | 2-Mar-2022 | 2-Mar-2022 | | | | |
| 3127 | 25-Aug-1976 | 5-Sep-1998 | 5-Sep-1998 | 5-Sep-1998 | 5-Sep-2008 | COMPULSORY | 75.0 |
| 3128 | 21-Jul-1990 | 21-Jul-2005 | 21-Jul-2005 | | 13-Jun-1998 | DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS) | 60.8 |

| Variable | Meaning |
|--------------------|--|
| | ID Not the CFJA judge code. For cross reference only. |
| First Appointment | Date of first appointment as a federal judge. |
| Eligible to Retire | Date eligible to retire with a full annuity as per the Judges Act. |
| Eligible to Elect | Date eligible to elect supernumerary status. |
| Elected | Date elected supernumerary status. |
| Retirement | Date of retirement. |
| Retirement Reason | Reason for/type of retirement. |
| Age at Retirement | Age in years at retirement rounded to one decimal. |


Produit intérieur brut, revenus et dépenses, quatrième trimestre de 2020

Diffusé à 8 h 30, heure de l'Est dans *Le Quotidien*, le mardi 2 mars 2021

Le produit intérieur brut (PIB) réel a augmenté de 2,3 % au quatrième trimestre de 2020, après avoir affiché des fluctuations record aux deux trimestres précédents. En 2020, le PIB réel a fléchi de 5,4 %; il s'agit de la baisse annuelle la plus prononcée enregistrée à ce chapitre depuis le début de la collecte de données trimestrielles en 1961. La demande intérieure finale a augmenté de 0,9 % au quatrième trimestre, mais pour 2020 dans son ensemble, elle a reculé de 4,5 %.

Graphique 1 Produit intérieur brut et demande intérieure finale

variation trimestrielle en %, dollars enchaînés (2012)



Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

La croissance du PIB réel s'est raffermie en raison d'une forte variation des stocks des entreprises ainsi que des augmentations dans les dépenses de consommation finale des administrations publiques, dans les investissements des entreprises en machines et matériel et dans les investissements immobiliers. Les augmentations dans les investissements immobiliers sont survenues dans le contexte de faibles taux hypothécaires et de la demande accrue de logements.

Les importantes baisses des stocks qui ont freiné la croissance du PIB au troisième trimestre n'ont pas été observées au quatrième trimestre, les stocks ayant enregistré une petite accumulation. En ce qui concerne les stocks des entreprises non agricoles, le changement important s'est concentré dans le secteur du commerce de détail, où ont été enregistrés des accumulations pour les détaillants de véhicules automobiles, de matériaux de




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Canada

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Canada

Canada

construction et d'articles de sport. L'accumulation des stocks de cannabis a principalement contribué à l'augmentation des stocks agricoles. Le ratio des stocks aux ventes dans l'ensemble de l'économie est passé de 0,843 au troisième trimestre à 0,836 au quatrième trimestre.

Graphique 2
Contribution à la variation en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut réel au quatrième trimestre de 2020




Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

La croissance des investissements immobiliers se poursuit

Les investissements immobiliers ont progressé de 4,3 % au quatrième trimestre, après avoir augmenté de 30,7 % au troisième trimestre.

Graphique 3 Investissement immobilier

variation trimestrielle en %, dollars enchaînés (2012)



Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0108-01.

Les hausses étaient généralisées : les nouvelles constructions ont progressé de 4,1 %, les rénovations, de 4,8 %, et les coûts de transfert de propriété, de 4,1 %. Une augmentation substantielle a été observée dans la construction de logements unifamiliaux et d'immeubles à logements multiples neufs, surtout en Ontario et en Alberta. L'augmentation des coûts de transfert de propriété a été générale, l'activité de revente de maisons ayant continué de croître partout au pays. De 2019 à 2020, les investissements immobiliers ont progressé de 3,9 %, tandis que la dette des ménages sur le marché hypothécaire résidentiel s'est accrue de manière considérable au cours de la même période.

Les investissements des entreprises ralentissent


Au quatrième trimestre, les entreprises ont accru leurs investissements en structures d'ingénierie de 1,6 %, mais elles ont réduit leurs investissements en bâtiments non résidentiels de 10,9 %. Cette réduction rend compte de la faiblesse de la demande pour des immeubles à bureaux et des centres d'achats, laquelle a fléchi en raison du télétravail et du magasinage en ligne, devenus plus courants. Les investissements accrus en machines et matériel (+7,0 %) ont coïncidé avec une augmentation des importations de machines et matériel industriels. Cependant, malgré cette hausse, les investissements à ce chapitre ont fléchi de 16,4 % en 2020.

Les dépenses des ménages diminuent légèrement

Après avoir augmenté de 13,1 % au troisième trimestre, les dépenses des ménages ont affiché une légère baisse de 0,1 % au quatrième trimestre. En 2020, les dépenses ont diminué de 6,1 % par rapport à 2019.

Graphique 4
Dépenses de consommation finale des ménages : biens durables et semi-durables

variation trimestrielle en %, dollars enchaînés (2012)



Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.


Les dépenses en biens durables ont fléchi de 0,2 %, après avoir affiché une hausse record (+39,6 %) au troisième trimestre, laquelle a fait suite à des baisses liées à la pandémie de COVID-19 au deuxième trimestre. La diminution des achats de camions, de fourgonnettes et de véhicules utilitaires sport neufs (-3,5 %) et de voitures particulières neuves (-6,4 %) a été partiellement contrebalancée par l'augmentation des ventes de véhicules automobiles d'occasion (+4,0 %). Ce changement dans les habitudes de dépenses témoigne de la tendance des consommateurs à opter pour des produits usagers en période d'incertitude économique.

Si l'on exclut ces achats, les dépenses en biens durables ont augmenté de 1,6 % au quatrième trimestre. Les dépenses des ménages en gros appareils ménagers (+9,0 %) et en meubles (+2,4 %) ont progressé dans le contexte de la croissance des investissements immobiliers. Dans l'ensemble, les dépenses en biens durables ont reculé de 3,7 % en 2020.

Après avoir affiché des fluctuations prononcées aux deux trimestres précédents, les dépenses en bien semi-durables se sont repliées de 4,7 % au quatrième trimestre. La baisse observée au chapitre des vêtements et chaussures (-8,9 %) a été compensée en partie par des hausses dans les jeux, jouets et passe-temps (+0,7 %) et les articles de sport, matériel de camping et matériel pour activités de plein air (+6,9 %). Ces variations rendent compte des effets de la pandémie sur les habitudes de dépenses des ménages. Les dépenses en biens semi-durables ont reculé de 7,8 % en 2020.

Graphique 5**Dépenses de consommation finale des ménages : biens non durables et services**

variation trimestrielle en %, dollars enchaînés (2012)



Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

Les dépenses en biens non durables ont augmenté de 0,6 %, après avoir progressé de 4,2 % au troisième trimestre. Puisque les consommateurs ont passé plus de temps à la maison et moins de temps à voyager, les dépenses en produits alimentaires (+3,1 %), en cannabis (autorisé) (+17,0 %) et en produits pharmaceutiques (+7,1 %) ont augmenté. En revanche, les dépenses en carburants et lubrifiants (-5,4 %) ont diminué, l'utilisation de ces produits ayant diminué par suite des nouvelles restrictions mises en place en Colombie-Britannique, en Ontario et au Québec au quatrième trimestre. Au cours de l'année 2020, les dépenses en biens non durables ont affiché une croissance de 3,1 % par rapport à 2019.


La croissance des dépenses en services a ralenti pour passer de 9,7 % au troisième trimestre à 0,2 % au quatrième trimestre. Des hausses ont été observées dans les services ambulatoires (+6,7 %) ainsi que dans l'assurance et les services financiers (+1,8 %), mais celles-ci ont été plus que contrebalancées par des baisses dans les services de restauration et d'hébergement (-11,1 %) et les services de soins corporels (-7,5 %), engendrées par les fermetures et les ouvertures restreintes des bars, restaurants et salons de beauté et de soins personnels. Dans l'ensemble, les dépenses en services ont fléchi de 10,3 % en 2020.

La croissance des volumes des exportations et des importations affiche un ralentissement

La croissance des volumes des exportations a affiché un ralentissement au quatrième trimestre. En effet, après avoir progressé de 14,7 % au troisième trimestre, les volumes des exportations ont affiché une croissance de 1,2 % au quatrième trimestre. Cette hausse plus modérée des exportations rend compte de la baisse de la demande internationale attribuable au ralentissement des économies des principaux partenaires commerciaux du Canada au quatrième trimestre, dont les États-Unis (+1,0 %), le Royaume-Uni (+1,0 %), les Pays-Bas (-0,1 %), l'Allemagne (+0,1 %) et l'Italie (-2,0 %).

Graphique 6 Exportations et importations

variation trimestrielle en %, dollars enchaînés (2012)



Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

Les exportations de produits énergétiques se sont accrues de 6,1 %, tout comme celles de produits en métal et de produits minéraux non métalliques (+10,8 %). Cette dernière hausse a été principalement attribuable à l'or sous forme brute, l'argent et les métaux du groupe du platine sous forme brute et leurs alliages; cette hausse marquée est attribuable aux exportations d'or raffiné vers le Royaume-Uni, dans le contexte des incertitudes économiques associées au Brexit. De 2019 à 2020, les volumes des exportations ont affiché un repli de 9,8 %.

Les volumes des importations ont progressé de 2,6 % au quatrième trimestre, après avoir enregistré des fluctuations record aux deux trimestres précédents. L'augmentation des importations de biens de consommation (+5,5 %), de véhicules automobiles et pièces pour véhicules automobiles (+5,3 %) et de machines et matériel industriels (+8,3 %) a été atténuée par la diminution de celles de produits en métal et de produits minéraux non métalliques (-10,7 %). Dans l'ensemble, en 2020, les volumes des importations ont fléchi de 11,3 % par rapport à 2019.


Les termes de l'échange s'améliorent

Les termes de l'échange, c'est-à-dire le ratio du prix des exportations au prix des importations, ont augmenté de 1,7 %, en raison principalement de l'augmentation de 2,4 % des prix à l'exportation du pétrole brut et du bitume brut observée au quatrième trimestre. Cependant, pour l'ensemble de 2020, les termes de l'échange ont fléchi de 3,4 %; cette baisse découle en grande partie du repli de 38,6 % des prix à l'exportation du pétrole brut et du bitume brut.

Le produit intérieur brut nominal augmente

L'indice implicite des prix du PIB, qui rend compte du prix global des biens et des services produits au pays, a augmenté de 1,1 % au quatrième trimestre. Par conséquent, la croissance du PIB nominal (+3,4 %) a été plus prononcée que celle du PIB réel. Comparativement à 2019, le PIB nominal a reculé de 4,6 % en 2020.

Carte 1 – Rémunération des salariés en 2020 comparativement à 2019 (indice 2019 = 100)



Source : Statistique Canada, tableau 36-10-0205-01, mars 2021.

La rémunération des employés a progressé de 2,5 % au quatrième trimestre, après avoir augmenté de 7,7 % au troisième trimestre. Malgré la croissance observée durant la deuxième moitié de 2020, la rémunération a reculé de 1,6 % au cours de l'année par rapport à 2019. La Subvention salariale d'urgence du Canada représentait 3,3 % de la rémunération totale des employés au quatrième trimestre, en baisse par rapport à la proportion de 7,3 % enregistrée au troisième trimestre. Les baisses, dont l'ampleur variait d'une région à l'autre, ont été particulièrement marquées dans les deux provinces riches en pétrole, soit l'Alberta et Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador, ce qui rend compte des répercussions de la diminution des prix du pétrole brut et du bitume brut en 2020.

Le taux d'épargne des ménages enregistré à la fin de l'année se chiffre à au moins 10 % pour une troisième fois d'affilée

Le revenu disponible des ménages a reculé de 1,0 % au quatrième trimestre, surtout en raison de la diminution de 17,2 % des autres prestations reçues des administrations publiques, comme celles de la Prestation canadienne d'urgence. Malgré ce recul, le revenu disponible a progressé de 10,0 % par rapport à 2019. Cette augmentation, la plus forte jamais enregistrée en près de quatre décennies, est liée aux mesures de soutien économique exceptionnelles mises en place par les administrations publiques au cours de l'année. L'étendue de ces mesures a considérablement diminué au quatrième trimestre, mais la valeur des transferts des administrations publiques a tout de même été nettement supérieure à celle enregistrée au quatrième trimestre de 2019, avant la pandémie (+33,2 %).

Pour un troisième trimestre consécutif, le taux d'épargne des ménages était d'au moins 10 %, et ce résultat est attribuable à l'effet combiné de la reprise de la rémunération — laquelle s'est poursuivie, quoiqu'à un rythme plus lent —, des transferts des administrations publiques toujours élevés et de la stagnation de la consommation. En 2020, les Canadiens ont épargné un montant comparable à celui des sept années précédentes combinées. Une partie de cette épargne s'est retrouvée dans le numéraire et les dépôts des ménages canadiens; la croissance de cet actif a été près de 160,0 milliards de dollars au cours des trois premiers trimestres de l'année. Le taux d'épargne s'est établi à 12,7 % pour le quatrième trimestre, et à 15,1 % pour l'année 2020 dans son ensemble. La valeur des transferts des administrations publiques a été supérieure à celle de la perte de rémunération et de revenus provenant d'un travail autonome, ce qui a fait en sorte que les jeunes ménages et les ménages à faible revenu ont affiché parmi les plus fortes [hausse de l'épargne](#).

Les dépenses liées aux programmes de soutien continuent de faire augmenter les emprunts des administrations publiques

Dans l'ensemble, les revenus des administrations publiques ont été nettement inférieurs aux dépenses tout au long de 2020, et une augmentation marquée a été observée au quatrième trimestre comparativement au sommet de 443,8 milliards de dollars en emprunts nets des administrations publiques atteint au deuxième trimestre.

Les revenus des administrations publiques se sont maintenus à un niveau relativement stable en 2020, à une exception près : lorsqu'un repli des revenus tirés des impôts sur le revenu et des impôts sur les produits a fait diminuer les coffres des administrations publiques au deuxième trimestre. Au quatrième trimestre, ces composantes ont regagné le terrain perdu, mais les revenus annuels des administrations publiques étaient tout de même de 3,9 % inférieurs aux niveaux observés un an plus tôt.

Note aux lecteurs

Révisions

Les données sur le produit intérieur brut (PIB) pour le quatrième trimestre ont été diffusées en même temps que les données révisées du premier trimestre au troisième trimestre de 2020. Les données diffusées intègrent des données nouvelles, des données révisées et des données mises à jour sur les tendances saisonnières. Étant donné la situation économique inédite en 2020, on s'attend à un plus grand nombre de révisions pour la période que d'habitude.

Mesures de soutien prises par les gouvernements

Pour atténuer les répercussions économiques de la pandémie de COVID-19, les gouvernements ont mis en œuvre un certain nombre de programmes, comme la Subvention salariale d'urgence du Canada et la Prestation canadienne d'urgence. Pour obtenir des explications détaillées de la façon dont ces mesures de soutien ont été traitées dans la compilation des estimations, veuillez consulter le rapport « Saisie des mesures liées à la COVID-19 dans les comptes nationaux » et le rapport « Saisie de nouvelles mesures liées à la COVID-19 dans les comptes nationaux ».

Des précisions concernant les principales mesures de soutien sont fournies dans les notes des tableaux [36-10-0103-01](#), [36-10-0112-01](#), [36-10-0115-01](#), [36-10-0118-01](#) et [36-10-0477-01](#).

Pour obtenir des renseignements sur la désaisonnalisation, veuillez consulter la page [Données désaisonnalisées — Foire aux questions](#).

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements sur le PIB, vous pouvez regarder la vidéo intitulée « [Qu'est-ce que le produit intérieur brut \(PIB\)?](#) ».

Variations en pourcentage

Les variations en pourcentage des statistiques relatives aux dépenses (comme les dépenses des ménages, l'investissement et les exportations) sont calculées à partir de mesures en volume qui sont corrigées en fonction des variations de prix. Les variations en pourcentage des statistiques relatives aux revenus (comme la rémunération des employés et l'excédent d'exploitation) sont calculées à partir de valeurs nominales, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ne sont pas corrigées en fonction des variations de prix.

À moins d'indication contraire, les taux de croissance représentent la variation en pourcentage dans la série d'un trimestre au suivant, par exemple, du troisième trimestre de 2020 au quatrième trimestre de 2020.

Tableaux de données en temps réel

Les tableaux de données en temps réel [36-10-0430-01](#) et [36-10-0431-01](#) seront mis à jour le 8 mars.

Prochaine diffusion

Les données sur le PIB selon les revenus et dépenses du premier trimestre de 2021 seront diffusées le 1^{er} juin 2021.

Objectifs liés au développement durable

Le 1^{er} janvier 2016, des pays du monde entier ont officiellement commencé à mettre en œuvre le [Programme de développement durable à l'horizon 2030](#), le plan d'action des Nations Unies axé sur la transformation qui vise à relever des défis mondiaux urgents au cours des 15 années suivantes. Ce plan est fondé sur 17 objectifs précis liés au développement durable.

Les données sur le produit intérieur brut selon les revenus et dépenses sont un exemple de la manière dont Statistique Canada appuie le suivi des progrès relatifs aux objectifs mondiaux liés au développement durable. Le présent communiqué contribuera à mesurer les objectifs suivants :



Tableau 1
Produit intérieur brut selon le compte des revenus — Données désaisonnalisées aux taux annuels

| | Troisième trimestre de 2019 | Quatrième trimestre de 2019 | Premier trimestre de 2020 | Deuxième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | variation trimestrielle en % | | | | | | millions de dollars | |
| Rémunération des salariés | 1,3 | 1,3 | -1,2 | -8,6 | 7,7 | 2,5 | 1 167 340 | 1 196 668 |
| Excédent d'exploitation brut | -1,4 | 0,6 | -4,6 | -6,9 | 15,2 | -0,5 | 623 968 | 620 720 |
| Revenu mixte brut | 1,7 | 1,8 | 0,8 | -2,2 | 3,2 | 1,4 | 283 192 | 287 068 |
| Impôts moins les subventions sur la production | 1,7 | -0,3 | -18,2 | -121,5 | 205,3 | 224,7 | 19 152 | 62 196 |
| Impôts moins les subventions sur les produits et les importations | 1,1 | -0,4 | -6,4 | -16,7 | 13,7 | 4,3 | 136 504 | 142 364 |
| Divergence statistique (millions de dollars) | -2 108 | -416 | 1 252 | 16 | 1 876 | -3 028 | 1 384 | -1 644 |
| Produit intérieur brut aux prix du marché | 0,5 | 1,0 | -2,9 | -12,1 | 11,5 | 3,4 | 2 231 540 | 2 307 372 |

Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0103-01.

Tableau 2
Produit intérieur brut réel selon le compte des dépenses, variation trimestrielle — Données désaisonnalisées aux taux annuels, dollars enchaînés (2012)

| | Troisième trimestre de 2019 | Quatrième trimestre de 2019 | Premier trimestre de 2020 | Deuxième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | variation trimestrielle en % | | | | | | millions de dollars | |
| Dépenses de consommation finale | 0,5 | 0,5 | -1,5 | -11,4 | 10,3 | 0,4 | 1 588 439 | 1 595 217 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des ménages | 0,6 | 0,5 | -1,8 | -14,1 | 13,1 | -0,1 | 1 137 117 | 1 135 859 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des institutions sans but lucratif au service des ménages | 0,9 | 0,6 | -0,0 | -13,6 | 7,8 | 4,5 | 29 840 | 31 188 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des administrations publiques | 0,4 | 0,5 | -0,8 | -4,4 | 4,0 | 1,5 | 421 401 | 427 753 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe | 1,9 | -0,9 | -0,3 | -13,7 | 14,5 | 2,3 | 436 880 | 447 012 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des entreprises | 1,8 | -1,0 | -0,8 | -16,0 | 16,3 | 2,6 | 351 027 | 359 992 |
| Bâtiments résidentiels | 3,4 | -0,7 | -0,5 | -15,6 | 30,7 | 4,3 | 156 314 | 163 068 |
| Ouvrages non résidentiels, machines et matériel | 0,7 | -1,5 | -1,2 | -17,9 | 5,9 | 1,0 | 157 280 | 158 899 |
| Produits de propriété intellectuelle | 1,0 | -0,0 | -0,4 | -8,9 | 5,8 | 0,5 | 35 831 | 36 017 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des administrations publiques | 2,3 | -0,3 | 2,1 | -3,3 | 7,8 | 1,4 | 83 974 | 85 131 |
| Investissements en stocks (millions de dollars) | -9 468 | 36 | -9 826 | -31 719 | -7 427 | 38 529 | -36 808 | 1 721 |
| Exportations de biens et services | -0,6 | -1,1 | -2,7 | -17,7 | 14,7 | 1,2 | 617 230 | 624 807 |
| Moins : importations de biens et services | -0,5 | -0,7 | -2,2 | -23,0 | 21,6 | 2,6 | 611 263 | 627 163 |
| Divergence statistique (millions de dollars) | 1 923 | 361 | -1 121 | -15 | -1 684 | 2 694 | -1 236 | 1 458 |
| Produit intérieur brut aux prix du marché | 0,5 | 0,1 | -1,9 | -11,4 | 8,9 | 2,3 | 1 999 452 | 2 045 925 |
| Demande intérieure finale | 0,8 | 0,2 | -1,3 | -11,9 | 11,2 | 0,9 | 2 023 946 | 2 041 230 |

Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

Tableau 3
Produit intérieur brut réel selon le compte des dépenses, variation annualisée — Données désaisonnalisées aux taux annuels, dollars enchaînés (2012)

| | Troisième trimestre de 2019 | Quatrième trimestre de 2019 | Premier trimestre de 2020 | Deuxième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 |
|---|--|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | variation trimestrielle en %, annualisée | | | | | | millions de dollars | |
| Dépenses de consommation finale | 2,1 | 2,0 | -5,9 | -38,5 | 47,8 | 1,7 | 1 588 439 | 1 595 217 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des ménages | 2,2 | 2,0 | -7,1 | -45,6 | 63,4 | -0,4 | 1 137 117 | 1 135 859 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des institutions sans but lucratif au service des ménages | 3,5 | 2,5 | -0,0 | -44,4 | 35,1 | 19,3 | 29 840 | 31 188 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des administrations publiques | 1,6 | 1,9 | -3,1 | -16,5 | 16,9 | 6,2 | 421 401 | 427 753 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe | 7,9 | -3,6 | -1,3 | -44,4 | 72,1 | 9,6 | 436 880 | 447 012 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des entreprises | 7,5 | -4,1 | -3,3 | -50,2 | 82,7 | 10,6 | 351 027 | 359 992 |
| Bâtiments résidentiels | 14,4 | -2,9 | -2,2 | -49,2 | 191,4 | 18,4 | 156 314 | 163 068 |
| Ouvrages non résidentiels, machines et matériel | 2,8 | -5,9 | -4,5 | -54,5 | 25,8 | 4,2 | 157 280 | 158 899 |
| Produits de propriété intellectuelle | 4,1 | -0,1 | -1,4 | -31,0 | 25,1 | 2,1 | 35 831 | 36 017 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des administrations publiques | 9,6 | -1,3 | 8,5 | -12,4 | 35,3 | 5,6 | 83 974 | 85 131 |
| Investissements en stocks (millions de dollars) | -9 468 | 36 | -9 826 | -31 719 | -7 427 | 38 529 | -36 808 | 1 721 |
| Exportations de biens et services | -2,5 | -4,2 | -10,4 | -54,2 | 73,1 | 5,0 | 617 230 | 624 807 |
| Moins : importations de biens et services | -2,1 | -2,9 | -8,5 | -64,9 | 118,8 | 10,8 | 611 263 | 627 163 |
| Divergence statistique (millions de dollars) | 1 923 | 361 | -1 121 | -15 | -1 684 | 2 694 | -1 236 | 1 458 |
| Produit intérieur brut aux prix du marché | 1,8 | 0,4 | -7,5 | -38,5 | 40,6 | 9,6 | 1 999 452 | 2 045 925 |
| Demande intérieure finale | 3,3 | 0,7 | -4,9 | -39,9 | 52,8 | 3,5 | 2 023 946 | 2 041 230 |

Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

Tableau 4
Produit intérieur brut réel selon le compte des dépenses — Données désaisonnalisées aux taux annuels

| | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|---|
| | | | Contributions à la variation en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut réel | Contributions à la variation en pourcentage des indices implicites de prix | Contributions à la variation en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut réel, annualisées |
| | millions de dollars enchaînés (2012) | | points de pourcentage | | |
| Dépenses de consommation finale | 1 588 439 | 1 595 217 | 0,342 | 0,277 | 1,416 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des ménages | 1 137 117 | 1 135 859 | -0,062 | 0,275 | -0,257 |
| Biens | 558 699 | 556 135 | -0,123 | 0,163 | -0,510 |
| Biens durables | 169 796 | 169 514 | -0,014 | 0,056 | -0,058 |
| Biens semi-durables | 90 207 | 85 927 | -0,196 | 0,013 | -0,812 |
| Biens non durables | 298 206 | 300 022 | 0,087 | 0,093 | 0,360 |
| Services | 581 474 | 582 666 | 0,061 | 0,112 | 0,253 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des institutions sans but lucratif au service des ménages | 29 840 | 31 188 | 0,069 | 0,010 | 0,286 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des administrations publiques | 421 401 | 427 753 | 0,335 | -0,008 | 1,387 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe | 436 880 | 447 012 | 0,541 | 0,217 | 2,239 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des entreprises | 351 027 | 359 992 | 0,484 | 0,194 | 1,999 |
| Bâtiments résidentiels | 156 314 | 163 068 | 0,391 | 0,164 | 1,619 |
| Ouvrages non résidentiels, machines et matériel | 157 280 | 158 899 | 0,083 | -0,004 | 0,339 |
| Ouvrages non résidentiels | 98 817 | 96 193 | -0,132 | 0,010 | -0,547 |
| Machines et matériel | 58 095 | 62 163 | 0,214 | -0,015 | 0,886 |
| Produits de propriété intellectuelle | 35 831 | 36 017 | 0,010 | 0,035 | 0,041 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des institutions sans but lucratif au service des ménages | 2 013 | 1 985 | -0,001 | 0,001 | -0,004 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des administrations publiques | 83 974 | 85 131 | 0,059 | 0,022 | 0,244 |
| Investissements en stocks | -36 808 | 1 721 | 1,750 | 0,042 | 7,248 |
| Exportations de biens et services | 617 230 | 624 807 | 0,362 | 0,399 | 1,495 |
| Biens | 518 047 | 523 179 | 0,243 | 0,373 | 1,006 |
| Services | 99 300 | 101 701 | 0,118 | 0,026 | 0,489 |
| Moins : importations de biens et services | 611 263 | 627 163 | 0,805 | -0,115 | 3,338 |
| Biens | 528 193 | 540 759 | 0,622 | -0,056 | 2,576 |
| Services | 87 339 | 90 661 | 0,184 | -0,059 | 0,762 |
| Divergence statistique | -1 236 | 1 458 | 0,135 | 0,000 | 0,559 |
| Produit intérieur brut aux prix du marché | 1 999 452 | 2 045 925 | 2,324 | 1,050 | 9,619 |
| Demande intérieure finale | 2 023 946 | 2 041 230 | 0,883 | 0,494 | 3,655 |

Source(s) : Tableaux 36-10-0104-01 et 36-10-0106-01.

Tableau 5
Principaux indicateurs des comptes économiques canadiens — Données désaisonnalisées

| | Troisième trimestre de 2019 | Quatrième trimestre de 2019 | Premier trimestre de 2020 | Deuxième trimestre de 2020 | Troisième trimestre de 2020 | Quatrième trimestre de 2020 |
|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| À l'échelle de l'économie | | | | | | |
| Revenu intérieur brut réel (indice 2012 = 100) | 113,5 | 113,8 | 109,9 | 96,6 | 107,0 | 110,1 |
| Déflateur du produit intérieur brut (indice 2012 = 100) | 109,9 | 110,9 | 109,8 | 109,0 | 111,6 | 112,8 |
| Termes de l'échange (indice 2012 = 100) | 94,7 | 95,2 | 90,6 | 88,1 | 93,6 | 95,2 |
| Secteur des ménages | | | | | | |
| Revenu disponible des ménages (millions de dollars) | 1 280 168 | 1 297 208 | 1 315 952 | 1 473 096 | 1 411 416 | 1 397 720 |
| Épargne nette des ménages (millions de dollars) | 20 424 | 26 048 | 67 104 | 410 016 | 193 316 | 177 048 |
| Taux d'épargne des ménages (%) | 1,6 | 2,0 | 5,1 | 27,8 | 13,7 | 12,7 |
| Secteur des administrations publiques | | | | | | |
| Revenu disponible des administrations publiques (millions de dollars) | 515 660 | 525 284 | 454 360 | 62 540 | 263 132 | 360 360 |
| Épargne nette des administrations publiques (millions de dollars) | 32 084 | 35 140 | -38 128 | -422 396 | -235 088 | -145 184 |
| Secteur des sociétés | | | | | | |
| Excédent d'exploitation net des sociétés non financières (millions de dollars) | 249 380 | 249 884 | 220 140 | 184 856 | 265 088 | 262 656 |
| Excédent d'exploitation net des sociétés financières (millions de dollars) | 41 240 | 41 176 | 41 008 | 38 016 | 40 504 | 40 844 |
| Épargne nette des sociétés non financières (millions de dollars) | -11 364 | -9 556 | -33 400 | -61 172 | 25 120 | 18 120 |
| Épargne nette des sociétés financières (millions de dollars) | 37 336 | 41 072 | 42 756 | 31 220 | 30 864 | 25 568 |
| National | | | | | | |
| Épargne nationale nette (millions de dollars) | 76 260 | 90 440 | 36 932 | -37 112 | 19 508 | 74 120 |
| Taux d'épargne national (%) | 4,0 | 4,7 | 2,0 | -2,3 | 1,1 | 3,9 |

Source(s) : Tableaux 36-10-0105-01, 36-10-0106-01, 36-10-0111-01, 36-10-0112-01, 36-10-0118-01 et 36-10-0116-01.

Tableau 6
Produit intérieur brut réel selon le compte des dépenses, variation d'une année à l'autre —
Données désaisonnalisées aux taux annuels, dollars enchaînés (2012)

| | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---|--------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------|
| | variation d'une année à l'autre en % | | | | | | millions de dollars | |
| Dépenses de consommation finale | 2,1 | 2,0 | 3,3 | 2,6 | 1,7 | -4,7 | 1 640 706 | 1 562 821 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des ménages | 2,3 | 1,9 | 3,8 | 2,5 | 1,6 | -6,1 | 1 184 887 | 1 112 476 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des institutions sans but lucratif au service des ménages | 4,7 | 9,0 | 0,4 | 3,3 | 3,0 | -4,8 | 31 699 | 30 190 |
| Dépenses de consommation finale des administrations publiques | 1,4 | 1,8 | 2,1 | 2,9 | 2,0 | -1,1 | 424 474 | 419 604 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe | -5,2 | -4,7 | 3,3 | 1,8 | 0,3 | -3,6 | 442 650 | 426 793 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des entreprises | -6,4 | -5,4 | 2,7 | 1,3 | 0,3 | -5,3 | 362 266 | 343 107 |
| Bâtiments résidentiels | 3,8 | 3,9 | 2,3 | -1,7 | -0,2 | 3,9 | 139 772 | 145 193 |
| Ouvrages non résidentiels, machines et matériel | -11,3 | -12,3 | 1,9 | 3,1 | 1,1 | -13,1 | 185 783 | 161 377 |
| Produits de propriété intellectuelle | -11,5 | -1,7 | 8,8 | 5,2 | -1,9 | -3,8 | 37 142 | 35 728 |
| Formation brute de capital fixe des administrations publiques | 1,5 | -0,1 | 6,5 | 4,3 | 0,3 | 4,3 | 78 457 | 81 865 |
| Investissements en stocks (millions de dollars) | -9 178 | -779 | 18 014 | -3 714 | 3 280 | -34 299 | 18 766 | -15 533 |
| Exportations de biens et services | 3,4 | 1,4 | 1,4 | 3,7 | 1,3 | -9,8 | 675 019 | 608 603 |
| Moins : importations de biens et services | 0,8 | 0,1 | 4,6 | 3,4 | 0,4 | -11,3 | 674 511 | 598 454 |
| Divergence statistique (millions de dollars) | -300 | 2 116 | -2 039 | 1 275 | -374 | 146 | 137 | 283 |
| Produit intérieur brut aux prix du marché | 0,7 | 1,0 | 3,0 | 2,4 | 1,9 | -5,4 | 2 102 304 | 1 988 721 |
| Demande intérieure finale | 0,3 | 0,5 | 3,3 | 2,5 | 1,4 | -4,5 | 2 081 607 | 1 988 173 |

Source(s) : Tableau 36-10-0104-01.

Tableaux disponibles : [12-10-0134-01](#), [12-10-0135-01](#), [34-10-0163-01](#), [36-10-0103-01](#) à [36-10-0109-01](#) , [36-10-0111-01](#), [36-10-0112-01](#), [36-10-0114-01](#) à [36-10-0118-01](#) , [36-10-0121-01](#) à [36-10-0132-01](#) , [36-10-0135-01](#), [36-10-0205-01](#), [36-10-0369-01](#), [36-10-0477-01](#), [36-10-0484-01](#), [36-10-0608-01](#), [36-10-0610-01](#) et [36-10-0611-01](#).

Définitions, source de données et méthodes : numéros d'enquête [1901](#), [2602](#), [2820](#) et [5169](#).

Le document « [Saisie de nouvelles mesures liées à la COVID-19 dans les comptes nationaux](#) », qui fait partie de la collection *Les nouveautés en matière de comptes économiques canadiens (13-605-X)*, est maintenant accessible.

Le produit de visualisation « [Centre de statistiques sur l'infrastructure](#) », qui fait partie de *Statistique Canada – Produits de visualisation des données (71-607-X)*, est maintenant accessible.

Le portail [Statistiques des comptes économiques](#), accessible sous l'onglet *Sujets* de notre site Web, offre un portrait à jour des économies nationale et provinciales et de leur structure.

Le *Guide de l'utilisateur : Système canadien des comptes macroéconomiques (13-606-G)* est accessible.

Le *Guide méthodologique : Système canadien des comptes macroéconomiques (13-607-X)* est accessible.

Pour obtenir plus de renseignements ou pour en savoir davantage sur les concepts, les méthodes et la qualité des données, communiquez avec nous au 514-283-8300 ou composez sans frais le 1-800-263-1136 (STATCAN.infostats-infostats.STATCAN@canada.ca), ou communiquez avec les Relations avec les médias au 613-951-4636 (STATCAN.mediahotline-ligneinfomedias.STATCAN@canada.ca).

Creek 6 (SDR 59 41 847), Tatelkus Lake 28 (SDR 59 41 865), Kluachon Lake 1 (SDR 59 49 830) en Colombie-Britannique.

Variantes de la classification

La CGT est la classification géographique de base utilisée pour la collecte et la diffusion de statistiques à Statistique Canada. Cependant, la CGT ne peut pas servir toutes les applications statistiques pour lesquelles la présentation et l'analyse des données économiques et sociales sont nécessaires. D'autres unités géographiques qui sont des agrégations des unités géographiques de la CGT sont incluses comme variantes de la version de la CGT. Quatre variantes de la classification sont reconnues comme partie de la CGT 2016 :

1. Classification des secteurs statistiques - Variante de la CGT 2016

Cette variante de la classification comprend toutes les régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR), toutes les agglomérations de recensement (AR) et toutes les zones d'influence métropolitaine de recensement (ZIM) au Canada.

2. Classification des secteurs statistiques selon la province et le territoire - Variante de la CGT 2016

Cette variante de la classification comprend les provinces et territoires, les régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR), les agglomérations de recensement (AR) et les zones d'influence métropolitaine de recensement (ZIM). Elle présente les parties provinciales et territoriales des RMR, AR et ZIM qui chevauchent les frontières provinciales et territoriales.

3. Régions économiques - Variante de la CGT 2016

Cette variante de la classification montre les régions économiques du Canada.

4. Régions agricoles - Variante de la CGT 2016

Cette variante de la classification comprend les régions géographiques du Canada, les provinces et territoires, les régions agricoles de recensement, les divisions de recensement, les subdivisions de recensement unifiées et les subdivisions de recensement du Canada.

Chaque variante de la CGT est un ensemble des groupements sur mesure des subdivisions de recensement. À Statistique Canada, des variantes sont créées et adoptées lorsque la structure de la version principale de la classification ne satisfait pas entièrement les besoins spécifiques des utilisateurs pour la diffusion de données ou lors de sondages dans les enquêtes. Une variante de la classification est basée sur une version principale de la classification telle que la CGT 2016. Dans une variante, les catégories de la version principale de la classification sont divisées, agrégées ou regroupées pour fournir des ajouts ou des alternatives (par exemple, des ajouts spécifiques selon le contexte) à la structure normalisée de la version principale.


Classification des secteurs statistiques - Variante de la CGT 2016

La Classification des secteurs statistiques (CSS) - Variante de la CGT 2016 regroupe les subdivisions de recensement selon qu'elles font partie d'une région métropolitaine de recensement, d'une agglomération de recensement ou d'une zone d'influence métropolitaine de recensement (ZIM). Les subdivisions de recensement (SDR) forment le niveau inférieur de cette variante de la classification. Le niveau suivant de cette variante est constitué des diverses régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR), agglomérations de recensement (AR) et zones d'influence métropolitaine de recensement (ZIM). Le niveau supérieur de cette variante se compose de trois catégories qui couvrent tout le territoire du Canada :

- Régions métropolitaines de recensement (Canada)
- Agglomérations de recensement (Canada)
- À l'extérieur des régions métropolitaines de recensement et des agglomérations de recensement (Canada)

La CSS fournit des identificateurs numériques uniques (codes) pour ces régions géographiques ayant des liens hiérarchiques. Elle a été établie aux fins de déclaration de statistiques. La figure 2 montre la relation hiérarchique des régions géographiques.

Figure 2 Classification des secteurs statistiques - Variante de la CGT 2016



► Description de la figure 2

Région métropolitaine de recensement et agglomération de recensement

Une région métropolitaine de recensement (RMR) ou une agglomération de recensement (AR) est formée d'une ou de plusieurs municipalités adjacentes situées autour d'un centre de population (aussi appelé le noyau). Une RMR doit avoir une population totale d'au moins 100 000

habitants et son noyau doit compter au moins 50 000 habitants d'après les données ajustées du Programme du recensement précédent sur la population. Quant à l'AR, son noyau doit compter au moins 10 000 habitants toujours selon les données du Programme du recensement précédent sur la population. Pour être incluses dans une RMR ou une AR, les autres municipalités adjacentes doivent avoir un degré d'intégration élevé avec le noyau, lequel est déterminé par le pourcentage de navetteurs (déplacement domicile-lieu de travail) établi d'après les données du Programme du recensement précédent sur le lieu de travail.

Si la population du noyau d'une AR diminue et devient inférieure à 10 000 habitants, l'AR est retirée du programme lors du prochain recensement. Cependant, une RMR restera une RMR même si sa population totale devient inférieure à 100 000 habitants ou si la population de son noyau devient inférieure à 50 000 habitants. Les régions à l'intérieur des RMR et des AR qui ne sont pas des centres de population sont des régions rurales.

Lorsque l'AR a un noyau comptant au moins 50 000 habitants d'après les données du recensement précédent sur la population, il est subdivisé en secteurs de recensement. Les secteurs de recensement sont maintenus pour l'AR même si la population du noyau diminue par la suite à moins de 50 000. Toutes les RMR sont subdivisées en secteurs de recensement.

Pour délimiter les RMR ou les AR, on se sert des municipalités (subdivisions de recensement) adjacentes comme unités de base. Ces subdivisions de recensement (SDR) sont incluses dans les RMR ou les AR si elles respectent au moins une des règles décrites ci-après, qui sont classées par ordre d'importance. Si une SDR respecte certaines de ces règles pour deux RMR ou AR ou plus, elle est incluse dans celle qui correspond à la règle la plus importante. Si les règles ont la même importance, la décision doit alors être

fondée sur la population ou sur le nombre de navetteurs (déplacement domicile-lieu de travail). Les RMR ou les AR sont délimitées de façon à maintenir la contiguïté spatiale.

1. Règle du noyau de délimitation : La SDR est comprise entièrement ou en partie (soit 50 % de sa population) dans le noyau.
2. Règle du navettage dans le sens normal : Avec un nombre minimum de 100 navetteurs, au moins 50 % de la population active occupée qui demeure dans la SDR travaille dans le noyau de délimitation définie selon la règle précédente. Ces chiffres sont établis à partir des réponses à la question sur le lieu de travail du recensement précédent.
3. Règle du navettage à contresens : Avec un nombre minimum de 100 navetteurs, au moins 50 % de la population active occupée qui travaille dans la SDR demeure dans le noyau de délimitation. Ces chiffres sont établis à partir des réponses à la question sur le lieu de travail du recensement précédent. Avant 2016, le pourcentage était établi à 25 %.
4. Règle de la contiguïté spatiale : Des SDR affichant un pourcentage de navetteurs insuffisant peuvent être incluses dans une RMR ou une AR, et des SDR ayant un pourcentage de navetteurs suffisant peuvent être exclues d'une RMR ou d'une AR.
5. Règle de la comparabilité historique : Afin de maintenir la comparabilité historique des RMR et des plus grandes AR (qui sont divisées en secteurs de recensement d'après le recensement précédent), on conserve les SDR pour au moins un autre recensement même si le pourcentage de navetteurs devient inférieur au minimum requis (règles 2, 3 et 4). Cet ajustement à la règle de la comparabilité historique se veut un avertissement aux utilisateurs qu'une SDR puisse être exclue d'une RMR ou d'une plus grande AR lors du prochain recensement ou de la prochaine délimitation de celle-ci.

6. Ajustements manuels : Une RMR ou une AR représente une région intégrée sur le plan socio-économique. Cependant, il existe certaines limites quant au degré d'intégration idéal. Comme les SDR utilisées comme unités de base pour délimiter les RMR et les AR sont des unités administratives, leurs limites ne correspondent pas toujours à d'autres unités statistiques (par exemple les noyaux des centres de population). Il y a toujours des cas où l'application des règles énoncées précédemment donne des résultats non souhaités ainsi que des cas où ces règles sont difficilement applicables. Dans de tels cas, des ajustements manuels sont parfois apportés aux limites pour assurer l'intégrité du programme.

Un de ces cas est une enclave-noyau, qui veut dire une SDR est située à l'intérieur d'une SDR qui fait partie de la règle du noyau de délimitation, mais cette dernière ne contient pas au moins 50 % de sa population à l'intérieur du même noyau, et n'a pas pu se qualifier selon une des règles de délimitations précédentes. Donc, cette enclave-noyau doit être incluse dans la RMR ou l'AR afin de maintenir la contiguïté spatiale.

Un autre cas d'ajustement manuel est lorsque la SDR est comprise en partie dans le noyau et d'après les données du recensement précédent sur la population il y a moins que 50 % de sa population qui réside dans le noyau. De plus, cette SDR n'a pas pu respecter les autres règles de délimitations précédentes.

Pour terminer, les SDR qui sont constituées de plusieurs parties ou qui contiennent des trous influencent aussi l'application de la règle d'ajustement manuel.

7. Fusion de RMR et d'AR adjacentes et règle du noyau secondaire : Une AR adjacente à une RMR peut être fusionnée avec cette RMR si le navettage (déplacement domicile-lieu de travail) total dans les deux

sens entre l'AR et la RMR équivaut à au moins 35 % de la population active occupée qui demeure dans l'AR, d'après les données sur le lieu de travail tirées du Programme du recensement précédent. Ce pourcentage est la somme des déplacements dans les deux sens entre la RMR et l'AR, exprimé en pourcentage de la population active demeurant dans l'AR (soit la population active occupée résidente, excluant la catégorie sans adresse de travail fixe).

Une RMR ou une AR regroupe des régions ayant entre elles des liens économiques et sociaux. Cependant, il y a des limites à la mesure dans laquelle on peut atteindre ce but. Étant donné que les SDR utilisées comme unités de base aux fins de la délimitation des RMR et des AR sont des unités administratives, leurs limites ne sont pas toujours des plus appropriées pour délimiter les RMR et les AR. Il y a toujours des cas où l'application des règles donne des résultats non souhaités ainsi que des cas où ces règles sont difficilement applicables. Dans de tels cas, des ajustements manuels sont parfois apportés aux limites pour assurer l'intégrité du programme.

Parce qu'elles sont délimitées de la même façon dans l'ensemble du Canada, les RMR et les AR sont statistiquement comparables. Elles diffèrent des autres régions, telles que les régions de commerce, de marketing ou de planification régionale établies par les autorités locales à des fins de planification ou autres; il faut donc faire preuve de prudence si on les utilise à des fins non statistiques.

Il y a 35 RMR et 117 AR en 2016. Deux nouvelles RMR ont été créées : Belleville (Ont.) et Lethbridge (Alb.). Huit nouvelles AR ont été créées : Gander (T.-N.-L.), Sainte-Marie (Qc), Arnprior (Ont.), Carleton Place (Ont.),

Wasaga Beach (Ont.), Winkler (Man.), Weyburn (Sask.) et Nelson (C.-B.). Les AR de Amos (Qc) et Temiskaming Shores (Ont.) ont été supprimées car la population de leur noyau était inférieure à 10 000 habitants en 2011.

La règle d'affectation du nom d'une RMR et d'une AR est incluse dans la section « Dénomination des unités géographiques » de ce manuel de la classification.

Zone d'influence métropolitaine de recensement

Le concept de zones d'influence métropolitaine de recensement (ZIM) permet de différencier géographiquement les régions du Canada situées à l'extérieur des régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR) et des agglomérations de recensement (AR). Les subdivisions de recensement (SDR) situées à l'extérieur des RMR et des AR à l'intérieur des provinces sont classées dans l'une des quatre catégories établies selon le degré d'influence (forte, modérée, faible ou aucune) que les RMR ou les AR exercent sur elles. Une catégorie distincte est attribuée aux SDR situées dans les territoires, mais à l'extérieur des AR.

Les subdivisions de recensement situées à l'intérieur des provinces sont classées dans l'une des catégories de ZIM en fonction du pourcentage de sa population active occupée qui se déplace pour se rendre au travail dans le ou les SDR qui font partie du ou des noyau(x) de délimitation des RMR ou des AR. Concernant le calcul de la population active occupée, celui-ci exclut la catégorie sans adresse de travail fixe. Les SDR sur lesquelles le même degré d'influence est exercé ont tendance à être regroupées. Elles forment des zones autour des RMR et des AR qui changent de catégorie de « forte » à « aucune » influence à mesure que la distance qui les sépare des RMR et des AR augmente. Puisque plusieurs SDR dans les territoires sont vastes et que leur population est dispersée, le navettage de la population active

occupée est instable. C'est la raison pour laquelle une catégorie distincte non basée sur les déplacements est attribuée aux SDR qui sont à l'extérieur des AR dans les territoires.

Les catégories de ZIM suivantes sont allouées aux SDR à l'extérieur des RMR et des AR :

- 1. Zone d'influence métropolitaine forte (Canada) :** Cette catégorie comprend les SDR situées à l'intérieur des provinces où au moins 30 % de la population active occupée (excluant la catégorie sans adresse de travail fixe) de la SDR se déplace pour aller travailler dans n'importe quelle RMR ou AR. Les SDR comptant moins de 40 personnes au sein de leur population active occupée du recensement précédent sont exclues.
- 2. Zone d'influence métropolitaine modérée (Canada) :** Cette catégorie comprend les SDR situées à l'intérieur des provinces où au moins 5 %, mais moins de 30 % de la population active occupée (excluant la catégorie sans adresse de travail fixe) de la SDR se déplace pour aller travailler dans n'importe quelle RMR ou AR. Les SDR comptant moins de 40 personnes au sein de leur population active occupée du recensement antérieur sont exclues.
- 3. Zone d'influence métropolitaine faible (Canada) :** Cette catégorie comprend les SDR situées à l'intérieur des provinces où plus de 0 %, mais moins de 5 % de la population active occupée (excluant la catégorie sans adresse de travail fixe) de la SDR se déplace pour aller travailler dans n'importe quelle RMR ou AR. Les SDR comptant moins de 40 personnes au sein de leur population active occupée du dernier recensement sont exclues.
- 4. Aucune zone d'influence métropolitaine (Canada) :** Cette catégorie comprend les SDR situées à l'intérieur des provinces où aucun membre de la population active occupée (excluant la catégorie sans adresse de

travail fixe) de la SDR ne se déplace pour aller travailler dans n'importe quelle RMR ou AR. Les SDR situées à l'intérieur des provinces comptant moins de 40 personnes au sein de leur population active occupée du recensement précédent sont aussi incluses.

5. Territoires (à l'extérieur des AR, Canada) : Cette catégorie comprend les SDR dans les territoires situés à l'extérieur des AR.

Tout le territoire du Canada à l'extérieur des RMR et des AR est classé selon l'une des cinq ZIM dans la variante de la classification. Par exemple, toutes les régions au Canada sans influence métropolitaine sont classées dans la catégorie « Aucune zone d'influence métropolitaine (Canada) ». Lorsque le mot « Canada » apparaît entre parenthèses, il peut être omis si le contexte est clair.

La structure de codage

Chacun des trois niveaux de la variante de la classification couvre l'ensemble du territoire du Canada. Pour le premier niveau qui comprend les catégories métropolitaines de recensement, un code alphabétique a été adopté :

- A : Régions métropolitaines de recensement (Canada)
- B : Agglomérations de recensement (Canada)
- C : À l'extérieur des régions métropolitaines de recensement et des agglomérations de recensement (Canada)

Au deuxième niveau, des codes numériques à trois chiffres sont utilisés pour les diverses RMR, AR et ZIM.

L'exemple ci-dessous montre les codes pour une RMR, une AR et une ZIM :

Codes pour une RMR, une AR et une ZIM

| Catégorie métropolitaine de recensement | Code RMR/AR/ ZIM | Nom |
|--|-------------------------|--|
| A | 001 | St. John's |
| B | 005 | Bay Roberts |
| C | 996 | Zone d'influence métropolitaine forte (Canada) |

Le dernier niveau est celui des codes de subdivision de recensement tels que décrits dans la version principale de la classification. Chaque subdivision de recensement fait partie d'une RMR, d'une AR ou est classée comme faisant partie d'une ZIM.

Classification des secteurs statistiques selon la province et le territoire - Variante de la CGT 2016

La Classification des secteurs statistiques (CSS) selon la province et le territoire est une variante de la Classification géographique type. Les subdivisions de recensement se situent au niveau inférieur de cette variante de la classification. Cette variante de la classification est fondée sur la « Classification des secteurs statistiques - Variante de la CGT 2016 » et ajoute les deux niveaux suivants à la hiérarchie de la classification :

- Régions géographiques du Canada
- Provinces et territoires

Cela permet de classer les catégories métropolitaines de recensement, les RMR, AR et ZIM, selon les parties provinciales et territoriales. La structure hiérarchique de la classification est indiquée dans la figure 3.

Figure 3 Classification des secteurs statistiques selon la province et le territoire - Variante de la CGT 2016



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> [Gestion du rendement](#)

Programme de gestion du rendement des sous-ministres, sous-ministres délégués et personnes rémunérées selon l'échelle salariale GX

▼ Lignes directrices du programme

Secrétariat du Personnel supérieur

Bureau du Conseil privé

Dernière modification : avril 2018

1.0 Introduction

Le présent document donne un aperçu du Programme de gestion du rendement en vigueur pour les sous-ministres, les sous-ministres délégués et les personnes rémunérées selon l'échelle salariale GX.

1.1 Objectifs du programme

Les objectifs du Programme de gestion du rendement sont :

- favoriser l'excellence du rendement en établissant des objectifs clairs et en évaluant de manière rigoureuse l'atteinte des résultats;
- reconnaître et récompenser un rendement de qualité et constater un rendement insuffisant;

- établir un cadre qui permet d'appliquer une démarche cohérente et équitable en gestion du rendement.

1.2 Régime de rémunération

En 1997, le Comité consultatif sur le maintien en poste et la rémunération du personnel de direction, composé de cadres supérieurs du secteur privé et d'autres administrations publiques, a reçu le mandat de fournir des avis indépendants au gouvernement sur les questions de rémunération et de gestion des ressources humaines intéressant les cadres de la fonction publique et les personnes nommées par le gouverneur en conseil.

En février 1998, le gouvernement a accepté les recommandations énoncées dans le premier rapport du Comité consultatif. Un nouveau régime de rémunération a donc été mis en place pour les sous-ministres, les sous-ministres délégués et autres cadres nommés par le gouverneur en conseil.

Conformément à la recommandation du Comité, la rémunération du personnel supérieur comporte deux éléments – le salaire de base et la rémunération au rendement. La rémunération au rendement comporte elle-même deux volets : un montant variable (la rémunération à risque) qu'il faut mériter chaque année et une prime accordée pour un rendement supérieur aux attentes. Comme c'est le cas dans le secteur privé, il est normal que la plupart des cadres supérieurs touchent une rémunération à risque.

La mise en place d'un programme efficace de gestion du rendement est essentielle au succès de ce régime de rémunération.

1.3 Admissibilité


Normalement, pour être admissible à la rémunération au rendement, le titulaire nommé par le gouverneur en conseil doit occuper ses fonctions pendant au moins trois mois consécutifs au cours du cycle de rendement. Cette période donne au titulaire suffisamment de temps pour atteindre des objectifs quantifiables.

Lorsque l'évaluation du rendement couvre une période supérieure à trois mois, mais inférieure à douze mois (cycle complet), la rémunération au rendement, si elle est approuvée, est calculée au prorata.

Les personnes qui sont nommées à titre de sous-ministre (ou de sous-ministre délégué ou de personne rémunérée selon l'échelle salariale GX) pendant le cycle de rendement à partir d'un poste de sous-ministre adjoint (SMA) seront admissibles à la rémunération au rendement pour le cycle complet du Programme de gestion du rendement des sous-ministres.

2.0 Aperçu du programme

Le diagramme ci-dessous résume le Programme de gestion du rendement.



► Version texte

3.0 Entente de rendement

Une entente de rendement est conclue d'un commun accord entre le sous-ministre et le greffier du Conseil privé (ou entre d'une part, le sous-ministre délégué ou la personne rémunérée selon l'échelle salariale GX et d'autre part, le sous-ministre). Elle porte sur les résultats attendus au cours du cycle de rendement.

Cette entente comprend des engagements individuels ainsi que les mesures de rendement connexes.

Engagements individuels :

- **Résultats liés aux programmes/politiques** : Ces engagements relatifs aux plans d'activités correspondent aux domaines prioritaires de l'organisme au cours du cycle de rendement. Ces engagements doivent représenter des défis, tout en demeurant réalisables par une personne qui utilise son influence et son contrôle et qui y consacre les efforts voulus. Ils sont également des résultats mesurables ou clairement démontrables. Les engagements doivent être formulés de façon à ce que le sous-ministre doive contribuer personnellement pour les concrétiser. On s'attend à ce que les titulaires élaborent les engagements suivants dans le cadre de leur entente de rendement :
 - engagements fondés sur les plans d'activités du ministère;
 - engagements liés à des priorités du gouvernement.

Chaque engagement doit être accompagné de mesures du rendement appropriées. Ces mesures sont composées d'observations ou de données servant à déterminer si les objectifs ont été atteints et comment ils l'ont été. C'est sur elles que s'appuiera l'évaluation à la fin du cycle de rendement.

- **Résultats de gestion** : On évaluera également les progrès des titulaires responsables de la gestion d'un organisme par rapport à leur mise en œuvre des conditions de gestion décrites dans le Cadre de responsabilisation de gestion (CRG), en particulier les priorités convenues entre le sous-ministre et le secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor ou le dirigeant principal des ressources humaines, dont la gestion de l'effectif.

Les conditions de gestion énoncées dans le CRG (Cadre de responsabilisation de gestion) se traduisent en engagements génériques, qui serviront de référence au rendement attendu de tous les sous-ministres (voir l'annexe A). **Par conséquent, les**

sous-ministres n'ont pas à inscrire les résultats de gestion dans leurs ententes de rendement, à moins de vouloir faire ressortir une initiative particulière.

- **Résultats de leadership** : Ces engagements correspondent à la démonstration des compétences clés en leadership, dont le titulaire doit faire preuve pour s'acquitter avec succès des responsabilités de son poste. Les compétences clés en leadership sont génériques et servent de référence au rendement attendu de tous les sous-ministres (voir l'annexe B). **Par conséquent, les sous-ministres n'ont pas à inscrire les résultats de leadership dans leurs ententes de rendement, à moins de vouloir faire ressortir une initiative particulière.**
- **Engagement ministériel** : Cet engagement reflète une priorité courante du gouvernement. Il sera identifié annuellement par le greffier du Conseil privé, et les résultats seront évalués et récompensés en fonction de la contribution de l'individu à l'engagement.

Les détails des priorités organisationnelles sont diffusés annuellement sur le [site Web du Bureau du Conseil privé](#).

3.1 Modifications à l'entente de rendement

Il est possible d'apporter des modifications à l'entente au cours du cycle de rendement, après consultation avec le greffier (ou avec le sous-ministre dans le cas des sous-ministres délégués ou des personnes rémunérées selon l'échelle salariale GX).

4.0 Évaluation du rendement

4.1 Commentaires sur l'évaluation du rendement

À la fin du cycle de rendement, chaque sous-ministre évalue ses propres réalisations à la lumière des engagements convenus. Le sous-ministre évalue également le ou les sous-ministres délégués et les personnes rémunérées selon l'échelle salariale GX sous sa responsabilité, s'il y a lieu.

Un sommaire d'une demi-page des réalisations doit être fourni avec chaque auto-évaluation. Les deux documents seront soumis pour étude au CHF (Comité des hauts fonctionnaires).

Le Bureau du Conseil privé se procurera des renseignements additionnels pour compléter les auto-évaluations, notamment :

- les commentaires du ministre responsable;
- les commentaires des organismes centraux, y compris les rapports du Bureau du Conseil privé, du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et du Bureau du dirigeant principal des ressources humaines sur les résultats au regard du CRG (Cadre de responsabilisation de gestion) et, si nécessaire, de l'engagement ministériel annuel;
- les commentaires recueillis par un sous-ministre retraité auprès des personnes appropriées, tels les présidents des comités de sous-ministres et les autres sous-ministres ou administrateurs généraux du portefeuille;
- les commentaires du CHF (Comité des hauts fonctionnaires).

4.2 Cotes de rendement

Les cotes de rendement dépendent non seulement du rendement des sous-ministres par rapport à leurs engagements, mais aussi de l'ampleur et de la complexité relative des défis qu'ils ont dû relever. Les cotes dépendront des résultats atteints, et aussi de la manière dont ils ont été atteints.

Le rendement global est évalué selon les résultats qui suivent :

- Non atteint / pas en mesure d'évaluer
Le titulaire n'a pas atteint les objectifs de rendement ou son rendement n'a pu être évalué au cours du cycle (congé, formation, affectation spéciale).
- A atteint -
Le titulaire n'a pas atteint tous les objectifs de rendement ou il les a atteints dans l'exercice de fonctions pour lesquelles les objectifs n'avaient ni l'ampleur ni la complexité de ceux que doivent atteindre d'autres sous-ministres.
- A atteint
Le titulaire a atteint pleinement les objectifs de rendement.
- A atteint +
Le titulaire a dépassé les objectifs de rendement ou il les a atteints dans l'exercice de fonctions pour lesquelles les objectifs ont une ampleur et une complexité supérieures à ceux que doivent atteindre d'autres sous-ministres.
- A surpassé
Le titulaire a surpassé de beaucoup les objectifs de rendement.

4.3 Rémunération au rendement

Le Programme de gestion du rendement offre la possibilité de recevoir la rémunération au rendement suivante :

- **Augmentation économique**

Une augmentation économique annuelle peut être recommandée par le Comité consultatif sur le maintien en poste et la rémunération du personnel de direction, et le cas échéant, prendra la forme d'un pourcentage d'augmentation du salaire de base. L'admissibilité à cette augmentation est habituellement liée à l'atteinte des engagements. Une augmentation économique peut également être accordée dans des cas où il est impossible d'évaluer le rendement en raison, entre autres, d'un congé ou d'une formation. Normalement, aucune augmentation économique n'est accordée lorsque le rendement ne répond pas aux attentes.

- **Progression dans l'échelle salariale**

Le changement d'échelon salarial se mérite grâce à l'atteinte des engagements. La progression habituelle est de 5 % par année. Il est possible d'approuver des pourcentages plus ou moins élevés, selon le rendement obtenu par rapport aux attentes. Aucun changement d'échelon salarial n'est accordé au titulaire qui n'a pas atteint ses objectifs.

- **Rémunération à risque**

Ce montant forfaitaire annuel, qui doit être mérité chaque année, équivaut à un pourcentage du salaire de base, et se fonde sur l'atteinte des engagements. Le montant peut varier selon le degré de succès obtenu, tel qu'il est décrit dans la section intitulée « Cotes de rendement ». Cette rémunération n'augmente pas le salaire de base, mais elle ouvre droit à pension. Elle peut être versée indépendamment de l'échelon salarial s'appliquant au titulaire, lequel

doit toutefois avoir atteint ses objectifs pour y être admissible.

- **Prime**

Ce montant forfaitaire est accordé en sus de la rémunération à risque, en fonction du dépassement des objectifs du titulaire. À l'instar de la rémunération à risque, ce paiement n'augmente pas le salaire de base, mais il ouvre droit à pension. Les primes au rendement peuvent être versées sans égard à l'échelon salarial s'appliquant au titulaire.

La progression dans l'échelle salariale, la rémunération à risque et les primes sont calculées à partir du salaire en vigueur le dernier jour du cycle de rendement, c'est-à-dire le 31 mars. Les augmentations économiques s'appliquent au nouvel exercice et sont octroyées en fonction du salaire après progression dans l'échelle salariale.

4.4 Pourcentages de rémunération au rendement

Le Bureau de Conseil privé publie annuellement de l'information sur la rémunération au rendement qui peut être versée selon le rendement atteint et l'échelon du titulaire. Cette information est disponible sur le [site Web du Bureau du Conseil privé](#).

5.0 Processus d'approbation et de rétroaction

La rémunération des sous-ministres et des sous-ministres délégués est approuvée par le gouverneur en conseil. Les personnes concernées reçoivent des copies du décret autorisant le paiement afin qu'elles les transmettent à leur bureau de rémunération pour mise en œuvre.

La rémunération des personnes rémunérées selon l'échelle salariale GX est approuvée par le Premier ministre.

5.1 Rétroaction

L'accent est mis sur une rétroaction constructive, y compris toute recommandation sur les moyens d'améliorer le rendement. Selon le cas, le greffier du Conseil privé, le secrétaire associé du Cabinet ou le sous-secrétaire du Cabinet (Personnel supérieur, transformation opérationnelle et renouvellement) fournira une rétroaction.

5.2 Recouvrement de la rémunération au rendement

Le programme de gestion du rendement des personnes nommées par le gouverneur en conseil incite le rendement en liant une portion de la rémunération à l'atteinte de résultats. Un processus d'évaluation rigoureux ainsi que la capacité à adapter la rémunération en fonction des résultats obtenus sont essentiels à l'intégrité du programme. Il arrive parfois que de l'information soit révélée après la période d'évaluation et qu'elle soit pertinente pour l'évaluation et la rémunération au rendement qui a été versée à un titulaire :

- Lorsqu'on a déterminé, suite à une procédure équitable, qu'un titulaire a, de façon délibérée ou irresponsable, cherché à cacher ses réalisations ou à leur donner une impression incorrecte de façon à rendre les déficiences difficiles à détecter lors de l'évaluation;
- Lorsqu'on a déterminé, suite à une procédure équitable, qu'un titulaire a commis des écarts de conduite graves ou réalisé une mauvaise gestion durant une période donnée, ce qui aurait eu un tel effet négatif sur la cote de rendement que le titulaire aurait reçu la cote « non atteint ».

Dans de tels cas, le gouverneur en conseil peut attribuer une cote de rendement révisée pour la période en question et récupérer la rémunération au rendement et la rémunération connexe qui ont été versées au titulaire durant cette période :

- Les montants admissibles sont considérés, au titre du document *Conditions d'emploi et avantages sociaux particuliers aux personnes nommées par le gouverneur en conseil à des postes à temps plein*, comme étant des trop-payés aux termes de l'article 155 de la *Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques*;
- Les montants admissibles comprennent la rémunération à risque, les primes et les progressions dans l'échelle salariale qui ont été acquis en raison de la cote initialement attribuée durant le cycle de rendement en question. Un nouveau calcul des versements de la pension pourrait aussi être réalisé si le titulaire a pris sa retraite, et les trop-payés connexes pourraient être recouverts.

5.3 Communications

Pour assurer la transparence, la compréhension et l'harmonisation des objectifs et des résultats, chaque titulaire est invité à communiquer à son organisation ses engagements en matière de rendement.

6.0 Échéanciers

| Échéanciers | Mesure prises |
|-------------|---------------|
|-------------|---------------|

| Échéanciers | Mesure prises |
|------------------------|---|
| Janvier à mars | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Les sous-ministres font les derniers ajustements à leurs processus de planification et rencontrent les équipes de gestion au sujet des engagements, etc. • Le greffier envoie un courriel aux sous-ministres où il demande ce qui suit : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Une auto-évaluation des résultats ms; ◦ Une évaluation de leur rendement individuel pour l'année financière précédente ainsi que celles des sous-ministres délégués et des personnes rémunérées selon l'échelle salariale GX ◦ Un sommaire des réalisations pour chaque évaluation; et ◦ Une entente de rendement pour l'année à venir. |
| Mi-avril | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remise des auto-évaluations et des sommaires. • Remise des nouvelles ententes de rendement. |
| Avril à juin | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Un SM retraité examine les auto-évaluations et obtient d'autres évaluations des réalisations et des compétences en leadership des sous-ministres et des sous-ministres délégués. • Le greffier sollicite des commentaires de diverses sources, notamment des ministres, du Bureau du Conseil privé, des organismes centraux et autres. |
| Juin | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Réunion du CHF (Comité des hauts fonctionnaires) pour donner des avis au greffier sur le rendement individuel. |
| Juillet et août | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Les sous-ministres reçoivent une rétroaction sur le rendement. |

| Échéanciers | Mesure prises |
|-------------|---|
| Septembre | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • La rémunération au rendement est versée. |
| Octobre | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Date butoir pour apporter des modifications aux ententes de rendement de l'année en cours, comprenant les modifications découlant de la rétroaction reçue sur le rendement. |

Annexe A - Résultats de gestion - Engagements génériques

Les engagements qui suivent reflètent les principales responsabilités organisationnelles et de gestion décrites dans le Cadre de responsabilisation de gestion.

Leadership et orientation stratégique

Définir et incarner la vision, le mandat et les priorités stratégiques qui guident l'organisation tout en aidant les ministres et le Parlement à servir l'intérêt public.

Résultats et responsabilité

À partir des résultats du rendement, assurer la reddition des comptes et promouvoir des améliorations continues et des gains d'efficacité systématiques dans les politiques, les programmes et les services aux Canadiens et Canadiennes.

Valeurs du secteur public

Donner l'exemple des valeurs fondamentales de la fonction publique que sont le respect envers les personnes et le respect de la démocratie, l'intégrité, la gestion et l'excellence.

Apprentissage continu et innovation

Gérer au moyen de l'innovation continue et de la transformation pour promouvoir l'apprentissage au sein de l'organisation et améliorer le rendement.

Gouvernance et gestion stratégique

Maintenir un régime de gouvernance efficace qui intègre et harmonise les priorités, les plans, les obligations redditionnelles et la gestion du risque pour assurer des fonctions de gestion interne qui appuient et favorisent des politiques, des programmes et des services hautement performants.

Gestion des personnes

Optimiser l'effectif et le milieu de travail pour permettre une productivité et un rendement élevés, une utilisation efficace des ressources humaines et une mobilisation accrue des employés.

Gestion financière et gestion des biens

Assurer une fonction de gestion financière efficace et viable fondée sur des contrôles internes rigoureux, la production en temps voulu de rapports fiables ainsi que l'équité et la transparence dans la gestion des biens et des services acquis.

Gestion de l'information

Protéger et gérer l'information et les systèmes à titre d'actifs stratégiques d'intérêt public qui soutiennent des processus décisionnels efficaces et des activités efficaces afin d'en maximiser la valeur au service des Canadiens et des Canadiennes.

Gestion des politiques et des programmes

Concevoir et gérer des politiques et des programmes pour assurer

l'optimisation des ressources dans la réalisation des résultats.

Gestion de la prestation des services

Fournir des services axés sur la clientèle tout en optimisant les partenariats et la technologie pour répondre aux besoins des intervenants.

i Les titulaires sont invités à consulter le Cadre de responsabilisation de gestion, disponible sur le [site Web du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor du Canada](#), pour bien saisir ses différents éléments ainsi que les objectifs.

Annexe B - Résultats de leadership - Engagements génériques

Les engagements qui suivent reflètent les compétences en leadership nécessaires à l'exécution efficace des responsabilités du poste.

Créer une vision et une stratégie

Les dirigeants définissent l'avenir et tracent la voie à suivre. Ils comprennent et communiquent le contexte avec la plus grande aisance, en tenant compte de l'environnement économique, social et politique. Agiles sur le plan intellectuel, ils mettent à contribution leurs connaissances vastes et approfondies, s'inspirent de différentes idées et perspectives, et dégagent un consensus sur les visions convaincantes. Les dirigeants assurent l'équilibre entre les priorités ministérielles et pangouvernementales, et contribuent à améliorer les résultats pour le Canada et les Canadiens.

Mobiliser les personnes

Les dirigeants inspirent et motivent les personnes qu'ils dirigent. Ils gèrent le rendement, offrent de la rétroaction constructive et respectueuse pour encourager et rendre possible l'excellence en matière de rendement. Ils donnent l'exemple en se fixant des objectifs pour eux-mêmes qui sont plus exigeants que ceux qu'ils fixent pour les autres.

Préserver l'intégrité et le respect

Les dirigeants donnent l'exemple sur le plan des pratiques éthiques, du professionnalisme et de l'intégrité personnelle. Ils créent des environnements de travail empreints de respect et de confiance, où les conseils judicieux sont valorisés. Ils encouragent l'expression d'opinions et de perspectives différentes, tout en favorisant la collégialité. Les dirigeants ont une conscience de soi et recherchent les occasions d'épanouissement personnel.

Collaborer avec les partenaires et les intervenants

Les dirigeants cherchent à obtenir, de façon délibérée et ingénieuse, le plus grand éventail possible de perspectives. Ils font preuve d'ouverture et de souplesse afin de parvenir à un consensus et d'améliorer les résultats. Ils apportent une perspective pangouvernementale à leurs interactions. Lorsqu'ils négocient pour en arriver à des solutions, ils n'excluent pas les solutions de rechange et gèrent les attentes avec compétence. Les dirigeants partagent la reconnaissance avec leurs équipes et partenaires.

Promouvoir l'innovation et orienter le changement

Les dirigeants ont le courage et la résilience nécessaires pour remettre en question les idées conventionnelles. Ils créent un environnement propice aux idées audacieuses, à l'expérimentation et à la prise de risques en toute connaissance de cause. Ils perçoivent les revers comme une bonne

occasion de comprendre et d'apprendre. Les dirigeants s'adaptent au changement en harmonisant et en modifiant les jalons et les objectifs afin de maintenir leur dynamisme.

Obtenir des résultats

Les dirigeants mobilisent et gèrent les ressources afin de réaliser les priorités du gouvernement, d'améliorer les résultats et d'apporter une valeur ajoutée. Ils tiennent compte du contexte, des risques et des renseignements organisationnels dont ils disposent afin d'appuyer la prise de décisions de qualité élevée en temps opportun. Ils anticipent, planifient, suivent les progrès et apportent des correctifs au besoin. Les dirigeants assument la responsabilité personnelle à l'égard de leurs actions et des résultats de leurs décisions.

▼ Pourcentage de rémunération au rendement

Rémunération au titre du PGR pour 2019-2020

| Résultat de l'évaluation | Augmentation économique | Progression dans l'échelle salariale | Rémunération à risque | Prime |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| N'a pas d'atteint | X | X | X | X |
| Pas en mesure d'évaluer | ✓ | X | X | X |

| Résultat de l'évaluation | Augmentation économique | Progression dans l'échelle salariale | Rémunération à risque | Prime |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--|--------------|
| A atteint - | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ DM-1/GX : au plus 10 % ✓ DM-2/3 : au plus 15 % ✓ DM-4 : au plus 20 % | X |
| A atteint | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ DM-1/GX : au plus 15 % ✓ DM-2/3 : au plus 20 % ✓ DM-4 : au plus 25 % | X |
| A atteint + | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ DM-1/GX : au plus 20 % ✓ DM-2/3 : au plus 25 % ✓ DM-4 : au plus 30 % | X |

| Résultat de l'évaluation | Augmentation économique | Progression dans l'échelle salariale | Rémunération à risque | Prime |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| A surpassé | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ DM-1/GX : au plus 20 % ✓ DM-2/3 : au plus 25 % ✓ DM-4 : au plus 30 % | ✓ DM-1/GX : au plus un montant additionnel de 6 % ✓ DM-2/3 : au plus un montant additionnel de 8 % ✓ DM-4 : au plus un montant additionnel de 9 % |

▼ Priorités ministérielles pour 2020-21

Priorités ministérielles pour 2020-2021

Dans le contexte de l'intervention du gouvernement face à la pandémie de COVID-19, nos priorités ministérielles n'ont jamais été aussi importantes pour guider les efforts collectifs des hauts dirigeants, car elles donnent le ton en faisant progresser les mentalités et les comportements qui donneront lieu à une fonction publique plus souple, plus inclusive et mieux outillée. Continuer de favoriser des milieux de

travail sains, diversifiés et inclusifs prend encore plus d'importance dans le contexte actuel et continuera de nous servir comme élément fondamental de nos responsabilités de leadership.

Compte tenu de ces réalités sans précédent, on s'attend à ce que la direction de la fonction publique réalise les priorités ministérielles suivantes en 2020-2021.

Mobilisation à l'appui des objectifs communs en réponse à la COVID-19

Pour 2020-2021, assurez-vous d'établir des engagements sur le plan du rendement comportant des indicateurs mesurables de votre leadership dans:

- S'adapter aux réalités opérationnelles et stratégiques changeantes à la suite de la pandémie de COVID-19 afin d'offrir des services et des résultats aux Canadiens.
- Promouvoir la santé et la sécurité physiques de votre organisation, particulièrement dans le contexte d'un retour sur le lieu de travail en 2020-2021.
- Soutenir la santé psychologique de vos employés en ces temps difficiles, y compris la prévention et la résolution du harcèlement et de la discrimination.

Favoriser la diversité et l'inclusion

Continuer les efforts afin d'augmenter la diversité de la main-d'œuvre dans votre organisation et favoriser l'inclusion d'un large éventail de voix et d'opinions dans la gouvernance et la prise de décisions. Voir les [engagements des sous-ministres en matière de diversité et d'inclusion](#).

Appui aux efforts pour régler les problèmes du système de paye (pour les organisations qui utilisent Phénix)

Prendre les initiatives nécessaires pour garantir que les employés reçoivent à temps la rémunération qui leur est due. Cela comprend des efforts pour gérer les périodes de pointe et réduire les interventions de paye afin de respecter les délais et les mesures de rendement suivant la méthodologie quantitative établie et les indicateurs communiqués par Services publics et Approvisionnement Canada et le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor du Canada.

▼ Priorités ministérielles pour 2019-20

Priorités ministérielles pour 2019-2020

En cette première année de mise en œuvre de l'initiative Au-delà de 2020, il est essentiel que les leaders de la fonction publique incitent leurs organisations à explorer et à faire progresser les mentalités et les comportements qui se traduiront par une plus grande souplesse, une plus grande inclusion et un effectif mieux outillé. Le succès repose sur votre leadership face à la modélisation, à la facilitation et à l'habilitation du changement au sein de votre organisation.

- **Milieux de travail sains**

Pour 2019-2020, continuer à bâtir et à entretenir un milieu de travail sain et démontrer plus particulièrement les progrès réalisés par rapport aux trois piliers de la Stratégie pour la fonction publique fédérale sur la santé mentale en milieu de travail; et prendre des mesures concrètes pour lutter contre le harcèlement et la discrimination.

- **Milieux de travail inclusifs**

Pour 2019-2020, poursuivre les efforts visant à accroître la diversité sociale et culturelle de la main-d'œuvre et favoriser l'intégration d'un large éventail de voix et de points de vue dans la gouvernance et la prise de décisions.

- **Système de paye (pour les organisations desservies par Phénix)**

Pour 2019-2020, les personnes nommées par le gouverneur en conseil dont l'organisation reçoit des services dans le cadre de Phénix continueront de contribuer activement à la stabilisation des RH à la paye et de faire rapport à cet égard pour s'assurer que les employés sont payés correctement et à temps. Entre autres, elles prendront certaines mesures au sein de leur organisation et contribueront aux efforts déployés par le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor (SCT) et Services publics et Approvisionnement Canada en vue de régler les problèmes liés à la paye. Plus particulièrement, comme l'a déterminé le SCT, les mouvements de ressources humaines (RH) menant à une intervention de paye (à compter du 1er avril 2019) respecteront les échéanciers et les mesures du rendement de la méthodologie établie par le SCT et seront évalués en fonction du Cadre de responsabilisation de gestion.

▼ Personnes-ressources

Pour plus de renseignements concernant le Programme de gestion du rendement, veuillez contacter :

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▼ Documents à l'appui



[Lignes directrices du programme](#)
[PDF (PDF (Portable Document Format)) - 113
Ko (Kilo-octet)]



[Pourcentage de rémunération au rendement](#)
pour 2019 - 2020
[PDF (PDF (Portable Document Format)) - 41
Ko (Kilo-octet)]



[Priorités ministérielles pour 2020-2021](#)
[PDF (PDF (Portable Document Format)) - 18
Ko (Kilo-octet)]

[Priorités ministérielles pour 2019-2020](#)
[PDF (PDF (Portable Document Format)) - 38
Ko (Kilo-octet)]



Gabarit pour l'Entente et évaluation de
rendement

[DOC (Document Microsoft Word) - 58 Ko
(Kilo-octet)]

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- > [La rémunération, les avantages sociaux, et les conditions d'emploi](#)

Lignes directrices concernant la rémunération des titulaires à temps partiel nommés par le gouverneur en conseil au sein d'agences, de conseils et de commissions

En vigueur le 1^{er} octobre 2000

Introduction

Les présentes lignes directrices établissent les montants et les conditions de paiement prévus à l'intention des titulaires à temps partiel nommés par le gouverneur en conseil. Celles-ci ne constituent pas une autorisation en soi : elles ne font qu'énoncer ce qui peut être recommandé en pratique courante sans qu'il soit nécessaire de justifier la chose auprès du gouverneur en conseil. Tous les organismes doivent obtenir le décret qui leur confère l'autorisation de payer.

Autorisation

Pour la plupart des organismes, la loi constitutive prévoit l'autorisation de rémunérer les titulaires nommés par le gouverneur en conseil.

Application

Les présentes lignes directrices s'appliquent à tous les titulaires à temps partiel nommés au sein d'agences, de conseils et de commissions à l'égard desquels le gouverneur en conseil est habilité à fixer le barème de rémunération.

Ces lignes directrices ne s'appliquent pas aux employés à plein temps d'un organisme du gouvernement du Canada, ceux-ci n'étant pas admissibles à une rémunération additionnelle accordée à un titulaire à temps partiel nommé par le gouverneur en conseil.

Principes

La politique de rémunération du gouvernement du Canada reconnaît le besoin de recruter et de retenir les personnes compétentes.

Toutefois, le service au public, non les taux du marché, influe sur les barèmes de rémunération des cadres supérieurs. La même notion influe sur la rémunération prévue pour les fonctions à temps partiel. Les exceptions sont les praticiens publics (avocats, conciliateurs, arbitres, etc.) qui sont nommés justement pour fournir ces services professionnels.

Définitions

Organismes exécutifs - ceux qui ont pour principale mission de rendre des décisions exécutoires et/ou de produire des biens et/ou d'offrir des services.

Organismes consultatifs - ceux qui s'engagent dans des activités d'enquête, d'évaluation ou de recherche afin de fournir des opinions ou de faire des recommandations.

Montants et conditions de paiement

Le barème des taux journaliers qui suit établit les taux maximums qui peuvent être soumis de façon régulière à l'approbation du gouverneur en conseil.

Les demandes de taux supérieurs à ceux du barème doivent inclure une justification qui sera soumise à l'examen exceptionnel du gouverneur en conseil.

Lorsque la loi constitutive d'un organisme limite le paiement à une circonstance particulière (participation à des réunions, par exemple), aucun paiement journalier ne peut être versé pour quelque autre raison que ce soit.

Un seul taux journalier est versé à l'égard d'un jour civil de vingt-quatre heures.

Un taux journalier est habituellement payable pour :

- toute présence aux réunions générales de l'organisme de même qu'aux réunions des comités ou sous-comités reconnus de l'organisme (y compris la participation par les moyens électroniques);

- toute participation à quatre réunions tenues avec quorum des membres de l'organisme ou de ses comités ou sous-comités, par téléphone ou autre moyen semblable;
- le temps de déplacement dans le cas où le trajet entre le domicile et le lieu de réunion exige plus de trois heures;
- toute responsabilité de direction, d'analyse ou de représentation explicitement mentionnée par les dirigeants de l'organisme.

Dans les organismes dont la loi constitutive prévoit un poste de vice-président, ou l'équivalent, le taux journalier peut être fixé à un montant supérieur à celui des membres en reconnaissance des fonctions additionnelles.

Inscription à une catégorie

L'inscription d'un organisme dans une catégorie donnée dépend de :

- a. la complexité et de la diversité de sa sphère d'activité;
- b. la portée de son activité, allant de l'individu ou de la simple entreprise locale à l'ensemble de la population ou à des industries entières d'importance nationale;
- c. l'impact de son activité, allant des attributs auxiliaires et des préoccupations secondaires aux caractéristiques et droits fondamentaux, ou au mieux-être essentiel.

Frais de déplacement

Sous réserve de toute disposition contraire de la loi, la Directive sur les voyages du Conseil du Trésor, telle qu'elle s'applique au groupe de la direction à la fonction publique, régit le remboursement des frais de déplacement des titulaires à temps partiel nommés par le gouverneur en conseil.

Barème - Taux journaliers

| Catégorie | Exécutif | | Consultatif | |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | Membre | Président | Membre | Président |
| I | 475 \$ - 550 \$ | 675 \$ - 800 \$ | 375 \$ - 450 \$ | 550 \$ - 650 \$ |
| II | 350 \$ - 400 \$ | 475 \$ - 550 \$ | 275 \$ - 325 \$ | 375 \$ - 450 \$ |
| III | 250 \$ - 300 \$ | 350 \$ - 425 \$ | 200 \$ - 250 \$ | 300 \$ - 350 \$ |
| IV | 200 \$ - 250 \$ | 300 \$ - 350 \$ | - | - |



Note: Pour connaître les organismes compris dans chaque catégorie, consulter les annexes A et B.

Annexe A - Agences, conseils et commissions de nature exécutive

Catégorie I

- Instituts de recherche en santé du Canada
- Office de répartition des approvisionnements d'énergie
- Commission sur les revendications particulières des Indiens
- Comité du pétrole et du gaz
- Conseil d'examen du prix des médicaments

Catégorie II

- Commission d'arbitrage (Inuvialuit)
- Commission canadienne d'examen des exportations de biens culturels
- Bureau d'examen des répercussions environnementales
- Conseil national des produits de ferme
- Caisse d'indemnisation des dommages dus à la pollution par les hydrocarbures causée par les navires

Catégorie III

- Commission Crie-Naskapie
- Commission d'indemnisation des marins marchands

Catégorie IV

- Conseil de gestion des ressources fauniques du Nunavut
 - Commission portuaire d'Oshawa
 - L'Office des ressources renouvelables (Sahtu)
 - L'Office des ressources renouvelables (Gwich'in)
-

Annexe B - Agences, conseils et commissions de nature consultative

Catégorie I

- Centre canadien d'hygiène et de sécurité au travail
- Commission du droit du Canada
- Table ronde nationale sur l'environnement et l'économie
- Comité de surveillance des activités de renseignement de sécurité

Catégorie II

- Conseil de promotion économique du Canada atlantique
- Commission canadienne des affaires polaires
- Centre international des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique

Catégorie III

- Commission canado-norvégienne de la chasse au phoque
- Comité d'étude des répercussions environnementales
- Commission des lieux et monuments historiques du Canada
- Commission internationale pour la conservation du thon de l'Atlantique
- Conseil international pour l'exploration de la mer
- Conseil consultatif national sur le Troisième Âge
- Conseil national du bien-être social
- Commission des poissons anadromes du Pacifique-Nord
- Commission internationale des pêcheries de l'Atlantique Nord-Ouest

Date de modification :

2018-03-02

Restez chez vous sauf pour les déplacements essentiels et respectez les [restrictions et les mesures de santé publique](#).



Divulgence des traitements dans le secteur public 2020 : employés de tous les secteurs et employés en détachement

Renseignements sur tous les employés du secteur public ayant touché un traitement de 100 000 \$ ou plus en 2020 et qui sont assujettis à la *Loi sur la divulgation des traitements dans le secteur public*.

Ces données sont présentées dans la langue dans laquelle elles ont été fournies.

Téléchargement de données

- [Tableur \(https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-fr-2020.ods\)](https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-fr-2020.ods) 24 MB
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Recherche - tableau



Incluant les colonnes cachées

[Sauter le dernier tableau](#)

Tableau trié par Secteur ordre descendant et montrant les résultats pour law

| Secteur | Traitement versé | Employeur | Poste | Année civile |
|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------|
| Universités | \$218,214.44 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law and Ass... | 2020 |
| Universités | \$196,344.77 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$160,886.17 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$336,516.04 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law and cros... | 2020 |
| Universités | \$222,894.00 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law and cros... | 2020 |
| Universités | \$339,195.00 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$247,415.89 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$186,672.00 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$149,831.46 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$147,123.97 | Carleton University | Executive Director, Centre... | 2020 |
| Universités | \$122,614.98 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$226,429.02 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |

| | | | | |
|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|------|
| Universités | \$262,743.00 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$151,321.89 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$300,197.04 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$297,000.00 | Ryerson University | Dean Faculty of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$207,718.32 | Queen's University | Associate Professor, Steph... | 2020 |
| Universités | \$144,655.16 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law | 2020 |
| Universités | \$217,282.04 | York University | Executive Director Law C... | 2020 |
| Universités | \$235,962.98 | University Of Toronto | Professor of Law and Ass... | 2020 |

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61 - 80 de 230 articles

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